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This thesis analyses Afghanistan’s legal culture from 1750 to the present date. 
In implementing this task, historical legal developments are discussed in light 
of available records such as the Law Gazettes and recorded cases by the law 
courts as well as the analyses produced in the form of books, research papers 
and objective reports by national and international sources.  
 
For the technical aspects of Afghanistan’s legal history and legal traditions 
(legal culture), the thesis aims to provide in-depth descriptions as to how legal 
issues in Afghanistan have developed over a period of nearly three centuries. 
In this thesis, the legal affairs, their strengths, weaknesses and deficiencies 
will be discussed in light of the given situations. They will be discussed in 
relation to the internal and external aspects of Afghanistan’s legal system in 
order to produce an informative research which shows  whether in 
Afghanistan a culture of legality has been established. Through the 
completion of this thesis, the writer aims to provide insights as well as 
suggestions in relation to the issues discussed and analysed. The writer is 
conscious that on a topic like this, despite all the efforts he has made, there is, 
given the state of the question, simply no way of excluding any possibility of 
a gap or a lacuna.  
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TERMS OF REFERENCE  
 
In this thesis, the terms Shari’a laws and Islamic laws are used 
interchangeably. The terms Islamic clergy, mullah, and ulemā convey the 
same meaning as well. Among these terms ulemā is the plural form of ‘alim’ 
which means knowledgeable and is used for persons of knowledge such as a 
mullah, clergy, astrologer, a nuclear scientist, an engineer, etc. In the context 
of Islamic studies, the term ‘ilm’ (knowledge), according to Wael Hallaq, 
signifies the knowledge of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, (traditions of Prophet 
Mohammad), and is the binary opposite of ra’y, which is ‘considered 
opinion’.1 In Islamic societies, the terms alim and ulemā are chiefly attributed 
to people with a knowledge of Islam. It also happens that within the circles of 
Islamicists and Islamists, the term ulemā also refers to a collective name for 
the Islamic religious authority.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have used legal and non-legal terminologies in 
Arabic, Dari-Farsi, Latin and Pashto languages. All foreign terms for which 
there are no standard spellings in the English language will be italicised. 
These terms will also show pronunciation signs for easier reading. All dates 
are written according to the common Western calendar. In this thesis, the 
languages of Farsi and Persian are one and the same. Different writers use 
these language names interchangeably. In Afghanistan, Farsi/Persian has 
been re-named as Dari. 
 
In the area of Islamic laws and in the field of humanities, different spellings 
of the same terms are frequently used. Often spelling differences arise when 
                                                          
1 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 15. 
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transliterations are given by speakers of different languages. For instance, 
Fāzel in Arabic is transliterated as Fādel, which is how an Arab speaker 
pronounces the word. The same rule applies to qāzi that is written as qādi in 
Arabic. I have followed the general orthographic standards of the Dari-Farsi 
language, as this language is the lingua franca for all the citizens of 
Afghanistan.  
 
Lastly, the term ‘Afghān’ must be clarified, as in recent decades this term has 
become controversial for members of the different ethnic groups of 
Afghanistan. The term Afghān is a polysemous word with three meanings and 
definitions. Firstly, it is the tribal name for the Pashtūns. Nile Green writes 
that before the early twentieth century, when the label ‘Afghān’ became an 
official state bureaucratic term denoting common national identity, it had for 
centuries denoted a narrower ethnic identity, equivalent to what we would 
now term Pashtūn or Pathān.2 Secondly, Afghān is used for the nationality for 
all citizens of Afghanistan, who come from dozens of different ethnic groups. 







                                                          
2 Green, From Conversion to the Taliban, xiv.  
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THESIS OVERVIEW  
 
My thesis has 14 chapters. The first two chapters focus on the thesis’ rationale 
and context. Chapter 1 sets out the research agenda and the hypothesis. 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the research methodology and research methods. 
This chapter describes the rationale for the choice of research methods, the 
relevance of the mixed methods research methodology, data collection, 
research interviews and the research questionnaires. In Chapter 3, the existing 
primary and secondary source scholarship on Afghanistan’s legal culture will 
be critically evaluated.   
 
Chapter 4 offers a brief overview of Islamic legal concepts indispensable to 
the study of an Islamic legal system, one of which is Afghanistan’s. In 
Chapter 5, this thesis introduces different religions of Afghanistan and 
highlights the relevance of her strong oral culture, and how the old and new 
religions form the mosaic of Afghan citizen’s identity and the beliefs 
pertaining to the sense of religious justice. This chapter clarifies that 
Afghanistan is far from being a monolith or fixed to Shari’a beliefs. The 
chapter intends to show that norms and beliefs in Afghanistan come from a 
number of overlapping beliefs, and at times, there are no clear-cut differences 
between what is perceived as Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs.  
 
Chapter 6 provides an elaborate account of the substantive justice based on 
Pashtūnwāli tribal code. It offers theoretical descriptions of tribalism, the 
institutions of Pashtūnwāli and demonstrates a number of substantive cases 
decided under Pashtūnwāli code. Chapter 7 presents an analytical 
understanding of legal pluralism and introduces Afghanistan’s three 
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dominant customary justice mechanisms; āqsaqāl, jirga and Shūrā, used by 
members of different ethnic groups. The chapter also provides a background 
history of the ethnic groups of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the chapter 
discusses the dispensation of justice by the international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) as well as the insurgent groups due to necessity and 
state weakness.  
 
Chapter 8, the longest chapter of this thesis is dedicated to legal transplants 
in Afghanistan. First, the chapter argues that legal transplants instigated by a 
national state are different to those brought to Afghanistan by foreign powers 
through military intervention and aid conditionality. Second, the chapter 
argues that legal transplants are prone to change and reversal, and in view that 
Afghanistan has suffered as a result of internal and international conflicts, the 
intervening factors such as regime changes, insecurity and the existence of 
weak or unpopular governments lead to the loss of gains. In this chapter, the 
research hypothesis is tested using the case-study method.  
 
Chapter 9 features the legal and political history of Afghanistan’s 
constitutions from 1923 until 2004. This chapter identifies the strengths and 
weaknesses of the constitutions of Afghanistan and avoids the use of 
generalisations. Finally, the chapter suggests transformative 
constitutionalism as a suitable direction for the future of Afghanistan’s 
constitution. Chapter 10 intends to show in what ways corruption affects 
Afghanistan’s government, society and the dispensation of justice. It 
introduces fifteen categories of corruption unique to Afghanistan with a focus 
on the political economy analysis and political analysis of predation. This 
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chapter shows that corruption in Afghanistan is top-down and entrenched. 
This chapter demonstrates how corruption affects the citizens of Afghanistan, 
the institutions of government and the delivery of justice.  
 
Chapter 11 provides a detailed account of Afghanistan’s legal development 
stages within the modern-state system from 1880s to 2021. This chapter 
distinguishes the differences between the normal processes of law-making 
and enforcing the laws by competent, apolitical and independent institutions 
of the government, and the uncharacteristic processes where the executive 
branch of the government influences, threatens and even at times disables 
certain government institutions. In this chapter, I argue that issuing excessive 
presidential decrees for legal matters, hasty and unnecessary hiring and firing 
of state officials and issuing extra-ordinary orders, most of which may be the 
duty of the parliament and other institutions of the government; when these 
powers are usurped by the president, it forms a legal interregnum. This is not 
simply overpowering other institutions; it is usurping their powers into the 
president’s hand. This chapter describes the legal institutions of Afghanistan 
in view of available historical information.  
 
Chapter 12 is dedicated to judicial quality in Afghanistan. The chapter focuses 
on legal education, recruitment of judges, and discusses problems 
surrounding reliable and accessible public data such as court promulgations. 
The research and data used in this chapter clarify the low judicial quality. The 
chapter cites a case that illustrates the tendency of judges to set aside the 
abstract laws and use informal dispute resolution instead, particularly when 
the victims are women or girls.  
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Chapter 13, provides a historical account of women’s status in society, in the 
government administration and how women are treated before the law. The 
chapter focuses on the national laws, international mechanisms and the 
problems encountered in Afghanistan for the implementation of EVAW law 
and the CEDAW convention. In regard to women’s rights, access to 
employment, education and services, the chapter argues that these services 
are only accessed by a small minority of women who seek to be enabled. 
Finally, the chapter investigates certain women’s rights that different 
governments have tried to improve since the 1880s.     
 
Chapter 14 sums up the conclusions of the thesis. It describes how the 
quantitative and qualitative data used throughout the thesis support the 
hypothesis. The 14 chapters support the central theme of this thesis, legal 
culture of Afghanistan. In order to answer the research question and sub-
questions and prove the hypothesis, this research uses the mixed methods 
research, and applies a number of research methods such as process tracing, 
case study, historical methods, political economy analysis, political analysis 
of predation and models of intersectionality.     
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION   
 
1. Introduction   
 
The legal culture and legal history of Afghanistan has not received adequate 
attention in Afghanistan’s legal studies before. Primary legal sources are 
limited. Comprehensive first-hand studies of Afghanistan’s legal situations 
are rare. There is, however, extensive quantitative data on Afghanistan’s 
government, society and legal system conducted as patchy and separate 
research.  
 
One may note, particularly since the 2014 US-NATO forces’ drawdown in 
Afghanistan, that research on Afghanistan’s legal situation have changed tune 
and are often framed within the binary of success or failure. This binary 
misleadingly undermines certain achievements. Punchlines such as “Why the 
U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan failed?”3 do not inform 
researchers of the root causes of the alleged failures.  
 
This research takes a different approach by highlighting why certain aspects 
of the rule of law do not work as well as intended, or why there is resistance 
to change, or why there are reversals, and in some areas perceived shortfalls 
or under-achievements. There are shortcomings in the way legal institutions 
operate in Afghanistan, but, over the past three hundred years, Afghanistan 
has also achieved notable successes in legal developments.           
1.1 Problem Justification  
 
                                                          
3 Geoffrey Swenson’s article titled “Why the U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law in 
Afghanistan failed,” LSE Research Online 1, no. 42 (2017): 114-15, does not inform the 
reader of the underpinnings that lead to failures or to gaining minuscule successes; however, 
Swenson’s PhD thesis titled “Addressing Crises of Order: Judicial State-Building in the 
Wake of Conflict“ DPhil thesis, Pembroke College, 2015, eloquently describes why elements 
of legal pluralism hampered the rule of law efforts in judicial state-building in Afghanistan.     
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In the context of Afghanistan, there are large amount of analytical data in the 
form of reports and criticisms by researchers and scholars as well as observers 
on how abysmal Afghanistan’s legal conditions are. The majority of these 
documents are written by individuals who may have received their education 
in a totally different environment to that of Afghanistan, or researchers may 
be strongly influenced by the universal philosophies, rationalism, logic and 
assumptions that are chiefly rooted in the West – issues that show stark 
differences to the realities in Afghanistan. This in turn ignores what is 
possible or what can be expected in Afghanistan. Taking this research 
dilemma into account, this thesis will try to discuss the root causes of certain 
problems in Afghanistan and will elaborate on those issues that work well and 
those that do not work that well.      
 
1.2 The Aims of the Research  
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to introduce Afghanistan’s plural legal 
culture and legal transplants, not simply according to the legal sources but 
also according to its own patchwork of de jure and de facto authorities. This 
research posits that acts of governments are overrated as constituents of legal 
culture. In this regard, the lives, perceptions, religious and customary beliefs 
of the people of Afghanistan form the main foci of this thesis. It is based on 
the premise that different religions, cults and spiritual orders practised by the 
people of Afghanistan over several millennia form the backbone of the 
current legal mosaic of the country. This research highlights contributions to 
the legal wealth of the country which merit special attention. To the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first research of its kind that pays special attention to 
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contributions of all the governments and the citizens of Afghanistan to its 
legal system – regardless of their numbers or religious convictions.  
 
The Baha’is, Jewish, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Kāfirs, Sufi orders, the 
adherents of Shamanism and those of the cult of Zhun have lived in 
Afghanistan, and most have practised and continue to practise these faiths to 
the present day. The influences these faiths and spiritual orders and cults have 
left behind are apparent among the population of Afghanistan. Although the 
focus of this thesis is limited to the past three hundred years, the influences 
of pre-Islamic faiths and spiritual orders can be noted in Afghanistan’s oral 
culture that manifest itself in the people’s practices today. The citizens of 
Afghanistan may be better understood not for what they read but for what 
they say, hear and believe, which requires an in-depth study of the culture of 
orality and informality. Therefore, it is necessary to provide an account of 
these faiths and spiritual orders for a better understanding of the current 
conditions.     
 
Islamic legal precepts, both historical and modern, will be discussed, as the 
vast majority of the population of Afghanistan profess to be Muslims. The 
thesis provides a history of the emerging legal institutions from former days 
to the present time that is indispensable for the study of law.  
 
In the process of reform and legal development, the importance of legal 
transplants cannot be overlooked, as Afghanistan has been using legal 
transplants for a long time, and more apparently since the 1880s. Legal 
transplants will be investigated in two quite different time periods: first, the 
government-initiated legal transplants where state officials opted to 
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modernise their country and institutionalise the delivery of justice that is from 
1880 to 2001, and second, the foreign-led legal transplants for the promotion 
of the rule of law through Western state-building efforts since 2001, where 
the state of Afghanistan has had limited choices of what to accept or reject.    
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
This research is significant for anyone interested in Afghanistan and its legal 
culture, as it pulls together a number of legal themes and offers readers an 
instructive insight into understanding the plethora of structural and socio-
cultural influences that have and continue to inform the perceptions around 
legality in Afghanistan.  
    
The experience of Western state-building and the advancement of the rule of 
law demands that more research, such as this thesis, be carried out in order to 
inform the academic community and the international stakeholders involved 
in Afghanistan, as well as the government of Afghanistan, of the emerging 
legal themes in line with globalisation and the universal quest for the rule of 
law promotion and the centrality of human rights.  
 
1.4 Situating the Thesis 
 
This thesis is at the intersection of several academic disciplines, including 
legal anthropology, legal pluralism, political economy analysis and historical 
methods. Its principal aim is to make a contribution to the field of legal culture 
and legal history of Afghanistan from 1750 to the present. Its main focus is 
to introduce the internal and external components of Afghanistan’s legal 
culture, of which, legal transplants form an integral part.  
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1.5 The Research Question and Sub-Questions 
 
My main research question is: 
How has Afghanistan’s legal history and legal culture been subject to change 
and evolution since the inception of the state in 1747 to the twenty-first 
century? 
 
My sub-research questions are: 
1. How has Afghanistan’s legal culture evolved since 1747? 
 
2. How have legal transplants shaped and continue to shape Afghanistan’s 
laws? 
 
3. What role does legal pluralism play in Afghanistan?  
 
4. What is the status of women under the formal and informal laws of 
Afghanistan? 
 
5. To what extent have the different religions of Afghanistan shaped its 




Hypotheses are predictions of outcomes based on literature or theories.4 The 
working hypothesis for this study assumes that legal transplants have not 
created a consolidated culture of legality in Afghanistan. Their use has been 
less helpful and at times mimetic. The following is the working hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis: State-sponsored legal transplants have not formed a culture of 
legality since the creation of a nation-state in Afghanistan. 
 
The working hypothesis of this study assumes that the more the state and its 
institutions support workable legal transplants and ensure the provision of the 
requisite education, provide adequate funds and enforce the state law 
                                                          
4 Creswell, Mixed Methods Research, 69. 
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nationwide without discriminations or derogations, then a realistic chance of 
instituting a culture of legality will emerge.   
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2 Introduction  
 
In order to answer the research question and sub-questions, it is imperative 
that the methods and methodology utilised stand up to scrutiny. The scarce 
and extant scholarship on the topic of legal history and legal culture applied 
in the case of Afghanistan requires an eclectic approach that brings together 
past and present research in order to offer a body of knowledge that 
contributes to the academic community. Henn et al. make the important 
distinction between method and methodology.5 They state that method refers 
to the range of techniques that are available to us to collect evidence about 
the social world, and methodology concerns the research strategy as a whole.6 
With this observation in mind, this thesis will utilise a variety of 
methodologies ranging from Political Economy Analysis (PEA), to legal 
pluralism and legal transplants. Applying these frameworks will be 
instructive in gauging the capacity for public trust, legal compliance, 
transparency in law, as well as public perceptions around legality and the 
ways in which legislation has been instituted across the modern history of 
Afghanistan. This will serve to provide a more holistic approach which will 
be more conducive to triangulating the data that emerges from the empirical 
chapters.    
 
2.1  Quantitative Methodology 
 
Quantitative methodology is a type of educational research in which the 
researcher decides what to study; asks specific, narrow questions; collects 
                                                          
5 Henn, Weinstein, and Foard, Introduction to Social Research, 10. 
6 Henn, Weinstein, and Foard, 10. 
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quantifiable data from participants (a large number of participants); analyses 
these numbers using statistics and conducts the inquiry in an unbiased, 
objective manner.7 The first stage of this thesis uses quantitative data.  
 
2.2  Qualitative Methodology 
 
Qualitative methodology is a type of educational research in which the 
researcher relies on the views of participants; asks broad, general questions; 
collects data consisting largely of words or texts from participants; describes 
and analyses these words for themes and conducts the inquiry in a subjective, 
biased manner.8 In the second stage of this thesis, qualitative data collected 
through questionnaires and interviews will be used.  
 
2.3  Mixed Methods Research   
 
Mixed methods research is defined as an approach to research in the social, 
behavioural and health sciences in which the investigator gathers both 
quantitative (close-ended) and qualitative (open-ended) data, integrates the 
two, and then draws interpretations based on the combined strength of both 
sets of data to understand the research.9 Mixed methods research involves the 
collection, analysis, and integration of both quantitative and qualitative data. 
In this way, the value of different approaches to research (e.g. the trends as 
well as the stories of personal experiences) can contribute more to 
understanding a research problem than one form of data collection 
(quantitative or qualitative) could on its own.10 The mixed methods typology 
                                                          
7 Fisher, “Mixed Methods,” 4.  
8 Fisher, 7. 
9 Creswell, Mixed Methods Research, 2. 
10 Creswell, 2. 
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undertaken in this thesis is an explanatory sequential design. In explanatory 
sequential design, the intent is first to use quantitative methods and then 
qualitative methods to help explain the quantitative results in more depth.11 
Quantitative data may generalise themes and it may not contain first-hand 
accounts that are necessary to understand the issues better. This is done 
through triangulating both types of methods and using qualitative data to 
explain the quantitative data.     
 
In mixed methods research, philosophical perspectives may be added.12 
Philosophical frameworks are general beliefs and assumptions about 
research, such as how researchers discover knowledge.13 This research uses 
legal pluralism, political economy analysis, historical methods and models of 
intersectionality. 
 
2.4  Data Collection Procedure  
 
Plano Clark conceptualised the stages of explanatory sequential data 
collection designs as three. In the explanatory design, the quantitative data is 
collected and analysed in the first phase, then the qualitative data will be 
collected to help explain or elaborate on the quantitative results.14 The 
rationale for this approach is that the quantitative data and results provide a 
general picture of the research problem; more analysis, specifically 
qualitative data collection is needed to refine, extend or explain the general 
picture.15 
                                                          
11 Creswell, 6. 
12 Creswell, 8.   
13 Creswell, 8.   
14 Subedi, “Sequential Mixed Method Design,” 572.  
15 Subedi, 572.  
 
   
 
Page 32 of 531 
 
 
2.5  The Rationale for using Mixed Methods Research  
 
John W. Creswell describes the benefits of using mixed methods research as 
follows:  
It is appropriate to use Mixed Methods Research when the use of 
quantitative or qualitative research alone is insufficient for gaining an 
understanding of the problem. Using only one method may be 
insufficient because of the inherent weaknesses of each approach. 
Quantitative research does not adequately investigate personal stories 
and meanings or deeply probe the perspectives of individuals. 
Qualitative research does not enable us to generalise from a small 
group of people to a large population. It does not precisely measure 
what people in general feel. In short, all research methods have both 
strengths and weaknesses, and the combination of the strengths of 
both provides a good rationale for using mixed methods. Quantitative 
research provides an opportunity for generalisation and precision; 
qualitative research offers an in-depth experience of individual 
perspectives.16  
 
Mixed methods research compares the quantitative and qualitative data, 
reflects participants’ points of view, fosters scholarly interaction, provides 
methodological flexibility and collects rich, comprehensive data.17 The 
quantitative data for this thesis has been collected first in order to understand 
and then to interpret them. This process has highlighted gaps in the existing 
quantitative research. The answers to my questionnaire – given by 
professionals with diverse experiences – aided me to refer to more 
quantitative data and in turn strengthen my arguments and alter some points. 
The mixed methods approach is therefore most expedient as it can mitigate 
potential shortcomings in the empirics and provide further insight on the 
initial arguments set forth in this thesis. The qualitative data gathered through 
                                                          
16 Creswell, Mixed Methods Research,15. 
17 Wisdom and Creswell, “Patient-Centred Medical Home Models,” 3. 
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interviews and questionnaires has offered useful historical backgrounds to 
law, society and governments as the interviewees and questionnaire 
respondents have offered extensive direct and indirect interactions in the areas 
under research. In the words of John W. Creswell, “adding additional features 
to a basic mixed methods research design makes it an advanced research 
method.”18  
 
2.6  Ethnography  
 
Ethnography is the study of social interactions, behaviours and perceptions 
that occur within groups, teams, organisations and communities.19 
Ethnographical research is conducted in different academic disciplines by 
anthropologists, archaeologists, psychologists, sociologists and other groups 
categorised as social scientists. The importance of ethnography in researching 
Afghanistan, its people and state cannot be overlooked. In the context of 
Afghanistan, ethnographic research conducted by different scholars will be 
used.  
 
2.7  Historical Methods  
 
Historical methods is referred to as the collection of techniques and guidelines 
historians use to research and write histories of the past. Legal history studies 
the origin and development of past legal systems and a legal historian should 
adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, which means he/she should 
be informed by economics, political science, sociology and other relevant 
                                                          
18 Creswell, Mixed Methods Research, 6.  
19 Reeves, Kuper, and Hodges, “Qualitative Research Methodologies: Ethnography,” 512. 
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social sciences.20 This is so because a legal system of any country cannot be 
fully appreciated if it is considered independently: religion affects the legal 
system, politics affect it and so do the economic institutions of that country.21 
In the context of Afghanistan’s legal history, this research uses primary as 
well as secondary sources. The methodical approach taken in legal history is 
narrative history. Narrative history is a method of writing history that 
describes the main and most critical developments in a chronological way so 
that an overall picture of the past can emerge.22  
 
2.8  Case study and Process Tracing 
 
The case-study and process-tracing methods will be used in order to test the 
hypothesis surrounding legal transplants in Afghanistan. The case-study 
method accounts for a large proportion of the research presented in books and 
articles in psychology, history, education and medicine as well as other 
fields.23 It addresses a wide range of research questions.24 Case studies are 
viewed as a qualitative research type or qualitative research method.25 In this 
thesis, case study is a method rather than a research type.   
 
2.9 Theoretical Perspectives  
 
The theoretical framework is the blueprint for the entire thesis inquiry and 
serves as the guide on which to build and support the study.26 It defines how 
the researcher philosophically, epistemologically, methodologically and 
                                                          
20 Muradu, “Legal History and Traditions,” 3.  
21 Muradu, 3. 
22 A2 History: “Introduction to historiography” 9.   
23 Starman, “The case study,” 28. 
24 Harrison et al., “Foundations and Methodological Orientations,” 1.  
25 Starman, “The case study,” 30. 
26 Grant and Osanloo, “The Blueprint for Your ‘House’,” 13.  
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analytically approaches the thesis as a whole.27 Theories are formulated to 
explain, predict and understand phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge 
and extend knowledge.28 The following two theoretical frameworks shall be 
used for this research.  
 
2.10 Political Economy Analysis   
 
Political Economy Analysis (PEA), according to the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), is “concerned with the interaction of political and 
economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth 
between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, 
sustain and transform these relationships over time.”29 This research adopts a 
political economy lens in assessing corruption. Corruption has a negative 
bearing on the rule of law, and corrupt practices, such as diverting funds 
intended for the delivery of justice, erodes not only the state’s legitimacy, but 
also leads to citizens evading taxes or civic duties, or disobeying their leaders. 
In this context – using political economy analysis is justified and necessary.   
  
2.11  Intersectionality  
 
Intersectionality, a term coined by the legal scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw, is a 
theory and an analytic tool to assess lived experiences within intersecting 
oppressions and may be better suited to analyse multiple forms of 
discrimination rather than single-axis approaches to discrimination.30  As a 
                                                          
27 Grant and Osanloo, 13.  
28 Sacred Heart University Library, “Theoretical Framework.” Last accessed 16 August 
2020.  
29 Strand, Borchgrevink, and Harpviken, “Afghanistan: A Political Economy Analysis,” 1. 
30 Rice, Harrison, and Friedman, “Doing justice to intersectionality,” 6. 
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theoretical framework, intersectionality is the most suitable analytic tool to 
assess a number of intersecting issues. whereas individuals’ experiences of 
injustice are multi-layered, complicated and may not be noted fully by another 
approach. The reality of the state, society, political system and the rule of law 
efforts by the international community demands that multi-dimensional 
issues such as marginalization, discrimination or negligent and systematic 
injustices are assessed through intersectionality.        
 
2.12  Data Collection  
 
I have collected the quantitative data through purchasing available books on 
Afghanistan, its history, governments, society and the law. From 2014 to the 
present, I have obtained more than a hundred books, written in English, Dari 
-Farsi and Pashto. The languages of these books are identified in the 
bibliography.31 The sources to search for the relevant books were the four 
Bloomsbury University of London libraries (Birkbeck, City, SOAS and 
UCL). Between 25 October 2019 and 15 June 2020 before a lockdown was 
enforced due to COVID-19, I visited the British Library, the National 
Archives and the Isma’ili Institute’s library in search of scarce sources on 
Afghanistan. In particular, I looked for sources on ethnic and religious 
minorities like the Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and Ismailis. These were sources that 
were not available digitally or in the bookshops.     
 
                                                          
31 Some books were out of print temporarily. I sought after a book for four years and I only 
managed to buy it in 2019. There were four books that, due to their rarity and high value, 
vendors sold at a very high price – nearly four times the price of a book on a bookshelf in the 
UK. These books are The Hazaras of Afghanistan by Sayed Askar Mousavi; Afghanistan: A 
Country Law Study (monograph) by Gholam H. Vafai; A Political and Economic History of 
the Jews of Afghanistan by Sara Koplik and Law in Afghanistan: A Study of Constitutions, 
Matrimonial Law and the Judiciary by Mohammad Hashim Kamali. 
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I have also accessed quantitative data in the public domain. The first set of 
public records were accessed through Academia, EconStor, JSTOR, Google 
Scholar, HAL, Research Gate, Sage, Springer and the Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN). The second set of public information records 
were accessed through Internet downloads for the law gazettes: Adālat 
(Justice), Agāhī Hoghūghi (Legal Awareness), Mizān (Scale), Qazā 
(Judgement), Sāranwāl (Prosecutor), Wekālat (Legal Representation); legal 
circulars by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan as well as legal statistics made 
available periodically, quarterly and annually; bench guides, legal news, 
newspaper articles, research papers and academic theses as well as reports 
produced by international non-governmental organisations including the Asia 
Foundation, the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), the International 
Development Law Organisation (IDLO), Medica Mondiale, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), U4, USAID, the United 
Nations branches as well as legal reports and analyses produced by other 
organisations or governments.  
 
I have accessed quantitative data through web portals of Afghanistan 
government ministries such as the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of 
Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. I have also 
accessed articles and reports produced by the Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) and the 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). These data 
are produced mainly in English, but there are Dari-Farsi and Pashto 
translations.   
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The other set of online data collected over the past six years are historical 
publications by Afghanistan governments. There are also publications by 
Western writers. These publications include the Kabul Times, the Khalq 
(Masses),  the Parcham (Flag), the Zhwandūn (Life), the Mirman (Women), 
the Kabul, Kandahar and Adab (Etiquettes) magazines as well as a trove of 
570 old books digitised by New York University. These materials were 
printed by Afghanistan governments from 1871 to 1913.32 The sources which 
digitise an exponential number of books and magazines written in English, 
Dari-Farsi and Pashto are the Internet Archive, the Library of Congress, the 
World Digital Library, Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University, the Arthur 
Paul Afghanistan Collection at the University of Nebraska-Omaha, New York 
University and Washington University.  
 
Online legal literature and legal teaching materials produced by Stanford 
University, the International Development Law Organisation (IDLO), the 
Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP), the Max Planck Institute of 
Comparative Public and International Law and Touch Point were other 
sources accessed and downloaded. These sources have produced legal 
guidebooks, training materials and bench guides on all aspects of 
Afghanistan’s laws.   
 
I have sought digital data available in the public domain through general 
searches for academic theses written on Afghanistan. I have also searched for 
items on three of the Afghanistan Analysts Network’s legal bibliographies 
printed in 2010, 2013 and 2019. Circa two hundred undergraduate and 
                                                          
32 The BBC, “The fate of rare books from Afghanistan.” Last accessed 18 August 2020.  
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postgraduate theses written on Afghanistan in different universities around 
the world have been collected. The majority of these theses were written in 
European or other Western universities.  
 
It has also been necessary to translate and transcribe some data. These are 
Mizān publication’s court data from 2009 to 2020 from Dari-Farsi which were 
translated into English by the author. Mizān is the Supreme Court of 
Afghanistan’s publication which provides sample data in its bi-monthly 
paper. A number of court promulgations, reports and other documents were 
also translated from Dari-Farsi into English. I have tried to access court data 
for prosecutions in the cases of Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(EVAW), but regrettably this type of information is very hard to come by. In 
two separate reports, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) identifies that government officials are reticent in sharing 
information.33 UNAMA states that access to some areas of Afghanistan was 
impossible due to insecurity and weak systems of record-keeping at all levels 
in government institutions that contributed to challenges in acquiring accurate 
information on violence against women cases.34  
 
In order to access data on cases relating women, the author asked two separate 
researchers based in Kabul to contact the relevant government institutions in 
order to access such data. They were unable to assist due to restrictions on 
access to information pertaining to women’s cases as well as restrictions due 
to COVID-19.  
 
                                                          
33 UNAMA, “Still a Long Way to Go,” iv.  
34 UNAMA, “A Way to Go,” 11.  
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2.13  Qualitative Data Collection  
 
Between 25 October 2019 and 02 June 2020, the author interviewed sixteen 
professionals of Afghanistan origin and collected data in forty semi-
structured questionnaires and three technical questionnaires in order to gain 
further information to explicate issues not addressed by the available 
quantitative data. The questionnaires and interview questions are shown in 
Appendices 1-7. 
 
Information on members of certain ethnic and religious groups of Afghanistan 
is scarce and available research data do not explain how these individuals are 
treated under different rules, in informal institutions and by the state’s legal 
system. In order to represent the views of all the groups of the Afghanistan 
population, including different faith groups as well as men and women, the 
following steps were undertaken.  
 
The author visited several places of worship in London to speak to Afghan 
Sikhs and Hindus. There are no identified places to find Afghan Jews in 
Europe or elsewhere. The author emailed three individuals: Irena 
Vladimirskiy, a historian of Jewish people, Sara Aharon and Esther Frogel, 
two second-generation Afghan Jews of Afghan parents. Sara is an author and 
Esther has conducted her doctoral thesis on the experience of second-
generation Afghan Jews in the United States of America. They both have 
interviewed Afghan Jews for their research. Sara kindly passed my 
information to her contacts and on 24 November 2019, the author received a 
phone call from Jack Abraham from New York.  
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Jack is an Afghan Jew who resides in the United States. Jack was born in 
Afghanistan and received his education in England and Israel. The author 
carried out Internet searches to find other Afghan Jews for interview with no 
success. He contacted Christer Angerbjörn in Sweden for Christian contacts. 
Christer aided this research immensely and printed copies of the research 
questionnaire and delivered them to two Afghan Christians who filled them 
in. One Afghan Isma’ili took part in interviews and filled in the research 
questionnaire. All forty respondents and interviewees involved in this 
research are from Afghanistan.           
 
A number of individuals who have taken part in my research through filling 
in my questionnaire have authored numerous academic papers, theses and 
books on Afghanistan. When choosing respondents for my questionnaires and 
interviews, I planned to contact Afghan citizens with average and high levels 
of education. There are a couple of respondents with primary and high school 
education. One female respondent who has acquired basic Farsi education 
asked her friends to read my questions to her and then she gave her answers 
which were recorded by her friends. I take this move as the highest 
manifestation of this respondent’s helpfulness and her eagerness to assist my 
research.  
          
2.14  The Research Questionnaire  
 
I developed my questions for qualitative data collection after having studied 
and considered the quantitative data. This enabled me to better formulate my 
questionnaire shown in Appendix 1. In order to gather comprehensive 
information for this research, a semi-structured research questionnaire, 
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technical questionnaires and face-to-face interviews allowed the participants 
to express their values and experiences in a way significant to them. For 
instance, question 1 of the research questionnaire, “What do you think about 
the purpose of the numerous constitutions of Afghanistan?” was used to test 
the knowledge of the respondents. Question 6 was, “If you were asked to 
propose ways to improve Loya Jirga, what would you say?” This question, 
and others like this, gave full latitude to the respondents to freely express their 
thoughts. There were questions for which the respondents were expected to 
put a tick mark. I do not believe that a Likert style questionnaire with multiple 
answers would have given me useful information for this research. Upon 
receipt of the questionnaires, it was noted that the respondents had provided 
very detailed, useful and often rare first-hand information that could not be 
found in articles or books.  
 
I am aware that my questionnaire was quite lengthy and some questions may 
have appeared repetitive to a few of the respondents. This raised criticisms by 
two respondents. I have taken this criticism into account for future research. 
Having known, observed and studied my countrymen and women in their 
personal and professional capacities for twenty-six years, I am aware of the 
fact that Afghan citizens are keen to be fully heard. I have given the most 
latitude to the respondents and, to my knowledge, and based on numerous 
positive feedbacks received, the respondents were respected and their 
freedom of expression was too. As a result of my experience in this field, I 
have become well versed in navigating Afghan social and cultural 
particularities and sensibilities throughout responses during the data 
collection process.  
   
 
Page 43 of 531 
 
 
2.15 The Questionnaire Respondents  
 
I used a purposive sampling approach in selecting the respondents for the 
research questionnaire. The time and scope of investigation in this research 
not being limited, my research benefited from the information given by 
respondents with extensive experience, individuals who have lived through 
different governments of Afghanistan. Interviews were conducted in places 
comfortable for the participants. One of the respondents could only answer 
questions through Facebook Messenger. Although this interview took slightly 
longer and was completed in a few sessions, it was conducted to the 
respondent’s satisfaction.  
 
The questionnaire respondents were carefully selected to be from medium 
and high levels of education. This meant that their views, although not from 
a large number of people, would be representative of the diverse population 
of Afghanistan. Tape-recording interviews would insult the respondents and 
the interviewees. I made a verbatim record of the interviews and in some 
areas, the interviewees wrote their answers to my questions by hand or they 
typed. When interviews were conducted over the phone, answers were typed 
and at the end the respondents and interviewees were given the option to 
review and finalise their answers. One respondent used this method of 
verification after the completion of the interview over the phone.   
 
Stratification in research relates to ascertaining which category of people or 
which characteristics are most relevant to the research. John W. Creswell and 
J. David Creswell describe stratification as specific characteristics of 
individuals (e.g., gender, females and males, education, etc.) that are 
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presented in the sample and the sample reflects the true proportion in the 
population of individuals with certain characteristics.35 For this research, the 
respondents’ and interviewees’ age, gender, levels of education, maturity and 
their personal or professional interactions with different governments formed 
the stratification descriptors. A respondent or interviewee of very young age 
could only help with his or her experiences that could be limited to a shorter 
period of time. A respondent aged seventy or over could offer information 
relating to several governments of Afghanistan.  
 
The respondents were in the age brackets: 24-35 (18), 41-49 (8), 52-58 (5) 
and 60-74 (9). The respondents’ levels of education were primary school (1), 
high school (2), undergraduate (15), master’s degree (16), doctorate (2), Legal 
Practice Course (1) and qualified medical doctors (3). By gender they were 
women (6) and men (34). By religious origin they were Christian (2), Jewish 
(1), Hindu (2), Sikh (1) and Muslim (34). By ethnic group origin the 
respondents were Brahminic, Hazāra, Ismaili, Tajik, Sādāt, Uzbek, Pashtūn 
and Sephardic Jew. The respondents were based in Afghanistan (13), England 
and mainland Europe (25) and the United States (2). The majority of 
respondents worked or had worked for several governments of Afghanistan 
in different capacities and had heard, experienced or studied the themes 
investigated in this thesis. For more information on the respondents, please 
refer to Appendices  8-9.  
Feedback from a couple of respondents suggested that some of the questions 
were repetitive. The claim to repetition may not be quite true, as for a question 
                                                          
35 Creswell and Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, 150-51.  
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such as “Do you agree with jirga or with Shūrā?” the answer may hardly ever 
be, “I do agree or I do not agree with jirga or Shūrā under any circumstances.”  
For this reason, I planned that the respondents’ answer on jirga (Pashtūn tribal 
assembly) and Shūrā (consultation) in family matters and dispute resolution 
are separated. Upon completion of the questionnaires, it is evident that the 
questions were designed well.  
 
When analysing the questionnaire information, it was noted that Questions 25 
and 26 were confusing for the respondents and for the author at the analysis 
stage. These were, “Do you believe that Afghan citizens go to jirga because 
it is a better way to receive justice?” and “Do you believe that Afghan citizens 
go to Shūrā because of the same reason?” These two questions limit the 
respondents’ liberty to say nothing but a “yes,” or “no” and these replies 
would not show what the intention of the respondent was. This type of 
research anomaly shall not happen in future research by this author.        
 
Most of the respondents thought the themes in the questionnaire were useful 
and answering the questions sparked interest for some respondents to study 
legal and historical issues. A few respondents have expressed their keen 
interest in getting involved in similar research in the future. A few individuals 
in Kabul did not have access to electricity, Internet or computers, but despite 
this limitation, they completed the questionnaires. Two individuals based in 
Afghanistan thought that one of their colleagues was a better person to 
complete the questionnaire.  
 
Three individuals completed the questionnaire over the phone where 
questions were read out to them and they gave their answers. I had planned 
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to see one of these three respondents in London on 13 March 2020. This 
meeting had to change due to COVID-19 lockdown. Instead, the 
questionnaire was filled in over the phone. Seven individuals completed the 
questionnaire in the author’s presence. Questions were asked and their 
answers were typed. They did not see a need to read back the answers after 
typing. This helped and expedited information recording with no need for 
member checks. Despite this, at the end of each interview, each respondent 
was offered the option to check their answers. All respondents were asked 
whether they want to be named in this thesis.   
 
For respondents who met the author in person, the question of being named 
in this research was asked at the very end, giving the full picture of the 
questions and answers, and to enable the respondents to make informed 
decisions whether to be named or not. All forty respondents knew they had 
the choice of remaining anonymous (communicated in the questionnaire’s 
introduction page, verbally and by email). All respondents knew that the 
information they provided was to be used for my thesis in the United 
Kingdom. The same information was communicated to the interviewees.       
 
The information provided in the questionnaires offered rich knowledge. Most 
of the respondents patiently provided detailed answers to the questions. 
Although the number of respondents was small, their diverse backgrounds 
and multi-ethnic and multi-faiths origins, as well as their different levels of 
education means they represented a valid sample of the wider population of 
Afghanistan.  
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2.16 Referring to Qualitative Information    
 
In this thesis, the individuals who filled in the research questionnaire will be 
referred to as “respondents”. Those who were interviewed will be identified 
as “interviewees” In both areas, where respondents and interviewees have 
consented to be named, they will be named. A number of themes in the 
qualitative data will be cited as block quotes and other themes will be cited in 
numerical forms (i.e., x number of respondents have taken position y or z on 
an issue). 
 
2.17  The Interviews  
 
For gaps in research where information was vague, rare, incomplete or 
confusing and needed further investigations, sixteen interviews were 
conducted with nine individuals and one organisation. All of these individuals 
also filled in my research questionnaire. For issues relating to the lives of the 
Hindus, Sikhs and the Jews, unstructured interviews and a separate small 
questionnaire was used. These were completed by four individuals: one 
Jewish, one Sikh and two Hindus.   
 
These interviews sought specific information and did not aim to collect 
general data. The modes of interviews were face-to-face, by telephone and 
email. Due to the global COVID-19 restrictions, further face-to-face 
interviews could not be conducted as was planned towards the end of March 
2020. All interviewees located in Afghanistan, Europe and the United States 
of America were very helpful and replied to the author’s texts, emails and 
calls punctually. Two of the interviewees preferred to remain anonymous.     
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2.18  Ethical Issues  
 
Being aware of cultural sensitivities, tape-recording the interviews was not 
appropriate. When interviews are tape-recorded, interviewees may refrain 
from expressing themselves freely. As a researcher, I had no power over the 
interviewees or questionnaire respondents. The interviewees and 
questionnaire respondents based in Afghanistan held Afghan citizenship, and 
the majority of respondents based in Western countries were citizens of 
Afghanistan by birth; two were asylum seekers based in Europe, two were 
recognised refugees in the United Kingdom with leave to remain and the rest 
held dual citizenship.  
 
The majority of interviewees and questionnaire respondents had lived through 
several governments of Afghanistan. Except two younger persons, one with 
primary and another with intermediate education and no formal designations, 
the rest were higher education students, journalists, civil servants, former 
diplomats, university lecturers, writers, employees of international 
organisations or current and former government employees. There is no 
reason to believe that the interviewees or questionnaire respondents had 
reasons not to express themselves freely and openly.               
 
2.19  Data Validation  
 
The information obtained qualitatively must be accurately recorded and be 
the actual work of the respondents. In completing the questionnaires, data 
accuracy and data validation was considered in all the stages of design, 
implementation and analysis. In order to help the respondents understand all 
the questions and themes, there were explanatory comments for some 
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questions. The questionnaires were produced in three languages: English, 
Dari-Farsi and Pashto. The respondents had enough time to respond to 
questions. Two respondents had not initially answered all the questions. They 
were asked to answer the blank parts, and they did.  
 
Prior to interviews, the interviewees were given plenty of time, written 
questions and when during the interview, certain issues could not be 
discussed, this was respected by the author. The individuals selected for 
interviews were suitable for the themes and subjects of the interviews based 
on their cultural and religious knowledge, origin, age, education and  
academic attainment. In order to store the collated information and ensure 
their safe storage, the author has applied the GDPR rules and complied with 
the Birkbeck, University of London’s ethical research protocol.         
 
2.20  Insider/Outsider and Reflexivity  
 
According to Amani K. Hamdan, reflexivity is researching myself and 
reflecting on my personal beliefs and values both as a researcher and as a 
member of the researched group.36 Reflexivity is a source of privilege because 
it provides the reader with the researcher’s unique perspectives on the 
research endeavour.37 The author of this thesis shares a similar cultural, 
language and socio-economic background with the interviewees and 
questionnaire respondents. The author has directly worked with national and 
international organisations in Afghanistan and in Britain for twenty-six 
continuous years. He has worked with citizens of Afghanistan on a daily basis 
                                                          
36 Hamdan, “Reflexivity of Discomfort,” 378. 
37 Hamdan, 378. 
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and has received first-hand and second-hand accounts in Afghanistan (six 
years) and the United Kingdom (twenty years). The author’s work with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Medical Emergency Relief 
International (MERLIN), Afghanistan Government institutions, British 
Government institutions and the British Red Cross Society (2004-2021) has 
given him certain advantages like being able to contact numerous high-profile 
Afghan citizens in different parts of the world.  
 
The author’s pre-existing professional profile made it easy for him to receive 
the full trust of the participants. Employing reflexivity throughout the 
research process entails that the researcher is paying close attention to his or 
her involvement in the research.38 The author of this thesis has gained extra 
advantages during his work with Afghans and Westerners (European and 
British). This has shaped his in-depth understanding of Afghans and 
Westerners, their values and prejudices as well as their biases. In the 
production of this research, he has insider/outsider knowledge as an Afghan-
born person having naturalised as a British citizen.       
 
2.21  The Research Dilemma  
 
For studying Afghanistan, there may be more than one or two research 
dilemmas. Those relevant to this thesis are the scarcity of certain types of data 
– in some cases data that is perceived to be quite sensitive in Afghanistan. 
These are data about women. Furthermore, there is scarcity or the absence of 
consistent and reliable government data. Another dilemma is the lack of 
accurate population estimates or census data. A full census head count has 
                                                          
38 Hamdan, 379. 
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never taken place in Afghanistan and accurate court statistics are rare. In 
many areas, the government-issued data may not be quite accurate.  
 
In Afghanistan, population estimates may bulge from a few thousands, to 
hundreds of thousands and even to millions without a logical explanation. 
These depend on who is making estimates and for what purposes they are 
used. For instance, for electoral jerrymandering, a village of ten thousand 
inhabitants may be reported to hold a few hundred thousand people, and 
likewise, a city whose population is less likely to vote for a certain leader may 
have two million people counted as one million. The author takes a pragmatic 
approach in dealing with this type of research dilemma and uses more than 
common-sense and analogical deductions. In the context of post-conflict 
developmental states like Afghanistan, one has to take into consideration that 
there may be inconsistencies and/or distortions in publicly accessible data.   
 
2.22  Limitations to the Research  
 
One of the major limitations to this research was accessing detailed court data 
or court promulgations. Court data produced by the government of 
Afghanistan and international sources are patchy and fragmented. In order to 
refer to court data, the author had to refer to hundreds of separate documents. 
The Supreme Court of Afghanistan has only produced two sets of court 
promulgations over the past twenty years that are available in the public 
domain. Other forms of available court data are issued periodically, quarterly 
and annually as well as bi-monthly in Mizān publications. Bulletin is written 
in the English language where the Supreme Court of Afghanistan records a 
selective assortment of court data. The data recorded on these publications 
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are anonymised and, in most cases, it is difficult to follow a pattern for cases 
for men and women or children.   
 
A further limitation of this research was inadequate quantitative information 
on the informal legal culture of the Turkic groups of Afghanistan (Kazakh, 
Kirghiz, Turkmen and Uzbek). In order fill in this research gap, two 
individuals with the right knowledge provided useful information.  
 
There has been scarcity of research materials on Hinduism, Zoroastrianism 
and the cult of Zhun. However, the researcher has used all the available extant 
literature on this subject matter.          
 
2.23  Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have described the introductory information for this thesis, 
and elaborated on the methodology, research methods and perspectives that 
will be followed throughout.  
 
On a broad subject such as the legal culture and legal history of Afghanistan, 
the author uses both quantitative and qualitative data through the mixed 
methods explanatory design in order to merge and triangulate both sets of 
data. The next section sets out the review of the relevant literature.      
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The literature review has been described as the foundation and inspiration for 
substantial and useful research.39 According to Thomas and Hodge, the 
purpose of a literature review is three-fold. Firstly, it provides an examination 
of existing pieces of research; thus it is the starting point for identifying the 
information and terminology relevant to the research undertaken and for 
becoming familiar with the subject area.40 Secondly, it allows the author to 
critically evaluate the quality of existing scholarly writings and to identify 
best research techniques and practices.41 Finally, the literature review aims to 
highlight different types of scholarship and their methodologies, and critically 
evaluate findings on different themes relevant to the issues being studied.42  
 
Creswell & Creswell state that a literature map enables a person to understand 
how the proposed study adds to, extends, or replicates research already 
completed.43 It is a visual summary of the research that has been conducted 
by others and is typically represented in a figure.44 The following literature 
map details the quantitative data accessed, read and cited, as well as some 
research that were not cited in this thesis.  
  
                                                          
39 Boote and Beile, “Scholars before Researchers,” 3. 
40 Thomas and Hodges, “Doing a Literature Review,” 105. 
41 Thomas and Hodges, 105. 
42 Thomas and Hodges, 105. 
43 Creswell and Creswell, Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, 34. 
44 Creswell and Creswell, 34. 
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Figure 3: Thesis Literature Map.      
 
3.1  Definitions of Legal Culture  
 
Describing the legal culture, a theme with a number of general definitions 
would be indispensable here. Legal culture is not the combination of legal 
and culture, but this compound term conveys multiple meanings in different 
societies and in different legal systems. Legal sociologist, David Nelkin, 
describes legal culture in its general sense as relatively stable patterns of 
legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes, and argues that identifying 
elements of legal culture range from facts about institutions such as the 
number and role of lawyers or the ways judges are appointed and controlled, 
to various forms of behaviour in litigations, issues related to prison rates, and 
the nebulous aspect of ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities.45 He further 
describes legal culture as what we are not what we do.46  
                                                          
45 Nelkin, “Concept of Legal Culture,” 1. 
46 Nelkin, 1. 
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Comparative legal scholar and lawyer, Ralf Michaels, describes legal culture 
as multiple different ideas, not always sufficiently separated, and relies on the 
description of Eugen Ehrlich calling legal culture, the living law.47 Roscoe 
Pounds regards legal culture as law in action.48 Friedrich Carl von Savigny 
posits that law reflects the culture of a given society, where reception in 
another culture is not possible as law is a product of that society’s particular 
attributes such as language, family, religion and so on.49 Werner Gephart 
discusses law as recht als kultur, meaning law as culture.50  
 
Csaba Varga claims that law is a living culture with specific rules and by 
replacing some of them we can only change it superficially.51 Varga finds 
legal culture to be a phenomenon shaped through cultural-historical and 
institutional development.52 Ditlev Tamm, Professor of History of Law and 
Comparative Law at the University of Copenhagen, refers to the ideas and 
behaviours of those within the law – like lawyers, judges and police officers, 
as the internal legal culture and the perceptions of law from the broader 
society, like what the people expect of the law and whether they trust legal 
institutions as the external legal culture.53 Susan Silbey categorises legal 
culture and cultures of legality by examining societal interactions with the 
                                                          
47 Michaels, “Legal Culture,” 1-7. 
48 Michaels, 1-7.  
49 Acar, “Concept of Legal Culture,” 145.  
50 Gephart, “Law as Culture,” 1-43. 
51 Varga, Comparative Legal Cultures, 21, 27. 
52 Varga, 21, 27. 
53 Tamm, “The Normative Complex,” last viewed on 22 August 2020.  
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law in three stages:54 (1) being before the law,55 (2) being with the law56 and 
(3) being up against the law.57 These definitions, particularly those of Susan 
Selby due to their relevance to Afghanistan’s conditions, where law can more 
easily be circumvented, form the backbone of normative understanding of 
legal culture.  
 
3.2  Legal Literature  
 
Within the existing scholarship in the academic circles, a few books offer an 
in-depth analysis of Afghanistan’s laws. By date order, the first one was 
written by Sultan Mohammad Khan, the secretary of Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 
1880-1901), The Constitutions and Laws of Afghanistan, published in 1900. 
Khan’s book was written during the genesis of state law under Abdur Rahman 
Khan’s supervision. The book describes the legal procedures of the 1800s. 
The second book was written by Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in 
Afghanistan: A Study of the Constitutions, Matrimonial Law and the 
Judiciary in 1985. This book discusses different types of enacted laws from 
up to the 1980s. Kamali identifies tribalism as a hindrance to progress and 
legal reforms, but does not elaborate on this subject.  
 
The third book (monograph) held by the Library of Congress in the United 
States of America was written by Gholam H. Vafai, Afghanistan: A Country 
                                                          
54 Silbey, “Legal Culture and Culture of Legality.” last viewed on 22 August 2020. 
55 Some people describe the law as fair and see it as a disinterested set of rules relevant to 
other people. Other people, for instance, may say, “Well, you dropped this banana on the 
floor; someone will fall and fracture his or her limbs.” There is a general good for the law.  
56 People are self-interested and pursue their rights. People talk about lawyers, judges, 
courts and accessibility of law and justice.  
57 People experience themselves without alternatives. They do not have power and look for 
ways around the law. When opportunities arise, they play the law but refrain from engaging 
in criminal behaviour. They find ways to get things done.  
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Law Study, in 1988. This monograph presents an account of laws in the 1980s 
with a focus on historical and political developments since the 1880s, 
governments and legal system, criminal law, criminal procedure, fair trial 
procedures, constitutional guarantees, domestic relations and the law of 
contract. The fourth book has been authored by Nighat Mehroze Chishti, 
Constitutional Development in Afghanistan, which was printed in Pakistan in 
1998. Chishti’s book is based on articles written by the Pakistani writer, Dr 
Anwar Khan, the American archaeologist, anthropologist and scholar, Louis 
Dupree, and the Scottish statesman and historian, Mountstuart Elphinstone. 
These scholars and politician were not legal experts or legal historians. In her 
book, Chishti downplays Afghanistan’s constitutions and argues that all 
constitutions of Afghanistan failed to serve their intended purpose. Chishti’s 
work is not based on cases, examples, observations or primary or secondary 
legal materials.  
 
The fifth book on the rule of law in Afghanistan was edited by Whit Mason 
in 2011, titled, The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction. This 
book discusses Afghanistan’s legal developments since the beginning of the 
Western military intervention in 2001. A report completed by the Afghanistan 
Civil Society Forum Organisation (ASCFO) in 2011 titled “A First Step on a 
Long Journey: How People Define Violence and Justice in Afghanistan 1958-
2008” investigates violence and justice over half a century. This report relies 
on qualitative data collected through interviews and questionnaires.  
 
Shoaib Timory wrote an academic article in 2019 titled “Judicial Review and 
Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan: A Case of Inconsistency” 
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Timory investigates judicial review as a mechanism that protects the 
supremacy of the constitution.58 He concludes that while in Afghanistan there 
is some clarity on the subject of constitutional review and the role of the 
Supreme Court, constitutional interpretation is more controversial.59  
 
The sixth and most recent book on the rule of law in Afghanistan has been 
authored by Abdul Salim Amin in 2020, titled, Judicial Independence in 
Afghanistan. Amin focuses on the lack of judicial independence in 
Afghanistan and show cases how the judiciary is subservient to the executive 
branch. Amin separates personal independence of the judges from 
institutional and collective independence of the judicial authorities. Timory 
and Amin investigate important constitutional issues in regards to judicial 
independence, judicial review and highlight burgeoning problems of 
interferences of the executive branch on judicial institutions.   
 
There are a number of useful historical books which offer insights into 
Afghanistan’s history of the distant past as well as the more recent period. Ali 
Ahmad Kohzad a renowned Afghan historian is the first writer whose work 
describes pre-Islamic Afghanistan with great detail. His book 
AFGHANISTAN DAR PARTAW TARIKH [Afghanistan in the Light of 
History] was printed in Kabul in 2008. Abdul Hai Habibi, another historian 
from Afghanistan, has authored The History of Afghanistan after Islam. 
Habibi describes the pre-Islamic and Islamic eras in Afghanistan. There are 
other historical accounts on Afghanistan written by the political leader, Abdur 
                                                          
58 Timory, “Judicial Review and Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan,” 223. 
59 Timory, 224.  
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Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), and by two Afghan historians, Mir Mohammad 
Ghūbār and Faiz Mohammad Kāteb Hazāra.  
 
Nile Green, an American writer edited Afghanistan’s Islam: From 
Conversion to the Taliban in 2017, a book that provides insights into the 
history of Islam in Afghanistan as well as the socio-legal developments under 
different dynasties which emerged and disappeared in Afghanistan. Green 
identifies the dearth of historical investigations in regard to Afghanistan as 
follows:  
 
Afghanistan’s Islam has attracted little sustained study. Beyond a few 
monographs devoted to a particular movement or movements 
(predominantly mujāhedin and Taliban), there exists no survey of the 
developmental trajectories of Afghan religiosity across the course of 
history. The scholarship becomes particularly patchy for the period 
before the Soviet invasion of 1979, making it difficult to position the 
fundamentalist movements from the 1980s onward in relation to 
earlier patterns of religious activity, whether local or transnational.60   
 
Jonathan L. Lee has published a historical book that investigates 850 years of 
Afghanistan’s history from Genghis Khan’s conquests to the twenty-first 
century. Lee’s book, titled Afghanistan: A History from 1260 to the Present, 
was printed in 2018. This book contains rich historical information. The 
historical accounts described here do not discuss Afghanistan’s legal history 
or legal culture. However, in these books there are historical events that 
mirror Afghanistan’s people, society, government and rulers from past to 
present.  
                                                          
60  Green, Afghanistan’s Islam, xiii.  
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There are a large number of ethnographic, historical as well as legal books 
written in Dari-Farsi and Pashto languages on all aspects of Islamic law and 
Afghanistan’s customary law and formal laws. Most of these books have been 
printed from the 1990s to the present day.  
 
There are large number of reports, reviews, commentaries, articles, academic 
journals, books and book chapters that discuss Afghanistan’s society, its 
formal and informal institutions and governments, as well as its pluralistic 
legal traditions. Approximately ninety percent of these literature have been 
produced between 2001 and 2021. At the start of this thesis in 2014, there 
were fewer resources to work on. However, within just over six years, 
hundreds of journal articles, books and book chapters have emerged and most 
are in print, can be found in bookshops and university libraries or can be 
accessed in the public domain. Most of the said literature deals with 
Afghanistan’s affairs, including its law. There is also a growing number of 
dissertations at graduate and postgraduate levels completed by students from 
different universities around the world. This thesis benefits from the findings 
of several theses written on Afghanistan.    
 
3.3  Islamic Legal Developments in Afghanistan  
 
In his doctoral thesis, “Rule of Law Experts in Afghanistan: A Socio-Legal 
History of the First Afghan Constitution and the Indo-Ottoman Nexus in 
Kabul, 1860-1923,” completed at the University of California, Berkeley in 
2013, Faiz Ahmed uses archival research accessed in Turkey, India, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, England and the United States. The bulk of Ahmed’s 
research is drawn from archival data. Ahmed argues that legal developments 
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in Islamic societies developed due to the attempts of Muslim rulers and the 
ulemā (religious authority), who in the context of Afghanistan instigated an 
Indo-Afghan and Kabul Nexus in order to write Afghanistan’s first 
constitution in 1923.  
 
Ahmed’s thesis discounts the involvement of Western legal codes and 
constitutions that built the backbone of the Afghan, Iranian, Indian and 
Turkish constitutions as well as other laws. He downplays the important roles 
of the French and British legalities. This makes Ahmed’s doctoral thesis a 
document based on ex post facto historiography. Muslim legalists, leaders and 
academics initially based, and to date continue to base, their legal reforms and 
modernisation on Western models. Ahmed further claims that the fātawā-ye 
ālamgiri (Alamgiri Fatwās) of the Mughal Empire (1675) and the Ottoman 
Mujallah (1869-1876) were codified Islamic legal texts, and pre-dated the era 
of the worldwide legal progression of the nineteenth to the twentieth 
centuries. Historical evidence negate Ahmed’s arguments, as in all Islamic 
countries, constitutional models, criminal, family and civil codes were 
transplanted from Western models.   
 
3.4  Constitutions  
 
Shamshad Pasaraly completed his doctoral thesis, “Making the 2004 
Constitution: A History and Analysis Through the Lens of Coordination and 
Deferral Theory,” at the University of Washington in 2016. Pasarlay uses 
primary and secondary literature for the quantitative part of his research. The 
primary quantitative data are records of the Constitutional Committee that 
drafted Constitution 2004 for Afghanistan. As for the qualitative data, 
   
 
Page 62 of 531 
 
Pasarlay interviewed thirty-five members of the Constitutional Review 
Committee and two members from the Constitutional Drafting Commission 
who were not part of the Constitutional Review Committee.  
 
Pasarlay assesses the successes and failures of Afghanistan’s constitutions 
using coordination theory and deferral theory. Although Pasarlay’s research 
focuses on Constitution 2004, he also compares previous constitutions of 
Afghanistan using the constitutional theories: coordination and deferral. 
Pasarlay’s thesis is useful and enriches my research in assessing the 
constitutions of Afghanistan. There is a gap in Pasaraly’s research. He does 
not mention the governments’ inaction on the constitutional deferrals or 
assess the impact of such inactions. This issue shall be addressed in this thesis.    
 
Zoe Bernadette Sherman wrote her thesis “Afghanistan’s Constitutions: A 
comparative study and their implications for Afghan democratic 
development” at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, in 
2006. In her study, Sherman brings together history, cultural anthropology, 
political science and constitutional law theories. She focuses on past and 
recent academic literature that identifies the fragmentation of Afghanistan’s 
society and investigates the tribal life of a substantial proportion of its 
population. Sherman states that jirga (assembly of elders) has been 
incorporated into the national political system of Afghanistan. Sherman’s 
assessment of Afghanistan’s constitutions deal with issues such as ethnicity, 
tribes, fragmentation of society and legal and constitutional elements. 
 
3.5  Primary Justice  
 
   
 
Page 63 of 531 
 
Friedrike Stahlman edited “Exploring Primary Justice in Afghanistan” a 
report prepared for the Universitet Leiden and Cordaid, in 2016. Stahlman 
drew his research from eight case studies in the Behsud district of Nangarhar 
Province and the Istalif district of Kabul Province. The report relies on 
qualitative data and investigates land dispute claims in which  claimants had 
to explore a number of customary law mechanisms as well as formal 
institutions like the hoqūq department and the government courts.  
 
Stahlman asserts that women who actually addressed state institutions, 
whether it was the courts or the police, faced a set of risks. Even though their 
chances to gain access to rights denied to them under customary law (such as 
that of inheritance) should be better protected by state institutions, though the 
question remains if women actually stand a chance to procure them.61 The 
many accounts of verbal and physical abuse by members of the police and 
justice personnel show that this environment is easily hostile to women and 
their interests.62         
         
3.6  Informal Justice  
 
Ali Wardak’s famous essay, “Building a Post-War Justice System in 
Afghanistan,” written in 2004 offers the overarching hypothesis that the 
traditional customary laws of Afghanistan have not received adequate 
importance in the process of rebuilding or fixing Afghanistan’s judiciary.63 
Wardak argues that in order to empower the rule of law in Afghanistan, there 
must be a bottom-up approach whereby statutory and codified laws form the 
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guiding principles of a quasi-traditional and quasi-official court system. He 
concludes that the marriage of the two is likely to serve the best interests of 
justice in Afghanistan. Wardak’s research fails to include the problematic 
self-rule at village and district level, which erodes the advancements of state 
legal developments.  
 
In a report produced for Leiden University in 2016 titled “A Decade and Half 
of Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Justice System: An Overview”, Wardak argues 
that customary laws and Pashtūnwāli code are quite important for 
Afghanistan. His views on justice and law in the context of Afghanistan are 
in favour of tribal laws.64 Taking into account that my research does not 
support customary and tribal laws due to contradictory standards and 
arbitraries of outcomes, Wardak’s work does not help my research.    
Stahlman’s research demonstrates that customary law does not serve justice 
– a position supported in this thesis.  
 
3.7  Legal Pluralism 
 
Legal Pluralism can be understood as the application of different legal sources 
to identical cases.65 Sally Engle Merry classifies legal pluralism that stands at 
the intersections of indigenous and European law as classic legal pluralism, 
and legal pluralism in advanced industrial countries of Europe and the United 
States of America as new legal pluralism.66 This classification makes it easier 
for the researchers of legal pluralism to assess this concept in less developed 
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countries with more ease. In the context of Afghanistan, the applicable 
archetype of classic legal pluralism.  
     
Mustafa Yayali (undated) has completed his master’s thesis “Beyond the Law 
of the Nation-State: An Inquiry into the Theory of Legal Pluralism and 
Societal Law” at the LUISS Guido Carli University. He provides a detailed 
theoretical account of legal pluralism and uses Afghanistan as a case study. 
Using Bronislaw Malinowski’s theory of deep legal pluralism, Yayali 
describes norms, logic, values, individual, community and the formation of 
legal pluralistic cultures. He analyses legal pluralism’s conceptual disputes 
between the two prominent scholars of this subject, John Griffith and Brian 
Tamanaha. Yayali tests his research questions against numerous Western 
political theories.  
 
Yayali highlights that relations between the legal and the social in legal 
pluralism are highly ambiguous and almost paradoxical: separate but 
intertwined, autonomous but interdependent, closed but open.67 Yayali argues 
that this so-called doubled-faced character is just part and parcel of the 
underdevelopment of the concept of legal pluralism and an exemplification 
of an anomaly of another concept, namely that of modern state law.68 He 
identifies Afghanistan’s troubled mosaic of legal pluralism and suggests 
decentralisation and social-federalism as a solution for Afghanistan.69 Yayali 
draws a grim picture of constitutions of Afghanistan, claiming all 
constitutions of Afghanistan failed, as they were drawn on the pre-modern 
                                                          
67 Yayali, “Legal Pluralism and Societal Law,” 15. 
68 Yayali, 16. 
69 Yayali, 102-5. 
   
 
Page 66 of 531 
 
nature of the country by weak governments which did not promote a 
constitutional culture. Yayali pays cursory attention to the constitutions of 
Afghanistan, failing to note that some constitutional elements worked while 
some others did not.   
 
The International Council on Human Rights Policy published a report in 2009 
on legal pluralism titled “When Legal Worlds Overlap: Human Rights, and 
Non-State Law.” This report describes legal orders and legal plurality in 
different countries, under various cultural, ethnic and tribal settings. The 
report is indispensable for assessing legal pluralism in any society.  
 
Geoffrey J. Swenson completed his DPhil thesis “Addressing Crises of Order: 
Judicial State-building in the Wake of Conflict” at Pembroke College in 2015. 
His thesis provides theoretical information on legal pluralism under various 
settings. The focus of the thesis is Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. Swenson 
maintains that his research “aims to offer an understanding of legal 
pluralism’s implications for post-conflict state-building and the influence of 
policymakers’ responses, and domestic and international judicial state-
building efforts in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, which serve as case 
studies.”70 He uses case study as his methodology, in which the questions 
“How?” and “Why?” regarding a contemporary set of events can be 
answered.  
 
Swenson adopts John Gerring’s definition of an in-depth study of a single unit 
and process tracing technique which requires extensive data. He uses a mix 
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of primary and secondary sources relating to state-building and legal 
pluralism in general, and efforts made in Afghanistan in particular. The 
completion of the thesis involved interviewing key stakeholders related to 
post-conflict judicial state-building and legal pluralism in Kabul in January 
and February 2014. Swenson’s research is a comprehensive piece of 
academic literature on Afghanistan’s legal pluralism and judicial state-
building. It concludes that legal pluralism has not been successful in 
Afghanistan, and a number of failures have led to the transition of the 
competitive legal pluralism archetype into combative, rather than cooperative. 
Swenson’s findings on legal pluralism in Afghanistan will strengthen this 
research.                  
 
3.8  Legal Transplants 
 
Alan Watson describes legal transplants as the moving of a rule or a system 
of law from one county to another, or from one people to another.71 The first 
doctoral thesis written on legal transplants in Afghanistan was completed by 
John Jupp, titled “Legal transplants: Appropriate tools for the reform of 
Afghanistan’s criminal law framework? An evaluation of the Interim 
Criminal Procedure Code 2004 and the Counter Narcotics Law” at the 
University of Sussex in 2011. Jupp’s research benefits this thesis on legal 
transplants. However, the author shall assess legal transplants over a longer 
period of time. 
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3.9  Law in Action 
 
Antonio De Lauri, a cultural anthropologist and an academic, has observed 
Afghan judges during court sessions (trials) and has interviewed legal 
professionals in Kabul. He has produced several papers, two famous ones 
being “Legal Reconstruction in Afghanistan’s rule of law, Injustice, and 
Judicial Mediation,” and “Law in Afghanistan: A Critique of Post-2001 
Reconstruction.” De Lauri assesses legal behaviour in formal adjudications 
and informal mediations through the lens of an Afghan judge. He voices some 
degree of criticism for certain aspects of foreign-led rule of law projects for 
Afghanistan. De Lauri observes Afghanistan’s state of legal affairs from a 
judge’s perspective to explore why judges use mediation, arbitration and 
peace-making between litigants rather than applying abstract laws to put 
criminals behind bars and compensate the victims.  
 
In 2018, Siavash Rahbari, coordinator at the International Development Law 
Organisation (IDLO) in Afghanistan, wrote that armed conflict and 
corruption are fundamental challenges to the rule of law.72 This thesis agrees 
with this part of Rahbari’s findings. However, his research overlooks the 
deep-rooted problems of law and legal institutions of Afghanistan by not 
addressing challenges such as growing religious radicalisation in the state 
education system; the existence of traditional political mechanisms such as 
jirga, Shūrā and Loya Jirga and the incoherence of legal pluralism in 
Afghanistan.  
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Rahbari justifies serious challenges of the constitutionally mandated 
relationship between state law, international obligations, Islamic principles 
and customary norms as a product of the bifurcated legal education system of 
law and Shariá tracks73 and asserts that courts have become more likely to use 
the law and are more pragmatic and organised.74 Rahbari further identifies 
that Afghanistan’s fractured plural legal system shows some signs of cohesion 
and coherence75 and that the parliament of Afghanistan cannot fulfil its 
constitutional mandate leaving the legislative prerogative of law-making to 
the presidents of Afghanistan.76 These are Rahbari’s broad statements which 
cannot be proven by the available evidence on Afghanistan. Rahbari’s 
research fails to describe the institutional problems, limitations to women’s 
rights and their access to justice; it does not tackle virginity testing or the 
abuse of law for political purposes, the selective adjudication of corruption 
cases, and the unfounded accusations of apostasy and blasphemy. This thesis 
notes the progress in the context of law, judiciary, judgeship and the 
dispensation of justice as well as in institution building, but does not agree 




Fayez Amiri wrote a master’s thesis titled “Curriculum Matters: An Analysis 
of Primary Schools’ National Curriculum in Afghanistan Post 9/11” 
completed at the Lehigh University in 2016. Amiri studies nine text books 
from grades one, two and three of the primary school curriculum of 
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75 Rahbari, 289. 
76 Rahbari, 292. 
   
 
Page 70 of 531 
 
Afghanistan. The subjects he assesses are Dari (language), maths and life 
skills. The schoolbooks under study were published between 2011 and 2012. 
Using critical discourse analysis theory, Amiri looks into Afghanistan’s 
undertakings in delivering primary education to its citizens. The main focus 
of his study includes how the new curriculum and textbooks tackle the 
teaching of tradition, religion, moral values, and gender issues. Amiri’s study 
aims to understand how political ideas are contemplated in primary school 
textbooks.  
 
The findings of his study show that in primary school books representation of 
women generally reflect patriarchal and religious traditions as well as 
stereotypes.77 Women are portrayed as passive and silent, while men are 
actively involved in various important activities.78 Amiri discuses overt and 
covert messages delivered by the curriculum. He elaborates that covertly, the 
curriculum aims for children to be raised in the Islamic faith and the absence 
of lessons on other religions means that none of the children realise that other 
religions are practised in the world.79 Amiri concludes that a range of 
religious and political indoctrinations, the appeal to nationalism and excessive 
focus on moral teachings lead to exclusivity, repression, conflict, inequal 
gender portrayals and lastly, overlooking democracy.80      
 
Rohullah Azizi and Charles A. Erickson wrote an article in 2015 titled “Legal 
Education Reform in Afghanistan.” This joint study investigates legal 
education at the law schools and Shari’a schools of public universities in 
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Afghanistan. This was a qualitative study using discussions with informal 
focus groups of academics and students through interviewing educators and 
members of the legal community as well as using quantitative data from 
organisations which support legal education in Afghanistan. The researchers 
investigate the duality of the faculty of law and the faculty of Shari’a, which 
produce inconsistent outcomes. They highlight the lack of coordination of 
legal education between the Ministry of Higher Education, judicial 
institutions, the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA), law 
schools and Shari’a schools.       
 
3.11 Society and Government  
 
Senzil Nawid completed her doctoral thesis “Aman-Allah and the Afghan 
‘Ulama’: Reaction to Reforms, 1919-29” at the University of Arizona in 
1987. For completion of her thesis, Nawid used primary sources, personal 
interviews and official publications by the Afghanistan government, 
periodicals, newspapers, reports on parliamentary debates, British and 
Afghan archival materials and data supplied by Afghan and Western 
historians. Nawid’s thesis is important to this research in many ways. It is the 
first comprehensive doctoral thesis that pays special attention to the ulemā’s 
role in society and government from 1747 until the thesis’s cut-off year: 1929.   
 
Although for the periods 1919 to 1929 and later years there are several books 
like those of Leon Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929 
(1973); Tally Stewart Rhea, Fire in Afghanistan, 1914-1929 (2000); Vartan 
Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (1969); Amin Saikal, 
Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (2012); and 
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Mohammad Nazif Shahrani, Modern Afghanistan: The impact of 40 years of 
war (2018), these books do not adequately investigate the ulemā’s role in 
society and politics in the preceding decades. Nawid’s thesis is helpful in 
assessing the state-ulemā nexus at a time when political leaders attempted to 
institutionalise justice that was the ulemā’s domain.      
 
In his book Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History published in 2010, 
Thomas Jefferson Barfield offers anthropological insights into Afghanistan’s 
ethnic groups, society and its kinship-based political system. There are 
invaluable sociological and anthropological insights in Barfield’s book and 
research articles on Afghanistan.  
 
Timur Sharan completed a doctoral thesis titled “The Network Politics of 
International Statebuilding: Intervention and Statehood in Post-2001 
Afghanistan” at the University of Exeter in 2013. Sharan employs 
ethnography, including participatory observation and in-depth interviews. His 
fieldwork was a mix of covert and overt ethnographic studies. Observations 
in the Lower House of Parliament for candidate campaign headquarters 
during the 2009 presidential election involved covert fieldwork. Sharan’s 
research provides good insights into understanding Afghanistan’s history of 
statehood and how networked politics in Afghanistan affect the creation of a 
popular and representative government.    
 
Mohammad Attar Abkenār completed his doctoral thesis titled “Resistance to 
the Government in Afghanistan’s Modern History: A Case Study Approach” 
at the Università degli Studi di Ferrara in Italy in 2015. Abkenār uses 
methodical case studies of two governments of Afghanistan. He scrutinizes 
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historical contexts of two selected cases: the conceptual model for state-
making and reform-making. Abkenār investigates the semi-totalitarian 
regime of King Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929) and the People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan’s government under the Soviet hegemony (1978-1979). 
His rationale for selecting these two different regimes is for their differences 
– spanning a monarchy and a period of democratic rule.  
 
Barnet Rubin, an American political analyst, academic, researcher and 
expatriate legal expert involved in the drafting of Constitution 2004, authored 
The Fragmentation of Afghanistan in 2002. This book provides a vivid 
account of Afghanistan’s political events in recent decades. Rubin discusses 
the political implications for Afghanistan, leading to various coups, and the 
causes of internally and externally driven conflicts in Afghanistan.  
 
3.12 War, Insurgency and Para-State Institutions  
 
Rebecca Young Greven completed her doctoral thesis “An Analysis of State 
Building: The Relationship between Pashtun ‘Para-State’ Institutions and 
Political Instability in Afghanistan” at the University of South Florida in 
2014. In her research, Greven describes the relationship between para-state 
institutions (armed networks or institutions which challenge the state) and 
political instability. She undertook to investigate the lacunae between the 
Afghan state and its population. Greven draws her research on quantitative 
data for state-building and, as methodology she uses the case-study of para-
state groups during the communist regime from 1979 to 1989 and the Taliban 
regime from 1994 to 2001.  
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Danny Singh completed a thesis for the degree of Master of Philosophy “An 
Investigation of Corruption and Clientelism in Afghanistan Hindering Law 
Enforcement: With a Specific Case Study in the Afghan National Police” at 
the University of York in 2012. Singh conducted field visits to Kabul and 
Bamiyan in May and June 2010 and, using semi-structured interviews and a 
focus group as well as a snowball-sampling network. He interviewed seventy 
individuals – mainly elites in the security and justice sector. Singh’s main 
focus is the study of corruption as one of the most egregious problems of 
failing states, in the context of Afghanistan’s government. This dissertation, 
as well as Singh’s article “Explaining varieties of corruption in the Afghan 
Justice Sector,” will inform the author’s understanding of corruption and 
political economy in Afghanistan.  
 
In many ways, Greven’s, Sharan’s and Singh’s doctoral theses offer useful 
scholarly insight on different aspects of society, state and political system, 
and illustrate the less-known long durée (length of time) underlying causes of 
state fragility and state collapse in Afghanistan. These are indispensable 
scholarly works highlighting state fragility from international relations and 
development perspectives. This thesis does not view the donors’ assistance 
and INGOs help in isolation from the bigger picture of legal developments in 
Afghanistan. The distribution of aid and the intellectual support (training, 
logistics, infrastructure) offered by the international community complements 
the instituting of legal frameworks, including the formation of elements of 
legal culture in Afghanistan. This view is also supported by the forty 
questionnaire respondents, all of whom stated that without international 
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support, Afghanistan’s government would not have been able to develop its 
legal institutions.           
 
3.13 Ethnographic Research on Tribal Life  
 
“The Socioeconomic and Legal-Political Processes in a Pashtūn Village, 
South Eastern Afghanistan” is a DPhil thesis completed by Alef Shah Zadrān 
in 1974. In order to complete his thesis, Zadran conducted formal and 
informal interviews and collected genealogical data. He used Arabic, English, 
Persian and Pashto sources relevant to his study. The study used traditional 
ethnography that presented details of kinship, descent, marriage and 
nomenclature systems of the people of Almara village, as well as describing 
the technology, economic and market system, and their system of ideology 
and values.  
 
Zadrān uses structural-functional analysis and case study method. His work 
is an extensive study of Pashtūns’ life in the 1970s. It details Pashtūnwāli 
norms and customs being practised in a Pashtūn-populated village. Numerous 
academics, anthropologists, writers and researchers quote Zadrān’s work. 
Taken that developmental work of the past governments of Afghanistan 
mainly focused on the urban centres, and rural areas were neglected, the cases 
cited by Zadrān still hold relevance to Afghanistan in 2021, as modernisation 
and development have not left a noticeable imprint on the rural parts of 
Afghanistan.   
3.14 Literature on non-Islamic Religious Monitories   
 
The search at the British Library for books on the religions of Afghanistan 
was not fruitful. There were a couple of titles written in the Hebrew language 
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which I could not read or use. There are, however, two useful books on the 
life of Jewish Afghans. From Kabul to Queens: The Jews of Afghanistan and 
their move to the United States written by Sara Aharon in 2011. The second 
book, A Political and Economic History of the Jews of Afghanistan, was 
authored by Sara Koplik in 2015. These books provide the everyday life 
conditions of Afghanistan’s Jewish population from before the two world 
wars until their flight to Europe, Israel and the United States in the 1950s and 
later years. There is a book in Farsi which dedicates a chapter to the Jews of 
Afghanistan, written by Sayed Tayeb Jawad, the ambassador of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan in Russia. The book is titled Be the Provider of 
Relief, Not an Inquisitor of Belief, printed in 2016. Jawad describes the 
everyday struggles of the Jews of Afghanistan and identifies research 
limitations in historical literature on Afghanistan’s Jewish people.         
 
Ester Frogel from Afghan Jewish parents has examined the acculturation 
experiences of Afghan Jewish immigrants living in the United States. In her 
PhD thesis titled “Afghan Jews and their children: In a qualitative study 
exploring the lived experiences and psychological impact of acculturation on 
first and second-generation traditional Afghan Jewish immigrants” completed 
at the Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts in May 2015, Frogel 
uses qualitative research, adopting a phenomenological approach to examine 
the experiences of six male and female first-generation, and six male and 
female second-generation Afghan Jewish immigrants residing in the United 
States of America. Frogel uses semi-structured interviews. The research 
method model to complete her psychology thesis was thematic analysis, a 
qualitative research method suited for identifying, analysing, and reporting 
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patterns within data. Frogel’s thesis will empower mine in the section relevant 
to the lives of the Afghan Jews. 
 
To this present day, there have only been two books written on Afghanistan’s 
Hindus and Sikhs. The first one, in Farsi, was written by the Germany-based 
Ichawar Dass: We the old dwellers of this land, in 2003. The second book was 
written by Inderjeet Singh: Afghan Hindus and Sikhs: History of a Thousand 
Years, in 2019. Dass and Singh highlight the Hindus’ bravery in defending 
Afghanistan against the Arab invaders and focus on their historical roots that 
go back to before the Islamisation of Afghanistan in the ninth century. The 
most recent ethnographic research on the lives of the Hindus and Sikhs of 
Afghanistan is an undergraduate dissertation by Nadia Salihi, completed in 
Farsi language at Shaheed Professor Rabbani Educational University in 
Kabul in 2019. This dissertation is titled “Hindus and Sikhs People’s 
Background.” Salihi’s thesis is drawn from quantitative data.  
 
Hafizullah Emadi has written two research papers describing the plight of 
Sikh and Hindu women. Fabrizio Foschini from the Afghanistan Analyst 
Network wrote an article, “The Other Fold of the Turban: Afghanistan’s 
Hindus and Sikhs,” in 2013. Afghanistan-based Porsesh Research & Studies 
Organisation produced a brief research paper (eighteen pages) in 2010. The 
same organisation produced Survey of the Afghan Hindus and Sikhs in 
February 2019. This research is available in Dari, Pashto and English.  
 
3.15 Women and Gender Injustices  
 
Torunn Wimpelmann completed her doctoral thesis titled “The Price of 
Protection: Gender, violence and power in Afghanistan” at SOAS University 
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of London in March 2013. Through an ethnographic lens, Wimpelmann 
examines shifting demarcations of domains, notions of gender, personhood 
and obligations, rights and entitlements as articulated in specific instances of 
contestation over gender violence. In order to complete her thesis, 
Wimpelmann carried out field research in Afghanistan in the summers of 
2009 and 2010. She uses ethnographic and comparative feminist scholarship 
to discuss gender issues and the plight of Afghan women in their struggle for 
recognition and protection. Her thesis records interviews with one hundred 
and forty-five individuals and organisations – including interviews and 
conversations with members of the foreign aid and diplomatic community in 
Kabul and beyond.81  
 
Wimpelmann uses the extended case study method that sits well with feminist 
methodology and is inseparable from ontological and epidemiologic 
perspectives as well as rejecting a dualistic distinction between actor and 
structure, object and subject.82 She uses two local researchers to conduct some 
interviews. In her case, the government institutions and courts were not 
helpful and did not provide the information needed.83 Wimpelmann’s 
research looks at the development of the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women (EVAW) law in different stages, where she personally attended 
conferences and parliamentary debates. Wimpelmann wrote The Pitfalls of 
Protection: Gender, Violence, and Power in Afghanistan in 2017, a book that 
was drawn from research conducted in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2015.   
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3.16 Honour and Patriarchy Affecting Women   
 
Sonia Ahsan authored a doctoral thesis titled “States of Honor: Sexual  Ethics 
and the Politics of Promiscuity in Afghanistan” at the Columbia University 
in 2015. Ahsan carried out field-work at a khane-aman (women’s shelter) in 
Kabul in 2011 and 2012. Ahsan described the khane-aman as a unique space 
for adulterous women waiting for their deaths or to be circulated back into 
the honour system of Pakhtūnwāli and Shari’a.84 Pakhtūnwāli is a spelling 
variation of Pashtūnwāli, mainly pronounced by Pakistani Pashtūns.  
 
Ahsan conducted ethnographic fieldwork through participant observation at 
the khane-aman in Kabul where she documented and observed conversations 
with women undergoing trials for adultery, fornication and promiscuity. 
Ethnographic study of honour and promiscuity through investigating 
Pashtūnwāli and Shari’a and highlighting the experiences of a group of 
Afghan women illustrates the wider patterns of societal discrimination, 
marginalisation and excessive punishments exercised against women who 
stand accused of transgressing moral boundaries. Ahsan’s and 
Wimpelmann’s research are complementary and useful for understanding the 
sufferings of Afghanistan’s women in private spaces, society, and seldom in 
the government settings.               
 
3.17 Diversity in the Choice of Literature 
 
This thesis shall mainly be using primary and secondary sources– some of 
which was written more than one hundred and fifty years ago. It also uses 
recent publications. On certain topics, different scholars and historians who 
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have produced secondary or tertiary literature are so much opposed to each 
other that it is perfectly essential to quote both old and new literature in order 
to appraise how much they have changed. On the extensive subject of the 
legal history and the legal culture of Afghanistan over two hundred and 
seventy-three years, the author does not limit his work to literature produced 
in any particular historical period.   
 
In some parts of this thesis, some scholars’ works have been serially quoted.  
Examples are Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Alef Shah Zadrān and Nile Green. 
Kamali has followed Afghanistan’s legal progression from the 1960s to the 
present day. Whilst there are many great legal experts around, as for the 
expertise on Afghanistan’s legal studies, there are few scholars such as 
Kamali who have obtained knowledge and experience specifically of 
Afghanistan’s laws for a continuous and sustained period of time. The author 
is aware that many books are written on Afghanistan. Most are the personal 
accounts of their writers, are mainly fictional or use novel writing methods 
which create fascinating reading; however, these books are not suitable or 
relevant for this thesis.  
 
3.18 Political Economy Analysis theory   
 
Political economy analysis (PEA), a field-research methodology that emerged 
in the 1990s as a tool used by donors to unpick how power, is used to manage 
resources and, as such, is especially valuable for exploring the role that 
political will has on enabling or undermining reform and progress.85 
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Alejandro Foxley, the Chilean Minister of Finance, provides an in-depth 
description of political economy:  
 
Economists must not only know their economic models, but also 
understand politics, interests, conflicts, passions – the essence of 
collective life. For a brief period of time you could make changes by 
decree; but to let them persist, you have to build coalitions and bring 
people around. You have to be a politician.86  
 
 
The Department of International Development (DFID) describes political 
Economy Analysis (PEA) as a powerful tool for improving the effectiveness 
of aid.87 Bridging the traditional concerns of politics and economics, it 
focuses on how power and resources are distributed and contested in different 
contexts, and the implications for development outcomes. Furthermore, it gets 
beneath the formal structures to reveal the underlying interests, incentives and 
institutions that enable or frustrate change.88 International donors make every 
attempt to deliver international aid effectively and use PEA89 or the applied 
political economy analysis90 as a benchmark of effectiveness. A PEA lens 
may consider different ways that wealth is being distributed to the 
beneficiaries and may involve corruption, abuse of official position and 
nepotism. In the context of Afghanistan, different ways of appropriation and 
misappropriation of aid money may be assessed through the PEA lens.           
 
There are a number of studies of PEA in the context of Afghanistan. Sara 
Koplik highlights the 1930s state monopoly of trade through Bank-i Milli by 
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then finance minister, Abdul Majid Khan Zabuli, whose discriminatory 
actions through the guise of economic development affected the Hindu, Sikh, 
Jewish and the Soviet refugees in the north of Afghanistan, minorities who 
were involved in mercantile activities and the export trade.91 Mohammad 
Najeeb Azizi and Shoji Haruna provide a brief history of development from 
1890 to 1930s and scrutinise past economic practices, whilst focusing on 
historical and social changes, economic structures and strategies of 
Afghanistan with an account of (i) political vision, (ii) institutional reforms, 
(iii) economic agendas, and (iv) development progress.92  
 
Tom Ginsburg assesses the intellectual aspect of political economy, where he 
concludes in his study of “An economic interpretation of Pashtūnwāli, that 
through obtaining an education, private vengeance exercised under the 
Pashtūnwāli code may result in fewer disputes and conflicts, and that 
empowering individuals through education, in turn reduces crime rates.93 In 
his study of the practical impacts of network politics in Afghanistan in 2013, 
Timur Sharan finds that political actions are reinforced through a series of 
different strategies including interfamilial marriage, gifts, partnerships and 
societal reciprocities based on identity-based divisions such as ethnicity, 
tribe, clan and kin.94  
 
The most recent study of PEA in the context of Afghanistan was conducted 
by Strand et al. in 2017.95 The study assesses PEA in politics of the state; 
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regional dimensions; the politics of economy; women’s position, rights and 
gender equality; security and reforms; peace processes; the judiciary; human 
rights; development and humanitarian aid and the Afghan state.   
 
3.19 Intersectionality theory  
 
Truscan and Bourke argue that intersectionality theory is being adopted in 
international conventions.96 The description of intersectionality by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw is as follows: 
 
Intersectionality is what occurs when a woman from minority group 
[…] tries to navigate the main crossing in the city […] The main 
highway is “racism road”. One cross street can be Colonialism, the 
Patriarchy Street […] She has to deal not only with one form of 
oppression but with all forms, those named as road signs, which link 
together to make a double, triple, a many blanket of oppression.97    
 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, the special rapporteur to the UN Secretariat on 
violence against women, stated that the term intersectionality had become 
tremendously popular and is used in various UN and NGO forums.98 On 23 
April 2002, at the 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
resolution E/CN.4/2002/L.59 on the human rights of women in its first 
paragraph “[…] recognised the importance of examining the intersection of 
multiple forms of discrimination, including their root causes from a gender 
perspective.” 99 The literature on intersectionality highlights the fact that, as 
a theory, intersectionality is becoming more prominent and widely used.  
 
                                                          
96 Truscan and Bourke, “Intersectional Discrimination,” 124-5. The CEDAW Committee 
adopted intersectionality theory in its General Recommendation No. 28 in 2010, 
Recommendation No. 30 in 2013, Recommendation No. 33 in 2015 and Recommendation 
No. 34 in 2016. 
97 Yuval-Davies, “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics,”196.  
98 Yuval-Davies, 194.  
99 Yuval-Davies, 194. 
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Intersectionality involves the study of the ways race, gender, disability, 
sexuality, class, age and other social categories are mutually shaped and 
interrelated through forces such as colonialism, neo-liberalism, geopolitics 
and cultural configurations to produce shifting relations of power and 
oppression.100 Some scholars have translated intersectionality into a 
methodology101 that may be applied to a wide range of cases where multiple 
factors intersect, such as identity formation, nationalism, gender oppression 
as well as religious persecution. For example, in Afghanistan, a woman 
without a male guardian may encounter several levels of oppression such as 
societal discrimination and strict interpretations of the gender role when in 
need of state protection, or she may receive unfavourable outcomes if she 
files a lawsuit against a man. In such a case, there are multiple forms of 
injustices that a woman suffers. Rejecting to investigate an application by the 
police and potential patriarchal interpretations of a judge are two axes of 
injustice.  
 
Feminist theories may not be used as widely as intersectionality in order to 
assess multiple forms of oppression intersecting at different junctures. For 
instance, a Shi’a Muslim of the Ismaili branch and from Hazāra ethnic group 
may face several levels of discriminatory encounters by members of other 
ethnic groups, by her co-religionists, the Twelver Shi’a Muslims whose 
religious doctrines differ. The government of Afghanistan does not recognise 
Ismaili jurisprudence or its legal doctrines. This limitation affects the Islamili 
people in the justice system. For a female Ismaili, more layers of hardship and 
                                                          
100 Rice, Harrison, and Friedman, “Doing justice to intersectionality,” 1. 
101 Rice, Harrison, and Friedman, 4. 
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discrimination may amass, which may involve her marginalisation based on 
faith, ethnic group identity as well as gender. Issues such as these evoke 
several levels on the intersectional spectrum. Crenshaw’s intersectionality 
theory – although initially framed as black feminist activism in the United 
States of America – in the context of weak states such as Afghanistan, is, in 
the author’s opinion, a useful theory.  
 
3.20  Case study and Process Tracing  
 
Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pederson define process-tracing methods as 
tools to study causal mechanisms in a single-case research design.102 In 
process tracing there are three variants within social science: theory testing, 
theory building and explaining outcome.103 The variant applicable to this 
thesis is explaining outcome. Case study and process tracing in mixed 
methods research requires case selection strategies in explaining-outcome 
process tracing driven by a strong interest in accounting for a particular 
outcome.104 The outcome expected in this thesis is to test whether legal 
transplants have resulted in forming a culture of legality in Afghanistan. The 
focal point of the case study in the post-2001 period demonstrates the 
                                                          
102 Beach and Pederson, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines, 2.   
103 Beach and Pederson, 3. Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pederson describe the three 
variants of process tracing: Theory-testing process tracing deduces a theory from the existing 
literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of a hypothesized causal 
mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within-case inferences about whether the 
mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was 
present. No claims can be made, however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause 
of the outcome. Theory-building process tracing seeks to build a generalisable theoretical 
explanation from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists 
from the facts of a particular case. Although this type of process tracing is analytically useful, 
to our knowledge, the literature offers no guidelines about how to proceed with this approach. 
Explaining-outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a 
puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general 
theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where 
the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented. 
104 Beach and Pederson, 156.  
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instrumentalisation of legality, where the state often uses and disposes of legal 




This chapter has shown a diverse body of research and analysis on 
Afghanistan, most of which strengthen my research. The literature assessed 
and listed contains information that supports my arguments throughout this 
thesis. In some instances, the available data may be influential and in other 
cases they may not be. The qualitative data gathered through questionnaires 
and interviews fill in some research gaps and lacunas.  
 
With a view to observe the legal landscape in Afghanistan, it is imperative to 
look at the more ostensible sources of legal guidance, which is of course 
Islamic law, and the manners in which it has been promulgated and codified 
throughout the ages in Afghanistan – the context in which they came to being, 
and the way it has been interpreted and implemented is undoubtedly critical 
to gaining a key insight into the larger mosaic of Afghan legal culture. The 
next section provides an introduction to Islamic law.             
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CHAPTER 4: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 
 
4 Introduction   
 
This chapter provides a brief history of Islamic law (Shari’a) with some 
explanations indispensable for understanding the genesis and its varied 
definitions and components. In the first part, historical roots of Shari’a will 
be explored. Then, the diversity and Shari’a’s pluralistic forms will be 
described. A number of viewpoints will be presented focusing on scholarly 
opinions on Shari’a law and its status before concluding the chapter. The 
rationale for explaining Islamic law (Shari’a) concepts here is to provide the 
general context between the technicalities around Shari’a, and then 
demonstrate how it has been implemented in Afghanistan, which are 
explained in more detail in the subsequent chapters.      
 
4.1 The Genesis of Shari’a  
 
In Arabic, Shari’a means the clear, well-trodden “path to water”; in Islamic 
terminology, however, it is used to refer to matters that God has legislated for 
Muslims.105 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, writer and lecturer at the Emory 
Law School in the United States of America, states that the primary sources 
of Shari’a are the Qur’an and the Sunna, understood in the context of early 
Muslim communities, initially in Medina –  the town in western Arabia where 
the Prophet of Islam established a state in 622 C.E. – and subsequently 
throughout the region known now as the Middle East.106  
                                                          
105 Ahmed and Gouda, “Measuring Constitutional Islamisation,” 26. 
106 An-Naim, “Shari’a in the Secular State,” 324. 
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Other sources, subject to slight variations among the Sunni and Shi’a 
Muslims, regard consensus (ijmā), reasoning by analogy (qiyās), and 
relatively independent juridical reasoning (ijtihād) where there is no 
applicable text in the Qur’an and Sunna as part of Shari’a.107 Hamid Khan 
states that in over fifty nations, Muslims form the majority religious 
community and number some 1.6 billion people worldwide, making Islam the 
world’s second-largest religion, and as a consequence, one of the most 
subscribed legal systems in the world.108 
 
Fiqh is the jurisprudential corpus of Islamic law (Shari’a) that applies to all 
legal matters in an Islamic society that is ruled by Shari’a. The Schools of 
fiqh were formulated by the medieval jurists Ja´far Sādeq (700-765 C.E.), a 
descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, and his disciples, Abu Hanifa, Malik 
ibn Anas, Al-Shafi’i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Their schools of jurisprudence 
were named after them as Ja’fari, Hanafi, Imam Azam, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. 
Shi’a Islam’s schools of jurisprudence are the Twelver, Ismaili and Zaidi. 
Fiqh, which is the jurisprudential application of Shari’a varies from society 
to society and from time to time.109 
 
According to Rudolph Peters, writer and lecturer at the University of 
Amsterdam, in the classical textbooks of fiqh, criminal law is not regarded as 
a single, unified branch of the law. It is discussed in three separate chapters: 
(1) provisions regarding offences against persons, i.e., homicide and 
wounding subdivided into (a) those regarding retaliation (qisās) and (b) those 
                                                          
107 An-Naim, 324. 
108 Khan, “Practitioners Guide to Islamic Law,” 11. 
109 Halper, “Legal Realism in Tehran,” 45. 
 
   
 
Page 89 of 531 
 
regarding financial compensation (diya); (2) provisions regarding offences 
mentioned in the Qur’an and constituting violations of the claim of God 
(huqūq Allah), with mandatory fixed punishments (hadd, plural hudūd) for 
(a) theft, (b) banditry, (c) unlawful sexual intercourse, (d) the unfounded 
accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse (slander), (e) drinking alcohol, (f) 
apostasy (according to some schools of jurisprudence) and (g) provisions 
concerning discretionary punishment of sinful or forbidden behaviour or of 
acts endangering public order or state security (ta’zir and siyāsa).110 The 
restrictive components of fiqh may be regulations for the relationship between 
men and women in the family and in the society at large.  
 
4.2 The Islamic Legal Authority   
 
Here, I shall discuss Islamic legal authority which ascertains, interprets and 
develops and has a role in the enforcement of Shari’a. Ibn Taymiyya, the 
medieval Sunni scholar, regarded the ulemā as the heirs of the prophets.111 
This argument is used by the ulemā to assign to themselves the right to govern 
an Islamic society. This ruling as well as other prophetic hadiths, and some 
references in the Qur’an provide the foundations of the ulemā’s theory of 
Islamic governance. Mohammad Hashim Kamali argues that one of the 
salient principles of government prescribed in the Qur’an, Shūrā 
(consultation), requires the head of the state and government leaders to 
conduct community affairs through consultation with community 
members.112  
                                                          
110 Peters, Crime and Punishment, 7. 
111 Lambton, "State and Government in Medieval Islam,” 139.  
112 Kamali, Freedom, Equality and Justice, 40. 
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Hamilton Gibbs comments that the Islamic theory of Government gives the 
citizen as such no place or function except as taxpayer and submissive 
subject.113 The ulemā, reading, interpreting and re-interpreting Shari’a from 
the Qur’an, hadiths of the Prophet Mohammad, rely on earlier ulemā’s 
consensus (ijmā) or build new formulations of their own and use their 
knowledge for analogy (qiyās). The ulemā create a body or a religious Canon, 
or Shari’a rulings called fiqh. Due to the centrality of the Islamic seminary 
education of the ulemā, regardless of which modern institutions of 
government regulate and enforce Islamic laws, the ulemā have a strong role 
in its theory and practice.  
 
An institution in which members of the ulemā are known as jurist-consults,114 
offers legal opinions on emerging legal situations called fatwās. There are 
different types of fatwās on different issues. For instance, Khaleej Times 
reports a fatwā issued in Dubai where the ulemā determined that using the 
Wi-Fi service of others without their consent is considered fraud and theft, 
making it prohibited in Islam.115 In Malaysia, the National Fatwā Council 
were asked to issue a fatwā as to whether Botox injections were permissible 
for Muslims.116 In countries where literacy is low and citizens have basic 
understanding of Islam, fatwās are sought much more than in literate and 
developed societies. For instance, in Afghanistan and Yemen there may be 
higher requests for fatwās, than there is in Iran, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.  
                                                          
113 Kamali, 17.  
114 Masud, Messick, and Powers, “Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation,” 3.  
115 Shaban, “Fatwa for using Wi-Fi without consent,” last accessed 19 October 2020.  
116 Aljazeera International, “Malaysia awaits Botox fatwa,” last accessed 19 October 2020. 
 
   
 
Page 91 of 531 
 
Due to the rationale used in fatwā formulations that is similar to other Shari’a 
matters (with the exception of hadd crimes and family fiqh), a fatwā 
highlights how the Islamic legal authority issues opinio juris verdicts and how 
it functions. A fatwā from late Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Bazz, the Mufti from 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on photography, is as follows:  
 
Response to a question about (Taswir) painting, drawing, sculptor, 
and photography. Q: Is it permissible for a person to photograph 
himself and send his photos to his family during the times of ‘Eid and 
similar occasions? A: There are many Hadiths of Allah’s Messenger 
(peace be upon him) that declare the prohibition of Taswir and curse 
those who do it, promising them severe punishment. Therefore, it is 
not permissible for a Muslim to take photos of himself or of any other 
being that has a soul except when necessary. For example, for 
passports, ID cards, etc. We ask Allah to set aright the affairs of all 
Muslims and to help our rulers adhere to His Shari’ah and keep away 
from all that is contrary to it. He is the best to ask for help. Allah is 
the One Who grants success.117   
    
 
In a number of underdeveloped Islamic societies where the law and legal 
institutions are not strong and where the state or non-state forces do not 
enforce the law, the abuse of ill-conceived fatwās may lead to actions that are 
inhumane and degrading, such as punishments, beatings, torture and killing 
of individuals on cursory matters – often these behaviours are enmeshed in 
defence of honour or invoked to stop religious infractions.  
  
4.3 The Sunna 
 
Another component part of the Islamic Laws is the Sunna, also spelt as 
Sunnah or Sunnat. Translated as tradition, Sunna is the reported behaviour of 
Prophet Mohammad and his disciples, known as the Sahāba. Wael Hallaq, a 
                                                          
117 Ibn Bazz, “English Translations of Majmoo’a-Fatawa,” 214.  
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Sunni scholar describes Sunna as an exemplary mode of conduct “setting or 
fashioning a code of conduct as an example for others to follow.”118 Rippin 
and Bernheimer posit that the Prophet Mohammad’s biography, Sira must be 
understood as a framework for the revelation of the Qur’an and it must be 
understood as a source for the normative example for Muslim behaviour, the 
Sunna of [Prophet] Mohammad.119 The followers of Sunna are referred to as 
Sunni. Devout Sunni Muslims may strictly follow the traditions reported to 
belong to the Prophet of Islam and his companions.  
 
In order to follow Sunna, Muslims refer to the reported speeches of their 
prophet. These reported speeches, called hadiths, were collected and written 
after the death of Prophet Mohammad. The most reliable hadiths are believed 
to come from the companions of the prophet.120 Hamilton Alexander 
Rosskeen indicates that al-Bukhari (d. A.D. 870, an early hadith collector) 
may have examined 200,000 hadiths, out of which he approved 7,300 
(actually 2,762 if duplicates are eliminated).121 Hadith is narrated through a 
chain of hadith transformers.  
 
4.4 Laws Concerning the Non-Muslims  
 
An important element of Shari’a law is dhimma formulations. Dhimmi, 
means ‘engagements’, ‘obligation’, ‘responsibility’, and Muslims adhering to 
dhimma formulations undertake to safeguard the lives and property of the 
non-Muslims in question, who referred to as dhimmis. This treaty necessarily 
                                                          
118 Hallaq, Introduction to Sunni usul-al-Fiqh, 10. 
119 Rippin and Bernheimer, Muslims: their religious beliefs and practices, 41. 
120 Dupree, Afghanistan, 100. 
121 Dupree, 100. 
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provides for the responsibilities of the non-Muslim with all duties deriving 
from it, in particular the payment of tribute, i.e., the fixed poll tax (jizja) and 
the land tax (kharāj), the amount of which is determined from case to case.122 
The process of being a dhimma, in the English language is called 
Dhimmitude. The Jewish and Christian communities living within territories 
controlled by Muslims are known as ahl al-dhimma or dhimmis and are not 
subject to the specific provisions of Islamic law because these laws apply to 
Muslims alone.123          
 
4.5 Shari’a According to Scholars   
 
Louise Halper states that Shari’a is considered law in all times and all places 
and thus it must suit each time and place.124 According to Joseph Schacht, 
Shari’a principles and Shari’a laws are social and religious realities for 
observant followers of Islam. As the Sunni religious authority describes, the 
sacred Law of Islam is an all-embracing body of religious duties, the totality 
of Allah’s commands that regulate the life of every Muslim in all its aspects; 
it comprises, on an equal footing, ordinances regarding worship and ritual, as 
well as political and, in the narrow sense, legal rules.125  
 
Abul Aˈlā Maududi, a radical Islamic scholar, argues that for an Islamic 
society Shari’a is quintessential and without Shari’a, in his view, a Muslim 
society cannot be regarded as Islamic.126 Maududi further adds that “if an 
Islamic society consciously resolves not to accept the Shari’a, and decides to 
                                                          
122 Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, 130-31.  
123 Rippin and Bernheimer, Muslims: their religious beliefs, 95.  
124 Halper, “Legal Realism in Tehran,” 45. 
125 Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, 1. 
126 Ahmed and Gouda, “Measuring Constitutional Islamisation,” 29. 
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enact its own constitution and laws or borrow them from any other source in 
disregard of the Shari’a, such a society breaks its contract with God and 
forfeits its right to be called Islamic.127 In the words of Alex Schank, Shari’a 
has a particular dynamism in the Islamic world that must be reckoned with 
and not ignored by assuming a “wholesale convergence toward what are 
perceived to be international standards of behaviour.”128    
 
In defending Shari’a, Hamid Khan argues that media accounts equate 
discrimination against women, forced marriages, honour killings and suicide 
bombings with Islamic law.129 Khan further argues that the term “Islamic 
law” is often conflated with Shari’a, which itself has been turned into an ugly 
word, used to describe an irrational system of barbaric laws laid down in the 
distant past.130 
 
Islamic penology in a number of Islamic societies has remained unchanged 
for centuries. It comprises fixed punishments known as hadd, which involve 
flogging and amputation of limbs or execution. Islamic penology is a sensitive 
subject in international human rights regimes and discourses. In Muslim 
societies, the differentiation between what defines political opposition and 
theologically interpreted public law has not been pushed far enough, much 
less than in the Western states. Substantial segments of Shari’a-sanctioned 
corporal punishments lie between an intuitive understanding of interpreting 
                                                          
127 Ahmed and Gouda, 29. 
128 Schank, “Constitutional Shari’a: Authoritarian Experiments,” 525. 
129 Khan, “Practitioner’s Guide to Islamic Law,” 11. 
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the divine laws and the power that the executioner wields to follow those 
divine laws.  
In a recent move by the Supreme Court of Saudi Arabia that intends to bring 
the kingdom into line with human rights norms against corporal punishment, 
flogging has been abolished. The Saudi Supreme Court says this decision is 
part of the reforms pushed through by King Salman and his son Crown Prince 
Mohammed Bin Salam.131 This decision is important for Islamic societies, as 
Sunni Muslims look up to Saudi Arabian Islamic leadership who are the 
guardians of the two holy Islamic sites, Mecca and masjed al-aqsā located in 
Saudi Arabia. Bin Salman is setting a precedent in banning flogging as a form 
of punishment. In another recent development, the political leadership in 
Sudan scraped apostasy law and lifted alcohol ban for non-Muslims and 
banned female genital mutilation.132 Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari 
said, “We [will] drop all the laws violating the human rights in Sudan.”133   
        
4.6 Discourses on Shari’a Law  
 
There are a number of Muslim writers who claim that Shari’a law is the divine 
law descended from God. Asifa Quraishi-Landes argues that “Shari’a is the 
idea of the way God is asking people to behave and live”.134 Wael Hallaq, a 
renowned scholar of Islam, asserts in his paper “Qur’anic Magna Carta: On 
the Origins of the Rule of Law in Islamdom” that more powerful than the 
Magna Carta in the constitutional history of Islam was the Qur’an, the most 
                                                          
131 Aljazeera International, “Saudi Arabia abolishes flogging.” Last accessed 10 December 
2020. 
132 The BBC, “Sudan scraps apostasy law.” Last accessed 10 December 2020.  
133 The BBC, “Sudan scraps apostasy law.” Last accessed 10 December 2020. 
134 Quraishi-Landes, “Islamic law and Constitutionalism,” 164.  
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authoritative “voice” in the traditions, past and present.135 Hallaq further 
states that the early caliphs and, later, the multitude of mighty sultans never 
made law, much less to have been in a sovereign political-legal position as to 
grant their subjects anything resembling a Magna Carta.136  
 
Dawood I. Ahmed, a Pakistani lawyer, and Moamen Gouda from Hankuk 
University of Foreign Studies claim that Shari’a is analogised as a sort of 
constitution, holding rulers accountable for transgressions and corruption to 
God’s law.137 These two scholars assert that Islamic constitutionalism can be 
traced back to fourteen centuries earlier, to the experience of the first Muslim 
constitution, established by the Prophet Mohammad in Medina in 622 C.E.138   
 
There are scholars who offer different perspectives in regards to Shari’a. 
Muhammad Shahrur, who trained as an engineer in Russia and is known for 
his modernist views on the history of Islamic legal developments, argues that 
there is a need to reinterpret ideas of religious authority and tradition, and to 
apply Islamic precepts to the contemporary societies.139 Shahrur suggests a 
modernist view of the ways the Qur’an must be interpreted by Islamic 
religious authority. He writes as follows:  
 
Qur’anic interpretation has been shackled for centuries by the 
conventions of medieval jurists, who mastered the craft of chaining 
authoritative commentaries to prior authoritative ones and of creating 
genealogies, or chains (silsilas), of traditions of authoritative 
learning.140   
                                                          
135 Hallaq, “Quranic Magna Carta,” 1.   
136 Hallaq, 2. 
137 Ahmed and Gouda, “Measuring Constitutional Islamisation,” 29.  
138 Ahmed and Gouda, 29.  
139 Christmann, The Essential Muhammad Shahrur, viii. 
140 Christmann, viii. 
   
 
Page 97 of 531 
 
Shahrur proposes another view on the guardians of Shari’a. He states that the 
ulemā and fuqahā (the jurists) of Islam have betrayed the progressive, 
universal message of al-Islam in the following ways: by their obsession with 
the particular details of seventh century Arabia; by their imposition of the 
hadith onto the Qur’anic text, holding its meaning firmly locked in the distant 
past; by their fixation on the details of rituals; by their distrust of the human 
rational faculty; by their suppression of freethinking and by their neglect of 
the common good and what Islam shares with other religions in favour of 
particularistic, sectarian interests that advocate a sense of spiritual 
superiority.141 
 
Rudolph Peters maintains that Islamic law does not conform to the notion of 
law as found, for example, in common law or civil law systems.142 Peters and 
Shahrur hold similar views of the  historical Shari’a, to that of the classical 
Shari’a in particular. In a number of books and articles, Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Na’im supports a secular legal order for the Islamic countries.143  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has highlighted a number of important takeaways on the 
definitions and status of Shari’a. Against the backdrop of varied 
interpretations, one may note that there are diverse views on Shari’a. In this 
chapter, I have argued that a number of Islamic societies subject to Shari’a 
law and led by the ulemā and jurist consuls have not developed Islamic 
theology or laws to the extent that personal interpretations of divine laws do 
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not jar with the dispensation of justice based on the accepted norms enshrined 
in formal laws of an Islamic country.   
 
By looking at the sources of Shari’a, the chapter has also identified that 
Shari’a remains broad, uncodified, informal and is prone to a number of 
interpretations by the people who claim to be the rightly guided ones, the 
ulemā. Having observed Shari’a law and the scope of its implementation 
across various socio-cultural milieus, it should only follow that the religious 
and cultural landscape in Afghanistan is observed in closer detail in order to 
situate these overlapping legal and ideological influences. In the next chapter, 
I will assess the religious and cultural influences in Afghanistan.   
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CHAPTER 5: RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL 
INFLUENCES IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
5 Introduction   
 
There is not a great deal of written literature on the conditions of 
Afghanistan’s legal institutions prior to Islam. This is due to the scarcity of 
old written records, and in part, owing to the high importance attributed to 
Islam in Afghanistan’s historiography. Abdul Hai Habibi (1910-1984), 
historian, relies on the travel diaries of a Chinese pilgrim and writes that in 
the first millennium, circa 630 C.E., Hyun Tseung, a Chinese pilgrim, 
travelled to Afghanistan and described how the institutions of justice 
operated.144 Habibi writes Tseung’s eye-witness account as follows:  
 
There were laws and fair trials and there was no corporal punishment 
if people disobeyed the orders of the government. If someone violated 
social rules and justice, or dealt with others with dishonesty, his or her 
punishment would have been cutting off his or her ear, nose, hand or 
foot. Sometimes the punishment for certain crimes was enforced exile. 
Petty crimes were resolved by a cash fine. If an accused person denied 
his or her guilt, there were four ways of investigation. The verdict 
would be issued after guilt was proven.145  
 
 
This account of pre-Islamic legal conditions may be used in describing the 
law in the first millennia. This chapter intends to answer the question: how 
did the different religions of Afghanistan shape her legal conditions? The 
                                                          
144 Habibi, Afghanistan after Islam, 531. According to Abdul Hai Habibi, “There were laws 
and fair trials and there was no corporal punishment if people disobeyed the orders of the 
government. If someone violated social rules and justice, or dealt with others with dishonesty, 
his or her punishment would be cutting off his or her ear, nose, hand or foot. Sometimes the 
punishment for certain crimes was enforced exile. Petty crimes were resolved by a cash fine. 
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peculiar issue in Afghanistan which has received inadequate attention from 
scholars are the diverse religious beliefs which determine the paths of legal 
developments in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has a strong oral culture and oral 
history. The orally narrated medieval and modern traditions, including legal 
traditions, offer clarity as to how the people of Afghanistan perceive law 
through the lens of their religious beliefs.    
 
This chapter will use theories of oral history by Walter J. Ong and relies on 
theories by the political sociologist, James C. Scott. The historical work of 
Louis Dupree will offer insights on Afghanistan, its people and various 
communities until the 1970s. In the first part, I will describe the oral history 
in the context of Afghanistan with examples to illustrate its importance. The 
chapter will discuss the pre-Islamic religions, followed by the three 
Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity and Islam). Islam was discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4. In order to avoid repetition, this chapter will include the 
Bahà’i faith, an offshoot of Islamic faith and the Sufi order. The chapter 
intends to show the rich contributions of  various religions, cults and sects, 
and their lasting legacies on the different communities of Afghanistan.  
 
5.1 Oral Culture in Afghanistan  
 
Anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists have reported on fieldwork 
in societies with oral traditions, and cultural historians have delved more and 
more into prehistory, that is, human existence before writing made verbalised 
records possible.146 European archaeologists came to Afghanistan in the 
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1920s.147 Research had to cease when in 1978, Afghanistan faced the Soviet 
occupation and the country was blighted by wars that continue to the present 
day.  
 
In Afghanistan, religious instructions and the sayings of the saints are highly 
valued and holy books are recited and transferred from one generation to the 
next. Despite the country being known as having a large illiterate population 
(although no exact figures are available), people recite the Qur’an in Arabic 
as well as Persian and Pashto poetry on a daily basis. The works of the great 
poets like Hafiz and Sa’di of Shiraz, Jāmi and Bīdel, as well as Rumi and 
many others are recited by people yearning for love, tranquillity and 
spiritualism. Rumi’s and Omar Khayyam’s poems are used and admired by 
the Sufis in Afghanistan as in other parts of the world.  
 
Walter J. Ong argues that the shift from orality to literacy and then onto 
electronic processing engages social, economic, political, religious and other 
structures.148 The adoption of modern technologies such as 
telecommunication, Internet and the use of social media in Afghanistan has 
brought about a new form of oral culture where audio, video speech and texts 
(online contents) can be accessed from all corners of the globe. Therefore, 
those citizens who were comfortable with an oral verbal tradition now have 
access to millions of multimedia sources through their digital devices, 
through access to the Internet.      
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James C. Scott, American political scientist and anthropologist, argues in 
favour of moving to an oral culture due to the manifest advantages of 
flexibility and adaption that an oral tradition has over a written tradition.149  
 
In sum, Afghanistan has not steadily progressed to a literate culture and has 
kept its oral culture intact, which may explain why individuals from different 
communities talk about 2,000 years ago as if they were eyewitnesses to the 
stories they narrate, as if they happened a couple of days ago. This strong and 
lively oral tradition helps us investigate the oral beliefs from multiple ancient 
religions of Afghanistan as well as Islam which shape her citizens’ religious 
understanding of a legal culture.      
 




It was in Bactria (Balkh) where Zoroaster is believed by many scholars to 
have found a base for propagation of his dualistic philosophy. Vishtaspa, the 
ruler of the region, gave the Iranian prophet sanctuary.150 Avestan sacred 
religious literature contains widi melodies, including religious laws, 
indicating the first suggestions of laws and judiciary as a spiritual 
heritage.151 Afghanistan, invariably presented as a Muslim country by its 
citizens and by foreign scholars, has in fact been home to various non-Muslim 
minorities.152  
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Zoroastrianism is one of Afghanistan’s oldest religions. According to some 
historical accounts, Zoroastrianism was the religion of the Iranian tribes 
living in Central Asia before they moved south onto the Iranian Plateaus.153 
Written historical records show that followers of Zoroastrianism lived in 
Afghanistan until the 1880s. Rule 75 of Asās al-Quddāt, a bench guide 
written by Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), stipulates that the oath at the 
beginning of a court hearing for the Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians must 
be taken in accordance with their own religion.154 However, in practice 
Shari’a rules were used in the trials of the non-Muslims.155  
 
Tamim Ansary, an Afghan-American writer describes the essential 
foundations of Zoroastrianism as follows:  
 
In the Persian universe, Zoroastrianism held pride of place and 
Zoroaster saw the drama of the universe vested in two divinities, not 
one, not thousands. Ahūrā Mazdā embodied the principle of God, and 
Ahrīman, the principle of evil. Fire served as an iconic representation 
of Ahūrā Mazdā which has led some to characterise Zoroastrians as 
fire worshippers; they worshiped not fire but Ahūrā Mazdā.156  
 
 
The ancient Iranians imagined a world in which Order and Chaos constantly 
jostled for supremacy, and the partisans of Order were heavenly powers with 
Ahūrā Mazdā, the all-knowing Ruler, Growth and Life.157 The use of the 
generic term, ancient Iranians also refers to the subjects who inhabited the 
lands that make up modern-day Afghanistan. Zoroastrians pray several times 
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a day and their holy book is called Avestā. They use fire as a symbol of the 
purity of God.158  
 
Nile Green posits that there is a lacunae in inter-group relations between the 
Muslims and non-Muslims of Afghanistan, including the Jews, Hindus, Sikhs 
and Armenian Christians.159 The ethnographic research conducted by 
Mohmmad Homayoun Sidky on Malang, Sufis and Mystics160 show how the 
practices and rituals of various polytheist cults and religions of Afghanistan 
influence and shape the religious beliefs of her citizens. There are numerous 
examples in this chapter of this fusion of inter-group (inter-religious) relations 
that are formed by Afghanistan’s culture of orality.   
 
According to the late American historian, anthropologist and ethnographer, 
Louis Dupree, one may note very close-knit inter-group interactions between 
the followers of various religions of Afghanistan. Dupree wrote in 1978 that, 
aside from faith in Allah and Mohmmad as the Messenger of Allah, most 
beliefs relate to localised, pre-Muslim customs.161 Zoroastrian beliefs to the 
present day influence the population of Afghanistan in many ways, including 
its philosophy of “Good Thoughts, Good Words and Good Deeds.”       
 
Buddhism   
 
Buddhism had been practised in Afghanistan prior to Islam. There is a general 
consensus that in Afghanistan the Buddha statues were created between 300 
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and 700 A.D.162 After Ashokā, militant Brahmanism ended the political force 
of Buddhism in India, but Mahayana Buddhism which gestated in Gandhārā 
spread along the commercial Silk Roads to Turkistan, Mongolia, China, 
Korea and ultimately Japan.163 Ashokā was an Indian emperor of the Maurya 
Dynasty who ruled almost the entire Indian subcontinent from 268 to 232 
B.C.E. Gandhārā was an ancient region in the Peshawar basin and the centre 
of the region was a confluence of the Kabul and Swat rivers, and Turkistan 
was the region of northern Afghanistan.  
 
Buddhism has values and beliefs such as sila (virtue, good conduct and 
morality), samadhi (concentration, mediation, mental development) and 
prajna (discernment, wisdom and enlightenment). In Buddhism, the religion 
begins with Siddhārtha Gautama’s achievement of enlightenment under the 
Bodhi tree.164 Buddhism survived in Afghanistan until the late tenth century, 
which would in turn suggest that popular Buddhist practices survived much 
later, while the region’s pre-Islamic heritage also included Zoroastrian, Indic 
and other local cults that were the fruit of centuries of selective adoption from 
religious influences that ranged from India to Greece.165  
  
The most recent blow to Buddhist heritage in Afghanistan was the destruction 
of the giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan city in central Afghanistan in March 
2001 by the Taliban.166 Buddhism has left lasting effects on the beliefs, 
perceptions and practices of the people of Afghanistan. Buddhist beliefs up 
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to recent times may have been indirectly transferred to the wider population 
of Afghanistan by followers of the Indic faiths, the Hindus of Afghanistan. 
Evidence of these influences may be found in various oral and written 
legends.       
 
The Cult of Zhun 
 
The cult of Zhun is one of the indigenous religions of Afghanistan we know 
most about because it was described in some detail by the Chinese Buddhist 
pilgrim, Xuan Zang, who visited Afghanistan shortly before the Arab 
invasion.167 The reference to the Arab invasion here is the Islamisation of 
Afghanistan by the Arabs between the seventh and ninth century A.D. Based 
on the worship of a golden idol with rubi eyes, the cult of Zhun (widespread 
throughout Zamindawar and Zabulistan) survived for two centuries after the 
arrival of Islam in Afghanistan.168 The idol was housed in a temple, in front 
of which stood the vertebra of a giant reptile, locally believed to be that of a 
dragon.169  
 
The priests of Zhun seem to have possessed shaman-like abilities, for Xuan 
Zang describes them as having powers to control demons and other 
supernatural forces and being able to both heal and harm people.170 The 
dragon (luus), or azhdhār, survived in Islamic Afghan cosmology through its 
association with Caliph Ali, celebrated in the country as the dragon slayer. 
Afghans identify a number of geological formations as the remains of the 
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dragon slain by the caliph and miraculously petrified by God.171 The most 
famous of these azhdhār is located near Bamiyan, the ancient Buddhist 
sanctuary complex.172 When a religion supplants another, it is not uncommon 
for the saints and culture-heroes of the new faith to be depicted as vanquishing 
those of the old religion. For Afghan Muslims, Caliph Ali, hero of the new 
Islamic faith, slays the pre-Islamic dragon god.173  
 
Hinduism   
 
To the present day, among several international archives and bibliographic 
collections such as Afghanistan Analysis Network (2010, 2013 and 2019) and 
Arthur Paul Collection, which list up to a thousand pages of bibliographic 
entries in Dari-Farsi, Pashto and English, there are only five short research 
articles about the lives of the Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan.  
 
Hindu presence in Afghanistan dates back to before her Islamisation in the 
ninth century.174 Ichawar Dass, a Hindu writer of Afghanistan origin argues 
that it was the Brahman and Hindus of Kabulistan who resisted the Arab 
invasion.175 Some historical accounts suggest that Kabulistan resisted the 
Arab invaders for two hundred years.176 Eventually, the son of Mahmood of 
Ghazna, Sebüktigin, conquered Kabulistan after which time the population 
was converted to Islam.177 
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Hassan Kakar, historian, writes that in Abdur Rahman Khan’s government (r. 
1880-1901), many Brahman Hindus were given high positions in the 
bureaucracy. Naranjān Das was made an honorary brigadier, and a council of 
Hindu elders was set up to investigate all suits, claims of interest and 
questions relating to Hindu laws before they were to be submitted to Abdur 
Rahman Khan for his instruction.178 Hindus were favoured over Sikhs, but 
both groups felt humiliated by being obliged to wear only yellow turbans and 
pay jezya tax.179 As late as the 1980s, the Hindu cult statue Murthi was 
worshipped in Kabul’s several Hindu temples.180 For example, Dhavailkar 
noted that the sixth or seventh-century Ganesh statue found in Gardiz is 
presently worshiped by the Hindu residents of Kabul in Daragh Pir Rattan 
Nath near Cinema Pamir.181  
 
There is written evidence that the Hindus of Afghanistan were involved in 
informal justice mechanisms. According to Gholam Vafai, the Panchāt or 
council of five elders which came into existence during the reign of 
Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919), had jurisdiction over disputes among 
merchants and traders and over most civil suits.182 Although Panchāt is an 
Indian community justice mechanism, in Afghanistan the Hindus and Sikhs 
only presided over this institution for a short while. Mohammad Hashim 
Kamali notes:   
 
The non-Muslim religious communities especially Hindus and Jews 
have historically played an important role in the trade, as merchants, 
money lenders, and officers of government treasury. This created a 
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demand for the establishment of commercial jurisdictions outside 
Shari’a courts. A board of commerce named Panchāt Bāshi was 
created in Kabul in the nineteenth century. The president of the board 
of Panchāt held an honorary post and was not paid a wage. The 
Panchāt was elected by Kabul’s merchants themselves, and often 
Hindus were elected for this post. The ulemā saw Panchāt arbitration 
as a threat to their authority and demonstrated fierce disagreements to 
Panchāt courts. The ulemā held Afghanistan’s legal system under full 
control prior to the legal reforms of the 1920s.183  
 
The Sikhs of Afghanistan resolve personal disputes in their Gurdwārā (a 
place of assembly and worship). In resolving disputes, the Sikh elders use 
intellect, not the religious texts.184 As far as historical accounts show, apart 
from the short-lived role given to the Hindus in Panchāt councils and their 
ceremonial participation in a number of Loya Jirgas, there are no other legal 
roles assigned to them.    
 
One the sad realities of life for the Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan has been 
the decline of their population. In the twentieth century, the population of the 
non-Muslim ethnic groups of Afghanistan decreased due to war, insecurity, 
barriers to trade and restrictions on their religious freedom. Between the 
1920s and the 1960s, the Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan numbered up to a 
quarter of a million.185 Inderjeet Singh estimates that their number dropped to 
sixty thousand in the early 1990s.186 The United States Commission on 
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) states that in 2020, the Hindu and 
Sikh population was just around one thousand.187 This shows a substantial 
depopulation for these two minority religious groups.   
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Despite the fact that Hindus have lived in Afghanistan for many centuries, 
they are ignored by the political leaders. Atwar Singh Khalsa, the president 
of the National Committee of Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan, who served 
as the Sikh representative to the Loya Jirga from Pakitya Province and who 
was appointed as a senior senator in 2004 for a five-year term, states that the 
government has never protected the rights of the Hindus and Sikhs in 
Afghanistan.188 In the public sphere, Hindus and Sikhs continue to suffer 
suppression and are threatened with violence.189  
 
The socialist governments of Afghanistan (1978-1992) empowered the Sikhs 
and Hindus and assigned to them certain political roles. The following is an 
account given by Harpal Singh, an Afghan Sikh now residing in Britain: 
 
If there is peace and safety in Afghanistan, I will return there. I spent 
my youth in Shorbazar. I joined the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) at a very young age. At year 7 of high school, a 
strong patriotic feeling grew in me. I became a teacher and worked 
with a very slim wage. I wanted to serve the people. I was willing to 
give my life for my country. I was happy to be a member of the PDPA. 
I know that life in Afghanistan is very different to life in the United 
Kingdom. However, if peace is established in Afghanistan, I will go 
back. I spent my youth in Shorbazar streets, went to school and passed 
through the streets; all of these give me reminiscence. After the Saur 
revolution, I had a very good life. There have been sincere comradery 
between the PDPA members for 35-40 years.190  
 
 
Ichawar Dass, a writer based in Germany and who manages a couple of 
websites with a focus on Afghanistan writes:    
 
Everything for the Muslim minorities and non-Muslim minorities 
were discriminatory. During Amanullah Khan’s reign the name Hindu 
was used. Afghanistan was a Hindu and Buddhist country and Hindus 
resisted and fought against the Arabs for 250 years. We the Hindus of 
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Afghanistan are those who did not convert to Islam. The history of 
Afghan citizens before Islam is recorded very briefly and except 
Ahmad Ali Kohzād, other historians have written very brief history of 
the non-Muslims. When I wrote the book, We the old dwellers of this 
land, I looked for sources, but could not find accurate information.191  
 
The Hindus of Afghanistan have lived in their country for over two millennia. 
Afghan citizens orally narrate a number of Indic myths and legends.   
 
The Kāfirs  
 
Kāfirs were one of the oldest non-Muslims population of Afghanistan. The 
term Kāfir translates as infidel in Indo-Iranian languages and also in Arabic. 
The word Kāfir or Kāfiristan must be used when referring exclusively to the 
elements of pre-Islamic culture, for it is resented as an insult by devout 
Muslims.192 Kāfir is a term that Islamic religious text equates to a person who 
questions the validity of the Islamic faith. The Kāfirs inhabited a region 
known in Western literature as Kāfiristan. Vartan Gregorian, historian, 
reports that “Before the Nuris (people inhabiting Nuristan) accepted Islam, 
they were referred to as Kāfirs by the Muslims of Afghanistan.”193 They were 
the major pagan groups inside Afghanistan.194  
 
Until the early parts of the twentieth century, the valleys of Nuristan in eastern 
Afghanistan were inhabited by Kāfiri-speaking tribes, a third of which are of 
an Indo-Iranian branch, while the neighbouring valleys of northern Pakistan 
are inhabited by various Dardic-speaking Muslim populations.195 Only the 
larger portion of the Kalāsha population living in three of the western valleys 
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of Chitrāl have retained their old pre-Islamic religion and rituals, while the 
rest of the Nuristani and Dardic-speaking people have retained, as Muslims, 
only vestiges of their former beliefs, and the isolated Kalāsha people have 
received strong religious influences from pre-Islamic Nuristan.196  
The main tribe of the Kāfiristan people were the Kám Kalāsh who followed 
ancient Hinduism. The people of Kāfiristan were forcibly converted to Islam 
by Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901) and then by his son Habibullah Khan 
(r. 1901-1919), in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Barnet 
Rubin, Nuristanis maintained their ancient polytheism until 1986.197 
Gregorian describes the Kalāsh Kāfirs as follows:  
 
This group are also referred to as the Nuris or Kāfirs, one of the Indo-
Aryan people of the Hindukush, an ethnic group of Afghanistan 
whose history is obscure. Some think that they are the descendants of 
aborigines of central Afghanistan; others believe they are of Greek 
ancestry. The Kāfirs’ physical features are suggestive of the Oriental, 
Dinaric and Nordic races, but of the five main Kāfir languages Kati, 
Ashkūn, Waigal, Parūni and Wamai, four are Dardic languages. 198 
 
The Kāfirs present interesting lifestyles, rich traditions and fascinating myths 
and legends. Karl Jettmar claims that the German ethnologists called the 
Kāfirs a megalithic people (megalithvolk) or Kāfiristan a megalithic centre, 
and the culture of Kāfirs was considered a phenomenon strictly separated 
from the great civilisations of Western Asia.199 Writing in 1969, Vartan 
Gregorian estimated the population of Nuristan Province to be between forty 
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thousand and one hundred thousand.200 G.W. Leitner states that persons sent 
on special expeditions often pass by the most interesting inscriptions, of 
which they merely report that “the characters of the [Kāfirs] are neither Greek 
nor Persian.”201  
 
In the absence of literature on Kāfirs’ legal traditions, I shall rely on the 
primary ethnographical and historical sources written by the British colonial 
agents, explorers and adventurers, which are still precious to anthropologists, 
linguists and historians.202 The literature to be used here describes the Kāfirs’ 
lives, rituals, polytheistic religious characteristics, beliefs and practices as 
well as their mythologies.  
 
The Kāfirs came from different clans and tribes, the most famous ones being 
Kam, Siāhpūsh, Sefidpūsh, Wai and Utzen. In his journey to Kāfiristan, Sir 
Scott Robertson writes:  
The Kāfir tribesmen inhabited the upper part of the Bashgul Valley. 
Kam and Wai tribes were amongst the fiercest tribes according to the 
Chitrālis. The Kalāsha Kāfirs are slaves to the Mehtar of Chitrāl and 
living within his border. Utzen tribesmen differed from all other 
Kalāsha people in having a strong infusion of Bashgul Valley blood 
in their veins. The village possessed a shrine to Gísh, the great war-
god of the Kāfirs. Torag Merak, a Kāfir brought up two of his sons as 
Muslim, and it seems by this, he intended to be on the right side, 
whatever might happen. If Umra Khan or any other Muslim power 
managed to conquer Kāfiristan, then Torag would be safe through the 
influence of his sons; as for the latter, they were naturally friends with 
their co-religionists, while the neighbouring Kāfirs, although disliked 
having the Muslim colony in their midst, dare not interfere, for the 
whole of Torag’s clan would avenge the death of any one of its 
members, whether he was a Kāfir or had embraced Islam.203 
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Georg Buddruss, Professor Emeritus at the University of Mainz, Germany, 
highlights significant correspondences between Vedic cosmology and the 
cosmology expressed in the mythology of the Kāfirs of Prasūn Valley, held 
to be the religious centre of Kāfiristan.204 The book of Persian fairy tales, One 
Thousand and One Nights, also known in the West as The Arabian Nights, 
contains a large selection of stories in which fairies are central characters.205 
In Persian mythology, the Peri are one of a large group of beautiful, fairly-
like beings represented as descended from fallen angels and excluded from 
paradise until their penance is accomplished.206  
In the Kalāsha ritual, a fire is constructed out of superimposed, crossing twigs 
much like a Vedic one, and a goat, especially its heart, is offered into the 
fire.207 Ancestors impersonated by young boys are worshiped and are offered 
bread. The men must be divided into two parties: the pure ones to sing well-
honoured songs of the past, but the impure ones to sing wild, passionate and 
obscene songs with an altogether different rhythm.208 Many mythical stories 
of the Kāfirs contain the element that the sun and the moon were in the hands 
of giants and had to be set free by the force and cant of the gods.209  
In his study of the Kāfirs, Max Klimberg deals with the sacrifice, rituals and 
religious authority of the Kāfirs. In peaceful times many pilgrims, bringing 
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with them mainly oxen and rams as sacrificial animals, must have come from 
all the Kāfir regions to pray for help or to attend the great annual 
ceremonies.210 Living in six small villages in the Parun Valley located 
between the areas of the more militant and competitive Kati, Waigal and 
Ashkun Kāfirs, they had established a sacred notion about their religions and 
culture. The valley was dotted with temples and village-based clan-houses, 
amel, where a great number of deities were worshipped.211 Klimberg 
describes amel as the place of worship and the religious hierarchy of the münd 
as below:    
The amel were clan-owned, inhabited only temporarily by the clan-
priest, münd, and his family unless there were established hereditary 
rights. The position of a münd was highly coveted. As a rule a 
meritorious man could fill its position only for a certain time, 
depending on a number of circumstances such as good fortune and the 
like. In case the clan was dissatisfied by its münd’s performances or 
by his failure to secure enough assistance from the clan deity, or if 
somebody else had won over the clan, the münd had to leave the amel 
and return to his house. The procedure of the take-over was simple, as 
it was enough to enter the amel with torch lights, to throw them into 
the amel’s fireplace and to request the resident münd to leave. He had 
to leave the premises by the following morning.212  
 
There have been attempts to convert the Kāfirs to Christianity. Feisal Hussain 
Naqvi writes that the Jesuits of Agra obtained permission in the 1670s to 
undertake a mission in Kāfiristan.213 Father Gregorio Roiz sent a report to 
Rome that concluded in respect of the Kāfirs, “I did not find dispositions in 
them for receiving the Faith, nor did I discover any indications that, as the 
Armenians had told us, they had been Christians at one time.”214  
                                                          
210 Klimberg, “Kāfiristan’s Sacred Valley,” 58.  
211 Klimberg, 50.  
212 Klimberg, 64. 
213 Naqvi, “People’s Rights or Victim’s Rights,” 679.  
214 Naqvi, 679.  
   
 
Page 116 of 531 
 
 
Kāfirs’ beliefs in animism, fairies, jinns and legends, influence nearly all 
communities of Afghanistan. In fact, the majority of these oral beliefs are 
beliefs in the strong sense of the word belief. This means belief in the sense 
that they are true. This shows a fascinating characteristic of Afghan society, 
most of whom may re-tell the story of Iliad, Homer, Zeus or even Skyla and 
Charybdis in their localised versions and varieties. The localisation of many 
foreign legends, myths and fairy tales among different groups of Afghanistan 
makes their strong oral culture second to none.             
 
Over the period of the seventh to the ninth centuries, most of the inhabitants 
of Afghanistan converted to Sunni Islam. Islam gradually replaced Buddhism, 
Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism and all other indigenous religions of the 
previous empires.215 Owing to the supplanting of old faiths by the new ones, 
one may argue that certain pre-Islamic beliefs, in part inform Afghanistan’s 
Muslims’ cultural knowledge and their perceptions and sense of religiously-




Mohammad Homayoun Sidky states that shamanism is an essential 
component of the religious beliefs of the Afghan people.216 Originating from 
the Turkic people of Central Asia, shamanism is prevalent among the 
Kazakhs, Mongols, Uzbeks and Turkmen, and is based on a number of beliefs 
and practices such as Tanggri, the heaven or sky deity, along with the 
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shamanistic beliefs that were brought to Central Asia by Hsiun-Nu.217 The 
Turkmen had many shamanistic beliefs, several of which persist in Afghan 
Turkestan.218 Among the Kirghiz and Uighur, shamans are known as 
Bakhshi.219 For each Turkic group, Bakhshi means a different person doing 
different things. Among the Kazakh, a Bakhshi is primarily a healer and an 
exorcist.220 For the Uzbek, according to Castagné, Bakhshi means a shaman, 
a doctor savant, sage or scholar who may use a qobuz (horsehair fiddle) to 
perform actions when in a trance.221  For the Turkmen, a Bakhshi is known as 
an epic or folk singer, lacks magical powers and uses dūtār (a musical 
instrument) rather than qobuz.222 Jarring and Slobin note that Bakhshi is a 
musician among the peoples of the oases of Afghan Turkestan.223  
 
The present-day Afghan ascetics, although Muslims, are undoubtedly the 
spiritual heirs of the shamans of the past.224 They use ecstatic techniques, 
communicate with spirits and foretell the future while in a trance state.225 
When a famous ascetic dies, his grave may become a ziārat (shrine), believed 
to be endowed with mystical potency, as were the ancient cult-centres of the 
past.226 In practice (but not in theory) Islam loosely accepts saints, and the 
cults of saints, although forbidden, it abound throughout the Muslim world; 
almost any stone thrown in Afghanistan will hit a ziārat of a pir, khwājah, or 
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other name-saint.227 Writing in 1973 and then in 1978,  Louis Dupree 
describes Afghan people’s belief in saints as follows:  
 
Pilgrims flock to ziārat to ask for intercession of the particular saint 
with Allah for specific favours. In Afghanistan, for example, a saint’s 
tomb near Jalalabad specialises in curing insanity; another near 
Charikar cures mad-dog bites; and in the valley of Paiminar, just north 
of Kabul, are forty-odd shrines, all dedicated to fertility. Women 
desiring children visit Paiminar to buy amulets (ta’wiz) from the ziarat 
caretaker, each guaranteeing a son or daughter as the case may be. The 
caretaker of the various shrines throughout Afghanistan sell ta’wiz for 
practically anything a man or woman might desire: control over a 
loved one; increased sexual prowess; protection from bullets in a feud; 
general good luck; protection from the evil eye, and others. Many 
ta’wiz consist simply of magical formulas or verses copied from the 
Quran, which are folded and sealed in a cloth, leather, or metal 
triangular or square packet, and then sewn to the clothing of the 
purchaser. Supplicants use several devices to remind the saint of their 
request. Usually an object is left behind: a lighted candle, a piece of 
cloth tied to a pole, a ball of clay to harden in the sun. At the Āshukān 
and Ārefān shrine in Kabul, believers drive nails into the threshold. 
Driving nails into selected trees scattered throughout Afghanistan (the 
shrine of Khawāja Ansari near Herat, for instance, and another near 
Chahārdeh-Ghorband) can achieve cure for toothaches. Often women 
will leave small toy chārpāyi (string beds) or construct small 
hammocks at fertility shrines to remind the saint to intercede. In 
addition to purchasing ta’wiz, pilgrims leave money with the caretaker 
to help support the shrine.228   
 
The practice of visiting ziārats (shrines) continues to the present day. In 
August 2020, Deutsche Welle Dari language news reported that people in 
Ghazni Province visit shrines, pay alms to the shrine keepers and believe that 
shrines, including those of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, Hakim Sanai, Abu 
Raihan al-Biruni, Bohlūl or Shams cure diseases, including complex mental 
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health illnesses.229 This practice is not limited to Ghazni, and there are people 
in all provinces of Afghanistan who believe that shrines cure illnesses.  
 
Slobin lists shamans in general categories as fortune-tellers: the term fālbin 
(seer) applies to all those who employ divination; tāla’bin is one who predicts 
the future in a more restricted sense by observing the ripples in a basin of 
water; the ramal or ramalbāz operates with dice, which are joined together 
by a metal shank and which, after manipulation, form combinations of 
numbers that are interpreted according to the book of divination; it is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish between healers and exorcists; the duaxān 
(prayer reader) sells formulas which are believed to have a protective value, 
e.g., against toothache or sterility; then there are sayyids (people who claim 
to be related to Prophet Mohammad), the darvish, malang and qalandar; and 
there is the mārgir (snake charmer) who also works with a set of mantar (a 
sage’s writing) compiled as a risāla (treatise).230   
 
Sidky describes the practice of Muslim mystics and mendicants of modern 
Afghanistan, some of whom are referred to as malang, others as dervish and 
Sufi, as a variety of ecstatic techniques which have clear affiliations with 
shamanism.231 Research conducted by Louis Dupree, Homayoun Sidky and 
Mark Slobin in 1971, 1973, 1978 and 1990 are supported by recent objective 
reports and documentaries by Afghanistan’s media (TV and radio) many of 
which class the above as superstition – wrong beliefs, falsely accepted as 
Islamic beliefs. These media sources aim to stop people falling victim to 
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fraudsters. Despite these attempts at raising awareness, the payers of fees to 
the ziārat keepers believe these individuals have supernatural powers.  
 
Taking a wider look at shamanism, its practices extend to different continents, 
and regardless of whether some practices came to Afghanistan from the 
Indian sub-continent, Central Asia or another place, beliefs in these practices 
are strongly held by many who may not be able to distinguish between 
superstition, non-Islamic and Islamic belief as far as shamanistic beliefs and 
practices are concerned.  
 
The beliefs and practices related to shamanism are shared by Afghans from 
all ethnic and religious groups. Only those with a modest education and who 
have adequately travelled may not hold such beliefs, which numerically are a 
very slim minority. This section of the thesis has shown that pre-Islamic oral 
culture and orally transmitted beliefs from different religions, cults or 
spiritual orders exist among the Afghans today. These beliefs are held by 
many men and women residing in the rural, urban, civic as well as in 
cosmopolitan provinces of Afghanistan.          
 
5.3  The Abrahamic Faiths  
 
Judaism   
 
The first-hand account the author received about Judaism in Afghanistan 
comes from an Afghan-American interviewee and questionnaire respondent, 
Jack Abraham who left Afghanistan years ago and lives in the United States 
of America. Jack states that ever since the Jewish people were exiled from 
their lands 2,600 years ago, they have lived in Persia and surrounding regions 
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like Afghanistan and Central Asia.232 In his first telephone conversation with 
the author, Jack stated:  
 
If you are going to interview other Jewish people, please contact me 
about the information they give you as some people may have 
prejudices against Afghanistan. If someone tells you information 
about Afghanistan which is untrue, I will make sure it is factually 
correct.233  
 
There is no accurate date to show how long the Jewish people of Afghanistan 
have lived there. Historical and archaeological investigations have led to the 
discovery of Hebrew writings on tombstones dating back several thousand 
years.234 Jewish and Muslim texts written between the eighth and thirteenth 
centuries show that Jews were present in Afghanistan since the medieval 
times.235 Worldwide Jewish organisations claim that Jews settled in 
Afghanistan in the eighth century.236 Discoveries of Hebrew writings on 
artefacts and tombstones in different provinces show that the Jewish subjects 
of Afghanistan inhabited the land for centuries.237  
 
Mark Silinksy argues that partly legend and partly documented history 
indicate that the Jews of Afghanistan traced their roots to the Assyrian and 
Babylonian empires of 720 B.C.E. and 560 B.C.E.238 Sara Koplik states that 
the Jewish history of Afghanistan can only be documented with some 
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certainty from the 1740s, but traces of older, unique influences were 
preserved in the religious culture of the Jewish community.239  
 
There are varied theories in regards to the Jewish and Pashtūn connection. 
There is a fascinating oral history that the Pashtūns believed for centuries to 
be of Jewish extraction. Some declare that Afghanā, who gave his name to 
the Afghans, was lineally descended from Abraham and Hagar through 
Ishmael, and affirm that he was the grandson of Saul.240 A Jew, by the name 
of Khaled, whom he converted [to Islam], wrote to his brethren in Gour  
[Ghor] to give notice of this happy event and induce them to embrace the new 
faith; but before adopting Islamism, they sent several of their chiefs to the 
Prophet.241 Amongst these was Keïs who pretended to be descended in direct 
line from Saul through forty-seven generations and Abraham through sixty-
five, and [Prophet] Mohammed loaded him and his companions with favours 
and gave him the title Malek Abd-ul-Reshid, a rank to which he was entitled 
as a descendant of the Jewish king.242  
 
Quoting Mr Wheeler, Khan Sultan Mir Munshi the chief secretary of Abdur 
Rahman Khan offers the following account on the Pashtūns’ Jewish roots:  
 
The origins of the Afghans is disputed by many authors. Mr Wheeler, 
who wrote in 1895, the life of Amir Abdurrahman, says: “The true 
Afghans, according to their own traditions, trace their descent from 
Afghanā, the son of Jeremiah, the son of Saul. Afghanā, it is said, was 
Solomon’s commander in-chief. They were transported from Syria to 
Persia by Nebuchadnezzar, and thence emigrated to the mountain of 
Ghor, and what is now the country of the Hazara. They were converted 
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to Islam by a party of their own tribe who had gone to Arabia, under 
a leader named Wais, and had fought for the Prophet Mohmmad.243    
 
In recent times, the Pashtūns and the Jewish people reject the theory that 
Pashtūns were Jews. There is no correlation between them and there are no 
DNA tests to prove claims of common ancestry. Simcha Jacobovici, an Israeli 
Canadian anthropologist, claims that the sense of justice according to 
Pashtūnwāli and its practical steps in delivering retributive justice is rooted 
in the Jewish Torah, or in the Christian Old Testament.244 Based on 
Jacobovici’s views, there are similarities between Pashtūnwāli and Jewish 
practices in regard to maintaining order and justice.  
 
Walter J. Ong’s and James C. Scott’s strong positions on the durability of oral 
culture and cultures of orality, explains the existence of claims, some of which 
may not be proven. These claims have interwoven the Jews and Muslims of 
Afghanistan for centuries. Judaism has held a respectable position among the 
Muslims of Afghanistan, as many religious and non-religious persons revere 
the prophets and holy books of the Jews who are also the prophets of Muslims. 
This commonality has led to the freedom of ideas of spirituality and the sense 
of justice to flow among the Jewish and Muslim people of Afghanistan, and 
more so within the Pashtūns’ communities.   
 
Esther Frogel, a second-generation Jewish citizen from Afghan Jewish 
parents conducted her doctoral thesis on the experience of the psychological 
impact of acculturation on the first and second-generation traditional Afghan 
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Jewish immigrants in the United States. She reports that in Islamic lands 
where Sephardic Judaism existed, as indicated by the experiences of Jews in 
Afghanistan, there was less segregation between the Jews and non-Jews.245 
The Sephardic Jewish culture was influenced not only by Jewish tradition but 
also by Arabic and Greek philosophy and science.246  
One of Esther’s Afghan Jew interviewees, using the name Daniella, who 
came from a rich and privileged first-generation immigrant family in the 
United States describes her life in Afghanistan as follows: 
 
Life in Afghanistan, was different, we were free. We had chauffeurs, 
there were different maids. We were wealthy. Most of the Jews were 
like that, not all but mostly all. Also everyone was Shomer Shabbat 
there. Only one person in the community was not…In Afghanistan 
everyone was the same. Everyone ate Kosher, was Shomer Shabbat, 
and went to Mikva. Everyone was the same…When I grew up, I was 
very educated. I learnt in the American consulate, and I was into being 
in the consulate. I was free, I had my own car and so did my sisters. I 
learnt how to drive when I was 12. And to think I failed my tests when 
I came here. I was princess there, I had everything I needed. We had 
everything there. We had vacation homes in summer. We went upstate 
to the mountains. We had beautiful parks. We had waiters that would 
serve us dinners, and we had musicians come to sing to us.247    
 
 
Erich Brauer wrote an account of Afghanistan’s Jewish religious and 
customary laws in the early 1940s as follows:  
 
In Herat province, the 2,500 Jews are divided into twenty families. 
The leaders of the ten most influential families formed the hevra, an 
internal Jewish body that governed the community’s private affairs. 
Hevra judged disputes in criminal and civil cases, using ‘fines and 
corporal punishments’ to settle matters such as inheritance. Hevra 
exercised complete autonomy over the inner workings of their 
community, as many Jews avoided the Muslim civil courts. The hevra 
also punished transgressions of the Sabbath and other religious 
precepts. For matters regarding marriage and divorce, the Jews went 
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to beit din, or to the rabbinic court. Members of hevra were 
responsible for burying the dead and helping the poor. Additionally, 




The Jewish internal communal affairs were organised by a hevra, a group 
composed of the heads of important families. They were responsible for 
educating the boys, assisting the poor, burying the dead, enforcing religious 
laws and resolving conflicts.249 The community was led by the head rabbi, 
and in Herat, who came from the Garji (Gharji) family. In contrast to the 
dispute resolution of the Muslim majority, disagreements were never brought 
before governmental officials or judges and instead, both sides were forced 
to accept the finality of the rabbi’s ruling.250 This could include fines and 
harsh physical punishments like the use of fallaq or bastinado, which would 
be hit against the offender’s feet.251  
 
Afghanistan’s Jews observed Judaism strictly and there were almost no 
known intermarriages or significant deviations from traditional Jewish 
practices.252 They observed Nikur, Shabbat, Passover, and Kosher.253 Jewish 
life was especially marked by the absorption of parochial values from the 
surrounding Muslim culture, and the Jewish community was organised by 
clans – similar to the tribal system of the Muslim population.254  
 
                                                          
248 Aharon, From Kabul to Queens, 33-34. 
249 Zohar and Yaniv, “Synagogue and the Jewish Home,” 37. 
250 Koplik, Jews of Afghanistan, 37. 
251 Koplik, 37. 
252 Aharon, From Kabul to Queens, 29. 
253 Aharon, 32. 
254 Aharon, 33. 
 
   
 
Page 126 of 531 
 
There are no accurate statistics on the numbers of Jewish people of 
Afghanistan. The Jewish population in the twentieth century was estimated 
to be five thousand.255 Groups of Sephardic Jews left Afghanistan for their 
holy land upon the foundation of Israel. Some moved to the United States, 
leaving behind them rich and fascinating religious values. In 2005, the BBC 
reported that Zubulon Zimentov was the only remaining Jew in Kabul who 
had refused to leave Afghanistan.256 In 2011, Haaretz reported that Zubulon 
had opened a cafe in Kabul’s only Synagogue.257 On 29 October 2019, Emran 
Feroz wrote in the Foreign Policy that Zubulon, “the Last Jew Gets Ready for 
the Taliban Again.”258 This report relates to the agreement signed between 
the United States of America on 28 February 2020.   
 
Although the contributions of non-Muslims’ cultural values have not received 
sustained studies, these values meshed with Islamic values and traditions due 
to the mutual respect and shared doctrines and beliefs – in turn form the 
foundations of Afghanistan’s socio-religious legal order that is strongly 




Before the Mongol onslaught in the thirteenth century, Afghanistan was a 
crossroad for many of the world’s religions, including Nestorian 
Christianity.259 Vartan Gregorian reports that there was once a small Christian 
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community of Armenians, established as a colony by Nadir Shah, but it had 
dwindled to only a few families before its expulsion in 1896.260 Christianity 
never gained the status of Judaism in Afghanistan. Muslims believe that Allah 
does not beget and is not begotten. Muslims see Jesus as a prophet of God 
with a holy book and revere him as one of the holy prophets named in the 
Qur’an. The most contentious disagreement between the Muslims and 
Christians is the doctrine of Trinity.  
The only Catholic chapel established in the Italian embassy in 1935 remained 
a place of worship and was ministered by Christians until the 1960s.261 As of 
2021, Our Lady of Divine Providence Chapel is the Catholic church based 
inside the Italian embassy in Kabul, where the expatriate Christians worship. 
Rula Ghani, President Ashraf Ghani’s wife is a Marmonite Christian from 
Lebanon.  
 
Bahà’i faith   
 
The formal homepage of the Bahà’i faith describes its beliefs as: “Bahà’i 
beliefs address such essential themes as the oneness of God and religion, the 
oneness of humanity and freedom from prejudice, the inherent nobility of the 
human being, the progressive revelation of religious truth, the development 
of spiritual qualities, the integration of worship and service, the fundamental 
equality of sexes, the harmony between religion and science, the centrality of 
justice to all human endeavours, the importance of education, and the 
dynamics of the relationships that are to bind together individuals, 
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communities, and institutions as humanity advances towards its collective 
maturity.”262  
 
In regard to Afghanistan’s Bahà’is, there is a dearth of information. This 
religious minority group is often mentioned in the human rights report or in 
the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 
reports. In its 2020 report, the USCIRF stated that that small community of 
religious minorities – including Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Ahmadi Muslims, 
and Bahà’is remain endangered without the ability to observe their faith 
publicly for fear of violent reprisal by terrorist groups or society at large.263 
The Directorate of Fatwās is a department of the Ulemā Council. In May 
2007, Afghanistan’s General Directorate of Fatwās ruled that the Bahà’i faith 
was blasphemous and since this ruling, members of the Bahà’i community 
have lived in secret.264 The Ulemā Council deals with nationwide religious 
matters and issues fatwās.  
 
A ruling from Dar-Al-Ifta Al-Missriyyah indicates that the Sunni religious 
authorities believe that Bahà’i is a fabricated religion.265 It provides the 
following fatwā on the Bahà’i faith:  
 
Bahaism is a fabricated faith; it includes elements from Buddhism, 
Brahmanism, idolatry, Judaism, Christianity, Islam and beliefs from 
the Baatni school of thought. Bahà’is do not believe in the afterlife, 
Paradise or Hellfire. The first Bahà’i leader claimed in his 
interpretation of Surat Yusuf that he is better than Prophet Mohammad 
and his book Al-Bayān is better than the Qur’an.266  
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The above fatwā concludes that “Muslims have unanimously agreed that 
Bahaism is not an Islamic doctrine and that whoever believes in it, is not a 
Muslim but an apostate from Islam; an apostate is a person who abandons 
Islam for another faith.”267 Afghanistan’s ulemā’s 2007 ruling about the 
Baha’i faith concords with the rest of Sunni religious authority in other 
countries.   
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Sufism   
 
There are a number of mystical orders in Islam, the most important one being: 
the Sufi or Tassawuf. These mystical orders did not pretend to replace 
orthodoxy, but offered ways to seek the Supreme Being through personal 
experience (ma’rifat) and to achieve momentary union with God, thus in 
general, rejecting knowledge (ilm), rational and theoretical.268 Sufi seekers 
often sound superficially like agnostics, or, with their emphasis on personal 
experience, like existentialists.269 They are different, however, in that they not 
only seek but find God, and Sufism embodies only a few ideas: the unity of 
mankind, predestination and the possibility of a momentary union of men 
with God.270  
 
The Naqshbandi Sufi order led by Pir Saif ur-Rahman, traces its origin, as do 
all Sufi orders, through an initiatic chain that reaches back to Islam’s founder, 
Prophet Mohammad.271 Gujduwani, the co-founder of Naqshbandi suggests 
mystic practices later embraced by the Naqshbandi Sufis as follows: 
 
Yād kard (remembrance, both oral and mental): repeating always 
dhiker imparted to you, so that the aspirant may attain the beatific 
vision. 
 
Bāz gasht (restraint): when engaging in the heart-repetition of the 
dhiker, interspersing it with such a phrase as “My God, thou are my 
Goal and Thy satisfaction is my aim” to help keep one’s thoughts from 
straying. Other masters have said that bāz gasht means “return,” that 
is, return to God by way of contrition.  
 
Nigah dāsht (watchfulness): being watchful over wandering, passing, 
or evil thoughts when in contemplation.  
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Yād dāsht (recollection): concentrating upon the divine presence in a 
condition of forestate of enlightenment and intuitively anticipating or 
perceiving the divine presence.  
 
Hush dar dam (awareness in breathing): inhaling and exhaling 
mindfully; every breath should hold the divine presence in awareness. 
 
Safar dar watan (journeying to one’s homeland): making the inner 
journey of consciousness from blameworthy or human to 
praiseworthy or divine.  
 
Nazar dar qadam (watching over one’s steps): maintaining vigilance 
during one’s journey, whatever the type of country through which the 
spiritual traveller is passing, so that he does not let his gaze be 
distracted from the goal of his journey, the divine presence.  
 
Khalwat dar anjuman (solitude in a crowd): knowing always that the 
journey of the Sufi, though outwardly in the world, inwardly is with 
God.272   
 
Sufi orders are popular in the Islamic world and in places like Afghanistan, 
Turkey and other countries, Sufis read the poems of Maulana Jamaluddin 
Balkhi – in the West known as Rumi. Famous Sufi poets of Afghanistan are 
Khawāja Abdullah Ansāri of Herat (11th Century), Hakim Sanāyi of Ghazni 
(12th Century), Jalaluddin Balkhi Rumi of Balkh (13th Century), Abdul 
Rahman Jāmi of Herat (15th Century), Pir Roshan Bayāzid Ansāri of 
Waziristan (16th Century), Shah Arzāni (16th Century), Rahman Bābā of 
Peshawar (17th Century) and Ahmad Shah Abdāli of Kandahar (18th 
century).273    
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5.4 Religious Persecutions  
 
Strong societal or institutional discrimination amounting to the persecution of 
different religious minority groups in Afghanistan has a long history. 
Discriminatory practices have varied in scope and form in different 
governments. Religious discrimination may be a major reason why different 
religious groups of Afghanistan remain severely under-studied. Moreover, 
discrimination and marginalisation of minority religious and ethnic groups 
has forced them to remain in the margins of society and evade the state and 
its institutions.  
 
In analysing the contents of Sirāj al-Akhbār, the second newspaper of 
Afghanistan, May Schinasi writes that Shi’a Muslims were appointed to 
government posts such as dabir, monshi and sar-daftar (manager, secretary 
and headman), and were expected to live amicably with the Sunnis without 
conflict or apparent antagonism, but when they were guilty of some crime, 
they received terrible punishments.274   
 
Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901) and his son Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-
1919), executed several Qadiyani preachers (also known as the Ahmadiyya) 
who entered Afghanistan.275 Followers of Ahmadiyya believe that their 
founder, Mirza Gholam Ahmad of Qadiyān was a prophet, which contradicts 
the Muslims’ belief that Prophet Mohammad was the last prophet of God.276 
During the five years of Amanullah Khan’s rule, some Qadiyāni mullahs 
entered Afghanistan and remained there, but on 6 September 1924, 
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Ne’matullah, a Qadiyāni missionary, was executed; some thirty Qadiyānis 
were arrested and two other Qadiyāni mullahs were stoned to death later that 
month.277     
 
In a number of research papers, Hafizullah Emadi, an Afghan scholar, 
investigates the repression of Hindus and Sikhs.278 Sara Koplik writes that 
Shi’a Muslims, especially Hazāras and poor Badakhshanis were extremely 
vulnerable to capture as slaves, as they were viewed as non-believers and 
heretics.279 The Turkmen would seize those traveling on the caravan routes 
between Khorasan and Bukhara, and rulers would obtain extra income 
through ransoming captives or selling them as slaves.280  
 
Inderjeet Singh writes that in Afghanistan, the Hazāra Shi’as are at the bottom 
of the class hierarchy.281 To the present day, Hazāra Shi’a Muslims get 
persecuted in society, in government circles and also by terrorist groups. Due 
to the practice of either engaging in or tolerating violations of religious 
freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), in its 
2020 report, the USCIRF recommends that Afghanistan remains on the 
United States State Department’s Special Watch List.282 
 
In responses to the research questionnaire, out of forty respondents, twenty-
seven stated that the Buddhists, Christians, Kāfiristan people, Jewish, Hindu 
and Sikhs of Afghanistan must be included in research on Afghanistan and 
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only two respondents disagreed. Twelve respondents were aware of the 
Jewish people’s customary justice and twenty-eight were not. Twenty-five 
agreed that non-Muslims must be judged under their own religious laws and 
fifteen disagreed. Thirty respondents believed that Afghan and international 
researchers have ignored the non-Muslims of Afghanistan, four disagreed and 
six refrained from answering the question.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has offered insights into Afghanistan’s different religions, cults 
and spiritual orders. It has highlighted the types of contributions these cults, 
orders and religions have made to Afghanistan and its people. Although these 
contributions have not been given the credit they deserve, their value is 
strongly felt today, given that the exclusion of religious and ethnic minority 
groups is not acceptable practice in contemporary human rights discourses. 
The old religious influences have such a large impact on Afghanistan’s less 
literate society that no one can say which cluster of beliefs belong to which 
faiths, Islam included.   
 
The chapter has tried to show different ways citizens of Afghanistan 
understand and relate to the religious and cultural influences as well as non-
religious beliefs (myths, shamanism, ziārat healing) which informs elements 
of their understanding of a legal culture, rooted in religion. As demonstrated, 
the religions, philosophies or spiritual orders and belief systems are 
intertwined. The chapter has also highlighted the power of oral culture and 
oral histories in Afghanistan. In the next chapter, I shall discuss the procedural 
and substantive justice based on Pashtūnwāli tribal code.      
   
 
Page 135 of 531 
 
CHAPTER 6: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE 
JUSTICE BASED ON  PASHTŪNWĀLI TRIBAL CODE 
 
 
6 Introduction  
 
This chapter starts with a theoretical introduction to tribalism and how it 
manifests itself in Afghanistan’s society and government, and then it 
discusses how tribalism affects social and political change. The definition of 
tribalism adopted in this chapter is that of Andrew Heywood, who defines 
tribalism as “group behaviour characterised by insularity and exclusivity, 
typically fuelled by hostility towards rival groups”.283 In the context of 
Afghanistan this definition is particularly applicable, given that since the 
inception of the Afghan state in 1800s, the central state based in Kabul has 
undertaken various policies of inclusion and exclusion of members of 
different ethnic groups in what it alludes to be forming a national identity.284   
 
The first part of this chapter introduces the institutions of Pashtūnwāli – an 
unwritten code of conduct attributed to the Pashtūns. Understanding 
Pashtūnwāli helps us note how this tribal code impacts the advancement of 
modern legal concepts in Afghanistan, and how the country’s legal culture 
progresses or regresses.  
 
The second part of the chapter highlights the procedural and substantive 
justice matters based on the Pashtūnwāli code with actual cases as examples. 
The chapter will seek to demonstrate that cultural relativist approaches have 
                                                          
283 Heywood, Politics, 459. 
284 These issues have received sustained research interests by Louis Dupree, Thomas 
Barfield, Mohammad Nazif Shahrani, Sayed Askar Mousavi, Ofran Badakhshani, Nasir 
Mehrin and a number of other researchers, historians and students of Afghanistan’s affairs.  
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seldom looked at the detrimental implications of tribal identities and their 
appropriation of religious legal codes, which have ultimately made the 
authorities malleable to the point where it is often circumvented.  
 
At the end of the chapter, the findings of Roland Martin Kraml, who 
investigated changes to Pashtūnwāli between 1978 and 2012 in his master’s 
thesis, will be discussed. Kraml’s findings are important in defining the scope 
of Pashtūnwāli in contemporary Afghanistan and how it has changed or 
reformulated itself in different forms. A few recent cases and decisions based 
on tribal customs such as the levirate marriage, bride-price and tribal 
punishment will be shown. 
 
6.1 Theoretical Description of Tribalism  
 
Tribalism is an issue of interest for different types of scholars. The two 
definitions of tribalism by the Oxford dictionary are 1) behaviour, attitudes, 
etc. that are based on supporting and being loyal to a tribe or other social 
group and 2) the state of being organised in a tribe or tribes.285 However, 
dictionary descriptions are formal and simplistic. Elena Vismara, quoting 
Paul James, postulates that there is currently an impasse when discussing 
tribal societies because of the supposed separation between structures 
referable to traditional tribalism and structures ascribable to modernism and 
post-modernism.286 Describing anthropology as a self-critical discipline, 
Vismara elaborates that the concept of tribes and tribal identities has been 
                                                          
285 Oxford Learner’s Dictionary, “tribalism,” last accessed 18 July 2020.  
286 Vismara, “The Contemporary Nature of Tribalism,” 3. 
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criticised by many social anthropologists because of its evolutionary 
connotation.287  
 
In the context of Afghanistan, Nivi Manchanda from Queen Mary University 
proposes a strong case against the use of the term tribe by the colonialists.288 
Manchanda’s writing relates to the British colonialists’ use of the tribe tag for 
Afghanistan. She questions the validity of history writing through the use of 
travelogues. In her book, Imagining Afghanistan: The History and the Politics 
of Imperial Knowledge, Manchanda criticises Western scholars and statesmen 
of the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries who in the context of 
Afghanistan have projected the term ‘tribe’ in variety of ways.289 She 
concludes that the notion of ‘tribe’, not unlike those of ‘race’, ‘caste, and 
‘ethnicity’ found elsewhere in the colonies, has been mined and 
instrumentalised in the service of empire with far-reaching implications for 
Afghanistan.290  
 
A number of scholars have paid attention to the instrumentalisation of tribal 
identity and its political use by Afghanistan’s governments which has created 
divided identities and divided loyalties in modern Afghanistan. Louis Dupree 
refers to Amir Abdur Rahman Khan’s spread of power beyond Kabul as 
internal colonialism.291 Mohammad Nazif Shahrani, writer and university 
lecturer based in the United States, argues that person-centric politics – the 
cornerstone of the kin-based mode of Pashtūn tribal social and political 
                                                          
287 Vismara, 2. 
288 Manchanda, “Imperial Sociology of ‘Tribe’ in Afghanistan,” 165 –189.  
289 Manchanda, Imagining Afghanistan, 105-142. 
290 Manchanda, 140. 
291 Dupree, Afghanistan, 417. 
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organisation –  have been the defining attribute of Afghan politics since the 
creation of the Pashtūn-dominated centralised polity in the mid-eighteenth 
century by a charismatic Abdali Pashtūn chief, Ahmad Shah Durrani (r. 1747-
1773).292 Shahrani contends that the rise of the Taliban movement during the 
post-jihad crises of succession, with their Islamic extremism of Talibanism, 
is the inevitable culmination of the legacies of a long history of internal 
colonialism and a person-centred, Pashtūn-dominated, Afghan political 
culture.293  
 
The internal element of colonialism leading to kin-based rule commenced 
when in the 1880s, the Durrani Pashtūn leaders killed their political rivals, the 
Ghilzai Pashtūns, the Hazāras and many of the Kāfirs. Referring back to 
Manchanda’s critical views, Afghanistan presents a unique tribal system in 
which power, religion, politics, localism and globalism are intertwined and is 
steered by the ethno-tribal leaders of Afghanistan – in a tribal political system 
that breeds hostility and internal colonialism. Furthermore, tackling the 
British colonial use of the word tribe head-on, but failing to note how the 
Kabul-centric political system consumes internal colonialism and tribal 
identity, indicates that Manchanda’s research lacks accuracy and relevance in 
the context of Afghanistan. Theoretically, and in practice, one cannot 
overlook or ignore the Pashtūns’ internal presentation of their tribal identity 
or the central government’s internal colonialist version of tribal identity in 
former and present times. Contrary to Manchanda’s view, for Afghanistan 
                                                          
292 Shahrani, “Resisting the Talibanism,” 2. 
293 Shahrani, 6. 
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and for many parts of the Islamic world, history writing through travelogues 
are very important.294  
 
The assessment of tribalism in Afghanistan is essential, as it helps researchers 
understand its negative bearing on a universal rule of law and legal culture, 
encouraged by the international community that seek to grant equal rights to 
all citizens of a country: men, women and to the people who profess different 
faiths or those with no faiths.  
 
6.2 The Institutions of Pashtūnwāli  
 
The Pashtūn population of Afghanistan are known for their strong customary 
traditions of Pashtūnwāli, an honour-based unwritten tribal code concerned 
with preserving honour by the protection of land, wealth and family. 
Pashtūnwāli is an ethno-centric concept, based on the idea that Pashtūns are 
distinct from other ethnic groups due to their Pashto language, culture and 
history.295 Mike Martin argues that Pashtūn society can be succinctly 
described through a trinity of lenses: those of tribal power, state power and 
religious power, tribe, state and mosque, and these power centres are 
represented at all levels of society and government.296 Palwasha Kakar, an 
Afghan-American scholar, states that “Pashtūnwāli, the way to be a Pashtūn 
is integral to Pashtūn identity”.297  
                                                          
294 Popular examples of travelogues are the diaries of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims, the 
Moroccan scholar, ibn Battuta. Western historical works through travelogues are the works 
of Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of The Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies, 
printed in 1815; Marjorie Jewett Bell, An American Engineer in Afghanistan, printed in 1948; 
Jason Eliot, An Unexpected Light: Travels in Afghanistan, printed in 1999; and Rory Stewart, 
The Places in Between, printed in 2014.        
295 Rzehak, “Doing Pashto,” 3; Barfield, A Cultural and Political History, 25. 
296 Martin, An Intimate War, 5. 
297 Kakar, “Tribal Law of Pashtunwali,” 3. 
 
   
 
Page 140 of 531 
 
Synoptically writing, the institutions of Pashtūnwāli are badal (revenge), 
baramta (usurping belongings in litigations), melmastiā (hospitality), 
nanwati (sanctuary), nang (honour), sharm (shame), peghore (satire), turah 
(bravery), sabat (loyalty), ghayrat (chivalry), nāmūs (protection of women) 
and purdah (women’s veiling).298 These are indivisible institutions which 
define how a Pashtūn individual must live his or her life. The Pashtūnwāli 
code is also dominant amongst Pashtūns of Pakistan. Kakar argues that 
publicly enacting norms that fulfil the precepts of Pashtūnwāli, such as 
honour, hospitality, gender boundaries and the institution of jirga, are a tool 
by which Pashtūns maintain specific social order and sustain a religious-
ethnic identity.299  
 
Nāmūs is an important institution for maintaining a gender segregated order 
of society, which is often linked to purdah (veil), the veil of a curtain being 
the boundary between men’s and women’s physical space: a control not by 
men on women but instead, in the words of Kakar, a border stopping both 
from entering into each other’s spaces.300  
 
The behaviours set out by the Pashtūnwāli code may not always be linked to 
Islam. Senzil Nawid makes this distinction, stating in the context of 
Afghanistan that “legitimacy of authority depended in considerable degree on 
the ruler’s acceptance and approval of values and behaviour that conformed 
to the Islamic precepts and to a lesser degree, to the mores of Pashtūnwāli”.301 
                                                          
298 Zahid, “Understanding Taliban,” 2; Eliaz, “Pashtunwali and Torah,” last accessed 16 
August 2020.  
299 Kakar, “Tribal Law of Pashtunwali,” 2. 
300 Kakar, 4. 
301 Nawid, “Aman-Allah and the Afghan ‘Ulama’,” 188. 
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Ashraf Ghani also argues that Islam and Pashtūnwāli are separate.302 Islamic 
interpretations concerning the segregation of men and women are in harmony 
with tribal concepts of nāmūs and purdah. For this reason, in areas where 
tribe, tradition and orthodox Islamic interpretations are strongly observed, 
women are hidden from public life – hidden under a burqa and are compelled 
to comply with the demands of tribal headmen and mullahs.  
 
Badal means in return and is the institution of exacting revenge. Badal may 
be exercised for the defence of institutions such as nang, sharm, peghore and 
ghayrat. Thomas Barfield contends, “In an aristocratic society where honour 
is the highest ideal, willingness to die to preserve it strikes observers as noble; 
in a commercial society where money takes precedence, such behaviour is 
considered lunacy.”303 In this comparative text, Barfield identifies aristocratic 
society as Afghanistan’s society, and commercial society as Western and 
capitalist society. Badal affects and endangers the lives of urban dwellers, 
including members of the Pashtūn population who do not live a tribal life.  
 
Badal in Pashtūn society is connected to preserving retributive justice at all 
costs.304 In most badal cases, innocent people are likely to be harmed, both 
physically and emotionally. A person who refrains from exacting badal is 
highly likely to experience rejection from his tribe or members of his kinship 
circle. According to Lutz Rzehak, a person who upholds honour is called 
                                                          
302 Ghani, “Islam and State-Building in Tribal Society,” 269.  
303 Barfield, A Cultural and Political History, 17. 
304 In numerous tribal conflicts where badal killings have taken place, each clan or tribe 
involved in the conflict may lose several members. After several people are killed from 
both sides, tribal elders seek peace through an elaborate ceremony which involves putting a 
copy of the Qur’an on the head, after which a feast is held for the elders and guests. 
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nangyālay (honourable) and he will be viewed with high esteem; heroic 
courage and bravery are in demand only when there is no alternative.305 Late 
historian, Hasan Kakar, regards badal killing as revenge to be a destructive 
component of Pashtūnwāli.306  
 
Customs amongst tribal Afghans [Pashtūns] dictate that victims’ family 
members are honour-bound to retaliate or seek to reconcile.307 It is often 
killing or exacting harm in retaliation that constitutes badal. Revenge killing 
is a source of conflict between community members.308 Despite the fact that 
some individuals use tribal institutions to exact revenge, there are peaceful 
avenues for reconciliation, including latitude for forgiveness of the 
perpetrator. One option to avoid killing is for the victim’s wāli (guardian) to 
receive financial compensation. A key aspect of criminal cases in Afghan 
society is reconciling the victims and perpetrators, and their families or clans, 
and providing compensation.309 The compensation is known as diyyāt, in 
Shari’a formulations and ozrāna (apology) in Pashtūnwali. 
 
Pashtūnwāli may also include the custom of giving girls into marriage as 
compensation, known as baad (marriage). Baad is the practice through which 
women are used as compensation for criminal acts or as restitution for 
personal injury suffered by another family member.310 Women get involved 
in inter-tribal peace-making processes when it involves baad marriages. Noah 
                                                          
305 Rzehak, “Doing Pashto,” 11. 
306 Kakar, The Reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan, 65. 
307 USIP “The Clash of Two Goods, State and Non-State Dispute Resolution in 
Afghanistan,” 16.  
308 USIP, 16. 
309 USIP, 27.  
310 Gaston, Sarwari and Strand, “Lessons Learnt,” 40. 
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Coburn and John Dempsey state that girls are forcibly exchanged to settle 
blood feuds, debts and other disputes given in baad exchanges – a practice 
that is against Afghanistan’s law, international law and contrary to Islamic 
law principles.311  
 
Baad marriages often take place when murder is committed, and such 
marriages serve as a form of bribery and, in the context of the rule of law, it 
is used to avert the prosecution of the culprits. The practice of baad marriages 
shows that certain elements of the Pashtūnwāli tribal code can easily 
circumvent state and international law, because the political leaders of 
Afghanistan claim to promote the formal laws, but in practice, undermine 
those very laws by overlooking the parallel tribal/customary institutions. 
Parallel institutions such as these undermine the state legal system in many 
ways. For instance, groups of people in rural parts of Afghanistan do not see 
themselves bound to follow the state law like the urban dwellers. There is an 
obvious ethno-tribal bias in Afghanistan’s political system. Examples of 
parallel institutions are jirga that negatively impact and undermine the courts 
of law; Loya Jirga that affects the operations of a parliament and Arbaki 
(tribal) militia-style police that affect the operations of a national police force.       
 
Melmastiā and Nanwatai are two other institutions of Pashtūnwāli. These 
institutions deal with hospitality and the protection of Pashtūn people. 
Protecting people in times of trouble is a revered quality of the Pashtūns. In 
cases where an offence of malum in se such as an immoral act is being 
                                                          
311 Coburn and Dempsey, “Informal Dispute Resolution,” 6. 
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committed, one cannot not expect to receive a hospitable reception or 
protection under Melmastiā. For instance, a man who has committed 
fornication and escapes revenge from the girl’s tribe cannot seek protection 
under Nanwatai. Strange enough, for murder one can ask for protection under 
Nanwatai. Kenneth P. Lizzio describes Nanwatai as follows:  
 
Criminals seeking to get beyond the reach of the law often take 
advantage of a Pashtūn custom, Nanwatai, which requires a host to 
grant asylum to anyone who requests it, except in the case of rape. 
Once inside the agency, fugitives customarily enter into a client-
patron relationship with their host such as that extended by the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan, who refused to turn Osama bin Ladan 
over to the Americans in 2001.312  
 
The institutions of Pashtūnwāli are interwoven in a complex web, where 
adherents of the code are expected to respect and follow certain obligations. 
The code forms binary communal relations between the kashr (youths) and 
the mashr (elders), a hierarchy based on social inertia. This may involve 
supporting group interests, some of which may involve taking part in combat, 
paying financial contributions in the name of Islamic taxation, offering free 
services or adhering to certain religious orthodoxies.   
 
  
                                                          
312 Lizzio, Embattled Saints, 90. 
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6.3 Customary Laws  
 
The national governments in Kabul have sought to impose centralised, code-
based judicial institutions upon local communities that have historically had 
non-state traditional institutions for regulating behaviour and resolving 
problems.313 Despite these attempts, customary practices based on 
Pashtūnwāli are popular in cities and districts but are not so strongly practised 
in the civic regions of the five cosmopolitan cities of Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, 
Mazar-e-Sharif and Nangarhar.  
 
In Afghanistan, inhabitants of the economically and geographically 
peripheral areas in the mountains, deserts and steppes have remained beyond 
the bounds of state control and therefore run their own affairs.314 It is the 
author’s view that this diarchy system, between the Kabul-based central 
power and the local traditional structures, which runs in parallel but 
disharmoniously, affects the empowerment of the rule of law. The following 
section gives a few examples of cases resolved by the Pashtūnwāli code.  
 




Amongst the tribesmen murder is a serious crime. In tribal parts of 
Afghanistan, murder often leads to blood feuds and consequently to a spree 
of revenge killings. Members often seek revenge rather than enforcing 
criminal punishments on the perpetrators. Afghanistan’s media outlets and 
government sources call these types of revenge killings doshmani shakhsi, 
                                                          
313 Barfield, “Afghan Customary Law,” 1.  
314 Barfield, 3. 
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which translates as personal enmity. Afghanistan’s administrations refrain 
from using the terms blood feud or inter-tribal killings.  
 
In rural Afghanistan, non-legal customary law institutions are unable to try 
people for their crimes and set punishments accordingly. Traditionally, the 
injured party would be expected to take revenge by murdering the killer or 
someone from the killer’s family. According to Pashtūnwāli practices, 
revenge-taking must take place face-to-face, and one must not target women 
or children. According to tsali (practices), the murder of an innocent man puts 
all of his own agnatic relatives at risk as targets of revenge.315  
 
In 1941 a group of men went hunting partridges in the mountains. Two 
men, one from the village of Ismaelkhel and the other from the village 
of Almara, quarrelled over who should get to keep an exhausted bird 
that had fallen to the ground. A fight ensued in which one of the 
Almara men was beaten with a stick and badly injured. The other men 
broke up the fight and the injured man’s brothers attempted to take 
him to a hospital in Pakistan but he died along the way. The brothers 
then decided to kill the murderer and went to his home in Ismaelkhel 
to ambush him the next morning. They shot and killed him on his way 
to dawn prayers. The brothers then fled to Almara hotly pursued by 
armed men from Ismaelkhel. Although the men of Ismaelkhel were 
eager for revenge, they relented when the elders of Almara informed 
them that the victim himself had killed one of their men the day 
before. An influential man of Ismaelkhel, whose servant was the 
victim of the dawn attack, put a holy Qur’an on his head to signal his 
willingness to act as mediator. After talking to both sides, he 
determined that the revenge killing was equivalent in type and asked 
that the armed men on both sides return to their respective homes to 
bury the victims properly. Because both sides had suffered equal 




                                                          
315 Barfield, 14.  
316 Zadrān, “Socioeconomic and Legal Political Processes,” 119-120.   
   
 




Customary laws are not just about forcing baad marriages and enforcing 
restitution or revenge that affect the family members of a criminal. Dispute 
resolution based on common sense forms the crux of the following case 
decided by customary practice:  
 
In 1962 ‘A’ wished to marry his son to the daughter of ‘B’. He 
therefore sent his wife to talk with ‘B’s’ wife about the possibility. 
‘B’s’ wife knew that ‘A’ was a rich and famous man, so she was in 
favour of marrying her daughter to his son. She therefore brought out 
some khone (a type of sugar cone used in order to signify the initial 
acceptance of a marriage arrangement) and gave it to ‘A’s’ wife. A 
few days later ‘C’ sent his wife to B’s wife for the same purpose. B’s 
wife promised her daughter to ‘C’s’ wife too. ‘B’ and ‘C’ were both 
informed of this agreement. ‘C’ and his relatives then went to B’s 
house to confirm the engagement publicly with the exchange of khone 
and the receipt of a handkerchief embroidered by the girl herself. 
Several days later ‘A’ complained about this to the government and 
four members of ‘C’s’ family were jailed. However, the government 
court said that the dispute should be handled by Pashtūn tsali 
(practices) and so a maraka317 was convened. The marakachian318 
refused to hear the case until ‘C’s’ relatives were released from jail so 
‘A’ was obligated to ask the government to do so. Since such a request 
indicated his willingness to be bound by the arbitration, they freed the 
men. Each side then presented their case. ‘A’ claimed that the initial 
exchange of khone bound ‘B’s’ daughter to an engagement with his 
son. It was, he claimed, as if he had left a deposit of grain at a mill to 
stake his claim to be first in line. ‘C’ argued that ‘A’ was simply using 
his wealth and power to override ‘C’s’ rights. Using an equally 
domestic metaphor to match ‘A’s’ claim, he said that making an 
engagement was like buying cloth from a merchant: once the cloth is 
cut the buyer owns it. He noted that the formal exchange of sweets 
and handkerchief involving the men as well as the women had made 
the engagement official. The judges decided that according to Pashtūn 
marriage practices, ‘B’s’ case was more solid. They declared that ‘B’ 
had the greater right and thus the case was resolved with ‘A’s’ loss.319  
 
  
                                                          
317 Setting up an elders’ community gathering for dispute resolution. 
318 The people who solve disputes in a maraka setting. 
319 Zadrān, “Socioeconomic and Legal-political Processes,” 317-319.  
   
 




According to customary laws, when a thief is brought before the elders in a 
jirga for their decision, the main approach taken is restitution. The stolen 
items must be returned to their owner. The thief may also have to pay a fine 
to the victim whose property has been stolen, as by stealing, the thief has 
violated the victim’s honour.  
 
In 1954 a labourer working for a landlord from another tribe stole his 
rifle and fled back to his home village. Because the thief came from a 
powerful tribe, the landlord wished to avoid using tribal arbitration 
and instead reported the crime to the police. The thief was arrested 
and sentenced to three years of imprisonment. While in prison he died 
of an illness. His relatives then demanded revenge or compensation 
from the landlord on the grounds that he would not have died had he 
not been jailed.320  
 
 
Trial by Ordeal  
 
There are different informal traditions to ascertain the truth. Trial by ordeal 
may not be practices any longer. In a trial by order, people in a maraka 
(customary jirga litigation) may demand that the accused takes an oath or 
undergoes an ordeal.321 In Pashtūnwāli, undergoing an ordeal in order to 
establish the truth is called towda.  
 
Among some Pashtūn groups an ordeal is required in addition to 
taking the oath, particularly in cases of theft. Trial by ordeal is based 
on the belief that an innocent person will suffer no ill effects from the 
ordeal, whereas the guilty will. Among the Zadrān Pashtūns the ordeal 
consists of having a red-hot piece of iron placed on the accused 
person’s right hand protected only by seven pieces of paper. The 
accused must then walk seven marked paces before throwing the iron 
away, after which his hand is bandaged. He spends the night under 
guard and then the hand is examined to see if it has blistered. If it has, 
he is guilty; if not, he is innocent and entitled to receive an indemnity 
for the false accusation and the accuser must apologise. The Tani 
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Pashtūns have a similar ordeal, but one that involves the accused 
picking three stones out of a pot of boiling water without suffering 
blisters. Zadrān observed that the popularity of the ordeal as a means 
to determining the truth was declining in favour of the oath alone, 
even by the mid-1970s. This was because many people had lost faith 
in its efficacy and because swearing oaths had a justification in 
Islamic law while ordeals did not. In cases of theft it was being widely 
replaced by an additional swearing, in which an innocent relative of 
the accused was asked to take an oath that he had no knowledge of the 





According to Pashtūnwāli, if a person is murdered for getting involved in a 
dishonourable act such as stealing, adultery or sodomy, then his or her death 
would not invoke revenge or punishments for his or her murderer. If two 
people are found to be in bed engaged in adultery, fornication or sodomy, 
their immediate killing is permissible, and such action will not lead to 
punishment for the perpetrators. This practice is the same in rural districts as 
it is in the cities.  
 
Until 2018, when the old legal code was updated, Article 398 of the Afghan 
Penal Code of 1976 stated that if a man were to find his female kin (a related 
female such as a wife, daughter, sister, aunt or cousin) in bed with another 
man, then killing both persons as a form of punishment would not be classed 
as murder or manslaughter.    
 
Article 398 of the Penal Code: A man who sees his wife, or another 
close family member, in the act of committing adultery or sharing a 
bed with another individual is exempted from punishment if he 
immediately kills or injures his spouse and the third party. Though the 
defendant would be exempted from regular murder and laceration 
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punishments, he would still be subject to a short term of 
imprisonment, two years or less, as a form of ‘ta’zir’323 punishment.324  
 
Due to the overtone of moral and religious disapproval of adultery, Shari’a-
inspired judges favour lenient punishments for someone murdering 
adulterous persons. In cases where personal moral judgements outweigh an 
official code, often the surviving victims are not protected or afforded respect 
or protection. In the formal legal system of Afghanistan, in cases of adultery, 
short term imprisonments based on ta’zir (discretionary punishment) are 
applied. In Article 398 of the Penal Code 1976 the wording of the sentence is 
vague and less than two years may mean anything from one day to just under 
twenty-four months. This means until recent years, a person would have 
received minimal and lenient punishments, or the killer could even walk free 
if he had killed someone accused of having committed adultery. In the courts 
of law, the vague and inconsistent gap between a day and twenty-four months 
makes the exchange of bribes quite appealing.  
 
Marriage as Compensation  
 
Crime is the personal responsibility of its perpetrator.325 In modern legal 
systems, this is a non-negotiable principle. In some authoritarian regimes, 
punishing the relatives of an offender in order to put pressure on the 
perpetrator to come forward may be practised. In the customary laws of 
Afghanistan, as for example in rape cases, the dignity and honour of a family, 
                                                          
323 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 46. Mohmmad Hashim Kamali describes Ta’zir as a 
doctrine which in Hanafi law grants the qādi wide discretion to order punishment in 
accordance with the individual circumstances of the case.  
324 ALEP, “Criminal Law of Afghanistan,” 108. 
325 CONSTITUTION 2004, art. XXVI. 
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clan or tribe is involved. In certain cases, punishment for a rapist has resulted 
in his innocent family members getting punished instead. In some other cases, 
in order to atone for the crime, the rapist would have to get his sisters or 
daughters married to men from the victim’s family.  
 
In Pashtūnwāli, this action is called sharm (apology) which is a form of 
restitution. The girls are sacrificed because one of their family members has 
committed a dishonourable action such as murder or rape or cannot pay off 
his debts. Baad marriage is the penance (restitution) and the type of sharm 
(apology) payment for the violated honour. Family members from both sides 
involved in baad marriages may have longstanding problems even after their 
girls are married based on Pashtūnwāli customs.  
 
If a couple involved in sexual acts are unmarried, according to traditions that 
have gained religious backing as well, the couple have to marry. Despite the 
fact that some couples marry after being involved in sexual intercourse, they 
both may be forbidden to enter their parents’ or in-laws’ houses because of 
the shame they have brought on the families.326  
 
Land Disputes  
   
Disputes can arise when land is to be bought or sold. For instance, several 
brothers in a family distribute family-inherited land amongst themselves. 
Blood feuds may be caused between families, clans and tribes over land 
ownership. The central government in Kabul is unable to register land titles. 
In recent years, Arāzi, a land registry institution has been established by the 
                                                          
326 Even if there is mutual consent for intimate relations and sexual intercourse outside 
wedlock, in Islamic law these relations are regarded as sins, zinā (adultery).  
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state to register lands in Afghanistan. However, most lands remain un-
surveyed and un-registered.  The following is an example of land dispute.   
 
In 1952 two tribes disputed ownership of a piece of wasteland that 
was located between their respective villages. A maraka was held but 
was unsuccessful, so the parties moved the dispute to a local 
government court. The judge, using Pashtūn tsali (practices) rather 
than Islamic law, decided that the case could be resolved if the elders 
of the village ‘A’ were willing to take a special oath asserting the 
rightfulness of their claim that the land was theirs. Qur’an in hand they 
walked over the land in question and swore that it was theirs. They 
were then awarded the land by the judge. However, because one of 
the oath takers later became deaf, many people from village ‘B’ 




Islam allots women half the share of an inheritance bequeathed to men who 
have the same degree of relation to the testator. Inheritance rules regarding 
women depend on their status, such as having children or having re-married. 
I shall give a general overview of inheritance here. People are free to donate 
their wealth and property to whomever they please; this can happen during 
one’s lifetime or it can be done through a will.  
 
In customary laws, men often exclude married women from inheriting from 
their father’s or mother’s land, depriving them of their share of the inherited 
assets. The inheritance for widows and unmarried girls/women will be 
allocated to them according to Shari’a instructions. Depriving women of 
inherited land is common in rural parts of Afghanistan. This action, a faux 
pas and malum in se, does not appear to attract the attention of Afghanistan’s 
religious authority. The ulemā do not condemn it or issue a fatwā (opinio 
                                                          
327 Zadrān, “Socio-Economic and Legal Political Processes,” 248.  
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juris) to ban this un-Islamic practice – indicating that the ulemā are willing to 
disregard religious law where they see fit.  
 
6.5 Changes to Pashtūnwāli Since 1978 
 
Roland Martin Kraml completed his Magister der Philosophie (master’s 
thesis) at the Universität Wien, titled “Changes in Pashtun tribal structures 
since 1978: the influence of war, foreign militaries and militant political 
Islam.” Kraml’s research investigates ethnic boundaries, foreign 
interventions, migration, exile and militant political Islam as well as Soviet 
and US-NATO military interventions. Roland finds that Pashtūn tribal 
organisation has been subject to profound changes over the last four decades, 
but local diverse circumstances mean that this conclusion cannot be 
generalised.328  
 
In Kraml’s opinion, a crisis of tribal leadership, social stratification, crime, 
drugs and availability of weapons and foreign funding have pushed traditional 
structures to the side-line.329 Telecommunication technology has reduced the 
rural-urban gap, but still, kinship ties through marriage bonds are exceedingly 
important.330 Despite the vital importance Kraml’s findings add to this area 
of research, the word of caution he exercises concerning local diverse 
circumstances show that on the ground, tribalism manifests itself in 
Afghanistan’s society, where Pashtūn politicians at the helm consume 
tribalism for their political interests.  
 
                                                          
328 Kraml, “Changes to Pashtun tribal structures,”135. 
329 Kraml, 136. 
330 Kraml, 136. 
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6.6 Recent Pashtūnwāli cases   
 
Levirate Marriage  
 
Although Afghanistan’s governments have tried to promote the issue of 
women’s free choice in marriage from the times of Abdur Rahman Khan to 
the present government (1880-2020), levirate marriages based on preserving 
honour, nang and namus keeps women and girls chained to the family which 
claims to defend its honour after the marriage is solemnised. Taking into 
account that marriages are very expensive in Afghanistan, the economic 
element may also play a role.331  
 
Khadija, an eighteen-year old was widowed twice; her dreams were shattered 
as she was passed down through a family deep in Taliban territory.332 One 
husband was a Taliban insurgent killed fighting American marines; one was 
a policeman killed in fighting the Taliban and one was an interpreter for the 
marines who is now hunted by the Taliban who have threatened to kill him 
and his infant son.333 Even before Khadija was born she was engaged to her 
first cousin, Zia Ul Haq; their fathers were brothers and farmers who lived 
near one another in Marja, Helmand.334 A major reason behind levirate 
marriages in Afghanistan is avoiding the hefty marriage costs. A woman’s 
deceased husband’s family keep her in their family, because her marriage to 
another family member will not incur any further costs.   
                                                          
331 A woman who marries another agnate of her deceased husband does not receive a new 
bride price or dowry and there is no lavish spending on luxury weddings. This is 
economically viable for poorer families.    
332 Nordland, “Khadija, 18, has married three brothers” 1-7.  
333 Nordland, 1-7 
334 Nordland, 1-7 
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Extensive legal codes that came about over one hundred and forty years ago 
and the attempts by the numerous political leaders of Afghanistan to regulate 
family affairs based on a code of law failed to give this most basic right of 
choice in marriage to the tribal and non-tribal women of Afghanistan.     
 
The Bride-price  
 
Bride-price is another cultural practice which the law and the political leaders 
of Afghanistan intended to change and regulate335 but did not succeed. Bride-
price is a strongly adhered to phenomenon which tribes perceive as an 
economic gain for the clan’s and the tribe’s power. Based on tradition, bride-
price is money paid to the bride’s parents – an action contrary to Islamic law 
that assigns mahr (dowry) to be paid to the bride.336  
 
Bride-price is a tribal phenomenon practised among the Turko-Mongol 
tribes,337 the Bedouin tribes 338 and a number of tribes from the different 
ethnic groups of Afghanistan.339 Bride-price is not restricted to the Pashtūns. 
The majority of marriages in Afghanistan involve the exchange of some 
amount of bride-price. According to Radio Free Europe, an Afghan man has 
married his fiancée after twelve years paying the bride price.  
 
Sayed Wali is finally a married man. His wife’s family had demanded 
a big bride price, payments by the groom to the bride’s family are 
commonplace in Afghanistan. Wali: “I got engaged for $2,800. I paid 
part of it over 10 years, but during the last two years, I haven’t been 
able to pay off the remaining $300.” Wali runs this small shop and 
                                                          
335 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 12; Nawid, “Aman-Allah and the Afghan ‘Ulama’,”. 95. 
336 Muzhary, “The Bride Price,” 1-6.  
337 Greaves, “Women in the Early Empires,” 12-13.  
338 Jabbur and Conrad, The Bedouins and the Desert, 295.  
339 Muzhary, “The Bride Price,” 1-6. Bride-prices from different parts of Afghanistan are 
Maidan Wardak ($1450-$11,800), Nangarhar ($1450 to $7,245), Loya Paktia (Khost, Paktia 
and Paktika) ($14,500 to $17,390), Farah ($11,800 to $21,733), Faryab $10,000 to $20,000), 
Kandahar and Helmand ($14,590 to $43,468).  
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makes little money. After his plight was shared in an RFE/RL report, 
activists and charities stepped in. Wali: “They helped me a lot. I got 
the money for the bride price, and I got everything I needed for my 
house.” His mother, Salma, is overjoyed. She says “I am extremely 
happy. I have never been so happy in my whole life.” Activists are 
urging families not to demand large payments. Jawed Khpalwak, Civil 
Society Activist: “The biggest problem we have is that the bride prices 
are so high, young people go to Iran to work [to raise the money], 
where they get addicted to drugs. When they stay here, they must work 
hard to earn the money.” High bride prices can leave grooms and their 




Afghans connect bride-price to the family’s prestige and honour. This means 
that a girl whose parents do not charge a bride-price may be viewed as less 
valuable by her future husband and in-laws. However, the Shi’a urban 
dwellers of the five cosmopolitan cities are the ones who stopped the practice 




The next example is the burning of the house of suspected murderers based 
on the Pashtūnwāli code. This incident happened in the Khost province of 
Afghanistan.  
 
After seven members of a family were killed, a number of tribal elders 
from Manduzai district of Khost province ordered that the house of 
five suspect killers must be burnt down.342 The BBC reports that no 
one was hurt, as the suspects were taken away and this incident took 
place in a government-controlled district and was based on local 
customs where the locals see it just to burn an oppressor’s house as a 
form of tribally-sanctioned punishment.343    
 
 
                                                          
340 Sharifa, “After 12 Years Paying Bride Price,” last accessed 07 July 2020. 
341 Conversation with members of the Civil Society Organisations based in Kabul, 
Afghanistan on 15 June 2020.  
342 BBC Farsi, “Houses of five suspects,” last accessed 14 July 2020; Alokhel, “Tribe Burns 
Down Houses,” last accessed 14 July 2020.    
343 BBC Farsi, “Houses of five suspects,” last accessed 14 July 2020; Alokhel, “Tribe Burns 
Down Houses,” last accessed 14 July 2020.    
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The government of Afghanistan has been ruled by Pashtūn political leaders 
from 1747 to 2020, most of whom supported Pashtūnwāli in the royal clans 
and in the leaders’ inner circles. Despite slight changes in the way 
Pashtūnwāli is understood and practised by the Pashtūns in rural and civic 
spaces in Afghanistan, the code has not been reformed and harmful 
traditions344 affect members of society and causes intolerable injustices. 
Customary laws based on Pashtūnwāli violate Islamic law as well as 
universal human rights laws that are enshrined in various conventions, 
protocols, treaties and declarations that the state of Afghanistan has accepted, 
ascended to or has ratified.345 The widespread practice of Pashtūnwāli in 
Afghanistan is a sign of state failure and the manifestation of the marginal 
tribalism of its political leaders.    
 
                                                          
344 Due to cultural relativity and the implementation of human rights conferred on the political 
will of a sovereign ruler, the human rights organisations exercise due care and use the term 
harmful traditions for what otherwise is known as the “violation of human rights”. 
345 Afghanistan has undertaken to comply with these international conventions: International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) (Ascension date 24 January 1983); 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
(Ascension date 06 July 1983); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) (Ascension date 06 January 1983); Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT) (01 April 1987); Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (28 March 1994); Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the sale of child prostitution and child pornography (CRC-OP-SC) 
(Ascension 19 September 2002); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (05 March 2003); Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW-
OP) (Ascension 23 June 2003); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CRC-OP-AC) (Ascension date 24 
September 2003); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) (Ascension date 05 June 2007); Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR-OP1) (Ascension 
date 04 October 2007); Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights aiming for the abolition of the death penalty (CCPR-OP2-DP) (Ascension 
date 17 October 2007); United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 
(Ratification date 25 August 2008); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) (Ascended on 18 September 2012); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD-OP) (Ascension date 18 September 2012); 
Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture (CAT-OP) (Ascended on 17 April 
2018).  
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6.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has clarified that tribalism, a term shunned by social 
anthropology and post-colonial scholarship in the West, in fact plays a big 
role in Afghanistan’s parallel (modern and traditional) ways of governing her 
people. This chapter departs from the conventional arguments that colonial 
writers belittle other societies by attaching the tribal tag to them.  
 
The chapter has also clarified the different axes of oppression by the internal 
colonisers on the colonised subjects (often the tribal people), whereas in the 
context of Afghanistan, the term tribe must not be rejected or ignored due to 
its importance in understanding internal colonialism in Afghanistan.   
 
This chapter has shown actual cases from the 1970s up to 2020 as well as the 
findings of Roland Martin Kraml in regard to changes in Pashtūns’ customs 
since 1978. The chapter illustrated three recent cases where customs and 
practices of tribal politics are still relevant to Afghanistan. Given that there 
are plural legal institutions and practices in Afghanistan – it is only fitting to 
look further into notions of legal plurality. The next chapter will focus on this 
aspect and discusses legal pluralism in Afghanistan.  
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CHAPTER 7: LEGAL PLURALISM IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
7  Introduction   
 
This chapter deals with legal pluralism in Afghanistan. First, it builds on 
theoretical literature on legal pluralism, and then highlights the informal 
mechanisms (customary laws) for four population groups of Afghanistan. 
Due to the overlaps between common use of some customary justice 
institutions by different ethnic groups of Afghanistan, in order, they will be 
listed as: Pashtūns for their use of jirga, Turkic People (Kirghiz, Turkmen 
and Uzbek) for āqsaqāl, followed by the Hazāras and Tajiks for they use 
Shūrā; which may also be used by members of the first two ethnic groups. In 
order to understand Afghanistan’s plural informal justice mechanisms, it is 
essential to provide introductory information for each ethnic group, followed 
by the type of informal justice mechanism that they use.  
 
In the next part of this chapter, the customary law dispensed by the insurgent 
groups and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) will be 
discussed. At the end, the status of formal and customary laws will be 
discussed vis-à-vis the existing scholarship in the field.   
 
Legal pluralism is a set of uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of 
law that make competing claims of authority; they may impose conflicting 
demands or norms and may have different styles and orientations.346 Brian 
Tamanaha pays particular attention to the rich legal pluralism that 
characterised the medieval period and how this pluralism was reduced in the 
                                                          
346 Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism,” 375.  
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course of the consolidation of state power.347 In the words of Geffrey 
Swenson, Afghanistan’s pluralist bodies of customary law – particularly the 
insurgents’  justice system – is an archetype of combative legal pluralism348, 
which competes with the weak and inconsistent formal law of Afghanistan. 
Marc Galanter, using a neologism for legal pluralism as “justice in many 
rooms,” observes: 
 
Just as health is not found primarily in hospitals or knowledge in 
schools, so justice is not primarily to be found in official justice-
dispensing institutions. People experience justice and injustice not 
only (or usually) in forums sponsored by the state but the primary 
institutional locations of their activity-home, neighbourhood, 
workplace, business deal and son.349  
 
Although Galanter wrote his article in the context of the United States, his 
logic applies to various societies and states. In the context of Afghanistan, the 
application of Galanter’s justice in many rooms, may be assessed in light of 
injustices due to the state weaknesses resulting in the formation of a 
combative legal pluralist systems in Afghanistan’s formal and informal 
justice institutions. In May 2017, Craig Charney uses the term a welter of 
legal systems350 for Afghanistan’s plural systems of formal and customary 
law when assessing the progress and problems in advancing the rule of law 
in Afghanistan for the JSSP and United States Department’s Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL).351    
 
                                                          
347 Tamanaha, 2.  
348 Swenson, “Legal pluralism in theory and practice,” 1.   
349 Galanter, “Justice In Many Rooms,” 17. 
350 Charney, “A Survey of Progress in Building the Rule of Law in Afghanistan,” 14. 
351 Charney, 1.  
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John Griffith advocates the ideology of legal centralism as a claim that “law 
is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons and administered 
by a single set of state organs.”352 Brian Tamanaha on the other hand, believes 
in the power of plurality of law, with varying degrees of authority and 
standards, and that the state of conflict between plural bodies of law creates 
opportunities for individuals and groups within society.353 In order to narrow 
down these theories in the context of Afghanistan, one may note that there are 
good and not so good quality customary law systems in use. In the not so 
good customary law system, the level of justice and injustice depends on local 
perceptions and on the quality of justice dispensers’ knowledge, power and 
what they make of justice.  
 
The customary laws in Afghanistan for over two centuries have shown a 
number of practices; whereas in one area of the country, a girl and a boy who 
elope are unharmed, receive the support of their families and marry, in 
another area of the country both will be stoned to death, albeit killers commit 
their crimes with impunity. In the next section, this chapter details the four 
major ethnic groups: Pashtūns, Turkic groups, Hazāras, Tajiks followed by 
the type of informal justice institutions they use.  
 
7.1 The Pashtūnwali customary laws   
 
Pashtūns are one of the major ethnic group of Afghanistan who constitute 
about forty percent of Afghanistan’s population.354 Pashtūns form many 
tribes and are urban and rural dwellers.  Pashtūn nomadic people are known 
                                                          
352 Griffith, “What is Legal Pluralism?” 3. 
353 Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism,” 375.  
354 Barfield, A Cultural and Political History, 24. 
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as the Kuchis. Latif Yaad, a Pashtūn scholar, names one hundred and fifty-
three Pashtūn tribes in his book titled Pakhtāna wo pezhane [Know the 
Pashtūn Tribes].355  
 
Barnet Rubin argues that Afghanistan has a patrilineal society, in which 
membership in family and lineage, as well as property, is inherited only by 
agnatic kin, and clusters of agnatic kin form alliances to defend or expand the 
patrimony, which also risk splitting into antagonistic factions over its 
management or division.356 He states that the old regime in Afghanistan 
firmly used certain state recognised tribal institutions and leaders as a means 
of control, and in the atrāf (rural areas), the district administration interacted 
with the population indirectly, through officially appointed representations 
called malik or arbāb, of units called qawm.357 Rubin argues that even after 
the apparent destruction of tribalism by a state, it might re-emerge during a 
period of state weakness or state collapse.358 The issue of Pashtūns’ tribalism 
has received the sustained attention of Afghan and foreign scholars.   
  
As for the rise to political power, Amy Romano posits that in 1709, Mir Wais 
Khan Hotaki, a Pashtūn of the Ghilzai tribe from outside of Kandahar, waged 
a successful uprising that defeated Persian forces.359 Thirty years after Hotaki 
liberated Kandahar, his successors were overthrown by a Turkic warrior, 
Nadir Shah, from Khorasan.360 The next page in the Pashtūns’ rise to power 
was turned after the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747. Pashtūns have co-
                                                          
355 Yaad, Know the Pashtun Tribes, 1-350.  
356 Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 23.  
357 Rubin, 25. 
358 Rubin, 10. 
359 Romano, Historical Atlas of Afghanistan, 29.  
360 Romano, 29-30.  
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ethnics in Pakistan. The following section will address a key aspect of the 
Pashtūnwali code, namely the institution of jirga used by the Pashtūns to 
dispense justice through customary law mechanisms.  
 
7.2 The Jirga 
 
Jirga, also spelt as jerga or jarga attributed to the Pashtūns, has common 
characteristics with the Turkic institutions of pre-Islamic Kangāsh and 
Kurultai. In understanding the correlations between these institutions, 
Abdullah Habibi and Habibullah Rafi state that white beard, a term used in 
Pashto as spin gir, is taken from the aqsaqāl which has Turkic origin.361 Noah 
Coburn surmises that jirga is a Pashto word, deriving from the Turkic word 
for circle, and typically denotes gatherings in which parties are represented 
by members of their patrilineal kin, who deliberate on the issue.362  
 
Regardless of its commonality with other similar institutions, jirga is an 
institution of customary law based on the Pashtūnwāli code. Jirga is an open 
discussion forum, held at village level and is comprised of elders: men 
deemed knowledgeable and respectable.363 In a jirga gathering, elders reach 
what they perceive as just in a particular case. Jirga plays a vital role for 
peace-making between feuding clans and tribes. It has become embedded in 
Pashtūn communities, and in the absence of effective institutions of formal 
justice, it is convened to deal with all types of criminal offences.364  
 
                                                          
361 Aqsaqāl questionnaire filled in by Aziz Rafiee dated 02 June 2020.   
362 Coburn, “Informal justice and international community,” 13. 
363 LAND INFO Country of Origin Information Centre, “Afghanistan: Blood feuds, 
traditional law,” 12. 
364 Jupp, “Legal transplants,” 69. 
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The jirgas’ collective decision-making mechanism is exclusively dominated 
by men. Jirgas’ prikra (decisions) are binding on the parties, where the 
marakachian (elders) reach collective decisions based on local interpretations 
of Shari’a and the unwritten customary codes.365 In jirga proceedings, 
machilgha (cash or property) is collected [as bond money] from parties, and 
failure to adhere to a verbal judgment may result in a range of punishments 
such as imposing cash fines, burning down the house of the guilty party, and 
in most serious cases, one’s expulsion from the tribe.366  
 
As detailed in Chapter 6, ignoring jirga decisions may lead to banishment, 
burning of property or other penalties. Segments of the civil society, the 
Afghanistan Independent Human Right Commission (AIHRC), and 
institutions of formal justice system, the Supreme Court, the Attorney 
General’s Office, and the Ministry of Justice have opposed working with 
informal mechanisms.367 Noah Coburn surmises that in Afghanistan, the 
informal system is preponderant, while the formal system seeks 
preponderance but remains secondary.368  
 
One of the major criticisms of the jirga system is the violation of human rights 
of the people who avail themselves of a jirga or, in some areas of Afghanistan, 
have no other choice but to use the jirga system. The AIHRC states that 
informal justice has no legal basis in Afghanistan and relies on Article 27 of 
Constitution 2004 that stipulates, “no person can be punished but in 
                                                          
365 Jupp, 69. 
366 Jupp, 70-71. 
367 Coburn, “Informal justice and international community,” 84. 
368 Coburn, 13.  
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accordance with the decision of an authorised court and in conformity with 
the law adopted before the date of the offence.”369 The AIHRC documented 
one hundred and ninety-six incidences over nine years from March 2010 until 
February 2019 including one hundred and seven cases of dissatisfaction with 
jirga and shūrā decisions and eighty-nine cases of infringement of decisions 
by either side of the parties after the decision was accepted.370 Despite the 
mentioned problems, the state of Afghanistan does not reform and improve 
the jirga system and does not expand its formal judicial services to all parts 
of Afghanistan. Prior to discussing the informal legal system used by the 
Turkic people of Afghanistan, it would be conducive to provide a 
demographic insight into the diversity of groups identified as the Turkic 
community. The mosaic of the Turkic people will demonstrate the various 
ways in which justice is dispensed through its informal body known more 
broadly as aqsaqāl.   
 
7.3 The Aqsaqāl customary laws   
 
The Kirghiz, Turkmen and Uzbek form the Turkic population of Afghanistan. 
Members of these three ethnic groups are also identified as Turks. The Turks 
of Afghanistan like other Turks trace their origin to a common ancestry. 
Based on legend, the Turks trace their genealogy to an apical ancestor named 
Oghuz Khan. Oghuz is an ethnonym of a Turkic tribe that played an important 
role in the history of Central Asia and the Middle East from the tenth century 
onwards. In Turkish sources, Oghuz tribes are referred to as Toquz Oghuz, 
                                                          
369 AIHRC, “Consequences of Informal Justice and Tribal Jirgas,” 5-6. 
370 AIHRC, 8. 
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meaning nine Oghuz tribes.371 The Oghuz Khan narratives, sometimes called 
Oghuz-nāma, provided the narrative framework for cultivating a universalist 
ideology and legitimising political power along the unity of the legendary 
past.372  
 
In Afghanistan, and in the neighbouring countries, both the Pashtūns and the 
Turks take pride in their ancestral connection to Islam. The Semitic 
connection of the Oghuz tribe resonated in the Ottoman mystic, Vani Mehmet 
(Mohammad) Efendi’s commentary on the Qur’an (Arā’es al-Qo’ran, Surah 
IX [al-Tawba], 38-39), where he says that the Turks are qowm (predicted 
people) who God would send if believers were to turn to the pleasures of the 
world, arguing that Oghuz Khan, the ancestor of the Turks and a 
contemporary of Abraham, was married to the daughter of Isaac; hence the 
Ottomans had a prophetic lineage back to Isaac via the maternal line.373 The 
Pashtūns make similar claims to their ancestral links to Abraham.     
 
Louis Dupree states that the different ethnic groups of Afghanistan have 
distinct legends of origin and development, but many tales overlap and often 
spread far beyond the boundaries of Afghanistan. The Turkic-speakers in the 
north of Afghanistan usually have the variation of Geser, the epic of the 
Mongols; the Uzbeks relive their days of greatness in several epics, which tell 
the story of the Golden Horde and the Central Asian Khanates as reflected by 
the lives of their great leaders: Alpamysh, Koblandy, Yer-Targyn and 
                                                          
371 Binbaş, “Oghuz, Turkish Tribe.” 4. 
372 Flemming, “Political Genealogies in the Sixteenth Century,” 123-137.  
373 Efendi; in: Binbaş “Ogūz Khan Narratives,” 5. 
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Yedigy.374 The Kirghiz epic, Manas, greatly influenced later Islamic 
historical folklore with its emphasis on the horse-cavalry complex.375  
 
The European scholar who studied the Turks of Afghanistan in the 1930s is 
the Swedish diplomat and philologist, Gunnar Jarring (1907-2002), who 
donated a collection of five hundred and sixty manuscripts from Eastern 
Turkistan to the university library in Lund – mainly books in the Uighur, 
Uzbek and Chaghatai languages from Eastern Turkistan and the Divan by the 
Chaghatai poet and cultural patron, Mir ‘Ali Shir Navai’ (1441-1501).376  
 
The Turks of Afghanistan express great pride in their political leaders Amir 
Timur (1336-1405), Mahmud of Ghazna (971-1030), Zahir ud-Din 
Mohammad Babur (1483-1530) and poet and scholar, Ali Shir Nawa’i (1441-
1501). The above information is stated in an 1TV interview with Marshal 
Abdul Rashid Dostum and is written on the Cultural Federation of the Turks 
of Afghanistan webpage.377 The Turks who ruled Afghanistan or kept it as 
their tributary before the eighteenth century, by far have left behind the 
greatest amount of artwork, statues, miniatures, paintings, decorated mosques 
and minarets with unique tilework.378 Kamaleddin Behzad (1450-1535) has 
produced the best paintings in the Islamic world.379 In the court of Mahmud 
of Ghazna, there were a total of nine hundred scholars, four hundred poets 
                                                          
374 Dupree, Afghanistan, 119. 
375 Dupree, 120.  
376 Törnvall, “From Khotan and Kashghar,” 1, 5; Lund University Library, “The Jarring 
Collection,” last accessed 04 January 2021.    
377 Please see CULTURAL FEDERATION OF THE TURKS OF AFGHANISTAN, (FFTA): 
available from: https://turklar.com/english/?cat=6 (last accessed 07 July 2020); 1TV, 
“Exclusive interview with Marshall Abdul Rashid Dostum,” 23 July 2020,                    last 
viewed 25 July 2020.   
378 Barry, “The Canticle of the Birds,” last viewed 13 March 2019.  
379 Barry, last viewed 13 March 2019. 
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and, the greatest one Abul Qasim Ferdausi with Shāh Nāma the Book of the 
Kings of Persia, had sixty thousand couplets.380  
 
The Kirghiz of Afghanistan are a group of Turkic-speaking people who, in 
1972-74 consisted of three hundred and thirty households numbering just over 
one thousand, eight hundred persons, who occupied the extreme northern and 
southern tip of the Wakhan Corridor – the high-altitude mountain valley areas 
of the Pamirs of Afghanistan.381 The origin of the Kirghiz people is still 
subject to speculation and suggestions include Mongol, Uralic, or 
independent origin.382 In 2010, Thomas Barfield recorded the number of 
Kirghiz to be less than a thousand people.383  
 
According to Mohammad Nazif Shahrani, the Kirghiz recognise three types 
of leadership statuses; in ascending order of importance these are: be, āqsaqāl 
and khan. Be refers to the head of an encampment where a number of families, 
often agnatic or affinal kinsmen, camp together and cooperate in herding and 
other matters of local concern.384 An āqsaqāl is head of an agnatic descent 
group known as oruq, whose members often live in contiguous areas and the 
office of khan is the vehicle through which the unity of the Kirghiz 
community is expressed.385  
 
                                                          
380 Dupree, Afghanistan, 77.  
381 Shahrani, The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan, xxxvii.  
382 Shahrani, 46. 
383 Barfield, A Cultural and Political History, 31. 
384 Shahrani, “The Kirghiz Khans,” 009.  
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The Uzbeks and the Turkmen became politically dominant in the region 
[Afghanistan and beyond] from about A.D. 950.386 The Turkmen play an 
important economic role because they produce Afghanistan’s famed carpets 
and karakul sheepskins, both of which are major export earners.387 Sara 
Koplik uses the term entrepreneurial communities for the Jews and Hindus 
of Afghanistan,388 a term that equally applies to the Turkmen people as well.  
 
The ethnonym Uzbek refers to any member of a Central Asian people that 
inhabit chiefly Uzbekistan and the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan, as well 
as other parts of Central Asia. The word Uzbek today is conventionally used 
in two senses, firstly to refer to the political system of the khans of 
Transoxiana of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and secondly to refer to 
the tribal groups who provided the amirial power for these ruling khans.389 
The designation of Uzbek is thought to refer to Öz Beg, 
the Mongol khan under whom the Golden Horde attained its greatest 
power.390  
 
Barnet Rubin claims that based on the Soviet model, Uzbek was used for 
people who spoke variants of Chaghatai Turkic languages, although the 
Afghan state never made an official ethnic classification of Turkic speaking 
groups.391 The Uzbek people make up ten percent of the population of 
Afghanistan, are Sunni Muslims and communicate in Uzbeki and Farsi.392 In 
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areas of Afghanistan where speakers of a minority language form a majority, 
pursuant to Article 16 of Constitution 2004, their mother language will be the 
third official language and speakers can obtain an education in their 
indigenous language.393 The two superpowers who elevated the status of 
minority languages to national level were the Soviets and the United States 
and its European allies. A number of the Turkic population of Afghanistan 
are known for living a tribal lifestyle. As this sub-section has documented the 
demographic diversity of the Turkic people, the following section explores 
the institutions of aqsaqāl which is attributed to the Turkic communities.    
 
7.4 The Institutions of Āqsaqāl    
 
There is limited quantitative data on the institution of āqsaqāl (also spelt as 
aksakal). Ole Olufsen in “Through the unknown Pamirs; the second Danish 
Pamir expedition, 1898-99” produced in 1904, conducted ethnographic 
research and gathered information partly by autopsy and partly by questioning 
the intelligent natives, such as Kasis (judges), and aksakals (āqsaqāl) whom 
he calls the superintends of town.394 Another author, Munshi Abdul Rahim 
describes the roles āqsaqāls played in Badakhshan in his book titled Journey 
to Badakhshan, with report on Badakhshan and Wakhan, a work ordered by 
John Biddulph in 1879-80.395 Rahim states that when two people fight 
                                                          
393 Article 16 of Constitution 2004 stipulates that in areas where the majority of the population 
speak in any one of the Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamīri languages, 
any of the aforementioned languages, in addition to Pashto and Dari shall be the third official 
language, the usage of which shall be regulated by law. The state shall design and apply 
effective programs to foster and develop all the languages of Afghanistan. Usage of all 
current languages in the country shall be free in press publications and mass media. Academic 
and national administrative terminology and usage in the country shall be preserved. 
 
394 Olufsen, Through the unknown Pamirs,” xvi.  
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amongst themselves, aksakals make peace between them, but if a serious 
disturbance takes place, which the aksakals cannot settle, the matter goes 
before the Mir.396  In a number of varied roles. Listed by Rahim, the aksakals 
were aides of the Mir who governed a region.397     
 
In order to gather qualitative information on āqsaqāls and investigate their 
role in informal justice mechanism used by the Turkic people of Afghanistan, 
the author contacted a number of academics in Afghanistan, Turkey and the 
United States. My attempts at data collection regarding āqsaqāl, proved 
useful. From four people contacted, two researchers, writers and academics, 
Aziz Rafiee and Mohammad Nazif Shahrani filled in the research gap on 
āqsaqāls.   
 
Aziz Rafiee, head of the Afghan Civil Society Forum Organisation (ACSFO) 
based in Afghanistan stated the following:  
 
Among the Mongols and Turks, in Ottoman and Khwarazm, there 
were three methods for dispute resolution. Before the advent of Islam, 
kangāsh system was in place which in Persian language changed to 
kankāsh (meaning search for truth), the first kangāsh was held during 
the Great Kanishka (78-144 A.D.), over decisions on Buddhist faiths 
in Gandhārā region, in Beig area of Pakistan, where the biggest 
Buddhist temple was built. In this kangāsh among seventy-five 
Buddhist faiths, only two were recognised. The second system is the 
Mongol kurultai (assembly). Genghis Khan used kurultai as biggest 
assembly of his empire. Among the Ottoman Turks, assembly is 
different; it is called jalgāh, or jalga which in Farsi it changed to 
jerga. For jalgāh, there was a headman and two shah-bālā 
(mediators), one of them acted when there were dead- ends, the other 
when there were serious familial disagreements with the king. In 
kangāsh, kurultai and jalgah systems, three votes are important; that 
of the headman, the mediator and the āqsaqāl, which here it means 
(consultant) and in all three systems he plays the same role.398  
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The translation of āqsaqāl is white beard, but this meaning is never used; 
instead in different Turkic languages āqsaqāl conveys the meaning of 
charitable person. The Turks created the ethos that the āqsaqāl’s respect is 
compulsory, but he does not hold responsibility for errors in decisions.399 An 
āqsaqāl could deal with the following issues:  
 
a) To resolve disagreements among families, like the bride, groom and 
the in-laws. An āqsaqāl was a close assistant of the jārchī 
(announcer). When someone died or an order was issued, then the 
khan would order the jārchī to stand on a high place and spread the 
news with a loud voice. There was another person called a tawārchī 
who worked under the āqsaqāl. Tawārchī spread the news on 
marriages, deaths or funerals. The khawāja ain were wealthy persons, 
whose main job was to keep money and worked as treasurers. The 
khawāja ain used the money for trade and when the land ownership 
system collapsed in Afghanistan, their power increased. During the 
reign of Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), and under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Hashim Khan (in office 1929-1946), the khawāja 
ain held the greatest power in the provinces. The āqsaqāl ascertained 
the places where khawāja ain had to conduct their trade, like the 
location of a shop. The khawāja ain had to ask the khan’s permission 
as to where to invest money and taxes were paid to the khan. The 
āqsaqāl collected farmers for the arbābs (landowner, master) from 
among poor families in the provinces and handed them over in return 
for a bounty. The āqsaqāl facilitated communication between the 
arbābs and khawāja ain. The āqsaqāl reported people’s collective 
decisions on an issue to the khan. Since the time of Habibullah Khan 
(r. 1901-1919), the āqsaqāl have stopped reporting to the king, as the 
arbāb, khawāja ain were dismantled.  
 
b) In the past, during powerful governments and after the khawāja ain 
and arbāb systems were formed in the villages and hamlets, problems 
increased, especially in areas inhabited by the Turkmen. The sub-
district governors appointed two āqsaqāl to solve these problems and 
involved the khan and the arbāb too. This custom lasted until the time 
of Zahir Shah (r. 1933-1973). When an āqsaqal’s arbitration was not 
accepted, the disputants were referred to the government. The final 
duty of the āqsaqāl was acting as witnesses in marriage ceremonies, 
reading the marriage vows like a mullah does, and acting as witnesses 
during the purchase of land and overseeing land measurements and its 
distribution. The most powerful person the āqsaqāl reported to was 
the chief of the tribe who in rank was below the khan. The khan was 
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the general head of the tribe. Each khan had ten arbābs, each arbāb 
had ten khawāja ain, each khawāja ain and each arbāb could have ten 
dawak (gophers). Dawak’s job was to run around in order to spread 
the news from one village to another.  
 
c) For an āqsaqāl old age was not always a strict requirement, there were 
young āqsaqāls as well. The āqsaqāls must have gained the trust of 
the khan. An āqsaqal’s words always carried fortitude, but the 
implementation of his advice was not compulsory. The arbāb and the 
khan could reject his advice. The arbāb had no influence on the 
āqsaqāls, although he could ask them for help. The āqsaqāl were in 
contact with the khan, chief of the tribe or with the king.  
 
 
Mohammad Nazif Shahrani describes the āqsaqāl institution as follows:  
 
“The role of āqsaqāl and local dispute resolution had become 
embedded in Turkic communities due to reshwat (bribery), and other 
forms of local abuses that pushed people to avoid going to the 
government. The āqsaqāl accepted cases for mediation, could carry 
out his own investigations and call witnesses from both sides of a 
dispute to testify. The āqsaqāl acted as shields between the 
government and the local community. The āqsaqāl held the lowest 
rank based on territory, though an āqsaqāl could be head of lineage 
and a respected member of the group. The āqsaqāl did not initiate 
anything, rather, disputants came to them. Then the āqsaqāl would 
decide who to invite in order to resolve the disputes. If people did not 
like an āqsaqal’s decisions, they could go to the beg and khan at a 
higher community level; or likewise they could go to the government 
court if they wished. The institution of āqsaqāl has not received 
adequate attention, and particularly since the forty years of Zahir 
Shah’s reign, community-state relations through the institution of 
āqsaqāl with the Turks of Afghanistan and the central government 
institutions had been severed.”400  
 
 
Dispensing of informal justice can not only be characterised on ethnic lines, 
but as the following section demonstrates how the Hazara community of 
Afghanistan is heavily influenced by a denominational component of its 
group identity in which bodies such as shūrā are applied through Shi’a 
religious interpretations.  
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7.5 The Shūrā customary laws  
 
The Hazāra people of Afghanistan are chiefly Shi’a Muslims and form one of 
Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups. The theory of the native origin of the 
Hazāras was proposed by the French scholar J.P. Ferrier, who travelled in 
parts of Hazārajāt (the land of the Hazāras in central Afghanistan) during the 
first half of the nineteenth century and he believed that the Hazāras had 
inhabited this area since the time of Alexander the Great.401  
 
Sayed Askar Mousavi, a Cambridge educated Hazāra scholar, writes that the 
Hazāras are the oldest inhabitants of Afghanistan; they are a mixture of races 
and ethnic groups, of which Genghis Khan and Amir Timur’s Mongol 
soldiers are, but one and relatively recent development is that Hazāra tribal 
and linguistic structures have been much influenced by Arabs who have 
influenced their religion and the Farsi language that has influenced their 
culture.402     
 
The Hazāra massif in central Afghanistan is the home to Hazāras who speak 
a type of Hazāragi and Persian and are predominantly Shi’a Muslims.403 Until 
conquests by Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), the Hazāras had a 
typically hierarchical Mongol tribal structure, presided over by chiefs called 
mirs or sultāns who exercised absolute power.404 Hazāra people reside in all 
parts of Afghanistan. They speak the Persian language, but their language also 
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includes many Turkic and Mongolian words.405 The mix of Turkic and 
Mongolian terms with Persian creates the Hazāragi dialect of Persian.  
 
In Afghanistan, the radical Sunni ulemā and foreign-backed insurgents regard 
the Hazāra people as non-conformist, hostile, and heretical.406 In over two 
centuries, the Hazāras of Afghanistan have experienced extreme levels of 
ethnic and religious discrimination. The Minority Rights Group International 
describes the fate of Hazāra people as follows:  
 
In 1880 the Hazāra community constituted of landed nobility, 
peasants and artisans. The social class was that of the ruling and the 
ruled classes, which itself was based on ownership of the means of 
production (animals, land and water). The gradual descent of the 
standing of the Hazāras has seen them plunge to the very depths of the 
social hierarchy in modern Afghanistan. Their engagement mainly in 
providing the unskilled labour required by society has resulted in 
further stigmatisation, with a good indicator of this being the low rate 
of inter-ethnic marriages with the Hazāra. Perhaps as a consequence 
of this, the Hazāras have been relatively isolated from the influence 
of other ethnic cultures of Afghanistan, and their identity has 
remained relatively static. The majority of Hazāras are reported to 
have nuclear families with the husband considered the head of the 
family except in the case of husband's death, when the woman 
becomes the head. In the latter case, the older wife in polygamous 
marriages succeeds the deceased husband until the eldest son reaches 
maturity. At national level, the Hazāra people tend to be more 
progressive concerning women's rights to education and public 
activities. Educated Hazāra women, in particular the ones who 
returned from exile in Iran are as active as men in civic and political 
arenas. Hazāra families are eager to educate their daughters.407  
 
In certain parts of Afghanistan, and only in the absence of formal legal 
institutions, some criminal cases may be referred to the Hazāra community 
for their collective decisions. In this case, an assembly of notable community 
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members, that may also include some women, get together and hold a meeting 
to resolve problems according to their religious school. This institution is 
called a shūrā.408  
 
From the Hazāra community, Kamran Mir Hazar, Sayed Askar Mousavi and 
Ali Amiri are three scholars who write about the injustices experienced by the 
Hazāra people over the course of history. Lillias Hamilton’s historical novel, 
A Vizier’s Daughter, published in 1900 and the Kite Runner published by 
Khalid Husseini in 2003 are two world-class novels which depict the 
brutalities and discrimination Hazāra people suffered during Abdur Rahman 
Khan’s reign and continue to suffer to the present day. Central to Hosseini’s 
post-modern novel is the division between the two factions of Afghan society: 
the politically and financially superior Sunni Pashtūns and the oppressed 
Shi’a Hazāras.409 In the novel, The Kite Runner, the two protagonists, Amir 
and Hassan, represent the two different ethnic groups and the different lives 
lived by those with and those without political power.410 The school text 
books Amir reads barely mention the history of the Hazāras – showing how 
seriously they are marginalised and invisible to an extent.411  
 
In the post-2001 order, for the first time in the history of Afghanistan’s 
statehood since 1880, Hazāras are able to exercise their rights, participate in 
different levels of government and attain an education. Despite some positive 
achievements, the Hazāra people remain severely discriminated against and 
marginalised. The Hazāra people have co-ethnics in Iran and Pakistan. Like 
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the Hazara community, Tajiks also dispense informal justice through their 
own religiously interpretive model of the shūrā based on the Sunni Hanafi 
jurisprudence.           
 
Members of the Tajik ethnic group form the second largest ethnic group of 
Afghanistan. The vast majority are Sunni Muslims, but there are Shi’a Tajiks 
too. Tajiks are one of the oldest sedentary farmers and inhabitants of 
Afghanistan and have been so for over two thousand years.412 Tajiks are 
frequently called Farsiwān (Farsi speakers) and constitute a numerous and 
widely spread portion of the inhabitants of Afghanistan, from whom they 
differ in language, perception, values and customs.413  
 
H.W. Bellow claims that Tajiks are representatives of ancient Persian, whilst 
the Afghāns (Pashtūns) are of ancient Indian inhabitants.414 A minority of 
Shi’a Tajiks are followers of Ja´fari and Ismaili Shi’ism and are scattered 
across Afghanistan. Tajiks make up a substantial number of the population or 
are in the majority in Badakhshan, Badghis, Balkh, Herat, Ghazni, Kabul, 
Mazar-e-Sharif, Panjshir and Parwan. Barfield estimates that Tajiks form 
thirty percent of Afghanistan’s population.415   
 
In the context of Afghanistan, there are oral historical accounts about the 
origin of the name Tajik and how it became a name to identify not one but 
dozens of the ethnic groups of Afghanistan. Tajik is a collective name given 
to members of numerous ethnic groups who speak the Persian language as 
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their mother tongue. According to Major H.W. Bellow, the term Tajik is said 
to be derived from ancient Persian.416 The Tajiks of Afghanistan have co-
ethnics in different countries in Asia and beyond. The largest majority of 
Tajiks reside in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
Due to their common Farsi language with the people of Iran, the Tajiks of 
Afghanistan have been able to access thousands of Farsi books authored or 
translated in Iran. Farsi-Dari is the lingua franca of all the ethnic groups of 
Afghanistan and the language of everyday use for the overwhelming majority 
of her population.417 The majority of Afghanistan’s population speak Dari-
Farsi as their mother language, as a habitual language or as a lingua franca. 
Thomas Barfield records that the Tajiks’ literacy in Persian – along the 
regional language of government administration, high culture and foreign 
relations – gave them a powerful role, no matter who was ruling the 
country.418 The majority of the Tajiks live in cities and cosmopolitan 
provinces and have no identifiable tribal customs. In the absence of state legal 
institutions in remote districts and villages, the Tajiks use the Shūrā 
institution to resolve disputes.   
    
7.6 The Institutions of Shūrā 
 
Shūrā is a mechanism of informal dispute resolution or informal justice with 
widespread acceptance for its Islamic characteristic. Although in Afghanistan 
there are a number of Shūrā set-ups for different purposes, Shūrā used here 
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is the institution of informal justice used mainly used by the Hazāra, Tajik 
and also all by other ethnic groups of Afghanistan.  
 
Ahmad Al-Raysuni argues that the Islamic concept Al-Shūrā or consultation 
is a tool for reconstruction and reform, mentioned in the Qur’an and suggested 
as being part of the practices of the Prophet Mohammad.419 There are explicit 
commandments in the Qur’an for Muslims to consult amongst one another; 
the famous command is the Shūrā Verse 38.420 The Qur’an and the hadiths 
(reported speeches of the Prophet Mohammad) put high emphasis on 
resolving disputes through amicable solutions that need to be just.421 In Al-
Hujurat Verse 9, the Qur’an commands, “[...] And if two parties among the 
Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them: but if one of them 
transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye, (all) against the 
one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah, but if it 
complies then make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for Allah 
loves those who are fair.”422  
 
In a Shūrā, the headman calls an assembly in order to solve disputes. In most 
of the villages of Afghanistan, a Shūrā is composed of traditional elites, like 
the khans, maliks, arbābs, mullahs and the local commanders.423 The Shūrā 
is used for solving disagreements such as the neighbours’ disputes, irrigation 
and environmental issues as well as settling personal differences. The Shūrā 
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institution does not deal with criminal matters or the punishment of moral 
transgression, religious offences, blood feuds or revenge killings. The 
decision of the Shūrā is often advisory and there are no consequences for 
ignoring it. On this note, the next section shall depart from viewing informal 
legal mechanisms through the communal context to a focus on formally 
recognised legislation, namely the government and its respective legal 
apparatus.  
 
7.7 Government of Afghanistan and Customary Law 
 
Over the past nineteen years, the governments of Afghanistan have 
demonstrated a number of shortcomings in the delivery of justice. The next 
chapter will deal with some inconsistences leading to the short-changing of 
justice. There are a number of irregularities in the way government 
institutions operate, their ill-performance, corruption and an ongoing war. A 
major problem related to the ill-management of the institutions of justice is 
the creation of temporary commissions and multiple departments doing the 
same jobs in different ministries, whose authority and jurisdictions often 
overlap.  
 
The formal courts of Afghanistan are managed by the Supreme Court as is 
mandated by Constitution 2004. There are several departments in other 
ministries, such as the Family Resolution Units (FRUs) in the police force; 
and the Hoqūq Department within the Ministry of Justice424, a type of civil 
court, but not under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
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is the highest judicial organ of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.425 The 
police whose duty it is to investigate crimes and collect evidence are given 
the power to arbitrate in the FRUs and the Ministry of Justice, which has the 
power and jurisdiction to draft laws deals with the resolution of actual cases, 
some of which may overlap between family, civil and criminal.  
 
The International Legal Foundation claims that in Afghanistan there has been 
a bifurcation of the legal system into an official and an unofficial law, forming 
the hallmark of Afghan legal history ever since attempts were made to 
introduce statutory laws.426 In the 1960s, judicial and law enforcement organs 
had a choice to permit alternative dispute resolutions, tribal jirga or out-of-
court solutions. Radio Free Europe reported that an unidentified twenty-year-
old man received eighty lashes by a government judge according to Shari’a 
law in in the province of Baghlan.427 Amnesty International reported that in 
2015, Afghan government officials were involved in flogging a man and a 
woman for adultery in Ghor Province.428 The problem of trials and 
jurisdictions between the tribal and state law overlap and often the same 
judges are highly likely to preside over a formal court and whip a person 
based on informal Shari’a interpretations – a problem that seriously affects 
                                                          
425 CONSTITUTION 2004, art. CXVI.   
426 International Legal Foundation, “The Customary Laws of Afghanistan,” 4. 
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the quality of justice in rural and civic spaces. With this in mind, another 
expedient lens to address this topic is by investigating the role of civil society 
within the debate on legality and more specifically, the implications of the 
ways in which INGOs have functioned in their perceptions of legality and the 
subsequent communal response.  
 
7.8 International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGOs)  
 
Over the past nineteen years, a number of international organisations have 
played an active role in the delivery of dispute resolution, as a result of state 
failure. As early as 2006, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) ran 
Information and Legal Aid Centres (ILACs) in eight centres across seven 
provinces: Jalalabad, Kabul, Bamiyan, Pul-e-Khumri, Mazar-e-Sharif, 
Maimana and Herat.429 At these centres the NRC legal counsellors assisted 
Afghan returnees to pursue their claims through the formal and informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms available in Afghanistan.430   
 
In Afghanistan, there is a high demand for out-of-court arbitrations, and 
different types of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) tribunals have been 
set up to assist litigants in informal justice mechanisms. For instance, ADR 
tribunals have taken place to try to resolve land disputes in the South-Eastern 
province of Khost. The Liaison Office describes the Commission on Conflict 
Mediation in tribal parts of Khost as follows:   
 
In Khost, this set up was named Commission on Conflict Mediation 
(CCM), and has been akin to western out-of-court arbitration for 
resolving resource and land-based conflicts. CCM teams have worked 
jointly with the provincial government and received some level of 
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international community’s oversight. Tribal jurisdiction agreements, 
a set of old mechanisms in place in the 1980s, have been tried in recent 
years due to fledgling weakness at sub-national government level. 
These agreements serve the purpose of establishing binding rules 
between tribes and have sought to attract support of the international 
community, including its military.431  
 
Small-scale family mediations and Community Based Dispute Resolutions 
(CBDR) have been attempted in Kabul and other provinces. Small-scale 
family mediation set-ups protect one’s privacy, reputation and the appearance 
of family or qawm (solidarity group). Rebecca Gang postulates that CBDR 
process is rapid and inexpensive which marks its popularity.432 Setting up 
temporary, project-based informal tribunals of this nature has been attempted 
throughout the past nineteen years. According to UNAMA, the use of 
mediation to address cases of violence against women remains a highly 
contested issue.433 Taken that resolving cases of violence against women may 
require judicial scrutiny and must pass through legal tests, the use of 
mediation is not recommended, for it deprives women of justice enshrined in 
the constitution and other laws.  
 
One of the main advantages of the INGOs involvement in dispute resolution 
and mediations is observing of the international standards of mediation. 
International standards of mediation have an implicit set of general principles 
such as preparedness, consent, impartiality, inclusivity, a normative 
framework, coherence, coordination and complementarities of mediation 
efforts as well as the quality of agreements.434 These standards are not 
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observed in many areas of mediation due to the insecurity and safety risks for 
independent auditors who are unable to go to most parts of Afghanistan. In 
the majority of disputes involving women, they do not have a number of good 
options to explore but have to seek help from family mediation teams in which 
local actors are the same persons who form a Shūrā or jirga. Separate to the 
aforementioned discussions of informal legal mechanisms in different ethnic 
communities of Afghanistan, similarly, it is also imperative to speak to the 
role of insurgent’s enacting of their own legislation which for contextual 
purposes are located in areas/jurisdictions solely controlled by these groups. 
A unique  point of departure therefore is the complete disregard of state-
instituted legislation, where in the prior cases they may be acknowledged in 
some remit or capacity.  
7.9 Justice Dispensed by the Insurgents    
 
The terms insurgents, anti-government elements (AGEs), non-state actors 
and warlords are names used interchangeably for the armed groups that 
allegedly oppose the government and international forces in Afghanistan.435 
The Taliban are the main insurgent group in Afghanistan. Adam Baczko finds 
judicial disorder and civil war’s dislocation of state from the rural areas of 
Afghanistan a precursor to the growth of the Taliban’s justice system.436 
Ashley Jackson and Florian Weigand note the popularity and growth of 
Taliban courts, but raise questions in light of the ongoing intra-Afghan 
                                                          
435 These names appear in reports provided by various international groups such as 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, UNAMA, UNDP, UNHCR, the United 
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Office in the United Kingdom.  
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negotiations with the Taliban as to the fate of women, government supporters 
and members of ethnic minorities under the Taliban court system.437  
 
In order to understand why Taliban courts have become prevalent, Jackson 
and Weigand focus on the struggle to develop a functional state justice system 
in Afghanistan after 2001.438 Over the past twenty-six years of their existence, 
the Taliban have used a mix of tribal and Islamic rules for dispensing justice. 
Their methods of punishment are reported to be at odds with international 
legal norms. In some of the Taliban’s recorded cases, Solomonic judgments 
have been used, where the reaction of one party to the decision of a judge is 
taken as further evidence to reach a final decision.439  
From at least 2008 onwards, in an environment of growing and rampant 
distrust, many Afghans – including those not sympathetic to the Taliban – 
have reportedly said that the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate was successful from 
1996 to 2001 and was the first state in Afghanistan to bring some kind of 
homogenous, state-enforced justice to every corner of the country, using 
Shari’a and customary justice and supervised by the ulemā and state 
officials.440 By arbitrating disputes amongst people and pursuing criminals, 
the Taliban have attempted to strengthen their claim to have a legitimate right 
over the state of Afghanistan.441 The Taliban claim that their central court 
receives up to twenty-five appeal cases per day.442  
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Joel Migdal identifies four functions of a government: it has to penetrate 
society, regulate social relationship, extract resources and apply those 
resources to identified group ends.443 These functions are relevant to any form 
of government, including a non-state governance system like tribes or clans, 
and of course the functions are independent of structure.444 The Taliban 
dispense justice and an some Pashtūns may prefer their decisions.  
 
Sir Sherard Cowper-Cole, a British diplomat formerly based in Afghanistan, 
mentioned in his address to the House of Commons in 2012 that “many 
Pashtūns in the South of Afghanistan view the Taliban as harsher but fairer 
than a predatory narco-mafia government.”445 The Taliban have established 
an ombudsman to prosecute their commanders who ill-treat civilians and have 
put in place Lāyeha, a military and criminal code of conduct for their 
members.446  
 
Taliban tax assessors, associated with their local governors, are appointed for 
each village and district to assess people’s property and crops in order to levy 
taxes around ten percent in a firm but generally equitable manner.447 Civilians 
who speak out against anti-government elements or in favour of government, 
face the risk of being subjected to summary trials in parallel and illegal 
judicial procedures operated by anti-government elements, some of which are 
the Taliban.448 The Taliban govern most parts of rural Afghanistan.  
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Robert Lamb and Brook Shawn call the Taliban government an illicit 
government, a government which works by the rule of patronage, cartels and 
smugglers.449 Mohammad Nazif Shahrani, however, argues that many non-
Pashtūn communities in the north see the war not between the Afghan 
government and armed opposition, but between included Pashtūns and 
excluded non-Pashtūns – an extension of the Pashtūn-led project of 
Afghanisation to centralise power in Kabul.450  
 
In sum, as for the plurality of legal, para-legal and pseudo-legal institutions, 
up to the present day, the state of Afghanistan has not succeeded in adopting 
Brian Griffith’s legal centralism; instead, the chaos of disharmonious legal 
pluralisms has led to a wide range of injustices. Using Marc Galanter’s 
metaphorical term “Justice in Many Rooms”,451 one may conclude that 
Afghanistan’s incoherent and chaotic legal pluralism is tantamount to 
injustices in many rooms with windows of abuse. The centralist state of 
Afghanistan strongly opposes any forms of federalism. It would not entertain 
Mustafa Yayali’s suggestion of social federalism modelled on Althusius’s 
theory. It is the author’s view that legal pluralism has not served justice in 
Afghanistan, nor has it offered the benefit of better accessible justice for 
litigants. Legal pluralism has opened more windows of abuse for the most 
impoverished, economically weak litigants, women, children and members of 
ethnic and religious minority groups.    
 
7.10 Conclusion  
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This chapter has clarified that legal pluralism or parallel systems in 
Afghanistan have a number of drawbacks, as the state law with its pluralist 
systems and its departments undertaking overlapping activities often creates 
confusion and inconsistencies for litigants.  
 
The chapter concluded that the institutions of informal justice vary from one 
ethnic group to another, are divided into further variations within each ethnic 
group; i.e. the Pashtūns’ jirga alone may have dozens of different varieties 
and Shari’a is divided into a number of schools (madhabs) with plural 
interpretations in each single school. This welter of systems simply makes it 
impractical to establish a centralised legal system across the country because 
of the various informal legal frameworks operating concurrently whilst in 
isolation of one another. The next chapter deals with legal transplants in 
Afghanistan.   
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CHAPTER 8: LEGAL TRANSPLANTS IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
8 Introduction   
 
Alan Watson, the Scottish-American legal scholar, coined the term legal 
transplants in the 1970s. Watson describes the idea of legal transplants as 
borrowing the most fruitful source of legal change.452 Watson posits that legal 
transplants are the source for most global legal developments because the 
majority of changes in legal systems are the result of borrowing.453 In 
Watson’s view, very often law develops through legal borrowing instead of 
through the consciousness of the nation.454 Afghanistan’s legal history has 
several examples of borrowing that worked well when Afghanistan’s political 
leaders of the first half of the twentieth century borrowed foreign laws and 
provided the necessary support through institutions of the government. 
However, in regard to borrowing (transplanting) laws, the post-1978 era 
extending to the present day has not been as successful as the earlier stages.   
 
Legal transplantation is significant for the development of different countries. 
Legal transplantation has been one of the most common ways of legal change 
in human history since the times of the Roman Empire.455 The history of 
Afghanistan is replete with the borrowing and transplantation of many legal 
ideas and codes of law from different parts of the world – examples of which 
are shown in the table at the end of this chapter.  
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By comparing national laws, the scholar, judge and student realise that the 
rules of their own legal system are not necessarily the best or most efficient 
ones.456 Otto Kahn-Freud notes three purposes for the use of foreign legal 
sources in reforming law: (1) transplantation for international unification of 
the law, (2) giving adequate legal effect to a social change shared by the 
foreign country with one’s own country and (3) with the objective of 
promoting at home social changes which foreign law is designed either to 
express or to produce.457 In this chapter, I argue that for the most parts, legal 
transplants in Afghanistan has not worked well.   
 
This chapter begins with a description of hypothesis operationalisation, 
giving clarity about the dependent and independent variables used for testing 
the hypothesis. It also shows how points are assigned to each variable. Then, 
the chapter offers a brief history of colonial influences on the organisation 
and codification of Islamic law, where Western ideas and legal norms 
positively impacted the modernisation of Islamic law and expedited legal 
change in the Islamic world – changes that could not be instituted by the 
Muslim political leadership or the ulemā. These colonial influences on 
classical Islamic law beset a departure from Shari’a norms in the nineteenth 
century, which until then had remained unchanged from the early Muslim 
community, fourteen hundred years ago.  
 
In this chapter, the case study method is used for assessing the legal 
borrowing or legal transplants from 1747 to 2020. The case study will assess 
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legal transplants by those governments of Afghanistan that borrowed foreign 
norms, codes and laws and incorporated them into Afghanistan’s legal 
system. Legal transplants will be examined under two conditions: (1) when 
the state of Afghanistan adopted legal transplants to improve its writ of 
government through law and (2) when legal transplants were imports of aid 
conditionality and foreign political pressures.  
 
John Jupp wrote his doctoral thesis, “Legal transplants as tools for the reform 
of Afghanistan’s criminal law framework. An evaluation of the Interim 
Criminal Procedure Code 2004 and the Counter Narcotics Law 2005.” Jupp 
looks at the transplantation of readily available law for the development of 
post-intervention criminal law reform in Afghanistan. However, his research 
does not differentiate legal transplants under the above two dissimilar 
conditions. Assessing the success or failure of legal transplants under these 
conditions requires a range of different investigations.  
 
As for legal transplants since 2001, I argue that the state of Afghanistan has 
shown a reluctance to accept the legitimacy or the necessity of Western legal 
transplants. There are three issues to be noted in this period: (1) legal 
behaviours based on Westerners’ expectations, (2) results and data for the 
sake of filling in tick boxes for international aid, (3) Western legal ideas such 
as accountability and checks and balances which restrict an Afghan leader 
who is used to reigning supreme, forming the rule of man as opposed to 
allowing the institutions of government to operate smoothly. I would argue 
that the leaders of Afghanistan do not see a point in accepting foreign legal 
rules that reduce their traditional unchecked arbitrary power. Abdur Rahman 
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Khan once said to the British, “A telescope would interest me only if it could 
shoot bullets.”458 The same goes for Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani 
Ahmadzai, who have demonstrated great abilities in using the law as a tool to 
consolidate their arbitrary rule.    
   
8.1 Operationalisation of the Variables 
 
In this thesis, two sets of five indicators are assigned to measure the dependant 
variable legal transplants and independent variable culture of legality 
respectively. The term culture of legality is simply another way to mean the 
observation of the rule of law.  
 
If the indicator for each variable meets the criteria, it is assigned a positive 
score of 1, for a total of 2 possible scores. A score of 2, the maximum for a 
positive score, is only assigned to an exemplary and innovative approach, i.e., 
instigating reforms and drafting a constitution that builds the foundation of 
future reforms. If an indicator does not meet the defined criteria, it receives a 
score of 0. For example, if the leader instigates legal transplants, then it will 
score 1 on the indicator state-led transplants of the dependent variable culture 
of legality. On the contrary, if a leader does not meet the criteria, it would 
score 0. This process of scoring applies to all indicators for both dependent 
and independent variables for all cases under examination.  
 
Due to differences of the types of legal progression in each reign, there will 
be some inapplicable elements which will be identified with an x. There is a 
need to devise the comparative data points as precise as possible. This 
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warranted the inclusion of x (non-applicability) as another data measuring 
point. Although on face value there appears to be a discrepancy between x 
marked sections and non-x marked sections, the resultant figures measure 
each reign in comparison to itself as opposed to offering a cross-comparison 
between reigns, i.e., they have been measured compared to their own 
applicable factors. Comparisons only comes into play where a variable 
matches the Independent Variable and the Dependent Variable. The 
researcher has tried to measure each single reign as to the consistency of its 
IV and DV, and only then compare the reigns’ performance. Therefore, the x 




State-led: whether the state instigated legal transplants. Regimes that did, 
score 1 or 2, and those that did not, score 0.   
 
Foreign led: whether external actors transplanted laws for aid or human 
rights purposes. Regimes for which foreign actors brought legal transplants 
score 0, those that did not score 1 or 2.     
 
Professional support: whether the state provided the right financial and 
intellectual support for the legal transplants. Regimes that offered 
professional support score 1 or 2, and those that did not score 0.  
 
Enforcement: whether the state was able and willing to enforce the 
transplanted laws. Regimes that enforced the transplanted laws score 1 or 2, 
those that did not score 0.   
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Receptive judiciary: whether members of the judiciary understood and were 
receptive of the legal transplants. The judiciary that was receptive score 1 or 
2, those that were not score 0.   
 
Independent Variable Measurement    
 
The criteria for the independent variable culture of legality include the 
following five indicators. The point allocation for the independent variables 
is the as the dependent variables as detailed above.   
 
The leader: how the leader of the country instigated the legal transplants.   
Examines who the leader was and whether he instigated legal transplants.  
 
Foreign actors: how external actors transplanted the laws. 
Examines whether the state was dependent on a foreign power, whether it was 
out of goodwill or based on conditions attached to foreign aid. Foreign-led 
transplants indicate state weakness and trend negatively.  
 
Judiciary organs: how the state facilitated logistics, intellectual and financial 
support so that the transplanted laws could be enforced. 
Examines the strengths of the government institutions, the requisite education 
and whether the newly transplanted laws could be understood by the 
judiciary.    
 
Law enforcement organs: how the state enforced the transplanted laws. 
Examines government effectiveness and whether laws were arbitrary and/or 
there were law evasion and corruption.  
 
Receptivity: how members of the judiciary reacted to the transplanted laws. 
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Examines whether members of the judiciary had the readiness, adequate staff, 
correct education and whether they accepted the transplanted laws as valid 
laws. 
 
8.2 Colonial Influences on Legal Transplants  
 
In times where modern governments did not exist, Shari’a law was composed 
of many variations and different versions were produced by individual 
scholars of different Sunni and Shi’a schools of jurisprudence. These diverse 
versions were not compiled into a clear canon; nor was there a precise 
hierarchy of authorities formulated – at least not in Sunni Islam.459 Rudolph 
Peters states that drastic law reform in the Muslim world in the nineteenth 
century was due to the Westernisation of state and society, which entailed the 
adoption of Western laws.460 M.K. Nawaz states that the modernisation of 
Islamic law is essentially a twentieth century phenomenon; earlier attempts 
to modernise Islamic law were limited in nature.461  
 
The Western colonial powers expanded the legal system of their colonies in 
different ways. An important element that escapes the notice of post-colonial 
scholars is that the codification and modernisation of classical Islamic law 
was instigated by Britain in colonised India. British judges presiding over 
courts in India did not set aside Islamic law and did not impose the British 
legal system on Muslim subjects; instead, they used both. Indian judges 
trained by the British as well as the British judges felt a need to compile a 
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collection of Islamic legal norms and theories to be used in the colonial 
judicial system.462  
 
The four major Islamic legal code books which the British colonial agents 
collected and translated from Arabic and Persian into English were Hedaya 
(The gifted) translated by Charles Hamilton; Digest of Muhammadan Law by 
Neil Baillie, Mahommedan Law by Syed Ameer Ali and Principles of 
Mahomedan Law by D. F. Mulla.463 This was the first stage of transplanting 
British legal ideas in organising Islamic law that may be classed as the 
preliminary move to modernising Islamic law. Rudolph Peters posits that the 
reform and eclipse of Islamic criminal law was a result of the Westernisation 
and modernisation of the Muslim world that took place in the late eighteenth 
century.464  
 
For the colonial judges, legal certainty and the predictability of the outcome 
of legal proceedings was a major objective of law reform and its role was 
important in criminal law.465 The range of legal reforms brought about by the 
colonialists according to Peters related to the thought that ta’zir (discretionary 
punishment) and siyāsa (political punishments) lacked clear definitions of 
offences and there were no fixed relations between crimes and 
punishments.466 The next point of contention between the British colonialists 
and classical Islamic law related to the rules of evidence and diya (blood 
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money) that British legalists could not agree with.467 Therefore, the first stage 
of collecting, translating and modernising Islamic law was set in India by 
British and Muslim scholars.   
 
8.3 Turkish Legal Transplants in Afghanistan  
 
The genesis of Afghanistan’s legal transplants was in the early stages of the 
creation of a political space that led to the formation of a nation-state later. 
For Afghanistan, the biggest influences on public law are those of Turkish 
origin. The word Turkish here does not simply mean Ottoman Turkey or the 
Republic of Turkey but a number of Turco-Mongolian dynasties, such as the 
Khwarazm Shahis (r. 1077-1231), the Ghaznavid (r. 977-1186), the Timurid 
(r. 1370-1507), the Afsharid Persians (r. 1688-1747), the Ottoman Empire 
and the Republic of Turkey. Political leadership and legal continuum for the 
Pashtūn leaders of Afghanistan from 1747 to the present day has been an 
extension of the Turco-Mongolian (Turkish) tribal dynastic system of 
government in Afghanistan.  
 
The earliest transplantation of Islamic and secular public law was taken from 
Turkey. The initial Ottoman Turks’ contact with the Afghan court 
commenced during the reign of Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1863-1880) and 
support continued for the succeeding dynastic governments. Nile Green 
writes that there were concrete Ottoman connections with the reformist circles 
in Kabul between the 1870s and the 1910s.468 Turkey expanded its cordial 
ties with Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929) through sending Turkish officers 
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like Bedri Bey, Mahmud Sami, Ziya Bey and Çemal who provided linguistic, 
educational and military support and organised military conscription.469  
 
In the process of legal reforms and the adoption of secular public laws, Ali 
Amiri, an Afghan writer, states that: “In Afghanistan, the first bylaws were 
set by a Turkish officer called Badri Bey during Amanullah Khan’s 
reforms.”470 The transplantation of laws from Turkey began in the 1880s and 
continued well into the 1980s. Turkey has played an important role in 
empowering education in the post-2001 period through the network of 
Afghan-Turk schools and also through offering bursaries to Afghan students 
to study in Turkish universities.  
 
8.4 Indian Legal Transplants in Afghanistan       
 
There has been a two-way flow of ideas and interactions between Afghanistan 
and India since medieval times. This took place either when the Mughal 
Indians ruled Afghanistan, or when the Afghan tribes captured parts of India 
and held Indian cities under control for a period of time. However, the 
relationship between Afghanistan and India under the British gave 
Afghanistan the choice of receiving financial aid. Faiz Ahmed surmises that 
Afghanistan was a British protectorate from 1880 until 1919.471 Afghanistan 
gained her independence from Britain in 1919 after the third Anglo-Afghan 
war was over.  
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Abdul Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), who was appointed by the British, had 
to keep his loyalty to Britain a secret and show to his people that he did not 
like the British. Abdul Rahman wrote in his diaries, “If I showed any 
inclinations towards the English, my people would call me an infidel for 
joining hands with infidels, and they would proclaim a religious holy war 
against me.”472 In Abdur Rahman’s administration, there was a combination 
of old customs and laws of Afghanistan with others introduced by him from 
India, or copied from the modern machinery of Western governments, and 
especially from the English constitution.473 Abdur Rahman could not openly 
reveal which Western political or legal ideas he transplanted from the British.  
 
Faiz Ahmed dedicates his doctoral thesis “Rule of Law Experts in 
Afghanistan: A Socio-Legal History of the First Afghan Constitution and the 
Indo-Ottoman Nexus in Kabul, 1860-1923” and his book Afghanistan Rising, 
Islamic Statecraft between the Ottoman and British Empires to the history of 
legal developments in Afghanistan. He highlights the important roles Indian 
Muslims and Ottoman Turks played in shaping Afghanistan’s first 
constitution – the Constitution of 1923. The role of the British, Indians and 
the Ottoman Turks in preparing Afghanistan for her legal reforms cannot be 
overlooked. Contrary to the historical works by many scholars, Ahmed claims 
that Amanullah Khan’s (r. 1919-1929) legal reforms were due to an 
indigenous Islamic modernism movement, not a Kemalist mimicry.474 Senzil 
Nawid, an Afghan scholar and legal historian, postulates that Amanullah’s 
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legislative movement was inspired by the nineteenth century Ottoman Turkey 
and the Turkish experience was a ready model for the Afghans.475  
 
Simon Fuchs claims that Ahmed overstates Afghanistan’s significance in the 
twentieth century and concludes that Afghanistan perhaps was not rising as 
high as Ahmed makes it out.476 Reading Ahmed’s doctoral thesis and his 
book, one notes that in some areas, he creates his own version of history 
which cannot be confirmed independently – one such issue is referring to 
Sayed Jamal al-Din al-Afghani as the founder of Salafism.477 Sayed Jamal 
and Muhammad Abduh of Egypt felt that change in Islamic societies was 
necessary to remedy backwardness among Muslims and to enable them to 
meet the military and technological challenges of the West.478 Sayed Jamal 
was a modernist, looked into the future, not into the past as the Salafi ideology 
tends to return to the past.  
 
Ahmed ignores the ten years of turbulent relationships between Amanullah 
Khan and the Deoband-trained mullahs of Afghanistan (not the state-trained 
ulemā), and his research disregards events leading to the abdication of the 
secular king. One other criticism that can be directed at Ahmed’s self-claims 
is his evasion of the fact that Amanullah Khan’s legal reforms and 
constitution were a result of the transplantation of the Nizamnamas (Kemalist 
bylaws) and the Turkish Constitution of 1876. Amin Tarzi, an Afghan 
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scholar, states that the 1923 constitution was greatly influenced by the king’s 
French and Turkish constitutional and governmental law experts.479  
 
The magnus opus of legalism in this era of elite-driven reforms was in part 
due to the flow of British, Indian, French and Turkish legal reformist ideas 
and the ready-made codified Islamic laws collected by British and Indian 
legal professionals. The Ottoman Majullah (codified commercial and civil 
law) was also used. Sediq Farhang, an Afghan historian, states that before 
Badri Bey of Turkey came to Afghanistan, there were no legal experts in the 
country.480 In the post-1919 era, the Afghan people and their political leaders 
did not wake up one day to see they had an exemplary laboratory for Islamic 
modernism and statecraft, as Ahmed claims.  
 
8.5 Egyptian Legal Transplants in Afghanistan 
 
Egypt was another Islamic country from which Afghanistan transplanted 
legal ideas and imported its ready-made legal codes. Legal transplants from 
Egypt took place in two historical stages. Stage one was during the rule of 
Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), when the Mamluk sultans’ laws made 
inroads in all Islamic societies, including Afghanistan. In the fifteenth 
century, the Mamluks developed a judicial system for the pluralist schools of 
Sunni jurisprudence, which produced a handbook for judges called mūgabāt 
al-ahkam wa-waqi al-ayyām, written by the jurist, al-Qasim ibn Qutlūbuga 
(d. 879/1474).481  
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The Mamluks were Chaghatai Uzbeks who ruled Egypt and Syria from 1250 
to 1517. The judicial handbook dealt with the doctrine of legal consequences 
and solved the conflict of laws in multi-madhab (multiple schools of law) 
jurisdictions.482 Abdur Rahman Khan’s judiciary produced a similar 
guidebook for judges, named Asās al-Qudāt [Principles for the Judges], by 
combining Western norms and parts of the Mamluk sultans’ judicial 
handbook. Early Islamic judicial developments to resolve pluralism in 
judgments across different schools of Islamic jurisprudence are rooted in the 
works of the Egyptian and Syrian scholars.  
 
Abraham Naum Polak an Israeli historian and Professor at Tel Aviv 
University states that, based on a statement from al-Magrizi, Siyāsa, the legal 
code of the Mamluks, was founded upon the Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan.483 
The name Siyāsa, that literally means politics or discretions is the 
combination of Si + Yasā. Alan Cay Culler argues that Yasā laws were 
recorded and judges’ decisions were documented – leading to a system of 
case-law that lasted for two hundred years.484 The Great Yasā was a written 
catalogue of traditional Mongol laws said to be dictated to scribes by Genghis 
Khan himself, along with maxims (bilik) of leadership and instructions for the 
maintenance and deployment of the Mongol armies.485  
 
The Turko-Egyptian scholarly works to the present day influences Islamic 
legal systems around the world. In Afghanistan, the nepotistic distribution of 
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power between sirdars (royal males), khans (rich men) and mullahs (religious 
officials) created a political culture that Afghans adopted from the Turko-
Mongolians, a corrupt system which remains intact until now. 
 
The second stage of the adoption of Egyptian legal transplants by 
Afghanistan’s judiciary was after bilateral diplomatic relations were set up. 
The first official contact between Afghanistan and Egypt occurred in late 
December 1927, when Amanullah Khan visited Egypt en route to Europe.486 
A treaty of recognition and friendship was signed between the two countries 
in 1928; Mohmmad Seddiq Mojaddedi was appointed resident minister in 
Cairo and the Egyptian government opened legations in Kabul in 1937.487  
Afghanistan’s choice of sending students to Al-Azahar University in Cairo 
and to transplant Egyptian laws were premised on Egypt being a Sunni and 
Hanafi country with a pluralist, multi-ethnic and tribal society. The first 
officials who received Islamic education in Egypt were from Zahir Shah’s 
and Daoud Khan’s governments (r. 1933-1978). The Civil Code 1977 was 
modelled on the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949, containing 2,416 articles that 
included family and inheritance laws. This civil code was influenced by the 
French Code.488   
 
The following table shows the governments of Afghanistan that have used 
legal transplants.  
  
Table 1: Governments of Afghanistan which instigated Legal Transplants  
Leader Type of government Years of rule 
                                                          
486 Adamec, “Egypt x. Relations with Afghanistan,” 266-276.  
487 Adamec, 266-276. 
488 Yassari and Saboory, “Shari’a and National Law,” 285.  
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Abdur Rahman Khan Absolute monarchy 1880-1901 
Habibullah Khan Absolute monarchy 1901-1919 
Amanullah Khan Constitutional Monarchy 1919-1929 
M. Zahir Khan Constitutional Monarchy 1933-1973 
M. Daoud Khan Presidential Republic 1973-1978 
Nur M. Taraki Socialist Presidential 1978-1979 
Hafizullah Amin Socialist Presidential 1979 
Babrak Karmal Socialist Presidential 1979-1986 
M. Najibullah Ahmadzai Socialist Presidential 1986-1992 
Hamid Karzai Presidential Islamic 2001-2014 
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai Presidential Islamic 2014- to date 
 
8.6 Ahmad Shah Durrani 1747-1772  
 
A brief insight into the conditions of Afghanistan’s legal system prior to the 
first government which used legal transplants (Abdur Rahman Khan), helps 
the readers understand the genesis of legal transplantation in the country. 
Ahmad Shah Abdali (r. 1747-1772), a member of the Saduzai Pashtūn clan 
and the founder of the Durrani Empire, developed an elaborate justice 
department based on the Hanafi School of Law, along with a religious council 
headed by a khan molla khan, or molla bashi (supreme ecclesiastic judge) to 
advise him on important state affairs.489  
 
The justice department was headed by chief magistrates and subordinate 
officials ranged from a chief legal tribunal official and a chief justice official 
to lower echelon legal officials, such as executives of bodily penalties, qāzis 
(religious judges), moftis (providers of legal opinion) and mohtasibs 
(supervisors of public morality).490 A number of state-sponsored clerical 
                                                          
489 Nawid, Religious Response to Change in Afghanistan, 7.  
490 Fofalzai, Dorrat-al-Zaman fi Tarikh-i-Shah Zamān [History of Zaman Shah], 272-273; 
Fofalzai, “Dar al-Qaza-i-Hozori-i-Lame’ al-Nur-i-Fakhera-i-Ahmad Shahi Waqe’ dar 
Qandahar [The Luminous Ahmadshahi Justice Department in Qandahar], 9-27.  
 
   
 
Page 205 of 531 
 
positions were created during the time of the Saduzai rulers,491 including 
khan-i-olūm, modarres-bāshi, or molla-bāshi (different ranks for heads of 
ecclesiastical education); imam of the Grand Mosque in the capital; mir wa’ez 
(head preacher) and sadr-i-shahr (head of the clerical groups in charge of 
religious endowments).492  
 
Ahmad Shah expanded central authority by stressing the Islamic character of 
the state and, within the limits of Shari’a, he enacted regulations concerning 
everyday matters of the state.493 The body of ordinary law (‘orf) was subject 
to modification. State laws were in the form of farmāns (royal proclamations) 
or fatāwā (plural for fatwā) – collected in a volume titled Fatāwā-i-Ahmad-
Shahi [Ahmad Shah’s fatwās] that was based on Hanafi law, and at times the 
tribal Pashtūnwāli norms for honour, hospitality, female chastity, vengeance 
and blood feud continued to exist, which overlapped with those of Shari’a 
and was a challenge for the central authority.494     
8.7 Amir Dost Muhammed Khan 1826-1863  
 
In the early years of his reign, Dost Muhammad Khan (r. 1826-1863) made 
up for his lack of education and was tutored under Naib Muhammad 
Akhundzada.495 The amir read a section of the Qur’an every day after 
morning prayer, followed by lessons on history and poetry.496 Dost 
Muhammad Khan spoke Persian, Pashto, Punjabi and Turkish.497 In the late 
                                                          
491 Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, 1. Sadozai’s rule started in 
1747 and according to Noelle Karimi, ended in 1826 when Dost Mohammed Khan’s reign 
began unofficially in Kabul.  
492 Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 277. 
493 Nawid, Religious Response to Change in Afghanistan, 7. 
494 Nawid, 7.   
495 Noelle, State and Tribe, 19. 
496 Noelle, 19. 
497 Noelle, 19. 
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1820s, Dost Muhammad’s reputation for justice had become so proverbial 
that the rhetorical question “Is Dost Muhammad dead, that there is no 
justice?” had become a common phrase among the inhabitants of Kabul.498 
  
The early foreign legal ideas in Afghanistan were for the separation of power 
between the state and the ulemā. As pointed out by Senzil Nawid earlier, there 
was a problem for the central authority when Shari’a and tribal rules 
overlapped. This form of separation of power in the West is called the 
separation of the state from the church. The first break from the ulemā’s full 
dominance in criminal matters was reported to be during the rule of Dost 
Muhammad Khan, when he declared that serious crimes should be referred to 
him for deliberation, prior to which the ulemā had enjoyed unchecked control 
in the provision of Shari’a education and in the application of Islamic law in 
all religious courts.499 There are no written legal records from the times of 
Ahmad Shah’s or Dost Muhammad Khan’s rules.  
 
  
                                                          
498 Noelle, 19. 
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8.8 Amir Abdur Rahman Khan 1880-1901 
 
Abdur Rahman Khan exercised secrecy in regard to adopting foreign ideas in 
his court or in the process of justice delivery. He was the first political leader 
to order that court activities must be recorded in a procedure called 
Kitabchai’a Hukumati (government record book)500 and formulated legal 
guidelines, Asās al-Qudat (Fundamental Rules for Judges), instructions on 
judges’ conduct in public, different ways to curb corruption and ethical issues 
such as to how judges should deal with situations where a conflict of interest 
arises.501 Asās al-Qudāt, judicial record-keeping and attempts to separate 
Shari’a law from qanūn (administrative law) and  Pashtūnwāli (tribal laws), 
formed the most important legal transplants during Abdur Rahman’s rule. 
Hereafter, scores for the independent and dependent variables – as described 
earlier – will be shown italicised and inside brackets.  
 
Abdur Rahman’s legal transplants were instigated by him and were completed 
in his court (1). Abdur Rahman maintained judicial impartiality at lower court 
only.502 There is inadequate information about professional support, but 
primary historical records show that strict enforcements were in place for 
whatever constituted the law (1); or else, it would cost the disobedient persons 
their heads.   
 
        Table 2: Abdur Rahman’s Regime 1880-1901 
DV Legal Transplant Indicators Scores 
State led 1 
Foreign led x 
Professional support 0 
Enforcement 1 
                                                          
500 Vafai, Afghanistan, 11. 
501 Alkuzai, Asas ul-Qudat [Fundamental Rules for Judges], 1-40. 
502 Amin, Judicial Independence in Afghanistan, 81. 
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Receptive judiciary 0 
Total scores 2 
 
Abdur Rahman established a uniform administration of justice marked by the 
introduction of many reforms.503 He is known for his fierce resistance to the 
role of the ulemā. In the late nineteenth century, Abdur Rahman would issue 
proclamations embodying his commands on a range of issues – something 
legitimised by reference to divine inspiration.504 According to Asta Olsen, 
Abdur Rahman used Islam to consolidate a policy of establishing the 
hegemony of state-sanctioned interpretations of Islam through centralised 
support and brutal suppression of different Sufis and ulemā.505 The most 
notorious example of this political deployment of Islam were his wars of 
conquest during the 1890s against the mountainous highlands of central and 
north-eastern Afghanistan, whose Hazāra and Kāfir population followed Shi’i 
Islam and their own indigenous religion.506 In 1896, Afghanistan’s Islamic 
laws were codified for the first time.507 This followed demands for 
codification of Islamic law in colonial India and Turkey.  
 
Abdur Rahman used a simple method of Pashtūnwāli to deal with highway 
robbery. If a man was robbed or killed, all villages within a radius of about 
ten miles of the place where the crime was perpetuated were fined from 
twenty to fifty thousand rupees, and if people failed to pay up promptly, two 
or three regiments of soldiers were sent and quartered on them until payment 
                                                          
503 Khan, The Constitution And laws of Afghanistan, 9.  
504 Mason, The Rule of Law in Afghanistan, 67.  
505  Green, Afghanistan’s Islam, 15. 
506  Green, 15.  
507 Jupp, “Legal transplants: appropriate tools?” 79. 
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was effected.508 Taking into account the authoritarian nature of Abdur 
Rahman, the laws he drew up or supported with the record-keeping 
Kitabchai’a Hukumati for the promulgation of the laws indicates that in his 
government, the legal transplants served their purpose (1). It is difficult to 
assess the remaining independent variables, as rejections or barriers to Abdur 
Rahman’s laws meant annihilation of people during his twenty-one-year rule.      
 
       Table 3: Abdur Rahman’s Regime 1880-1901 
IV Culture of Legality Indicators    Scores 
The purpose 1 
Foreigners’ purpose for legal transplants  0 
Judiciary readiness 0 
Capacity to enforce transplanted laws 0 
Barriers to receptivity of transplanted laws 0 
Total scores  1 
 
8.9 Amir Habibullah Khan 1901-1919 
 
Under the rule of Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919), legal institutions were 
empowered. He was not known for steadfast reforms. Habibullah Khan did 
not follow his father’s harsh stance in maintaining legal superiority, but 
during his rule there were other circumstances that shaped a slightly more 
organised legal system. In regard to demands for legal reform and social 
change, Sa’doddin Hashimi states the following:    
 
After the death of Abdur Rahman, in the twentieth century, the Asian 
awakening process, together with the internal conditions of 
Afghanistan created a platform for political, social and cultural 
realisation. In order to change the brutal structure of the government, 
a group of intellectuals referred to as the “first wave of 
constitutionalists” was formed. This was the first constitutional 
movement in the history of Afghanistan.509  
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Mir Mohammad Ghubār, historian, reports that during Habibullah Khan’s 
rule, the intellectuals of Kabul comprised three categories: (1) the liberals 
from within government circles who pushed for reforms in the government; 
(2) the intellectuals based in Habibia High School in Kabul who sought 
democracy and reforms and favoured a democratic government and (3) the 
intellectuals outside of government and outside of Habibia High School.510 
Sometimes, members of these groups held friendly political links with one 
another.511 This period also coincided with Persia’s constitutional revolution 
that began in 1905 and lasted until 1911, suggesting that similar legal 
developments were underway in Persia, Afghanistan’s neighbour. The birth 
of the Afghan constitutional movement can be traced back to Habibiya School 
and the influence of some of its foreign teachers.512  
 
According to the Ministry of Justice of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
during Habibullah Khan’s rule, Afghanistan suffered serious lawlessness and 
disorder:    
 
During Habibullah Khan’s rule, the king was the creator of the laws 
and protector of the crown and kingdom. His power and authority was 
undefined with no rules to bind him. Habibullah Khan ruled the 
country by decree, and his opinions were instrumental in the creation 
of legal guides. Citizens were given harsh punishments without the 
presence of a competent judge in a court of law. Educated members 
of society sought to limit the king’s power and there were demands 
for constitutionalism in line with international developments in other 
countries. The years 1905-1908 were important years of awakening in 
Asia where new ideas were spread in Central Asia, Turkey and 
Persia.513 
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Habibullah Khan set a precedent for royals’ involvement in cases in his court 
– an innovative legal idea which was later adopted by his son, Amanullah 
Khan. May Schinasi, a historian of Afghanistan, states that one of the 
strongest traditions influencing the lifestyle and governing practices of the 
Afghan sovereigns was the holding of audiences, and according to the Siraj 
al-Akhbar newspaper, the Sadozai kings held them with a ceremonial copied 
from Persia.514 These audiences were public events like festivals, and working 
audiences, were known as darbār-e kār, that were assigned for petitions and 
replies, and were held several times a week or every day, according to their 
importance.515 They were presided over by Habibullah Khan, his brother, 
Nasrullah Khan, or his sons, Enayatullah or Amanullah, to hear written or 
oral requests and legal proceedings.516 This is a precedent that most Afghan 
leaders have followed to the present day, and face-to-face meetings are 
particularly held with Pashtūn tribal elders or religious leaders. This is an 
important part of Afghanistan’s political culture that has survived for over a 
century.  
 
Unlike his father, Habuibullah Khan supported and respected members of the 
Mojaddedi and Naqshbandi Sufi orders.517 During World War I, Habibullah 
Khan aligned himself with the British.518 For him, this was a dangerous 
decision because Afghanistan’s population was strongly opposed to the 
British and their domination of their country.519 Britain supported  Abdur 
                                                          
514 Schinasi, “Afghanistan at the beginning of the twentieth century,” 117. 
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Rahman Khan and his son, Habibullah Khan, through the payment of 
subsidies and provision of weapons.  
 
Another noteworthy legal transplant of this era was the adoption of Panchāt, 
a council of five elders which came into existence during the reign of 
Habibullah Khan.520 Panchāt is a village council presided over by five elders 
and is of Indian origin. The cumulative factors for reforms, the formation of 
Panchāt councils and holding audiences to solve the petitioners’ problems in 
face-to-face meetings and in the presence of litigants by the royals formed the 
state-led legal transplants (1) and based on historical evidence, during 
Habibullah Khan’s reign, laws were enforced (1). As law was directed by the 
king, professional support and receptivity of the judiciary cannot be assessed.   
    
               Table 4: Habibullah Khan (1901-1919) 
DV Legal Transplant Indicators    Scores 
State led 1 
Foreign led x 
Professional support 0 
Enforcement 1 
Receptive judiciary 0 
Total scores  2 
Habibullah Khan produced legal guidance for judges, named Sirāj al-Ahkām, 
which delineated the duties and powers of the qāzis (judges), the muftis (legal 
religious advisors) and the ulemā.521 Based on information from May 
Schinasi and other historians, holding audiences; helping petitioners; passing 
judgments and involving the Sufis and the ulemā in the court, and 
Habuibullah Khan’s legal transplants by co-opting religious figures into the 
state power indicate that legal transplants served their purpose (1). However, 
                                                          
520 Vafai, Afghanistan: A Country Law Study, 12.  
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the king and his family members were the sole persons who set the laws and 
presided over legal issues. Therefore, the rest of the independent variables 
score (0).      
  
               Table 5: Habibullah Khan (1901-1919) 
IV Culture of Legality Indicators    Scores 
The purpose 1 
Foreigners’ purpose for legal transplants  x 
Judiciary readiness 0 
Capacity to enforce transplanted laws 0 
Barriers to receptivity of transplanted laws 0 
Total scores  1 
 
8.10 Amanullah Khan 1919-1929 
 
Amanullah Khan ruled Afghanistan from 1919 until 1929. In 1919, 
Afghanistan obtained its independence from Britain. This meant that 
Afghanistan could decide her internal affairs and foreign relations. Prior to 
siting on the throne, Amanullah Khan presided over his father’s darbār 
(audience) and had the experience of dealing with litigants.  
 
The first constitution, Nizāmnāma-e asāsi, was promulgated in 1923.522 
Amanullah Khan’s relations with religious leaders deteriorated as a result of 
such measures as the discontinuation of government allowances to religious 
leaders and the introduction of restrictions on the employment of mullahs 
(ulemā) in judicial posts.523  He attempted major social and legal reforms 
through a series of codes and decrees and based his vision of progress and 
modernisation on Kemal Ataturk’s reforms that took place in Turkey during 
the late nineteenth century.524 Under Amanullah Khan’s rule, Afghanistan 
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experienced the biggest leap in transplanting Ottoman Turkish laws as well 
as legal ideas from other parts of the Islamic and non-Islamic world. The chief 
foreign advisor to the king, the Turkish Badri Bey, relied heavily on Turkish 
codes and, by association, on the Code Napoleon.525  
 
From 1919 to 1923, a series of political, legal, and judicial reforms were made 
at Amanullah Khan’s initiative aiming to resolve fractures in society.526 In his 
reign, Amanullah Khan abolished slavery, created campaigns of 
reconciliation against violent divisions between the Sunni and Shi’a branches 
of Islam and improved the status of non-Muslim minorities by abolishing the 
jezya (poll-tax) that was levied on non-Muslim subjects.527  
 
An important part of Amanullah Khan’s legal reforms was the empowering 
of state education. The textbooks for religious madrasas in 1923 consisted of 
Fosul-i-Akhbāri, Kafiyya, Sharh-i-Molla, Kanz, Sharh-i-Waqqāya, Hedāyā, 
the translated Qur’an, Osul-i-Shahi, Nur al-Anwar, Seraj, theology 
(aqqayyid), Islamic history, the history of Afghanistan, geography, 
mathematics, Akhlāq-i-Mohseni, Tamassok-Qozat, Fundamental Law, 
Nezāmnāma-i-Asāsi, and the General Penal Code (Nezāmnāma-i-Jazā-i-
Omūmi).528 This madrassa curriculum, compared to the current madrassa 
curricula, meant combining a university law degree with a degree of theology. 
It produced state-sponsored intellectuals, and the clergy who were running 
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Amanullah Khan’s judiciary. The positive effects of this education system 
continued until 1978.  
 
Afghanistan’s Marriage Law was one of the most progressive ones in the 
Muslim World.529 The Soviets used Afghanistan’s Marriage Law 1923 in the 
Central Asian states under their control.530 The first girls’ school opened 
under Amanullah Khan’s government in Kabul in 1919.531 In 1928, there were 
eight hundred girls in schools.532 However, the girls’ schools closed under 
Nadir Shah, who ruled Afghanistan from 1929 to 1933.533 As aforementioned, 
Amanullah Khan tried to establish state control over religious madrasas, 
earning the hostility of the folk mullahs.534 As a consequence, in the 1920s, 
opposition to girls’ education played an important role in stirring up 
opposition to Amanullah Khan’s rule.535  
 
Out of all the political leaders of Afghanistan since 1747, there has been no 
other royal to match Amanullah Khan’s progressive plans for legal reforms 
and by far, he successfully transplanted the greatest number of codes from 
different countries. The king initiated legal reforms (2); professional support 
was present whereas since his grandfather’s time, a new cadre of state-
supported ulemā had been trained in the state-run madrasas and as cited 
earlier, the intellectuals and constitutionalists of Kabul received the required 
professional support (1); laws were enforced effectively (2) and, in view of 
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the fact that the reforms matched the expectations of the intellectuals, the 
judiciary was receptive of these reforms (1).    
  
               Table 6: Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) 
DV Legal Transplant Indicators    Scores 
State led 2 
Foreign led 0 
Professional support 1 
Enforcement 2 
Receptive judiciary 1 
Total scores  6 
 
The ill-fortune of Amanullah Khan was not due to failures by the members of 
his court or those who ran legal and judicial organs but was linked to the tribal 
leaders and sirdars (male progenitors from the royal clans) who, in the eyes 
of Amanullah Khan, were an obstacle to a modern government. Amanullah 
Khan intended the Pashtūn tribes to adhere to a new criminal law, that ignored 
the customary practices of Pashtūnwāli.536 The transplanted laws served their 
purpose well (2); the judiciary was ready to embrace them (1); the state had 
the capacity to enforce the laws (2) and there were no major barriers in regard 
to their receptivity (1).  
 
                Table 7: Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) 
IV Culture of Legality Indicators    Scores 
The purpose 2 
Foreigners’ purpose for legal transplants  x 
Judiciary readiness 1 
Capacity to enforce transplanted laws 2 
Barriers to receptivity of transplanted laws 1 
Total scores  6 
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The dynastic rule of this family of royals started with Dost Muhammad Khan 
(the grandfather of Abdur Rahman Khan), then Abdur Rahman Khan, 
followed by his son, Habibullah Khan, and his grandson, Amanullah Khan. 
All three amirs produced written judicial guidelines (Asās al-Quzat, Sirāj al-
Ahkām and Tamassok al-Qozāt). Despite their notoriety and harsh ways of 
governance that are well-documented, these rulers were experienced 
politicians and problem solvers from the early stages of their lives. They were 
born to rule and understood their people and society very well.     
 
8.11 Habibullah Kalakani (r. 1929) and Nadir Khan (r. 1929-
1933) 
 
During the reign of Habibullah Kalakani (r. 1929) and Nadir Khan (r. 1929-
1933), there were no reported legal transplants. Nadir Khan created a new 
constitution and copied provisions of Amanullah Khan’s with changes to 
please the ulemā and the Pashtūn tribal leaders.  
 
8.12 Zahir Shah 1933-1973 
 
In the next half century, Afghanistan was ruled by another family of 
experienced politicians, the Musahiban family, some of whom held important 
roles in Habibullah Khan’s and Amanullah Khan’s governments. The 
Musahiban brothers were Hashim Khan, Shah Wali Khan, Mohammad Aziz 
and Shah Mahmud; these were the uncles of the young king Zahir Shah. From 
1923 to 1978, Afghanistan saw the greatest success in nation-building.537 
Zahir Shah started to send students to Egypt, Europe and the United States 
for higher education. Between 1950 and 1952 seventy-five scholarships for 
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four-year courses in technology, science, public administration, economics, 
agriculture and law were given to Afghan students in study in the United 
States and Europe.538 Ministers of the government and a number of ulemā 
studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo.  
 
Zahir Shah’s government promulgated Constitution 1964 and drafted 
numerous laws. The government under Zahir Shah was the first to pay legal 
aid fees to poor defendants. Sarah Han from Afghanistan’s Analysts Network 
writes that defence lawyers and legal aid existed in Afghanistan during the 
reign of King Zahir Shah.539 The first statutory law for legal aid was enacted 
in 1965 and the laws governing defence lawyers and legal aid were passed in 
1972, 1987 and 1997.540  
 
Between 1933 and 1973, Afghanistan had access to a large body of literature 
on legal issues not only from Turkey, Egypt and India but also from France 
and other European countries. A French constitutional expert, Dr Louis 
Fauger, who had assisted in the drafting of the Moroccan constitution, was 
employed to assist with Afghanistan’s constitution.541 After the promulgation 
of Constitution 1964, a mixed pattern in legislation developed, which created 
confusion over the relationship of state law and Shari’a laws.542 The 
confusion mainly related to the issue of jurisdiction and whether a case had 
to be decided by a Shari’a or a civil judge. The courts of law generally applied 
the Arabic manuals of Hanafi jurisprudence as well as translations of the 
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Ottoman Mujallah: the codified version of Hanafi jurisprudence for civil 
transactions, excluding family law.543  
 
According to Kristine Ziems from Touch Point, following the adoption of the 
1964 constitution, in practice, if a statute law did not take jurisdiction away 
from Shari’a law, then Shari’a law applied.544 Ziems argues that statutory law 
is viewed as a codification of substantive Shari’a rules, not as a supreme 
law.545 The reference to secular laws in the context of Afghanistan are laws 
called qanūn (a Farsi word which literally means law) that cover state law or 
the public law.  
 
The 1964 constitution paid particular attention to issues such as institution 
building, democratic structures and the structure of parliamentary democracy, 
and independence of the judiciary from the executive branch.546 The king was 
supposed to be a follower of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam.547 The king 
was not accountable to anyone and had to be respected by everyone.548 Article 
2 of the constitution declared that the sacred religion of Islam was the religion 
of Afghanistan. It further stated that all human beings were equal,549 coupled 
with provisions for the secrecy of people’s communications.550 Freedom of 
expression was declared to be a fundamental right.551  
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Numerous scholars and historians report that the 1964 constitution was 
formulated in a relatively democratic fashion, where public consultation and 
meaningful debate played a major role in determining its contents. It is 
thought to be the most refined and coherent of the earlier constitutions of 
Afghanistan.552 Over a period of forty years, a number of legislations and a 
new constitution were drafted (1); there were adequate numbers of 
professional lawyers and judges to deal with the legal demands of 
Afghanistan (1); the enforcement of laws in this era was effective553 (2) and 
the judiciary and parliament drafted the laws – both organs supported the laws 
they established (1).   
    
               Table 8: 1933-1973 Zahir Shah 
DV Legal Transplant Indicators    Scores 
State led 1 
Foreign led x 
Professional support 1 
Enforcement 2 
Receptive judiciary 1 
Total scores  5 
 
The growing number of legislations and legal ideas adopted by the state 
served their intended purpose (1); the judiciary at this time operated 
effectively and was ready and capable to embrace the legal transplants (1); 
there was adequate capacity to enforce the transplanted laws (1) despite the 
existence of slight disagreements among the ulemā and tribal leaders, it did 
not disrupt legal processes (1). Due to the conservative nature of Zahir Shah’s 
rule, according to Harvey H. Smith et al., the tribal justice system existed in 
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a few areas where violators tried by family or tribal jirga based their 
adjudications on customary laws.554 The shortfall of 1 score in the 
independent variables is due to the slow pace of reforms and political change.    
 
               Table 9: 1933-1973 Zahir Shah 
IV Culture of Legality Indicators    Scores 
The purpose 1 
Foreigners’ purpose for legal transplants  x 
Judiciary readiness 1 
Capacity to enforce transplanted laws 1 
Barriers to receptivity of transplanted laws 1 
Total scores  4 
 
8.13 Mohammad Daud Khan 1973-1978 
 
Mohammad Daoud Khan served as the prime minister of Afghanistan from 
1953 until 1963 under King Zahir Shah. Daud Khan thwarted the monarchy 
in a bloodless coup on the 17 July 1973, declared Afghanistan a republic and 
appointed himself president and prime minister.555 He abolished the 
monarchy, dismissed the parliament, suspended the constitution and took 
executive control over the judiciary.556 Nadjma Yassari and Hamid Saboory 
describe three of the challenges faced by president Daoud Khan’s 
government: (1) Daoud Khan occupied the position of foreign minister and 
minister of defence; (2) the fourth constitution of Afghanistan was enacted 
under Daoud Khan in an unstable legal situation on the 24 February 1977 and 
(3) this constitution with one hundred and thirty-six articles was prepared in 
thirteen chapters, and as far as the text and language were concerned, it was 
one of the best drafted constitutions of its time – with highly ambitious 
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provisions.557 On president Daoud Khan’s constitutional provisions, Yassari 
and Saboory elaborate as follows:   
 
Article 1 of the constitution relates to the defence of independence, 
national sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Article 2 stipulated that 
power must be exercised by the people, the majority of whom consist 
of farmers, workers, and intellectuals. Article 3 stipulated the 
strengthening of thoughts, actions and sought the involvement and 
participation of all people in the government. Article 4 advocated 
secure democracy based on social justice and the interest of people 
and Article 5 stresses respect for human liberty and dignity, and the 
elimination of all forms of torture and discrimination. Despite the 
elaborate and highly ambitious provisions in the constitution of 1977, 
the government was involved in countering a destructive insurgency 
which had internal and external elements.558  
 
Daoud Khan’s presidency witnessed the rise of numerous Arab-inspired 
Islamist groups linked to Ikhwān-ul-Mūslemin (The Muslim Brotherhood) 
based in Egypt.559 In 1974, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood [in 
Afghanistan], Mohammad Niazi, was arrested along with two hundred 
followers.560 President Daoud Khan was to pave the way for the left to gain a 
necessary foothold in the Afghan bureaucracy and military ranks and, in due 
time, to take full control of the state.561 According to Sediq Farhang, the 
leftists were also using Daoud Khan’s leadership to eliminate their rivals from 
power – namely the Islamists and the nationalists.562  
 
Kristine Ziems contends that despite the enactment of comprehensive legal 
codes during the 1960s and the 1970s, the role of the court as an independent 
                                                          
557 Yassari and Saboory, “Shari’a and National Law,” 281-283.  
558 Yassari and Saboory, 281-283.  
559 Yassari and Saboory, 281-283.  
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body was to enforce state law, and the judiciary’s role as a counterbalance to 
the executive never developed.563 Drafters of Constitution 1977 were able to 
incorporate principles of law for a modernising legal order and adopt some 
elements of democracy. These provisions have been magnified in various 
forms in the one hundred and thirty-six articles of Constitution 1977. Article 
22 of this constitution designated Islam as the religion of the state, but without 
reference to the prominence of the Hanafi School of Law as had the previous 
constitution in 1964.564  
 
Daoud Khan’s government also enacted the Penal Code of 1976, a document 
that reflects Afghanistan’s turbulent governance much better than its 
constitution does. This penal code consisted of five hundred and twenty-three 
articles and contained an extensive list of crimes including joint-enterprise, 
alliance in crime, penal responsibility, security measures, legal excuses, 
judicial extenuating conditions, aggravating conditions, bribery, 
embezzlement, misbehaviour of public officials, forgery, kidnapping, 
sabotage, terrorism, defamation, obscenities, commercial crimes, treason, 
espionage and other crimes. Daoud Khan’s government also enacted the Civil 
Code 1977, which was modelled on the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949, 
containing 2,416 articles that included family and inheritance laws. This civil 
code was influenced by the French Civil Code.565  
 
By 1973, Afghanistan had a cadre of legal experts, linguists, translators and 
legalists who could draw on legal ideas from different parts of the world. 
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During this period, Egyptian and Western codes formed the major sources of 
legal transplants for Afghanistan. Daud Khan’s government scores the same 
points as those of Zahir Shah, because for a quite long time, Daoud Khan and 
Zahir Shah ran the same government as prime minister and king. Their 
achievements from 1933 until 1973 were common, despite the fact that Daoud 
Khan promulgated the greatest number of legal codes during his short-term 
presidency.   
 
Daoud Khan, a political leader with ten years’ experience as prime minister, 
known for a strong nationalist agenda, grew up in a royal family involved in 
politics since the 1900s. He was efficient in instigating legal innovations 
through transplanting Egyptian codes that were based on French codes (2); 
professional support was strong enough (1); enforcement was brutal but 
effective (1) and the judiciary was receptive of the new laws that were 
formulated (1). The low scores for the dependent variables are due to Daoud 
Khan’s autocratic leadership style and his ambitious laws – some of which 
could not be delivered.        
 
               Table 10: 1973-1978 Daoud Khan 
DV Legal Transplant Indicators    Scores 
State led 2 
Foreign led x 
Professional support 1 
Enforcement 1 
Receptive judiciary 1 
Total scores  5 
 
Daoud Khan’s laws, despite possessing good quality, contained far-fetched 
elements, and had he not been killed in a bloody coup in 1978, he may not 
have implemented them easily, as these laws were one hundred percent 
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copying legal provisions that worked well in modern states like Turkey, Iran 
and Egypt – whose ulemā and tribal elites did not pose big threats to the rule 
of their leaders. The legal transplants served their intended purpose – at least 
until Daoud Khan oversaw their enforcement personally (1); the judiciary was 
ready to accept and follow the new laws (1) and the state had the right capacity 
for their enforcement (1).      
  
               Table 11: 1973-1978 Daud Khan 
IV Culture of Legality Indicators    Scores 
The purpose 1 
Foreigners’ purpose for legal transplants  0 
Judiciary’s readiness 1 
Capacity to enforce transplanted laws 1 
Barriers to receptivity of transplanted laws 0 
Total scores  3 
 
8.14 The socialist governments, 1978-1992    
 
Nur Mohammad Takaki (r. 1978-1979) 
Hafizullah Amin (r. 1979)  
Babrak Karmal (r. 1986)  
Najibullah Ahmadzai (r. 1986-1992) 
Najmuddin Kaviani states that under the socialist governments, before the 
drafting of new codes, the government provided translations of constitutions 
and legal codes from other countries to guide the drafters.566 These were 
Islamic and Western codes and various legal documents.567 In this section, 
the socialist governments of Afghanistan are assessed together because their 
main focus from 1978 to 1992 was to bring steadfast cultural change; support 
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to the toilers; adopt a modern lifestyle and promote the socialist form of 
modernity in villages and cities of Afghanistan.  
 
The first two socialist presidents of Afghanistan, Nur Mohammad Taraki and 
Hafizullah Amin, mainly used presidential decrees rather than the law. In 
April 1980, President Babrak Karmal announced the adoption of a new 
constitution titled “Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan” and in January 1987, Najibullah Ahmadzai hinted that a new 
constitution would be drafted which would recognise Islam as the religion of 
the state.568   
 
The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the main socialist 
ruling party, began promoting the cultures of different ethnic minority groups 
through the media and began educating children in their mother tongue.569 
The PDPA recruited Sikhs as party members and promoted them in television 
programs in order to introduce their faith and culture to the people of 
Afghanistan.570 Harpal Singh, a Sikh from Afghanistan and a former member 
of the PDPA, confirms that the socialist governments raised awareness of 
Hindus’ and Sikhs’ lives through television programmes.571 Singh believes 
that this was a good move by the government to support ethnic and religious 
minorities.    
 
The dominant laws of the early socialist era (1978-1980) were mainly 
presidential decrees which were of a socialist nature. The Parchamis 
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(member of the socialist party, Parcham), and the regimes’ Soviet advisors 
were opposed to Hafizullah Amin’s (r. 1979) far-reaching changes brought 
about so rapidly in a country as socially conservative and economically 
underdeveloped as Afghanistan.572 In a series of presidential edicts, 
Hafizullah Amin cancelled many types of rural debts and pursued some of 
Amanullah Khan’s aims of limiting marriage payments and improving 
women’s rights.573  
 
Decree No. 6 aimed at the liquidation of usury in agricultural communities 
and the establishment of cooperatives, and Decree No. 7 imposed age 
restriction on marriage, curtailed polygamy and abolished mahr (dowry). 574 
Decree No. 8 dealt with large-scale land reforms based on the confiscation 
and redistribution of parcels of land in excess of thirty jaribs (a jerib is 2,000 
square metres) and by mid-1979, some 250,000 hectares of land had been 
distributed among 296,000 of the poorest families but with each receiving 
land about the size of a large garden rather than a small farm – not enough 
space to provide food for an income.575  
 
Writing in 1985, Mohammad Hashim Kamali argued that extravagant 
marriage ceremonies and the payment of a huge bride-price (walwar) and 
dowry (mahr) are issues which have remained unresolved despite legislative 
efforts over the last sixty years.576 The current government of Afghanistan 
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grapples with the same issues, with no success in protecting the rights of 
women.   
 
There were a number of legal innovations and a series of legal transplants 
between 1980 and 1992. These were politico-legal ideas that the socialist 
governments adopted. The PDPA government formed the thirty-member 
Revolutionary Council which later adopted the Soviet-style Politburo.577 In 
the early stages of the socialist rule, in which Hafizullah Amin ruled for one 
hundred days in 1979, several thousand innocent people were summarily 
executed. The Dutch prosecutor, Thijs Berger, has compiled a list of five 
thousand names of those who were executed in 1978 and 1979.578  
 
Except for the summary killings –perpetrated by Nur Mohammad Taraki, 
Hafizullah Amin and their brutal officers – the latter socialist leaders did not 
exercise the same level of brutality. The legal transplants during the socialist 
governments were partly state led (1); there was professional support for the 
laws (1); enforcement was carried out (1); and the judiciary was receptive of 
the new transplanted laws (1).    
 
               Table 12: 1978-1992 The socialist governments 
DV Legal Transplant Indicators    Scores 
State led 1 
Foreign led 0 
Professional support 1 
Enforcement 1 
Receptive judiciary 1 
Total scores  4 
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The transplanted laws served their intended purpose (1); the judiciary was 
ready to implement them (1) and the right professional capacity existed (1). 
The shortfall and difference of 1 point between the dependent and 
independent variables is because most (but not all) legal matters were 
executed through presidential decrees and the party’s High Council’s decrees 
rather than through the codes of law and by legal institutions.  
 
               Table 13: 1978-1992 The socialist governments 
IV Culture of Legality Indicators    Scores 
The purpose 1 
Foreigners’ purpose for legal transplants  0 
Judiciary’s readiness 1 
Capacity to enforce transplanted laws 1 
Barriers to receptivity of transplanted laws 0 
Total scores  3 
 
8.15 Hamid Karzai 2002-2014  
 
The Karzai era (in office 2002-2014) was one of the biggest episodes of 
massive foreign-led legal transplants in the history of Afghanistan. From the 
formation of an interim government after the Bonn Conference in late 2001 
to the drafting of roadmaps, strategies, legislations as well as operational 
plans, a bevy of international consultants, mainly Western experts, were 
involved in pushing through the foreign-led legal transplants.  
 
Prior to assessing these legal transplants, it is necessary to discuss the status 
of Islamic laws on top of which foreign legal ideas were mounted. To the 
present day, Afghanistan’s Islamic law remains in its classical conditions. 
Classical Shari’a, with limited scope to answer contemporary legal questions 
in a modern state, is limited to personal status matters, marriage, divorce, 
custody of children and inheritance. Anastasiya Hozyainova argues that 
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Islamic law (Shari’a) is a centuries-old legal system and adhered to by 
Muslims and Islamic governments worldwide.579 Although Islamic law is 
continuously evolving and is dynamic, its foundation lies in the interpretation 
of key principles and instructions laid out in the sources of Islam, most 
importantly, the Qur’an – the holy book for Muslims, and the Sunna – the 
examples and behaviours set by Prophet Mohammad during his lifetime.580  
 
The genesis of modern government and rule of law since 1919 hints at the 
incompatibility of Western and Islamic laws in Afghanistan. According to 
Senzil Nawid, the ulemā felt offended by Amanullah Khan’s (r. 1919-1929) 
Nizamnamas, as they believed these laws did not conform to Hanafi 
doctrine.581 Attempts to codify Islamic criminal law produced the Islamic law 
book Tamassok al-Qozāt.582 The ulemā of Afghanistan disagree with 
codifying Islamic law to the present day.  
 
In 2013, scholars and judges from other Islamic countries reported in their 
research papers that Afghanistan’s Islamic curriculum taught in the madrasas 
lagged behind other Islamic judiciaries by at least a hundred years.583 The 
books being studied in the madrasas of Afghanistan as of 2020 are: Shrut 
Salat, Qoduri, Kanz ul-Sadeq, Noor ul-Izah, Sarf va Nahv, Mashkot, Fiqh 
Akbar, Al-Hedaya, Aqidāt al-Tahtāwi, Tafsir Jalalain and Sahih Bokhari.584 
This brief description of classical Shari’a and madrassa curriculum shows a 
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581 Nawid, Religious Response to Change in Afghanistan, 107.  
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reversal in Islamic education, compared with the madrassa curriculum  
between 1919-1929 and 1978.   
 
Hanafi jurisprudence that is dominant in Afghanistan, allows for local custom 
to be used as a secondary source of law.585 The Civil Code 1977 at Articles 
1(2) and 2, and Article 130 of Constitution 2004586 allow custom to be used 
as law.587 The rule of law invoked in numerous international documents 
involves a number of different issues. The rule of law in basic terms consists 
of rules that are according to law(s) that no one can be sentenced to or 
sanctioned by certain punishments without codified laws and criminal 
procedures.588 According to universal norms and standards, the rule of law 
refers to the full accountably of government and state institutions within 
international human rights standards, international humanitarian law (IHL) 
and maintaining the supremacy of law.589 The United Nations’ conception of 
the rule of law contains four components: governance, procedural fairness, 
substantive law and the application of law.590  
 
Legal transplants recommended by members of the international community 
from 2001 to the present day, has involved the building of new government 
                                                          
585 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MICA), “Cultural Islam in Afghanistan,” 2.  
586 Article 130 stipulates that in cases under consideration, the courts shall apply provisions 
of this Constitution [2004] as well as other laws. If there is no provision in the Constitution 
or other laws about a case, the courts shall, in pursuance of Hanafi jurisprudence, and, within 
the limits set by this Constitution, rule in a way that attains justice in the best manner.  
587 Article 1(2): In cases no provision of law exists, courts shall decide in accordance with 
general principles of Hanafi Jurisprudence of Islamic Sharia in order to secure justice in the 
best possible manner. Article 2: Where neither do provisions of law exist, nor any ruling is 
found among principles of Hanafi Jurisprudence of Islamic Sharia, courts shall decide 
according to common custom, provided that the custom does not contradict provisions of law 
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institutions, updating old legal codes and drafting a new constitution which 
requires legal training at universities, higher education institutions, as well as 
seminars and workshops. Since 2002, Afghanistan has gained a reformed and 
updated corpus of civil, criminal and family laws. Major foreign-led legal 
transplants have led to the formulation of the Juvenile Code, the Interim 
Criminal Code for Court 2004, the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(EVAW), the Counter Narcotics Law 2005 and anti-corruption laws and 
strategies.  
 
In an interview with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC), the author investigated the inclusion of human rights lessons in the 
school curriculum. The main problems pointed out by the AIHRC in 
promoting human rights in government schools are low educational levels of 
teachers, low education of its personnel, overemphasis of political ideologies 
under the pretext of religious values by professionals of the Ministry of 
Education, and Article 3 of Constitution 2004 stands as a barrier and is used 
as a tool in favour of the conservatives – factors that hamper the promotion 
of human rights in government schools.591  
 
Fayez Amiri writes that religious, ideological and ethnic differences in 
Afghan society have influenced and sometimes disturbed the progress and 
function of the education system.592 Primary school books’ representation of 
women generally reflects patriarchal and religious traditions as well as 
stereotypes.593 Women are portrayed as passive and silent, while men are 
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actively involved in various important activities.594 Reading through the 
history, religious and literature books printed from 2002 until 2020,595 and 
considering AIHRC’s and Amiri’s findings, the government schools teach 
misogynistic lessons and promote strong patriarchy. 
 
Jerald Gort argues that no government, no societal institution, no business or 
even no transnational corporation can openly ignore human rights or deny 
them with impunity.596 In practice, politicians in different parts of the world 
easily derogate from basic international human rights principles under 
pretexts like culture, faith and political issues. In regard to plural legal orders, 
human rights standards leave important gaps in clarity and direction as the 
fragmented and uncoordinated development of standards create additional 
problems for indigenous and minority rights, gender equality and the right to 
culture.597  
 
According to Rudolph Peters, Siyāsa Shari’a (discretion of the authority) is 
justified as part of classical fiqh-based criminal law with provisions 
concerning discretionary punishments for sinful or forbidden behaviour or 
acts endangering public order or state society (ta’zir and Siyāsa).598 
Discretionary power is exercised by the executive force, the judiciary and 
their dependencies like the prosecution office and the police. In Afghanistan, 
there are a number of crimes in which defendants receive harsher and unjust 
                                                          
594 Amiri, 59. 
595 Three sets of schoolbooks from Year 1-12 have been put in the public domain. These are 
books printed in 2009, 2012 and 2019. The books are available from download on the 
Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan website and on the Pashto 
website: Khyber.org.   
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punishments based on Siyāsa that are not commensurate to the crime 
attributed to the accused.  
 
Between 2002 and 2020 the majority of these crimes were moral 
transgressions: lavāt, zinā, eloping, girls fleeing forced marriages or domestic 
violence, and a category of crime known as farār az manzel, meaning girls 
running away from their homes, as well as apostasy and blasphemy. For some 
of these categories there are strict evidence requirements in Islam, and for 
most of them there are no legal justifications for punishment in Islamic law. 
Based on public data, Afghanistan’s judiciary severely punishes people for 
the above categories of Islamic crimes without obtaining the right evidence. 
The following anonymised court records published by the Supreme Court in 
its Mizān publication shows some examples. 
 
Figure 4: Mizān court statistics. Supreme Court of Afghanistan  
 
 
Figure 5: Mizān court statistics. Supreme Court of Afghanistan   
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Ghazi Hashmi, postulates that Afghan judges use Article 130 of Constitution 
2004 in violation of the principles of legality set forth in Article 27, but also 
contradict international criminal law, including the principles of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.599 Article 130 of Constitution 
2004 establishes that in cases under consideration, the courts shall apply 
provisions pf this Constitution as well as other laws. If there are no provisions 
in the Constitution or other laws about a case, the courts shall, in pursuance 
of Hanafi jurisprudence, and, within the limits set by this Constitution, rule 
in a way that attains justice in the best manner.   
 
Hashimi reports that since 2004, in over one thousand cases, judges have used 
Article 130 to justify holding defendants criminally liable where no crime had 
been defined by an enacted statute.600 The following are sample of cases 
collated from the bi-monthly Supreme Court of Afghanistan’s Mizān 
publication from 2008 to 2020.601  
 
Charges  Number 
of cases 
Abortion  16 
Adultery  1,491 
Alcoholic drinks  129 
Escaping from home  31 
Insulting sacred beliefs  2 
Rape  522 
Sodomy  680 
Underage marriage  4 
Figure 6: Selected cases from Mizān 2008-2020.  
                                                          
599 Hashimi, “Defining the Principle of Legality,” 186. 
600 Hashimi, 188. 
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According to intersectionality theory, in order to discuss the social 
stratification and hierarchy stemming from the presence of various identity 
axes, some identity axes are perceived by the prevailing social construction 
as axes of oppression, whereas others are seen as axes of domination.602 Those 
located on the axes of oppression are the defendants whose punishments are 
not based on facts or evidence and punishments are not commensurate with 
the alleged crimes. On the domination axes are Islamic legal professionals 
(judges, muftis, prosecutors) using state power, who suspend the divine laws 
and exercise their man-made Siyāsa in order to wreak terror in the defendants’ 
hearts and in society at large, for alleged crimes such as apostasy and 
blasphemy – for which there are no punishments in the Qur’an – and farār az 
manzel (running away from home), which is not a crime, but in all criminal 
matters, girls and women have to undergo virginity checks and are sent to 
prisons. This affects the women and girls severely, violates their rights, 
deprives them of societal respect, tarnishes their social standing and the takes 
away their chances of choosing a husband and setting up a family.  
 
According to the AIHRC’s findings, in 119 cases, 92.3% of virginity exams 
were conducted without the consent of the accused girls and women and there 
were no court orders based on Article 640 of the Penal Code.603 From the 
above 119 cases, 60 persons were accused of adultery, 31 accused of escaping 
home, 23 accused of murder, 6 were examined for evidence of rape, 3 were 
accused of theft, 3 were accused of smuggling, 2 were accused of false 
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reporting and one was accused of escaping home and conducing lavāt 
(buggery).604  
 
Based on the multiple intersecting sufferings for women accused of moral 
crimes, their punishment may be regarded manifold compared to that of men. 
The defendants (male or female) would become a victim of domestic and 
societal aggression if they were accused of moral transgression and would be 
punished for bringing dishonour to the family, clan or tribe.  
 
Hamid Karzai and his government did not instigate legal transplants (0); as a 
president, he was reluctant to support human rights laws and was pushed to 
do so by foreigners (0); professional support existed during Karzai’s rule 
where Afghans and international experts aided the institutions of government 
(2); law enforcement was often politicised and not  strongly enforced (1) and 
the judiciary did not embrace Western legal norms, but superficially agreed 
to them in order to receive aid money (0). Arne Strand et al. argue that in 
Afghanistan, Western normative ideals are neither legitimate nor effective.605    
 
               Table 14: Hamid Karzai 2002-2014 
DV Legal Transplant Indicators    Scores 
State led 0 
Foreign led 0 
Professional support 2 
Enforcement 1 
Receptive judiciary 0 
Total scores  3 
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According to the Freedom in the World 2014 report, from 2005 to 2007, 
Afghanistan enjoyed partly free status. In areas such as political rights, civil 
liberties, rule of law and individual rights there were some positive gains.  
 
 Figure 7: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014. 
 
The foreign-led transplanted laws in Afghanistan serve their purpose but are 
often imposed through aid conditionality (1); foreigners transplant the laws 
(0); the judiciary is not ready or willing to embrace foreign laws that are based 
on Western norms (0); professional capacity exists for the enforcement of the 
laws (1) and there are multiple barriers to the foreign-led transplanted laws 
(0). The fourteen years of Hamid Karzai’s rule show abysmally low 
achievements for the rule of law because of the many problems that Afghan 
leaders and foreigners ignored or pretended they were not problems. 
Corruption has been the biggest barrier to the rule of law.     
 
                Table 15: Hamid Karzai 2002-2014 
IV Culture of Legality Indicators    Scores 
The purpose 1 
Foreigners purpose for legal transplants  0 
Judiciary’s readiness 0 
Capacity to enforce transplanted laws 1 
Barriers to receptivity of transplanted laws 0 
Total scores  2 
 
8.16 Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai 2014 - to date   
 
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai took power in a highly contested presidential 
election in 2014. For this election, more than twenty million voter registration 
cards were issued, despite the estimated number of voters being only twelve 
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million.606 Following the fraudulent presidential elections, a National Unity 
Government (NUG) was formed where presidential power was shared 
between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah.  
 
The second presidential elections held in August 2019, was marred with 
widespread fraud, and election results were announced in March 2020. 
Abdullah Abdullah contested the results. Following international pressure 
from the United States and the European Union, both front-runners had to 
reach another power-sharing agreement on the 17 May 2020.607           
 
In Ashraf Ghani’s rule, excessive use of presidential legal decrees is a huge 
impediment to the empowerment of the rule of law, it affects two major 
institution of the government, the judiciary and the Parliament. According to 
Ariana News, the Parliamentary Legislation Commission complained that the 
president acts extra-constitutionally: from the beginning to the end of his first 
term (2014-2018), Ashraf Ghani ran most of the ministries without obtaining 
the approval of the parliament.608 The president issues legal decrees which 
violate the constitution and usurps the parliament’s legal powers, and the 
report adds; twice in one day the president issued fourteen – and on another 
day sixteen – legal decrees that were not in accordance with the law.609  
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608 Ariana News, “Ashraf Ghani violating the law,” last accessed 02 July 2020. 
609 Ariana News, last accessed 02 July 2020.  
 
   
 
Page 240 of 531 
 
Since 2014, the Afghan and international press have reported similar 
complaints from different institutions of the government.610 The lack of a 
legitimate space for dissent has been a persistent driver of violent resistance 
in Afghanistan where a predominant political culture has evolved of power 
concentrated centrally in a single ruler who sets policy and distributes 
resources, leaving no room for non-violent opposition.611  
  
In 2016, following mounting Western pressure on Ashraf Ghani to curb 
corruption, the government established the Anti-Corruption Judicial Centre 
(ACJC). John Sopko, head of the U.S. Watchdog: Special Inspector General 
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), claims that the Anti-Corruption 
Judicial Centre and Major Crimes Task Force, which claim to prosecute high 
level corruption cases, lack the capacity, resources and security needed to 
perform their function.612 Afghanistan’s law enforcement and judiciary often 
avoid investigating, prosecuting and punishing powerful individuals.613  
 
SIGAR expects the  government to combat corruption by extradition of 
suspects from overseas; arrest, trial and imprisonment of powerful individuals 
engaging in corruption, and to give significant output from anti-corruption 
courts; recover stolen assets and use proper resourcing of anti-corruption 
institutions as well as transparency in contracting.614 In the run up to 
Afghanistan Conference 2020 in Geneva 23-24 November 2020, the 
                                                          
610 These media sources are Ariana News, TOLO News and Ava Press from Afghanistan, 
Deutche Welle Aljazeera International, the BBC, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, 
from the West.   
611 Barfield, “Afghanistan’s political history,” 15.  
612 SIGAR, “Problems Must be Addressed,” 3. 
613 SIGAR,” 3.  
614 Sopko, “Corruption: A Threat to the Rule of Law,” 9-10. 
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government of Afghanistan established the Anti-Corruption Commission, 
and swore in the commissioners.615     
 
Under the banner of punishing corrupt officials, the ACJC has often been used 
as a political tool to remove political rivals from their posts. Two examples 
are the minister of telecommunications, Abdul Razzaq Wahidi – a Hazāra 
minister – and Abdul Ghaffar Dawi, a businessman. Wahidi was charged with 
corruption and was sent to Pul-E-Charkhi Prison. In the absence of evidence 
to prove guilt, Wahidi got released from prison on appeal. Shukria Barakzai, 
a former female lawmaker and former ambassador of Afghanistan to Norway, 
and ex-wife of businessman Dawi, stated in a TV interview that the 
government of Afghanistan ran an oligarchy and there was no transparency 
for imprisoning Dawi who, in Barakzai’s words, was an innocent man.616 The 
web portal of the Attorney General’s Office displays ACJC’s court 
promulgations between one and three pages, which for serious crimes is 
inadequate information. Please see Appendix 14 for a translation of a sample 
promulgation.  
 
Ashraf Ghani’s decrees are mainly issued for dismissals and appointments of 
state officials. Over the past couple of years, Ghani has fired and replaced 
many officials without offering explanations to the nation or to the relevant 
institutions. Political appointment of ministers and removing them with 
ignominy and at the president’s whim affects the growth of a political culture 
that institutions must serve the population of Afghanistan.  
                                                          
615 BBC Farsi, “Afghanistan will form anti-corruption commission,” 12 November 2020. 
Last accessed 26 November 2020. 
616 1TV Kabul, “Cactus Interview with Shukria Barakzai,” last accessed 02 July 2020.  
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Since 2014, most of the legal transplants are being eroded, weakened and 
reversed. There are no successful state-led legal transplants; the ACJC was 
established due to international community’s pressure for accountability and 
curbing corruption (0); there are other foreign-led legal transplants, like the 
EVAW law which remains weakly enforced. As of January 2021, the United 
Nations General Assembly expects the Afghan government to increase efforts 
to prevent, punish and eradicate all form of violence against women; 
guarantee that women and girl victims of violence are provided with 
immediate access to effective remedies, shelter, legal assistance, and 
reparations; provide funding for accessible shelters for women; implement 
without delay the recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against women; and ensure that current legislation, notably 
the Penal Code, and new legislation, such as the draft family law, are not 
discriminatory towards women and meet international human rights 
standards617 (0); professional support for the transplanted laws exists (1) and 
enforcement is often discriminatory, politicised and arbitrary (1).       
 
               Table 16: Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai   2014- to date 
DV Legal Transplant Indicators    Scores 
State led 0 
Foreign led 0 
Professional support 1 
Enforcement 1 
Receptive judiciary 0 
Total scores  2 
 
                                                          
617 United Nations General Assembly, “Situation of human rights in Afghanistan” 
A/HRC/46/69, 13. 
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The autocratic rule suspends the law and stops institutions from serving their 
purpose (0);  foreigners continue to transplant laws as the state is very weak 
(0); the judiciary is ready to accept new laws (1); the capacity for legal 
transplants is not present as the country is ruled partly by the Taliban who are 
connected to the weak central government officials through nepotism, blood 
and kinship ties (0) and there are old and new barriers as a result of 
illegitimate election results, extra-constitutional rule and the abuse of legal 
institutions for persecuting political rivals (0). Afghanistan is sliding back to 
pre-state conditions, despite partial achievements in some elements of the rule 
of law.    
 
               Table 17: Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai   2014- to date 
IV Culture of Legality Indicators    Scores 
The purpose 0 
Foreigners’ purpose for legal transplants  0 
Judiciary’s readiness 1 
Capacity to enforce transplanted laws 0 
Barriers to receptivity of transplanted laws 0 
Total scores  1 
 
8.17 The Taxonomy of Legal Transplants   
 
In order to classify legal transplants in Afghanistan, three distinct categories 
of law must be assessed: Shari’a, Qanūn and Pashtūnwāli. These pluralistic 
categories of law with inconsistent geographical variations have at times 
worked well together, or at other times worked against one another, or one of 
them filled in the gaps when the other/s were absent. 
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Table 18: Legal Transplantation Taxonomy in Afghanistan 1747-2020 
Type Definition Examples in Afghanistan 
Transplantation of 
Legal Traditions 
The transfer of an entire 
body of law, along with 
techniques of legal reasoning 
and the role of law in society 
Monotheistic: Zoroastrian, 
Mosaic and Islamic laws; 
Roman and Germanic law; 
Ottoman law; Egyptian law 
Transplantation of 
National Law 
A country adopts the 
substantive law of another 
country 
Afghanistan adopted Turkish 
and Egyptian laws (family, 
criminal and civil) and qanūn 
laws  
Transplantation of an 
Area of Law 
A country or jurisdiction 
elects to create or retain a 
body of law in a given area 
Constitutions were based on 
French models; commercial law 
on Ottoman (Ottoman from 
Swiss); reforms through judicial 
decisions were adopted from 
English law; Panchat Bashi, the 
Mamluk Sultans’ judicial 
consistency, Siyāsa and 
Janissary (gholām bacha); 
eclectic use of Shari’a-based 




Transfer or adoption of 
specific legal concepts or 
rules 
Codified Islamic laws by 
Britain; 
administrative law from English 
law; Ottoman Mujallah; Islamic 
concepts of bay’at and Shūrā for 
informal justice; Pashtūnwāli 
penal rules from Yāsā; Soviet 
Politburo’s chain of command 
Double 
Transplantation 
A country transplants a 
specific area of law and then 
uses transplantation in the 
making of a broader law 
Mix of Yāsā and Pashtūnwāli 
has formed a hybrid tribal 
system; Taliban use of Yāsā, 
Pashtūnwāli under the veneer of 





A country’s law, recognised 
as being advanced or 
modern, influences, or 
modern law influences the 
evolution of law in other 
countries 
Mosaic law, Mongol law and 
Islamic law influence all forms 
of punishment; purdah and 
gender segregation laws from 
Achaemenid, Bedouin tribes of 
the Arab Peninsula  
Superficial 
Transplantation 
Adoption of foreign 
terminology 
Italian Criminal Law 1988, 
CEDAW, UDHR, UNCAC, 
Counternarcotic Law 2005, 
human rights provisions that 
contradict Pashtūnwāli and the 
ulemās’ interpretation of Islamic 
law concerning women, children 
and religious freedoms  
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8.18 Testing the Hypothesis  
 
In the following score table, differences between the dependent indicator 
legal transplants and the independent indicator culture of legality transpired 
in four categories. The first one is (0) difference, which means the legal 
transplants formed a culture of legality. This is due to Amanullah Khan’s 
legal reforms through legal transplants that were consistent with what the 
state required to embrace and sustain. To the present day, all the leaders of 
Afghanistan have followed some elements of Amanullah Khan’s reforms and 
built on the legal foundations he set forth in Afghanistan.  
 
The second category is the legal transplants where political leaders were 
involved in their operation. These were reforms that worked to some extent, 
but not all conditions necessary for their embracing and sustaining were 
present. These have a difference of 1. These were due to Abdur Rahman Khan 
and Habibullah Khan, Zahir Shah, and the socialist governments’ efforts. 
These political systems worked well, but they could not bring about an 
irreversible culture of legality. The military coups and bloody conflicts led to 
most of the reversals.   
 
The third category is the legal transplants brought to Afghanistan, following 
foreign interventions. These legal transplants were foreign led and were 
connected to aid conditionality, and were strongly needed due to state 
weakness. These have a difference of 1. The difference between this category 
and the earlier one is that in this era, the political leaders are likely to embrace 
legal transplants for financial gain. The best evidence to test this is that leaders 
do not follow the rules and achieving change may be a pyrrhic victory. These 
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are prone to quick reversals. A number of factors shown in the section for 
Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai explain why Afghanistan is 
backsliding, partly due to a welter of legal pluralisms, tribal power and 
religious authority as well as the modes of ethno-tribal governance that are 
reversing Afghanistan’s gains to pre-Abdur Rahman’s times. 
 
The final category is the difference of 2, which is the highest in one hundred 
and twenty years of statehood. This belongs to Daoud Khan who ruled 
Afghanistan single-handedly, annulled Constitution 1964 and although he 
formulated the best-written laws in the history of Afghanistan, his 
government could not implement them.    
  
Table 19: The Score Table 
No. Case Transplants Culture of 
Legality 
Difference 
1 Abdul Rahman Khan 2 1 1 
2 Habibullah Khan 2 1 1 
3 Amanullah Khan 6 6 0 
4 Zahir Shah 5 4 1 
5 Daoud Khan 5 3 2 
6 Socialist governments 4 3 1 
7 Hamid Karzai 3 2 1 
8 Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai 2 1 1 
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Figure 8: The Independent Variable Culture of Legality 1880-2020.  
 
The legal transplants for a variety of reasons as demonstrated above did not 
resonate at local and communal level and were thus received with 
indifference to the point they were in large part disregarded. As for the state-
led legal transplants of the past, in order to adopt Hanafi legal norms, 
Afghanistan’s judicial and legislative branches simply mimicked the 
Egyptian legal progress, possibly not for the sake of empowering the rule of 
law per se, but because laws imported from Egypt helped Afghanistan’s 
global image and classed it as a modernising state. This type of mimetic 
isomorphism in the area of importing legal texts garnered support for creating 
and expanding an Islamic legal order which this chapter identifies as weak 
and less developed. William Gourley describes mimetic isomorphism to be 
the copying of other organisations’ models that are perceived as being 
successful without understanding the basis of that success.618  
 
                                                          
618 Gourley, “Interface between English Further and Higher Education,” 149. 
 









Culture of Legality 1880-2020
Difference Culture of Legality Transplants
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From the forty questionnaire respondents who participated in this research, 
more than fifty percent think that the legal transplants from Egypt, Turkey 
and Western countries between 1747 to 2001 were useful. As for the post-
2001 era, a large number say that legal transplants have not been useful; some 
refrained from answering the question, and a few say they have been useful. 
It may be understood from the answers to other questions in the research 
questionnaire that some respondents believe there has been no law or a 
meaningful government in Afghanistan since 2001. Some negativity and 
frustration is noted in answers to questions concerning justice, law and order 
relating to the post-2001 period.  
 
 
Figure 9: Research Questionnaire. Legal Transplants 1747-2001.   
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Yes
No
Q9: Do you believe the laws Afghanistan has
borrowed from Egypt, Turkey and western
countries from 1747 to 2001 have been useful?
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This chapter has shown the different stages of legal reforms in Afghanistan 
with a focus on legal transplants from 1880 to the present day. It has also 
offered a background to the legal conditions from 1747 to the 1880s. The 
chapter has highlighted different approaches taken by the political leaders of 
Afghanistan to instigate reforms and make those reforms work.  
 
The chapter showed the stages where legal transplants were the demand of 
Afghanistan’s political leaders and that the monarchs performed very well. 
The chapter further showed that the post-2001 governments of Afghanistan 
have displayed cursory changes and certain achievements, but their motives 
do not appear to be for the sake of expanding the rule of law but rather to 
receive international aid money. The chapter shows that foreign-led legal 
transplants are fragile, ineffective and prone to speedy reversals.  
 




Q10: Do you believe that laws brought to
Afghanistan by western powers from 2001 to the
present day are useful?
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This chapter has tested the null hypothesis, the only hypothesis with the 
working assumption that the state-sponsored legal transplants have not 
formed a culture of legality since the creation of a nation-state in 
Afghanistan. Although Amanullah Khan’s government is an exception, the 
chapter has identified that intervening factors such as coups, wars and under-
development reversed the gains. This chapter has used case-study and 
process-tracing methods to test the hypothesis. The results of the hypothesis 
agree with the working assumption quoted above. The hypothesis is a robust 
one and lies between the smoking gun and double decisive results.  
 
The next chapter will be dedicated to the development of constitutions of 
Afghanistan. By observing constitutions, this will enable us to assess which 
laws have been critical to the development and modernising of Afghanistan’s 
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CHAPTER 9: THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 
AFGHANISTAN: 1923-2020 
 
A society in which the observance of the law is 
not assured, nor the separation of powers 
defined, has no constitution at all. 619  
9 Introduction 
 
A constitution is a body of basic laws and principles that describes the general 
organisation and operation of the state and contains fundamental principles 
and norms that underlie and guide government action.620 Given the 
fundamental nature of a constitution and its role in laying a groundwork to 
shape and support the state, a constitution is usually expected to be 
longstanding and somewhat difficult to change or undo.621 The vast majority 
of contemporary constitutions describe the basic principles of the state, the 
structure and processes of government and the fundamental rights of citizens 
in higher law that cannot be unilaterally changed by an ordinary legislative 
act.622 The content and nature of a particular constitution, how it relates to the 
rest of the legal and political order, varies considerably between countries, 
and there is no universal and uncontested definition of a constitution.623  
 
The American constitutional expert, Walter F. Murphy, describes 
constitutionalism as respect for human worth and dignity as its central 
principle, and to protect that value, citizens must have a right to political 
                                                          
619 Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. 
620 Hedling, “The Fundamentals of a Constitution,” 1.  
621 Hedling, 1. 
622 Bulmer, “What is a Constitution? 5.   
623 Bulmer, 5.   
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participation and their government must be hedged in by substantive limits 
on what it can do, even when perfectly mirroring the popular will.624 
Constitutionalism, according to the Bar of Human Rights Committee of 
England and Wales, is limited government and includes the ideas of the rule 
of law and the separation of powers as a means of restricting and controlling 
government.625 The rule of law emphasises the importance of general rules as 
binding on citizens and government alike; it requires laws to reflect certain 
basic values derived from the nature of rules as guides of conduct.626   
 
In assessing the constitutions of Afghanistan from 1923 to 2004, a number of 
researchers have expressed their views. Mustafa Yayali claims that all the 
constitutions of Afghanistan failed, as they were drawn on the pre-modern 
nature of Afghanistan by weak governments that failed to promote a 
constitutional culture, and Nighat Mehroze Chishti states that all the 
constitutions of Afghanistan failed to serve their purpose. In this chapter, I 
argue that these careless assessments of Afghanistan’s constitutions lead to 
unqualified and generalised statements. In refuting these two claims, the 
chapter seeks to highlight the incrementalist nature of Afghanistan’s 
constitutions, and observes the intervening factors such as conflicts and 
disruptions of the political processes, mainly due to regime changes. 
Constitutions enshrine different principles in different periods of history, and 
it may not be possible for governments to implement all of the constitutional 
provisions.  
                                                          
624 Murphy, “Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy,” 3. 
625 Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales, “Manual on Rule of Law 
Afghanistan,” 20.  
626 Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales, 20. 
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This chapter assesses the constitutions of Afghanistan – from the first one 
drafted in 1923 and the last in 2004 – for the promises these constitutions 
offered, against actions taken by the political leaders and government 
institutions, such as the legal system, in order to fulfil these promises. The 
chapter suggests transformative constitutionalism as a pathway to inclusivity 
and for future direction.   
 
9.1 Demands for a Constitution in Afghanistan   
 
In Afghanistan, the demand for written laws is closely linked to the reforms 
and legal developments in a wider geographical region that included 
Afghanistan’s closest neighbours, India and Persia (Iran), and further afield, 
Egypt and Turkey.  
 
In 1839, Mountstuart Elphinstone the Scottish statesman wrote, “The Durrani 
aristocracy does not have Statute Laws, except the laws of the Prophet 
Mohammad, and there are no public records of the proceedings of their 
government, so it is impossible that any regular constitution has grown among 
them.”627 In Afghanistan’s then neighbour, India, legal and constitutional 
provisions were in place as British political agents and viceroys were 
involved in running India’s legal and political affairs. In Afghanistan’s other 
neighbour, Persia (renamed Iran in 1923), under the rule of the Qājārs, an 
intellectual and constitutional movement had taken shape that led to the 
creation of the first Iranian constitution in 1906. Sa'doddin Hashimi observes 
that:  
                                                          
627 Khan, Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan, 21. 
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In the global East, various societies and nation-states decided to 
import Western technology and culture in order to preserve their own 
cultural heritage and also be part of the Western concepts such as 
human rights, freedom, democracy, independence, and nationalism. 
National States took hold in the global East and gradually some people 
adopted certain ways of a Western life.628   
 
In The Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan printed in 1900, Sultan 
Mohammad Khan refers to Ahmad Shah Durrani as the founder of the Durrani 
dynasty and the first elected constitutional sovereign of his time in 
Afghanistan.629 In the context of Afghanistan, Khan uses terms such as the 
sovereign, the commonwealths of Afghanistan and constitutional order and 
infers that the tribal selection process in appointing Ahmad Shah as king was 
congruent with a constitutional process.630  
 
9.2 CONSTITUTION 1923 
 
NIZAMNAMAH-YE-ASASI- DAULAT-E-ALIYAH-E AFGHANISTAN, 
20 HAMAL 1301 [Fundamental Principles of the Exalted State of 
Afghanistan, Constitution, 09 April 1923] was the first constitution of 
Afghanistan drafted under King Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929). This 
constitution was formed by seventy-three articles and in nine sections. 
Nizāmnāma is a term that emerged in the Middle East following the Tanzimāt 
period in nineteenth century Turkey.631 According to Joseph Schwager, the 
Constitution of 1923 was in substance a judicially valid constitution, and its 
provisions for legislation were designed to lead an autonomous development 
of secular law-making and to show the way to the separation of secular from 
                                                          
628 Hashimi, Constitutional Movement in Afghanistan, 30. 
629 Khan, Constitution and Laws of Afghanistan, 4. 
630 Khan, 4. 
631 Nawid, “Aman-Allah and the Afghan ‘Ulama,” 76.  
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canonical jurisprudence.632 The reference to canonical jurisprudence here is 
the Shari’a provisions.   
 
According to the Afghan scholar and writer, Senzil Nawid, during Amanullah 
Khan’s rule, the new regulations were intended to bring greater order to the 
administration of government; to regulate social relations; to promote human 
dignity; to ensure equality before the law without regard to ethnic origin or 
distinction of class, and promote general welfare and tranquillity, and in 
addition, Amanullah Khan intended these regulations to provide a foundation 
for modern education and economic reform.633 The second chapter of the 
constitution constituted the Afghan Bill of Individual Rights and Article 8 
declared that all people residing in Afghanistan were Afghan citizens, 
regardless of their religion or creed.634 Articles 9 and 10 provided that no 
individual could be arrested or punished, except as provided in the law, and 
Article 16 recognised the equality of all citizens before the law.635  
 
The legal transplants chapter identified that Amanullah Khan was the only 
king of Afghanistan whose government’s legal transplants matched the 
capacity of his government’s institutions. Amanullah Khan’s government 
drafted many Nizāmnāma regulations for central government organisation, 
provisional administration, economics, military, citizenship and civil status, 
changes in the law, education, social and cultural affairs and public welfare.636 
                                                          
632 Tarzi, “Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan,” 210.  
633 Nawid, “Aman-Allah and the Afghan ‘Ulama,” 76. 
634 Nawid, 79. 
635 Nawid, 79-80. 
 
636 Nawid, 218-220.  
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Nadjma Yassari and Hamid Saboory report that during Amanullah Khan’s 
rule, Afghanistan was plagued by inter-ethnic divisions and tribal conflicts, 
and the population was taken hostage by corrupt religious fanaticism that 
opposed the existence of a modern government.637  
 
Afghanistan’s constitutional culture became well-grounded by her first 
constitution. The subsequent leaders used the provisions of the previous 
constitution/s as the main pillars of their new constitution/s. Gillian K. 
Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast argue that constitutional enforcement is 
important as most constitutions in the world fail.638 The fact that a country 
has several constitutions does not necessarily indicate weakness or failure. 
Another issue that must be considered in assessing constitutions is the 
addition of a bill of rights, amendments or the emergence of new constitutions 
by new governments. Radhika Coomaraswamy states that over three decades, 
India’s constitution was amended fifty times.639  
  
The Result of Constitutional Promises: Despite the ulemā’s and tribal chiefs’ 
disagreements to Amanullah Khan’s steadfast modernisation programs, the 
king and his government fulfilled the promises enshrined in Afghanistan’s 
first constitution. The constitution was supported by other legalisations. 
Amanullah Khan’s constitution formed the backbone of all future 
constitutions of Afghanistan.  
 
9.3 CONSTITUTION 1931 
 
                                                          
637 Yassari and Saboory, “Shari’a and National Law,” 277.   
638 Hadfield and Weingast, “Constitutions as Coordinating Devices,” 1. 
639 Coomaraswamy, “Uses and Usurpation of Constitutional Ideology,” 160.  
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In 1931, Nadir Shah drafted the second constitution, generally in tune with 
the sensitivities of the majority of Sunni Afghans, where he stated: “Islam 
comes before any materials needs, but that is no reason why we should not 
move forward, even on European manner” without shedding a single detail 
of his spiritual equipment.640 There is little information surrounding the 
circumstances leading to the promulgation of the 1931 constitution or who 
was involved in putting the document together.641 The substance of the 1931 
constitution clearly illustrates that traditional Sunni ulemā and tribal notables 
were either consulted or had a direct influence over the constitution drafting 
process and some such ulemā and representatives of tribes were appointed in 
important state offices.642  
 
Louis Dupree surmises that the 1931 constitution embodied a hodgepodge of 
unworkable elements, extracted from the Turkish, Iranian and French 
constitutions and the 1923 constitution of Amanullah, plus many aspects of 
the local customs and Hanafi Shari’a of Sunni Islam.643 By allying himself 
with the conservative tribal ulemā, Nadir Shah inserted himself into power 
and obstructed reforms until the mid-1960s.644   
 
Shamshad Pasaraly finds Nadir Shah’s constitution more effective than 
Amanullah Khan’s  constitution, because in Pasarlay’s view, it identified key 
stakeholders who needed to be at the negotiation table, deferred on many of 
the controversial questions that the first constitution had tried to answer and 
                                                          
640 Tarzi, “Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan,” 214. 
641 Pasarlay, “Making the 2004 Constitution,” 75. 
642 Pasarlay, 75-76. 
643 Dupree, Afghanistan, 56.  
644 Tarzi, “Transformative politics in 20th century Afghanistan,” 28.  
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was careful not to offend the stakeholders.645 Mohammad Hashim Kamali 
argues that this constitution overruled the spirit of reform upheld by 
Amanullah Khan’s constitution.646 According to Vartan Gregorian, the 1931 
constitution “institutionalised the power of the religious establishment” – a 
majority of which professed Hanafi jurisprudence, as Nadir Shah’s main 
support and legitimacy came from these conservative ulemā, mostly from 
Pashtūn-dominated Eastern Afghanistan.647 The supremacy of Hanafi 
jurisprudence was established in Article 88 where the courts were mandated 
to address lawsuits in accordance with Hanafi jurisprudence.648 Nadir Shah 
abandoned sixty of Amanullah Khan’s Nizāmnāma regulations.649 Ghizal 
Haress points out that Constitutions 1923 and 1931 did not recognise judicial 
independence and courts remained part of the executive branch under direct 
control of the king.650        
 
The Result of Constitutional Promises: Taken that Nadir Shah did not make 
new promises that would enhance Amanullah Khan’s modernist programs, 
and he revoked sixty of Amanullah Khan’s laws, one may regard Constitution 
1931 as regressive and unhelpful. The biggest reversal was that Nadir Shah 
privileged the ulemā, and as Mohammad Hashim Kamali concludes, his move 
served as a rapprochement towards the Eastern Pashtūns651, whilst Amanullah 
                                                          
645 Pasarlay, “Making the 2004 Constitution,” 77. 
646 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 20.  
647 Tarzi, “Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan,” 215. 
648 Tarzi, 216. 
649 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 20. 
650 Haress, “Judicial Review in Afghanistan,” 7.  
 
651 Tarzi, “Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan,” 215. 
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Khan saw all the inhabitants of Afghanistan as equal citizens. Constitution 
1931 was not a useful constitution.    
 
9.4 CONSTITUTION 1964 
 
The 1931 constitution was in operation until the successor king, Zahir Shah, 
son of the assassinated Nadir Shah, decided in 1964 to draft a new 
constitution. The need for a new constitution in 1964 arose as a result of 
Afghanistan’s opening and reaching out to the international community as, 
for the forty-five years leading up to 1964, Afghanistan had independently 
conducted her international relations with the East and the West. For this 
period of Afghanistan’s history, Louis Dupree reports that one would meet 
Afghan officials who spoke Dari, Pashto, English, French, German and Urdu; 
French was the non-Afghan lingua franca among the intelligentsia before 
World War II, and then English dominated Afghanistan and the Russian 
language increased its importance.652 This indicates the genesis of 
Afghanistan seeking close ties with different countries.  
 
In this period, a mixed pattern in legislation developed which created 
confusion over the relationship between state law and Shari’a laws.653 The 
confusion related to the issue of jurisdiction and whether a case must be 
decided by a Shari’a or civil judge. The courts of law generally applied the 
Arabic manuals of Hanafi jurisprudence as well as the translations of the 
Ottoman Mujallah. The Ottoman Mujallah is a codified version of Hanafi 
jurisprudence for civil transactions, excluding family law.654  
                                                          
652 Dupree, Afghanistan, 93. 
653 Yassari and Saboory, “Shari’a and National Law,” 281. 
 
654 Yassari and Saboory, “Shari’a and National Law,” 281.  
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Constitution 1964 was formed by eleven chapters and one hundred and 
twenty-eight articles. It paid particular attention to issues such as institution 
building, democratic structures, the structure of parliamentary democracy and 
the independence of the judiciary from the executive branch.655 This 
constitution excluded members of the royal family from taking political 
offices, but retained considerable powers for the king. As head of state, the 
king embodied national sovereignty, was the guarantor of the basic precepts 
of Islam and was the sole authority to decide on independence. The king was 
supposed to be a follower of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam.656 The king 
was not accountable to anyone and had to be respected by everyone.657 Article 
2 of the constitution declared that the sacred religion of Islam was the religion 
of Afghanistan. It further stated that all human beings were equal658 with 
provisions for the secrecy of people’s communications.659 Freedom of 
expression was declared to be a fundamental right.660  
 
Constitution 1964 was formulated in a relatively democratic fashion and is 
thought to be the most refined and coherent of the earlier constitutions of 
Afghanistan.661 Zahir Shah changed the royal family’s hold on political posts 
by forcing his cousin, Daoud Khan, to resign from his premiership post. Dr 
Mohammad Yusuf, a non-royal, replaced Prime Minister Daoud Khan in 
                                                          
655 Yassari and Saboory, 281.  
656 CONSTITUTION 1964, arts. VI-VIII. 
657 CONSTITUTION 1964, art. XV 
658 CONSTITUTION 1964, art. XXV. 
659 CONSTITUTION 1964, art. XXX. 
660 CONSTITUTION 1964, art. XXXI. 
661 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 222-243.  
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March 1963 and this ushered in a new era of limited representative 
democracy.662  
 
According to Shamshad Pasarlay, Constitution 1964 used the strategy of 
constitutional deferral, coordinated insiders in constitutional negotiations and 
connected with democratic, liberal and forward-looking forces, but the 
document was a failure from the paradigm of coordination theory, for power 
brokers were unhappy with the way the legislative and executive powers were 
exercised.663 For the first time, this constitution gave the parliament the power 
to vote out a minister, prime minister or a government as a whole.664 Ghizal 
Haress posits that Constitutions 1923, 1931 and 1964 lacked mechanisms for 
reviewing statutory laws for compliance that would confirm the supremacy 
of the constitution.665    
 
The Result of Constitutional Promises: The government of Zahir Shah 
legislated numerous laws which supported the Constitution of 1964. Zahir 
Shah’s last ten years of rule is hailed as the decade of democracy in the 
country, and his forty-year rule marks the most stable and tranquil period in 
the history of Afghanistan since her statehood in 1880. The government of 
Zahir Shah delivered most of the promises stipulated in Constitution 1964 and 
marked it as the most progressive constitution.  
 
9.5 CONSTITUTION 1977 
 
                                                          
662 Tarzi, “Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan,” 218-219.  
663 Pasarlay, “Making the 2004 Constitution,” 91, 92, 98.  
664 Pasarlay, 92. 
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In 1973, former prime minister, a member of the royal family and cousin of 
King Zahir Shah, Mohammad Daoud Khan, organised a coup and toppled the 
monarchy. Daoud Khan declared Afghanistan a republic and appointed 
himself as the president and prime minister.666 He abolished the monarchy, 
dismissed the parliament, suspended the constitution and took executive 
control over the judiciary.667  
 
The Constitution of 1977 differed from its predecessors in several ways. The 
document used constitutional principles from former constitutions and 
offered new promises. These were to shift power from the few to all the 
people (Article 2); to secure the full participation of the nation in the material 
and economic development of the country (Article 3); to strengthen the 
concept of democracy based on social justice, human dignity and liberty 
(Article 5); to consolidate a republican system (Article 6); to regulate the 
economy in a way that secured the interests of the majority of the people of 
Afghanistan (Article 7); to eliminate exploitation (Article 8); to ensure the 
rights of the workers (Article 9) and to provide free and compulsory education 
(Article 10).668  
 
Article 12 of the constitution stipulated respect to the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.669 
According to Antonio De Lauri, this first official step to the recognition of 
human rights in Afghanistan remained just a simple archive record.670 Article 
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22 designated Islam as the religion of the state without reference to the 
prominence of the Hanafi School of Law as had the previous constitution in 
1964.671 Despite the elaborate and highly ambitious provisions in 
Constitution 1977, Daoud Khan’s rule had to counter a destructive insurgency 
which had both internal and external elements.672 From 1973 to 1977 Daoud 
Khan governed the country as an absolute dictator and countered increasing 
Islamist challenges to his rule – relying on the Soviet Union.673 
 
In order to support his constitutional promises, Daoud Khan’s government 
drafted the Penal Code of 1976, which was primarily based on Islamic 
principles as well as European criminal codes. As quoted earlier in this thesis, 
Kristine Ziems contends that despite the enactment of comprehensive legal 
codes during the 1960s and the 1970s, the role of the court as an independent 
body was to enforce state law and the judiciary’s role as a counterbalance to 
the executive never developed.674 This penal code consisted of five hundred 
and twenty-three articles. Daoud Khan’s government also enacted the Civil 
Code of 1977 which was modelled on the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949, 
containing 2,416 articles, including family and inheritance laws. This civil 
code was also influenced by the French code.675 Daoud Khan promoted an 
authoritarian model of governance that provided for a presidential system of 
government within the framework of a single-party system.676 The hopes of 
political liberalisation foundered as independent newspapers appeared and 
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were shut in quick succession and a cycle of conspiracies, arrests and 
executions set in.677 According to Pasarlay, this shortest-lived constitution of 
Afghanistan, lasting less than a year, showed the failure of the coordination 
device.678  
 
The Result of Constitutional Promises: Daoud Khan’s government could not 
adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) principles due 
to intervening political events, including the looming Soviet invasion and 
ongoing internal conflict.679 Despite some economic progress and the drawing 
up of master plans to build modern cities – some of which are being 
implemented in present times – Daoud Khan could not deliver the promises 
enshrined in  the Constitution of 1977. This was the first least successful 
constitution of Afghanistan.     
 
9.6 CONSTITUTION 1980 
 
Members of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan organised a 
bloody coup against Daoud Khan in 1978 and ended two hundred and thirty-
one years of Sadozai/Mohammadzai dynastic rule. As part of President 
Babrak Karmal’s appeasement policy directed towards the Islamic sentiments 
of the Afghan population, in April 1980 his administration announced the 
adoption of a new provisional constitution by the Revolutionary Council.680 
This was the fifth of Afghanistan’s constitutions. Constitution 1980 did not 
explicitly mention communism but pointed to the communist objectives, 
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views, policies, organisation and responsibilities of various institutions in the 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the ruling party.681  
 
Mohammad Hashim Kamali points out that, unlike all preceding constitutions 
ratified by the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly), the 1980 constitution was 
passed by the Revolutionary Council as “the mouthpiece of the ruling PDPA.” 
682 Article 29 of the constitution guaranteed full freedom in the practice of 
Islam; Article 56 allowed the settlement of cases through the application of 
Shari’a where laws of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were not 
clear. Despite these provisions, Constitution 1980 was seen as an un-Islamic 
document.683 The major laws from 1978 until the drafting of Constitution 
1980 comprised eight presidential decrees – the most important documents 
for the reforms promised by the PDPA government.684  
The Result of Constitutional Promises: Despite the fact that Constitution 1980 
was seen as un-Islamic by some observers in Afghanistan, the PDPA 
                                                          
681 Yassari and Saboory, “Shari’a and National Law,” 287.  
682 Tarzi, “Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan,” 228. 
683 Tarzi, 229. 
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Council, eleven of whom were from the Khalq faction and ten of whom were from the 
Parcham faction; Decree No. 3 (14 May 1978): this decree abrogated Daoud Khan’s 1977 
constitution and established the legal procedures to be followed until a new constitution could 
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judicial process at the lower level; Decree No. 4 (12 June 1978): this decree announced the 
design of the national flag and emblems; Decree No. 5 (12 June 1978): this decree withdrew 
citizenship from twenty-three members of the royal family, most living in exile in Italy and 
Iran; Decree No. 6 (12 July 1978): this decree made a noble attempt to eradicate usury in the 
countryside; Decree No. 7 (17 October 1978): this decree granted equal rights to women, 
regularised dowry and marriage expenses and prohibited forced marriages; Decree No. 8 (18 
November 1978): this decree introduced cause reforms and emphasised individual ownership 
of land within established limits. It encouraged the formation of cooperatives to facilitate 
farmer credit and distribution of fertilisers, seed and agricultural inputs.  
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government empowered education programs; elevated minority languages to 
official language status and appointed non-Muslim officials in government 
positions – all of whom enjoyed better rights than in previous governments 
and could obtain political party membership. Constitution 1980 followed 
some secular aspirations of Amanullah Khan and was in large parts 
successful.  
 
9.7 CONSTITUTION 1987 
 
In 1987, President Najibullah Ahmadzai introduced a new constitution to 
Afghanistan within a socialist context. It consisted of thirteen chapters and 
one hundred and forty-nine articles. This constitution was not much different 
to the previous socialist constitution. In order to garner public support, 
President Ahmadzai added a new clause to make Islam the religion of 
Afghanistan, stating, “The sacred religion of Islam is the religion of 
Afghanistan. In the Republic of Afghanistan, no law shall run counter to the 
principles of the sacred religion of Islam and other values enshrined in this 
Constitution.”685 In Article 73, the president was required to be a Muslim and 
of Afghan parents, and Article 75 required any new president to take an oath 
and swear “In the name of Allah the Almighty, to protect the principles of the 
sacred religion of Islam.” 686  
 
This constitution provided for an eight-member constitutional council (shūrā-
e qānūn asāsi), which mainly served as a political organ of the state.687 
Mohammad Hashim Kamali argues that whilst constitutions of 1931, 1964 
                                                          
685 CONSTITUTION 1987, art. II.  
686 Tarzi, “Islam and Constitutionalism in Afghanistan,” 230.  
687 Kamali, “Afghanistan’s Constitution Ten Years On,” 5. 
   
 
Page 267 of 531 
 
and 1977 were silent on the issue of interpreting laws for constitutionality, 
the Constitution of 1987 assigned an eight-member council to ascertain the 
constitutionality of laws, legal documents and international treaties, and to 
advise the president on issues pertaining to the constitution.688 According to 
Article 94, eight different government institutions were given the power to 
propose, introduce, amend or repeal laws.689 It also assigned the 
Constitutional Council of Afghanistan as a supreme institution of the 
country.690 President Ahmadzai’s government may have drafted this 
constitution in order to gain the support of radical Islamist groups. This 
aspiration was not fulfilled.   
 
The Result of Constitutional Promises: This constitution did not focus on 
democratic and socialist ethos very much but intended to attract members of 
the insurgent groups. It did not serve the purpose of co-opting the insurgents 
into the state system. Constitution 1987 had good provisions, but it was a 
weak constitution.   
 
9.8 CONSTITUTION 1990 
 
In 1990, President Ahmadzai called in a Loya Jirga to draft yet another 
constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan was issued in 
June 1990, formed by one hundred and forty-nine articles in thirteen chapters. 
In the preamble it stipulated:  
 
Our beloved homeland, Afghanistan is enriched, with heroic struggle 
of our brave people for independence national sovereignty, national 
unity, democracy and social progress; the present state, the State of 
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the Republic of Afghanistan actively carrying the policy of national 
reconciliation, relying upon the support of national, political and 
patriotic forces; keeping in mind the historic changes in the 
contemporary world, adhering the principles of sacred religion of 
Islam, abiding by the accepted Afghan traditions and rituals, relying 
upon realties of the country’s history and culture, respecting the 
valuable heritages of the Constitutional Movement and in conformity 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and for the purpose 
of preserving the independence, defending the territorial integrity and 
strengthening the national sovereignty.”691  
 
In this constitution, issues such as Islam, proclaiming Afghanistan as an 
independent Islamic country, provisions for a multi-party system and 
establishing the private sector and private enterprises, as well as encouraging 
foreign investment in Afghanistan were provided in Articles 16, 20 and 25.692 
This constitution heralded important changes to Afghanistan’s government 
and its legal system, and aimed to include all the groups and stakeholders who 
had been ignored in the past. The government also drafted another important 
legal document, the Civil Procedure Code 1990 on the 22 August 1990. This 
code contained five hundred and six articles.  
The Result of Constitutional Promises: This constitution aimed to create 
National Reconciliation (āshti milli) in order to share power with the 
insurgent groups. It failed to serve the aspirations of reconciliation, as the 
insurgent groups wanted to hold power and disagreed with power-sharing. 
However, the constitution achieved its other promises in a continuum of 
former socialist governments’ efforts for change and reform in legal system 
and society. This was a much better constitution than the previous two 
socialist governments’ constitutions.    
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9.9 CONSTITUTION 2004 
 
Following the tragic events of 9/11 in the United States, in late 2001 the 
American forces and their NATO allies invaded Afghanistan in order to 
punish Osama Bin Laden who had received sanctuary by the Taliban. The 
Unite States and NATO, together with the United Nations, sought to establish 
a post-Taliban government. Members of the international community, formed 
by representatives from the United States and its Western allied powers, the 
United Nations and a number of Afghan representatives, convened a 
conference in Bonn in December 2001. The conference was attended by the 
victors of the war against the Taliban, the Northern Alliance as well as 
members of diaspora groups known as the Rome Group, Cyrus Group and 
Iran Group.693  
 
The Security Council of the United Nations was tasked to draft an agreement 
on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of 
permanent government institutions that asked the then president of 
Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, to transfer power to an interim authority 
– which would then form a fully representative government. The interim 
authority would be established upon the official transfer of power on the 22 
December 2001, to form a Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ), planned to be 
convened within eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional 
Authority.  
 
The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements, a document drafted by the 
United Nations Security Council stipulated that: “Within two months of its 
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establishment, the new authority with the assistance of the United Nations, 
would be tasked to establish a constitutional commission – provided that 
Constitution 1964 did not contradict the terms of the Bonn Agreement or the 
international legal obligations that Afghanistan was party to – with the 
exception of the king and legislature that would temporarily be the 
constitution of the Interim Authority.”694 The second stage of the Bonn 
process began on 27 January 2002, when President Hamid Karzai established 
a nineteen-member commission for an Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ), to 
appoint a transitional government. The ELJ delegates elected Hamid Karzai 
as the president of the transitional administration with 1,295 votes out of 
1,575 in favour.695  
 
Constitution 2004 was formed by twelve chapters and one hundred and sixty-
two articles. Article 3 of this constitution stipulates that “no law shall 
contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy region of Islam in 
Afghanistan”. Article 7 stipulates that Afghanistan adheres to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Articles 3 and 7 contradict each other, 
as there are many provisions in the UDHR which run counter to Islamic 
tenets. The constitution has not provided for a mechanism to clarify this 
important contradiction and ambiguity.  
 
Article 121 of the constitution stipulates that at the request of the government, 
the Supreme Court shall review the laws, legislative decrees and international 
treaties as well as international covenants for their compliance with the 
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constitution and their interpretation in accordance with the law.696 The 
Independent Commission of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC), 
established by Article 157 of the Constitution is given an advisory role in 
examining the constitutionality of legal instruments in relation to Islam. The 
Supreme Court’s opinions on the constitutionality of the laws are binding, 
and those of the ICOIC’s are advisory.  
 
Article 130 of Constitution 2004 provides that in cases under consideration, 
the courts shall apply provisions of this constitution as well as other laws. If 
there is no provision in the constitution or other laws about a case, in 
pursuance of Hanafi jurisprudence, and, within the limits set by this 
constitution, rule in a way that attains justice in the best manner.697  
 
There are a number of criticisms of Constitution 2004. In the review of “10 
years since the Afghan Constitution 2004”, Mohammad Hashim Kamali 
comments as follows:  
 
The relatively slow pace of constitutional review in Afghanistan may 
partly be due to a certain tendency on the part of Afghan judges to 
have ready recourse to Islamic sources when statutory texts and 
available guidelines fall short of providing the needed guidance. This 
is reinforced by the fact that many of Afghanistan’s constitutions 
explicitly instructed the judges to refer to Islamic or Hanafi 
jurisprudence regarding matters not regulated by statutory law, a 
position qualified under Article 130 of Afghanistan’s Constitution of 
2004. The important qualification of this article, namely that such a 
recourse should be guided by the spirit of “administering justice in the 
best possible way,” has unfortunately been frequently overlooked. 
Ready recourse to Hanafi jurisprudence had the effect of impeding the 
development of a lively discourse on constitutional interpretation. 
Instead of addressing a constitutional ambiguity on its own grounds, 
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Afghan judges tend to refer to Hanafi sources partially because of 
their greater flexibility and scope. That said, one might add that 
Afghan judges have probably engaged more with statutory law, or 
qānūn, by way of clarifying and interpreting its provisions than they 
have with the constitution. There is of course, the absence of a 
constitutionalist tradition in Islam, and the all too obvious reference 
to the Shari’a.698   
 
Said Arjomand, a scholar and writer who is critical of Afghanistan’s 
Constitution 2004 drafting processes, identifies several problems. In 
Arjomand’s view, the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ), was less broadly 
representative, procedures were more irregular, less open, and many 
manipulations and behind the scene alterations were involved.699 Afghan 
women formed twenty percent of the Loya Jirga, a commission of five 
hundred and two members.700 The presence of women in such a large male 
majority commission in a strongly male-dominated setting raises the question 
as to what role women were allowed to play in the process, apart from their 
physical and ceremonial presence in the commission. Amin Tarzi states that 
“Constitution 2004 was drafted with little participation of the Afghan 
people”.701   
 
The final version of Constitution 2004 was completed in mysterious 
circumstances. Hamid Karzai made last-minute changes and additions to 
articles under the guise of correcting typing errors. Ramazan Bashardost, a 
lawmaker nicknamed as the Gandhi of Afghanistan by Radio Free Europe,702 
states that Afghanistan’s constitution is not the version that the Loya Jirga 
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had finalised.703 An Afghan law student and political activist named Zakaria 
Osuli calls Constitution 2004 a fake constitution.704 He writes in his collection 
of articles that the main version of the constitution was fifty-five pages with 
one hundred and sixty-two articles and was marked by Sibghatullah 
Mojaddedi’s signature on every page.705 Osuli reports that after the Loya 
Jirga’s approval of the draft constitution, it was changed in seventy areas.706 
Shamshad Pasarlay claims changes to the draft constitution were forty-eight 
minor orthographic changes.707  
 
Ghizal Haress writes that an important deletion from the draft constitution 
was the provision for a constitutional court.708 The constitutional court would 
have had a wide range of powers aimed at ensuring the supremacy of the 
constitution and protecting fundamental rights; it would not have limited the 
parties that could refer cases to the court and would have allowed ordinary 
citizens as parties to litigation and the Human Rights Commission to 
challenge the constitutionality of those laws that breached fundamental 
rights.709 Haress adds that for the first time in the history of Afghanistan’s 
constitutions, provisions for judicial review were stipulated in Constitution 
2004,710 though this prerogative is limited to the executive branch.711 Access 
to judicial review is denied to those parties that oppose the government.712  
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The post-2001 era is different to previous periods in Afghanistan’s legal 
development. The international community brought to Afghanistan a bevy of 
international advisors, legalists and philanthropists. Since 2001, a substantial 
number of legalisations have been formulated to support the realisation of 
Afghanistan’s rule of law commitments and support its constitution. Major 
laws that have been updated, amalgamated and expanded are the Interim 
Criminal Procedure Code of 2004, a redacted version of Afghanistan’s Penal 
Code of 1976 and the Italian Criminal Code of 1988.713 This law was in force 
until 2017 when the Penal Code of Afghanistan was updated. The United 
Kingdom helped Afghanistan draft the Counter Narcotic Law 2005.714 The 
EVAW law was pushed for by international organisations,715 leading to a 
presidential decree in 2009.  
Shamshad Pasarlay does not state whether Constitution 2004 is a good 
constitution through the lens of coordination or deferral theories. Instead, he 
points out issues such as the need to amend the constitution and identifies 
problems with interpreting constitutional provisions and the constitutionality 
of the laws – citing the impasse between President Hamid Karzai and the 
parliament in 2010 forming a focal point. 
 
The Result of Constitutional Promises: Constitution 2004 appears an 
excellent document on paper. It gives many promises that a centralist and a 
one-man rule cannot keep. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles regards the 
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Constitution 2004 as unstable, highly centralised and unsustainable because 
it does not go with the grain of Afghan tradition.716  In 2016, Freedom House 
Afghanistan reported that since 2004, the governments of Afghanistan have 
violated one hundred and sixty-one out of the one hundred and sixty-two 
articles of Constitution 2004, but at least left Article 21 intact – which 
stipulates that Kabul shall be the capital of Afghanistan.717  
 
Mehdi J. Hakimi, director of Afghanistan Legal Education Program (ALEP) 
at Stanford University, argues that the president of Afghanistan has actively 
compromised the parliament’s legislative, oversight, and representation 
functions through undue deployment of its emergency legislative 
competence; mocks the parliament’s constitutional oversight by not 
introducing ministers for parliamentary approval; attempted to transfer the 
Ministry of Finance’s function to the president’s office which was opposed 
by the United States’ State Department; and has convened Loya Jirgas with 
dubious legality, and the executive’s overreach has afflicted and buffeted the 
judiciary.718 The executive branch of Afghanistan has disbanded the laws of 
Afghanistan and has sabotaged all institutions of government. Despite the 
contradictory articles which sign-posts high power to the ulemā and to the 
president, Constitution 2004 is a good constitution.       
 
9.10 Future Constitutional Directions  
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Constitution 2004 is a copy of Constitution 1964, and as this chapter has 
clarified, there have been many last-minute changes, secretive agreements 
rather than consultations and deferrals and that the people of Afghanistan did 
not participate in transparent and effective constitution building processes. 
Instead, the drafting process was sabotaged by a few at the helm. Depending 
on the type of future government in Afghanistan, should the rule of law be 
empowered meaningfully and legitimate presidents come to power through 
free and fair elections; an ideal path for an inclusive and effective constitution 
for Afghanistan may adopt transformative approaches with provisions that 
cannot easily be abused by dictators.  
 
Upendra Baxi describes transformative constitutionalism as a “historic bridge 
between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, 
untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of 
human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development 
opportunities for all, … irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex”.719 
Transformative constitutionalism is often applied in the context of South 
Africa, where its past injustices are similar to those of Afghanistan’s despotic 
regimes and their internal colonialism.  
 
The metaphor of crossing the bridge is suggestive of movement from where 
we stand today – the geography of injustice created by institutionalised state 
racism.720 The future generations of Afghanistan must take lessons from the 
brutality of the past and use transformative constitutionalism to their 
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advantage in opposing tyranny, terrorism and subjugation of the will of the 
nation by leaders brought to power by fraudulent elections.        
 
9.11 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided an assessment of the eight constitutions of 
Afghanistan from 1923 to 2004. It has clarified that despite the fact that some 
constitutions were short-lived and were inspired by different values and 
provisions including secular, Islamist and socialist, Afghanistan 
governments’ constitutional experiences in view of conflicts and intervening 
factors have been stable. The chapter has highlighted the incrementalist 
nature of the constitutions ushered by Afghanistan’s political leaders and her 
institutions which makes different constitution drafts as continuity rather than 
disjointedness. The chapter has also shown that each government of 
Afghanistan incorporated important constitutional provisions, upheld major 
provisions of previous constitutions, and, despite its turbulent history of 
statehood, Afghanistan has fared far better in its constitutional commitments 
than in shaping a legal culture through legal transplantation that would not 
reverse from one government to the next. Constitutions of Afghanistan, not 
being subject to casuistry interpretations of the judges in courts, and in part 
due to their paramount value, have worked better than other transplanted laws 
that were subject to change and re-interpretation.    
 
This chapter has shown that the constitutions of Afghanistan have been 
carefully drafted and remained least affected by internal conflict, international 
military interventions and regime changes. Corruption in its multifaceted 
forms serves to undermine or abuse certain legal frameworks. The next 
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chapter highlights corruption in Afghanistan and how it affects Afghanistan’s 
citizens and the ways in which it affects the delivery of justice.  
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CHAPTER 10: CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND 
ITS IMPACT ON THE RULE OF LAW 
 
 
“Happy families are all alike; 
every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” 
 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Anna Karenina  
10 Introduction  
 
Corruption is a problem that affects Afghanistan’s ongoing development, 
slows down reform, negatively affects all institutions of government, and in 
turn, has a precarious impact on all facets of Afghanistan’s legal culture. 
Corruption creates distrust, affects the social contract between the citizens 
and the state, and creates impunity which often affects the most impoverished 
citizens who suffer greatly, when in a corrupt government system, they find 
themselves at the intersections injustices, oppression and abuse. This chapter 
assesses corruption through the lens of political economy analysis (PEA) and 
political analysis of predation (PAP). PEA is concerned with the interaction 
of political and economic processes within a society: the distribution of power 
and wealth between different groups and individuals and the processes that 
create, sustain and transform these relationships over time.721  
 
Political economy is concerned with how political forces influence an 
economy and economic outcomes. In the context of Afghanistan, the PEA 
assessment in this chapter identifies who gains and who loses as a result of 
the distribution of benefits from political and economic activities. This will 
involve the activities connected to international aid and national extractive 
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resources and revenues. The PAP involves the study of political decision 
making by a predatory state. According to Mehrdad Vahabi, a predatory state 
is a state that promotes the private interests of dominant groups within that 
state, such as politicians, the army and bureaucrats.722 Alex Bavister-Gould 
argues that predatory regimes are seldom completely predatory.723 According 
to James Galbraith, a predatory state has a political system in which a narrow 
band of elites use policy instruments for their own benefit, while the rest of 
the population foots the bill.724  
 
A predatory state is a national government whose politics, as observed in the 
construction of complex deals in the spheres of social welfare, public 
investment and regulation that have the effect of enriching specific private 
actors while passing along – perhaps – a diluted benefit to the broader 
public.725 This research does not regard the government of Afghanistan as 
purely predatory, but based on its dysfunctional ethno-tribal political system 
and despotism, it is partially predatory.     
 
The first question to raise in assessing the political economy in the context of 
international aid is whether international aid is humanitarian or political. 
Claire McLoughlin surmises that donors are political actors, and whilst PEA 
should be undertaken to help identify the potential for pro-poor reform, there 
is less clarity regarding whether and how aid modalities are capable of 
adjusting political realities or the extent to which political analysis is 
                                                          
722 Vahabi, “Symposium on Predatory State,” 233.  
723 Bavister-Gould, “Predatory Rule and Predatory States,” 1.  
724 Galbraith, “The Predator State,” 1. 
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changing donor behaviour.726 A comprehensive study of political economy in 
the context of Afghanistan requires the study of the donors’ behaviour (how 
they use aid money), the behaviour of aid recipients (the political agents who 
receive donations), the distribution of donations, and lastly, how donations 
reach the intended beneficiaries (the people).  
 
Prominent researches on political economy and corruption are produced by 
international organisations, using a variety of approaches. The Swedish SIDA 
Power Analysis aims to identify where real power in a society lies and how it 
is distributed; it looks for possible conflicts of interest and stipulates that PEA 
should primarily rely on local expertise.727 SIDA Power Analysis is based on 
the understanding that issues of power asymmetries, access to resources and 
influence over politics must be addressed if poverty is to be reduced.728  
 
Norway’s NORAD approach to PEA focuses on legitimacy of the state and 
provides a way of analysing governance and state-building, particularly in 
situations of fragility.729According to NORAD, an analytical approach 
stressing the legitimacy of the state adds value to a standard PEA because it 
looks at what citizens expect from the state, on the one hand, and how those 
in control of the state can improve the standing of the state in the population, 
on the other.730  
The World Bank’s problem-driven framework is a platform that tries to bring 
together and to summarise for World Bank teams some practices, thinking 
                                                          
726 McLoughlin, “Guide on Political Economy Analysis,” 10. 
727 McLoughlin, 8.  
728 Nash, Hudson and Luttrell “Mapping Political Context,” 24. 
729 McLoughlin, “Guide on Political Economy Analysis,” 8. 
730 NORAD, “Political economy analysis with a legitimacy twist,” 11.  
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and lessons learned; SIDA Power Analysis and the Department for 
International Development (DFID) use the/a drivers of change approach 
which directs researchers to look at actors, institutions and structures that 
influence poverty and development policies at macro level.731 Each donor 
country pays particular attention to this subject and there may be overlaps 
when several approaches are applied to the same situation without proper 
coordination. In some parts of this chapter, in the absence of objective 
information, participant observations will be used.         
 
10.1 Definitions of Corruption   
 
UNAMA defines corruption as an indicator of weak political 
institutionalisation.732 According to DFID, the term corruption refers to the 
misuse of resources or power for private gain, and Transparency International 
defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”.733 Inge 
Amundsen describes corruption as a disease – a  cancer that eats into the 
cultural, political and economic fabric of society and destroys the functioning 
of vital organs.734 Syed Hussein Alatas, a Malaysian politician and scholar, 
defines corruption as the subordination of public interests to private aims 
involving a violation of the norms of duty and welfare, accompanied by 
secrecy, betrayal, deception and a callous disregard for any consequences 
suffered by the public.735  
 
                                                          
731 McLoughlin, “Guide on Political Economy Analysis,” 8. 
732 UNAMA, “Crucial for Peace and Prosperity,” 7.  
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Classifying corruption into general categories may not reveal the full extent 
of corruption in a given society. There are universal characteristics of 
corruption, such as the different forms of abuse of power for private gain. The 
nature, causes and functions of corruption differ from country to country.736 
In a study of corruption in Afghanistan completed in 2007, Integrity Watch 
Afghanistan (IWA) noted that the definition and scope of corruption in 
Afghanistan must be based on Afghans’ perceptions, beliefs, values and 
attitudes in designing and implementing effective anti-corruption measures 
suited to Afghanistan.737 The phenomenon of corruption may be studied using 
sociological, case-study or ethnographic researches. 
 
The assessment of societal perceptions and measuring the effectiveness of the 
legal institutions of the government may be carried out using a number of 
approaches. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, as an indigenous Afghan 
organisation, the Asia Foundation, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CHR) and 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) as 
international organisations, and Danny Singh, Jonathan Goodhand, Sarah 
Chayes and Arne Strand et el., as individual scholars offer invaluable 
researches on PEA and corruption in Afghanistan.738  
In order to assess corruption in Afghanistan, it will be helpful to identify 
different categories of corruption in society and government. Historically, 
                                                          
736 Alatas, ix. 
737 IWA, “Afghan’s Experience of Corruption,” 12-13.  
738 Wheatland, “Afghanistan as a Driver of Conflict,” 1-14; McDevitt, “Focus on 
Development Assistance,” 1-16; Strand, Borchgrevink and Harpviken, “Afghanistan: A 
Political Economy Analysis,” 1-51; Goodhand, “War Economy to Peace Economy?” 155-
70; Singh, “Explaining varieties of corruption,” 213-55; Singh, “Investigation of Corruption 
and Clientelism in the lower levels of the Afghan police,” 621-650.  
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Afghanistan’s governments have exercised strong censorship in society and 
in the political circles. In his book written in 1965, Arnold Fletcher attributed 
the term hermit kingdom to Afghanistan due to its isolation from the outside 
world.739 This form of isolation of Afghanistan, its political groups and 
members of society to the present day remains understudied, and the sense of 
barricading the state to outsiders resonates well into the twenty-first century, 
despite the fact that since 2001, Afghanistan has had open borders to the 
outside world. State officials pay lip service when speaking of the ills of 
corruption and do little to address it. 
 
Syed Hussein Alatas, the sociologist of corruption, states that “sociological 
analysis of corruption will be confronted by a methodological problem; 
accepted and generally applied methods of social research such as interview, 
the questionnaire and statistical analysis cannot be applied as long as 
corruption is considered a shady transaction.”740 He adds that the sociologist 
studying the phenomenon of corruption has to be fully conversant with the 
history, the culture, the language and the circumstances of at least one rich 
and complex instance from which he or she can derive his or her data and test 
the theories, and without background knowledge, it is hard to offer fruitful 
insights beyond that which is obvious.741    
This section offers a synopsis of Western and Islamic views on corruption 
with fifteen categories of corruption relevant to Afghanistan and attempts to 
show what aspects of corruption are under-reported and are not taken into 
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account as much as they should be. The citizens of Afghanistan are fearful of 
reporting corruption and politicians conceal the rotten practices of corruption 
in order to continue their privileged positions as receivers of international aid. 
Over the past nineteen years, Afghanistan’s media outlets have referred to 
corrupt officials as the zoorwāk (Pashto) or zoormandān (Farsi/Dari) – vague 
terms that translate as the powerful ones.  
 
In the line of their duties, Afghan journalists face threats from all sides: 
government officials exploiting weak legal protections to intimidate reporters 
and editors to compel them not to cover controversial topics; the Taliban and 
other insurgent groups are using threats and violence to compel reporting they 
consider favourable, and police and justice officials are letting threats, 
assaults and even murders go uninvestigated and unprosecuted.742 The media 
often reveal petty corruption and refrain from naming powerful officials. This 
chapter will list some of Afghanistan’s major corruption cases.  
 
10.2 International Political Actors   
 
International political actors or political decision makers, mostly Western 
politicians, but not technical experts or international aid workers, are the 
subject of this assessment. Do the international political actors understand 
they are corrupt? The international design of a prêt-a-porter state743 for 
Afghanistan, starting from the Bonn Conference in late 2001, has been 
corrupt from the outset. Hamid Karzai was not chosen or voted for by 
Afghanistan’s representatives in Bonn, Germany in 2001. The candidate 
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chosen to rule Afghanistan as an interim president was Abdul Sattar Sirat, an 
ethnic Uzbek close to the former king, Zahir Shah.744  
 
The rationale for selecting an interim president from a weaker ethnic group 
was to avoid an autocratic presidency and to establish an order in which no 
ethnic group would be able to sabotage Afghanistan’s nascent democracy 
under the guise of a questionable majoritarian representation. However, the 
United States wanted to install a Pashtūn head of state, and the choice fell on 
Hamid Karzai.745 Shamshad Pasarlay identifies that the Northern Alliance 
group formed by leaders representing the Hazāras, Tajiks and Uzbeks 
demanded a parliamentary system with a prime minister, but that request was 
rejected.746 The non-Pashtūns, that is, the Uzbeks, Hazāras and Tajiks wanted 
a parliamentary system with stronger checks on executive power and on 
central state power.747 
 
Dawood Moradian from Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS), a think-
tank from Afghanistan, argues that it is unfair to blame Afghans for 
corruption as it was the Americans who created the post-2001 structure in 
Afghanistan; formed the constitution and passed it in the Loya Jirga; imposed 
it on Afghans and empowered people like Ashraf Ghani.748 Moradian adds 
that since 2001, with their particular visions, Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani 
and Zalmai Khalilzād have kept one ethnic group of Afghanistan, the 
                                                          
744 Gopal,  No Good Men Among the Living, 45. 
745 Wimpelmann, The Pitfalls of Protection, 41.  
746 Pasarlay, “Making the 2004 Constitution,” 1-476.  
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March 2020.  
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Pashtūns, in control of Afghanistan through a strong presidential system, 
whilst the opposition parties believe that there should be a system that 
represents all political groups.749  
 
Lee Ferran reports that the United States’ government’s pouring of billions of 
dollars into Afghanistan with inadequate oversight in many cases fuelled 
corruption at unprecedented levels and ultimately undermined America’s 
mission.750 Ferran quotes John Sopko’s remark that corruption is like 
corrosive acid that eats away the base of every pillar of Afghan reconstruction 
– including security and political stability.751  
 
In the context of corruption and fraud in international aid projects, Michael 
Kramer, a United States attorney and consultant, writes that bribe takers 
include project personnel, supervisory government and ministry officials, 
local and expatriate employees of international aid agencies, auditors, 
inspectors of all types and even the press and NGOs.752 James Bovard argues 
that counting on foreign aid to reduce corruption is like expecting whisky to 
cure alcoholism, and that United States aid makes corrupt countries more 
corrupt.753 These assessments ring true in Afghanistan’s development 
projects from a Taliban rule to a Western-allied state since 2001.      
 
The people of Afghanistan view Westerners as highly corrupt and corrupting, 
and it is also their belief that Westerners are emptying Afghanistan’s 
resources – transporting Afghanistan’s heroine and uranium as well as its 
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precious stones in their cargo planes. Listening to social media broadcasts and 
reading through written information for over nineteen years, the above-
written forms popular views held by many Afghans – starting from an asylum 
seeker who works in a butcher’s shop in London, an imbiss worker in 
Hamburg’s Hauptbanhof, a taxi driver in Kabul to a migrant labourer in the 
Gulf states, who follow Afghanistan’s news on the radio, TV and internet, all 
brought to Afghanistan through Western aid.754 This is what many Afghans 
strongly believe, similar to how many of them unquestionably believe in 
legends and myths.  
 
After nearly twenty years, and despite many human and financial sacrifices 
made, the people of Afghanistan do not trust foreigners. Criminality, 
corruption, insecurity and high numbers of civilian and military casualties 
further strengthen their distrust. The absence of trust between the donor 
nations and the beneficiaries of donations affect meaningful progress in 
developmental work.     
 
The chapter on religions showed that Afghanistan’s people’s beliefs are 
traditional, and often, beliefs in legends, exoticism and shamanism may form 
complex religious and communal belief systems. This has also created a 
culture of putting the blame on others. Aulia Atrafi looks at persistent theories 
that the hand of the British is behind every evil in Afghanistan. He adds that 
in the Afghan psyche, the British are lurking in the shadows, spying on 
Afghans, plotting and [still] managing to manipulate Afghan affairs for the 
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worse.755 This psyche extends to all foreigners involved in Afghanistan before 
and since 2001.  
 
10.3 Categories of Corruption in Afghanistan   
 
There are at least fifteen major sociological categories of corruption affecting 
Afghanistan. These categories are assessed using Syed Hussein Alatas’s 
sociological method. These categories will be supported by objective sources, 
when such sources exist. The assessment of political economy in this chapter 
will consider a set of questions outlined in the Australian Government’s 
Guidance Note for a country level PEA for the structures, institutions, actors 
and dynamic interactions.756 The categories of corruption in Afghanistan are 
as follows:    
 
  
                                                          
755 Atrafi, “The country where the British are blamed for everything,” last accessed 21 
September 2020.  
756 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Political Economy 
Analysis,” 7. These questions are: (Structures): What are the key ‘embedded’ political 
structures? How do they function, and in whose interests? What are the key constraints and 
intractable problems? (Institutions): How well aligned are formal and informal institutions? 
What are the overriding rules of the game? What are the incentives that shape the behaviour 
of the key players? (actors): Who are the key players driving and opposing reform? Is there 
momentum for reform? Are there coalitions for change? (dynamic interaction): Why is the 
institution as it is? How do decision-making processes actually work? What are the risks and 
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One: Acceptable Corruption  
 
People holding government jobs abuse their positions and expect that 
members of society serve them and pay them certain gifts. This form of 
corrupt practice in Afghanistan is called chai pooli, literally meaning money 
for a drink of tea. During the socialist governments of Afghanistan (1978-
1992), an army soldier seeking extra leave – like extended weekends – would 
offer his superior a bottle of vodka or a bottle of eau de cologne.757 Chai pooli, 
commonly viewed as a form of gift, may also be regarded a form of petty 
bribery. Chai pooli may involve the use of a person’s skills, time and money. 
Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) describes chai pooli as petty corruption 
that involves the exchange of small amounts of money and the granting of 
minor favours by those seeking preferential treatment.758  
 
Syed Hussein Alatas identifies another aspect of petty bribery as speed 
money, where the bribe giver does not wish to get anything unlawfully, but 
wants to speed up the process of the movement of communications relating 
to decisions.759 Petty bribes are often given when the bribe giver expects 
favours and the speeding up of work processes that may otherwise take longer 
if bribes were not paid.  
 
In practice, an office clerk will ensure the director endorses his instructions 
on an application speedily. A government official inspecting a doctor’s 
surgery may expect free consultancy as a form of bribery. If the doctor is 
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involved in malpractice, the receiving of the bribe by the inspector will 
endanger lives.  
 
Inspectors of chemist shops which operate under the city council 
(municipality) ask at the counter during their inspection, “Do you have 
amoxycillin?” These inspectors, who are known to the shop owners, falsely 
pretend they want to buy the medicines. The chemist shop owner understands 
that this is a signal for bribes.760 Once the medicine is offered to the inspector 
free of charge, then the inspection may not take place, or it may be quite an 
easy one. This little amount of bribe, costing a fraction of one US dollar is 
likely to endanger the lives of patients who could be buying expired or low-
quality medicines from a chemist shop that has not been inspected properly. 
When the inspector repeats this request at many chemist shops, he will 
accumulate a substantial amount of medicines and may sell them on later.  
 
Two: Blaming Others for Corruption 
 
Afghanistan is a country with a highly divided society breeding distrust in 
which several micro-nations (Hazāra, Tajik, Pashtūn, Uzbek and other 
groups) live together. Until 1978, the Pashtūn Durrani ruling clan devised 
policies that all Afghans were brothers and sisters and talking about ethnic 
group rights or ethnic groups’ population could have dangerous 
consequences. Katherine Adeney posits that estimates for ethnicity numbers 
are contested because relative population strengths or weaknesses have 
political implications.761  
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In the post-2001 period, certain people from different ethnic groups put the 
blame for corruption on groups towards whom they hold unsavoury attitudes. 
This form of blaming others for corruption is often used as a form of 
systematic official propaganda by the ruling neo-patrimonial corrupt 
politicians and their networks. In a neo-patrimonial system, there is no clear 
distinction between the public and the private domain.762 Members of neo-
patrimonial corrupt networks accumulate and appropriate as much public 
wealth as possible for their personal use. A famous Persian dictum says, “The 
pocket of corrupt officials has holes.” These pockets will never be filled.     
 
The most divisive politics of blaming others for corruption in Afghanistan are 
spread through Facebook, Instagram and Tik Tok accounts, as well as blogs 
and news websites. The popular example to cite, which has received 
excessive attention by the supporters of the neo-patrimonial corrupt networks 
connected to the Presidential Palace (ARG) is blaming Dr Abdullah Abdullah 
for the expensive suits and ties he wears, whilst international observers report 
that billions of U.S. dollars are lost in international aid – stolen under wages 
and maintenance fees for non-existent ghost presidential advisors, ghost 
schools, ghost police officers, ghost army soldiers and funds are embezzled 
by several ministers who served under Hamid Karzai and continue to serve 
under Ashraf Ghani – are completely ignored.  
 
As the chapter on legal transplants showed, Mr Wahidi, a minister of the 
government from the Hazāra ethnic group, was sent to the notorious Pol-e-
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Charkhi prison despite the absence of evidence for his guilt. He was released 
in 2019 on appeal for his conviction. The negative effects of blaming others 
for corruption and not seeing the corruption of one’s own ethnic group is a 
devastating form of societal and political corruption that affects the entire 
population of Afghanistan. 
 
Embezzlement by the ruling elites, according to Inge Amundsen, involves the 
theft of public resources by public officials and as such, it is understood to be 
a form of misappropriation of public funds.763 Embezzlement is to steal, 
misdirect or misappropriate funds or assets placed in one’s trust and under 
one’s control.764 Individuals and government officials, faithful to each other 
through tribal, linguistic and ideological ties, are unlikely to perceive their 
own ethnic group as corrupt. They point fingers at others, and Afghanistan 
with a fragmented society suffers from this problem.        
 
Three: Bribery  
 
Bribery is the bestowing of a benefit in order to unduly influence an action or 
decision.765 In Afghanistan, bribery is known as reshwat. Bribery is the act of 
dishonestly persuading someone to act in one’s favour by a payment or other 
inducements which can take the form of gifts, loans, fees, rewards or other 
advantages (taxes, services, donations, etc.).766  
 
In Afghanistan, bribery is common and takes place in different situations. 
People accept that paying bribes will save them time and money. Payment of 
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bribes at times requires connection to illegal networks like illegal commission 
workers who are connected to the bribe taker. For instance, during the Taliban 
rule (1995-2001), the passport office in Herat Province stopped issuing 
passports and the official in charge received hundreds of thousands of 
Afghanis as bribes for each passport application submitted through his 
network of commission workers. Stopping the issuance of passports was a 
way to solicit bribes.767  
 
A popular method to solicit bribes is delaying the processing of applications, 
where paying bribes is the only way to get things done quickly. Bureaucratic 
delay is a serious problem encouraging corruption.768 A case concerning 
bureaucratic delay is the issuance of passports at Afghanistan embassy 
branches in Germany. As of 2020, online appointments offered to Afghans 
applying for a passport at embassy branches in Bonn or Berlin involve two 
years waiting time.769  
 
In July 2020, an Afghan diplomat working at the Berlin embassy was 
recorded on video when soliciting for bribes amounting between €7,000 to 
€1,000, for issuing a passport without the two-year waiting time. For a 
verbatim transcription and translation of this conversation please see 
Appendix 17. Afghan citizens distributed this video on social media and a 
number of demonstrations took place outside Afghan embassies in Bonn and 
Berlin in July 2020. On 09 September 2020, angry Afghan refugees aware of 
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the red tape, deliberate bureaucratic delays and the widespread solicitation of 
bribery, pelted the Afghan embassy branch in Bonn with bricks and caused 
substantial damage to the building.770       
 
Obtaining services through bribery requires special knowledge, 
communication skills and connections to illegal networks. The women of 
Afghanistan are not insulated from the overall political dynamics which are 
often shaped by relations of patronage and personal competition.771 Taken 
that women are deprived of certain public services due to government 
weaknesses and societal inertia, they are also deprived of obtaining services 
through bribery. Women may have to rely on the trust of other men to act as 
middlemen in order to obtain goods or services on their behalf, which is risky 
and highly likely to increase costs and expose them to exploitation.  
 
Four: Divisions in Society Empower Corruption 
 
This is when members of weaker ethnic groups in society and in political 
circles are kept away from important decision-making roles and remain prone 
to exploitation. Afghanistan has too many examples of these divisions. At 
different periods in history, the Hazāra, Ismaili, Wakhi, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh 
and Shi’a Muslims have been deprived of meaningful political roles, and for 
over a century members from these groups were not appointed to high level 
government jobs – only as scribes, junior employees, porters or in low ranks 
in the police and army. With a few exceptions between 1933 and 1992, 
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members of these ethnic groups did not hold ministerial roles. This changed 
substantially in the post-2001 power-sharing arrangements.  
 
This problem relates to favouritism – a mechanism of power abuse involving 
privatisation and a highly biased distribution of state resources.772 
Favouritism, also known as cronyism, is the grant of offices or benefits to 
friends and relatives, regardless of merit.773 IWA describes favouritism as a 
form of abuse not governed by the self-interest of an official but by the 
interests of someone linked to him or her through kinship, political party, 
tribe, or religious group affiliation.774 In Afghanistan, corruption in the form 
of patronage networks exacerbates inequalities among social groups and 
political factions, fuelling tensions and the risk of social unrest.775 Abbas 
Azimi from Gawharshad Institute of Higher Education in Kabul writes that 
in Ashraf Ghani’s administration, Pashtūns have been treated as owners of 
the land and other ethnic groups as aliens.776 
 
Five: Education is Corrupt 
 
The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, a Norway-based institution that 
assists international development professionals in addressing corruption, 
indicates that education is particularly susceptible to corruption given that it 
is often the largest or second largest public expense in most countries.777 U4 
identified more than twenty forms of corruption that can take place in the  
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education sector, including those related to bribery, embezzlement, 
favouritism and the exploitation of students and parents.778 Corruption in 
education creates distrust, hostility and divisions, and individuals obtain high 
positions in the government using fake qualifications. Due to high demands 
for educated cadres in the post-2001 period, some civil servants have bought 
fake certificates, bribed a university or used madrassa certificates to gain jobs 
in judiciary departments.  
 
In 1995, teachers at the Herat Medical Faculty created a neologism for 
students who came to study medicine through the Taliban’s written orders as 
parachuted students. Individuals connected to the Taliban governors and 
commanders came with a letter stating, “The bearer of this letter is one of our 
special Mujahedin brothers, he likes to enrol in year 2 of Medical Faculty.” 
These were students who had basic/primary school education and neither did 
they complete the requisite Year 12, nor did they sit university entry exams. 
A graduate doctor who makes his way into a medical faculty through 
cronyism will kill patients and ruin the lives of people who seek his expertise. 
Antonio Giustozzi, an Afghanistan scholar, wrote in 2010 that the principal 
of a secondary school in Nangarhar said that half of all the teachers working 
in the province might have forged documents to get their jobs; students too 
were buying admission to higher grades to speed up and smooth their 
education.779  
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The chapters on legal transplants and constitutionalism have identified that 
Afghanistan’s education system promotes misogyny, gender discrimination 
and radicalism. This is intellectual corruption where the population is 
encouraged by its own government to advance radical agendas, hate women 
and use violence against people who think, believe and live differently. In 
essence, this behaviour of the government violates all its liberal undertakings 
manifested in the constitution and the statute books. It affects all citizens of 
Afghanistan.    
 
Madhuvanthis Srinivasan investigates the university quota system in 
Afghanistan introduced by President Ashraf Ghani. The quota system allows 
Pashtūn students to enter higher education even if they do not have the 
requisite marks for entry. Ashraf Ghani’s quota system came under the 
spotlight after the results of the Marshal Fahim Military University entrance 
test came out where, despite scoring 312 marks, a Hazāra student from 
Uruzgan Province did not get into the university while his Pashtūn 
counterpart got accepted into the same university with a score of 145.780  
 
Srinivasan states that this quota system is misperceived and misused for two 
reasons: (1) the quota is used to increase the share of Pashtūns despite their 
community forming the largest ethnic group in the nation and being 
historically dominant in public institutions and (2) the quota system is used 
selectively to try and increase the share of Pashtūns in public institutions, 
where the community’s presence has witnessed a decline after the fall of 
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Najibullah’s government in the 1990s.781 Civil society activists have accused 
the Ghani-led government of discrimination and have called for the 
annulment of ethnicity-based quota systems and ending favouritism in all 
sectors.782 Ashraf Ghani’s quota makes the oppressed groups more oppressed 
and is a bad move for Afghanistan’s future.      
 
Six: Emulating Others for Corruption 
 
Acculturation of corruption and perceiving it as acceptable is a way of 
promoting corruption in a society. People agree to pay bribes and empower 
corrupt officials through gifts, favours, and donations. This is when without 
getting involved in corrupt practices, there is no way to get things done. Alatas 
distinguishes between the partner and victim of corruption. He postulates that 
when a businessman willingly bribes a government official to accomplish a 
sale’s transaction, he becomes a partner in corruption, but when a citizen has 
to use bribery to acquire a passport, he becomes a victim of corruption.783   
 
When corruption grows through acculturation, the leader of the country steals 
billions, grants contracts to his friends and clan members; doctors sell 
medicines not needed for an illness; teachers expect bribes and favours from 
students who otherwise will fail; a police officer takes a bribe from a terrorist 
who blows himself up and kills scores of people. As described at the 
beginning of this chapter, international donors’ errors may also increase 
corruption. This may be tolerating the bribing of terrorists for safe passage of 
                                                          
781 Srinivasan, 1-3.  
782 Haidari, “Quota system fanning ethnic prejudice,” last accessed 19 August 2020.  
783 Alatas, The Problem of Corruption, 91.  
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the army or logistical convoys, prisoner release, establishing secret and 




Extortion is perhaps the worst form of corruption in which public office is 
used for obtaining bribes. Alatas identifies extortion as demanding gifts or 
favours in the execution of public duties, regarded as corruption.784 In 2013, 
Transparency International interviewed people in Afghanistan, thirty-three 
percent of whom rated the police as highly corrupt and fifty-one percent of 
whom reported having paid a bribe to the police force in 2012.785 Extortion 
often takes place when a police officer is holding a detainee; a prosecutor is 
pressing charges against an accused; a judge who can forgive or order the 
execution of a person has the power and discretion to punish or forgive; and  
a teacher can fail or pass students. In all these situations, services, material 
and money may be expected. There is often a disproportionate power 
imbalance between civil servants and the powerless citizens, and to choose 
the lesser evil, bribery may be the only easy option for the citizens to achieve 
a favourable outcome.  
 
According to Weeda Mehran, in Afghanistan, administration positions have 
become objects of transactions or resources that can be bought, sold, 
exchanged and doled out for political support.786 Government officials who 
may have bought their positions from the higher chain of their patrimonial 
network, according to Mancur Oslon, act as roving bandits who see working 
                                                          
784 Alatas, Corruption and the Destiny of Asia, 6. 
785 U4 Expert Answer, “Corruption as a Driver of Conflict,” 5.  
786 Mehran, “Neopatrimonialism in Afghanistan,” 101.  
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for the government as an opportunity to extort bribes and position themselves 
as stationery roving bandits in which public goods are offered in the form of 
protection. This model treats the exchange as one between rulers and 
homogenous citizenry.787 Corrupt officials in most cases are not begging for 
bribes: they hold citizens captive to their power – giving citizens no choice 
but to heed to their illegal demands for bribes.  
 
Eight: Abuse of Power 
 
Transparency International divides corruption into three terms: grand, petty 
and political, depending on where it occurs and the amount of money that is 
lost.788 Grand corruption occurs at the highest levels of government that 
scramble policies or dysfunction state institutions, making it possible for 
leaders to take advantage at the expense of public goods.789 In Afghanistan, 
the highest level of power abuses involving grand corruption comes from its 
kings and presidents. The president holds the entire nation subservient to his 
personal whim, intrigues and powerful position. Mohammad Nazif Shahrani 
states that Ashraf Ghani has more powers than a king.790  
 
Ahmad Ali Jalali argues that the absence of strong political parties and the 
prevalence of shifting political alliances foster the survival of patronage 
networks based on personnel-client relationships; the government wheeling 
and dealing with such a system hinders the development of state institutions 
and impedes the emergence of a viable and service-oriented administration; 
                                                          
787 Berg, “The Stationery Bandit.” 1.  
788 Adel, “Understanding and Explaining Corruption: A case study of Afghanistan,” 5.  
789 Adel, 5. 
790 Shahrani, “Afghan president has more powers than a king,” last accessed 16 September 
2020. 
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[whereas] the absence of a ruling party tends to make the president act as a 
supreme khan.791 Authoritarian rulers are using the power capabilities of the 
state in the struggle for power to attain, retain and increase their powers and 
to accumulate resources from the ruled for their own private benefit.792  
 
The Government Media and Information Centre (GMIC) reported that the 
president of Afghanistan has spent millions of US dollars that are not 
accounted for, and some of the money has been spent in areas that were not 
intended.793 Payam-e-Aftab, an Afghan news source, reports that Ashraf 
Ghani’s [former] advisor, Hanif Atmar, recruited 900 ghost advisors.794 Civil 
servants from low to high levels, politicians, ministers and parliamentarians 
use public office to extort and embezzle billions of US dollars from aid 
money, from Afghanistan’s tax revenues and licit (imports, services, energy) 
and illicit (opium, counterfeit and smuggled goods) economy. UNAMA 
reports that currently international donors provide about USD 8.5 billion in 
on-and-off-budget support to Afghanistan per year.795  
 
Nine: Halal Corruption 
 
Halal in Islam means religiously permissible. In the context of corruption, this 
religious norm is used by the devout Muslims to regard illegal money 
obtained through corrupt practices as licit money. A good example of this is 
when a devout Muslim cultivates, buys and sells opium and heroin. 
                                                          
791 Fleschenberg, “Afghanistan’s parliament in the making,” 19. 
792 Amundsen, “Political Corruption,” 8.  
793 BBC Farsi, “Afghanistan’s Budget,” last accessed 10 September 2020.  
794 Payam Aftab News, “Ghani’s advisor: Hanif Atmar had recruited 900 ghost advisors,” 
last accessed 16 September 2020. 
795 UNAMA, “Crucial for Peace and Prosperity.” 11. 
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Mohammad Hashim Kamali, an Afghan scholar who lectures at Malaysian 
universities, offers examples that officials in the early Islamic community 
kept in motion anti-corruption measures.796 Kamali’s normative view may be 
influenced by Syed Hussein Alatas and similar scholars. Alatas, in two of his 
books on corruption, heavily relies on religious morality and offers examples 
of anti-corruption practices by Muslim leaders in the past.797 However, 
Kamali’s and Alatas’s view on Islamic morality as a deterrent to corruption 
is inapplicable in Afghanistan as corruption is widespread and entrenched.   
 
Ten: Dishonesty as Corruption 
 
There are many examples of dishonest practices in Afghanistan that breed 
corruption. Dishonesty in spreading false population data helps a political 
leader in his pursuit of jerrymandering – depriving certain individuals or 
groups of people from exercising their civil and political rights. Politicised 
and questionable population estimates in Afghanistan may constitute a 
predatory form of dishonest dealing, a category one may call statistical 
corruption.  
 
Eleven: Legal Gaps for Corruption  
 
UNAMA’s 2020 anti-corruption report highlights shortcomings in the 
government’s anti-corruption endeavours, but also views the current anti-
corruption framework in Afghanistan as good.798 In his master’s thesis on 
corruption in Afghanistan, Enayatullah Adel surmises that corruption in 
Afghanistan is endemic, occurs in all sectors of the government, and he 
                                                          
796 Kamali, “Government in Islam is a Trust,” 1-3.  
797 Alatas, Corruption and the Destiny of Asia, 119-122; Alatas, The Problem of 
Corruption.  
798 UNAMA, “Crucial for Peace and Prosperity.”  20. 
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concludes that Afghanistan’s defective political structure, along with 
patronage and clientelist networks, and a state that rests on neopatrimonialism 
are the causes of corruption.799 Legal gaps in Afghanistan’s government 
system stems mainly from the abuse of excessive power identified by 
Mohammad Nazif Shahrani, and grows in the defective political system 
highlighted by Enayatullah Adel.  
 
Despite the anti-corruption strategies having been drafted and put into 
operation, in Afghanistan corrupt practices are top-down and often inaccurate 
information may be used to satisfy the international aid community. In 2019, 
judicial impartiality was impaired by bribery and pressure from public 
officials, tribal leaders, families of accused persons and individuals associated 
with the insurgency.800 According to prisoners and local non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), in 2019, corruption was widespread across the justice 
system practically in connection with the prosecution of criminal cases and 
in arranging release from prison.801 There were multiple reports that judges 
would not release prisoners who had served their sentences without receiving 
payment from family members.802 In 2010, the International Crisis Group 
identified poor coordination between judges, prosecutors and police to act 
like a petri dish for corruption, allowing exponential growth of complex 
systems of graft run by rival networks.803  
 
Twelve: Low Income  
 
                                                          
799 Adel, “Understanding and Explaining Corruption: A case study of Afghanistan,” 1.  
800 US Department of State, “Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights Practices,” 9. 
801 US Department of State, 28. 
802 US Department of State, 28.  
803 ICG, REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY,” 23. 
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In 2010, many Afghan judicial officials reported that low salaries are one of 
the primary factors perpetuating petty bribery.804 State officials receiving a 
low income may see corruption as a way to top up their wages. Bakhshesh 
(gift), shirini (sweets) and chai pooli (tea money) are three terms used for a 
small amount of money or gifts in kind offered in return for favours and 
services. Alatas views the bakhshesh system not as disruptive as it appears.805 
Bakhshesh money are the smallest amounts of bribes known in Afghanistan 
society. Bakhshesh may constitute a pack of cigarettes, shirini may be 
anything from a cup of tea to a feast and chai pooli is similar to the other two. 
Through the payment of bakhshesh, a guard outside an embassy may let a 
person jump the queue, which costs the other visa applicants their time.  
 
Paying bakhshesh bribes to a nutritionist who distributes BP5 biscuits to 
malnourished children will deprive certain beneficiaries of the much-needed 
nutritional biscuits. This type of bribery kills the malnourished children. Gifts 
may be offered for showing gratitude for someone’s services as well. People 
who regularly visit an office may see it beneficial to offer a pack of sweets, a 
bottle of perfume or a small amount of money to a guard, to a registrar or 
receptionist – all of whom are able to speed up appointments, quickly deliver 
messages or take an application or petition to the higher officials in the 




                                                          
804 ICG, 25. 
805 Alatas, The Problem of Corruption, 15.  
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The formal description of nepotism, combined with patronage and 
clientelism, according to Johnsøn, is “patronage at its core that means the 
support given by a patron and in government, it refers to the practice of 
appointing people directly.”806 There is a deep-rooted historical dimension to 
nepotism in Afghanistan’s governments. When the Turco-Mongol dynasties 
declined in the early parts of the eighteenth century and political power was 
transferred to the Hotaki and Abdali-Durrani Pashtūn tribes, their military 
organisation strengthened through services provided to the Safavids of Persia, 
and subsequently these tribesmen later formed their own dynastic empire.807 
In Afghanistan, nepotism is inherited from the Turco-Mongolian government 
systems which existed before the Pashtūns rose to power and prominence.  
 
Thomas Barfield, an American anthropologist, writer and university lecturer, 
notes that Ahmad Shah Durrani retained many of the characteristics of 
Afghanistan’s Turco-Mongolian predecessors, particularly the tradition that 
restricted leadership of the kingdom to members of the royal clan, and from 
1747 until 1838 Afghan rulers had only close relatives as rivals.808 
Mohammad Nazif Shahrani argues that in Afghanistan, the system of 
governance from 1747 to 1880 was based primarily on the practices of the 
Afsharid court tradition in Iran and there was some borrowing from the 
Mughals in India.809 The Afsharid and the Mughals were both Turco-
Mongolian empires.  
 
                                                          
806 DFID, “Why Corruption Matters,” 12.   
807 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 19.  
808 Barfield, “Political Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” 1.  
809 Research questionnaire filled in by Mohammad Nazif Shahrani on 16 January 2020. 
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The Musahiban brothers, occupying highest level political posts under 
Habuibullah Khan, Amanullah Khan, Nadir Shah, and Zahir Shah from 1901 
until the 1970s, and who ruled Afghanistan from 1930 to 1978 used nepotism 
in sharing high political posts. In Afghanistan, nepotism is a tribal form of 
sharing the wealth and power of the government. Nepotism is also the 
lubricant of the post-2001 neopatrimonialism. In Afghanistan, a country 
formed by hundreds of qawms (solidarity groups), nepotism in political office 
affects dozens of ethnic groups whose members, based on arguments 
proposed by Dawood Moradian, Mohammad Nazif Shahrani, Ehsanullah 
Adel and Abbas Azimi,  are often projected as aliens, enemy, with equal rights 
on paper but unequal in the allocation of political roles, distribution of wealth 
and decision-making.  
 
Fourteen: Predation in Politics 
 
In Afghanistan, predation is connected to continuous wars and continuity of 
illicit streams of political economy. Mehrdad Vahabi, a scholar for the study 
of Political Economy of Predation, defines armed conflict as a form of 
predatory behaviour and appropriation allocation mechanism.810 When 
waging wars is more important than winning them, war enemies as economic 
beneficiaries of war might be implicit partners.811 David Keen’s study of civil 
wars in different historical episodes in Sierra Leone, Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
today’s Afghanistan furnishes cases of useful enemies and useless allies.812  
 
                                                          
810 Vahabi, The Political Economy of Predation, 9-10. 
811 Vahabi, 10. 
812 Vahabi, 10. 
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In Afghanistan’s political history, there is long history of predation in which, 
through despotism and abuse of the public wealth, political leaders create 
internal colonialism and oppress their people. Illicit income, government 
revenues and donated funds are unfairly siphoned to the members of the 
ruling clan, and this deprives the vast majority of citizens from economic 
benefits and the common good expected of the economic system of the 
country. In his oral address to the House of Commons on 09 November 2010, 
Sir Sherrard Cowper-Cole, a British politician, stated that Afghanistan has a 
predatory narco-mafia state.813      
 
Fifteen: Tax Evasion and Discriminatory Taxation 
 
The governments of Afghanistan are known for levying discriminatory 
taxation. In 2008, the state of Afghanistan, started to devolve several southern 
provinces of Afghanistan to the Taliban. The devolution of provinces means 
that millions of citizens living under Taliban rule do not pay taxes to the 
government. In varying degrees, since 1880, political leaders of Afghanistan 
have pursued ineffective, inconsistent and discriminatory tax systems.  
 
Sarajuddin Isar, PhD Candidate from SOAS University of London, reports 
that Afghanistan has been an aid-dependent country for at least two 
centuries.814 The Shah Shoja (r. 1809-1818), Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1819-
1839), Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901), Musahiban regimes (r. 1929-
1978)815 and the socialist governments (r. 1978-1992) as well as the post-
2001 governments have received subsidies, loans and donations from Britain, 
                                                          
813 UK Parliament. “Foreign Affairs Committee,” 6.   
814 Isar, “A Blessing or a Curse?” 2.  
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the United States, the Soviet Union, the European Union states and other 
countries.   
 
Sayed Daud Fazli highlights six elements as contributors to poor revenue 
collection in Afghanistan. These are (1) political: most revenue collection 
procedures depend on government policies, many of which include 
exemptions for specific actors, (2) economic: changes in taxation, economic 
growth, interest rates and inflation can have a negative impact on the 
behaviour of taxpayers, (3) social: it is difficult to introduce a tax collection 
system after a prolonged period of war, particularity when instability persists, 
(4) technological: revenue collection officers often use paper-based systems, 
which limit the capacity to perform their duties effectively and in a timely 
manner, (5) environmental: the security situation and lack of a functioning 
infrastructure limits the mobility of taxpayers and tax collectors and (6) legal: 
the discriminatory nature of certain government policies favours particular 
communities and political groups and negatively impacts the tax collection 
process.816       
 
10.4 Major Corruption Cases 2001-2020 
 
The biggest corruption case in which powerful individuals connected to the 
state of Afghanistan embezzled nearly one billions US dollars is the Kabul 
Bank fraud. The Washington Post exposed the Kabul Bank case in February 
2010.817 In the Kabul Bank case, what were termed as loans to the board 
members were in reality interest-free grants without a repayment schedule or 
                                                          
816 Fazli, “Revenue Collection and Management,” 2.   
817 Strand, in Tina Søreide, Williams, Corruption, Grabbing and Development: Real World 
Challenges 176.  
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any collateral.818 Six years after Ashraf Ghani’s claim in 2015 that his anti-
graft policies “broke the aura of impunity that had surrounded high level 
maleficence”, the Kabul Bank fiasco remains a glaring example of the 
prevailing culture of impunity in Afghanistan.819 According to Ekram Afzali, 
the CEO of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, over the past six years, Ashraf 
Ghani’s government has only recovered 30 million US dollars from the total 
913 million stolen from Kabul Bank.820  
 
Sputnik News reports that 769 million dollars was embezzled in ghost schools 
in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2013; over 3 billion US dollars has 
disappeared in the energy sector; over the past seventeen years, 154 million 
US dollars has been stolen from the fuel budget for Afghanistan’s military 
and 23 employees from logistics and finance departments and the head of a 
private firm embezzled 600 million US dollars from the meat for army 
soldiers in 2019.821 In the post 2001 period, Afghanistan suffers from an array 
of high level corrupt practices, including the formation of a highly corrupt 
political system and the empowerment of corrupt leaders – who have created 
a kleptocratic system in Afghanistan. 
 
As explained in this chapter, petty, grand or political corruption negatively 
impact all facets of society and government. It is anathema to the rule of law. 
The examples cited show that citizens’ rights, welfare, safety and dignity are 
                                                          
818 Strand, in Tina Søreide, Aled Williams, 178. 
819 Mehdi J. Hakimi, “The Rule of Law Crisis in Afghanistan,” 2.  
820 Zahra Rahimi, “Kabul Bank Funds recovery,” last accessed 17 September 2020.  
821 Sputnik News, “Despite many legal and political reforms, corruption is one of the 
obstacles for long-term development, peace and welfare,”  last accessed 10 September 
2020.  
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compromised by corruption that starts from the president’s office and extends 




This chapter has shown that corruption in Afghanistan is entrenched and 
deep-rooted, and although the state of Afghanistan claims to be fighting 
corruption, in practice it does little to eradicate or minimise it. The chapter 
has identified that the government deals with corruption selectively and re-
routes corruption instead of uprooting it, which in itself is a form of predatory 
political corruption.  
 
This chapter has also shown a number of ethnographic and sociological 
categories of corruption in the context of Afghanistan and has offered reasons 
as to why civil servants receive bribes and how corruption affects different 
population groups of Afghanistan. The chapter has further demonstrated how 
Afghanistan’s government, civil servants and politicians light-heartedly 
perceive the concept of corruption and are susceptible to the rhizomic fabric 
of corruption. In particular, this chapter finds the most egregious cases of 
corruption that have served to undermine and erode both the legal system and 
the perception of regard for legality to be the abuses of state power alongside 
predation in politics, both of which are contributing factors to the way 
nepotism functions and manifests within Afghanistan. These particular 
aspects of corruption inevitably lead the general public to circumvent and 
disregard the government and its legal institutions, albeit to various degrees, 
precisely because of the self-serving nature of nepotism and the implication 
it has for the wider society. In short, this systemic problem lends itself to a 
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public perception that in many cases, it simply does not benefit people to 
comply with the law. This has been evidenced with the examples illustrated 
in this chapter.  
 
The next chapter will show different forms of corruption in the institutions of 
justice and how corruption undermines the quality of serving justice. The next 
chapter describes the history of legal developments and the legal institutions 
of the government of Afghanistan.     
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CHAPTER 11: AFGHANISTAN’S LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Law remains an important, if not the most 
important, element in the struggle which is 
being fought in Islam between traditionalism 
and modernism under the impact of Western 
Ideas.822   
Joseph Schacht   
11 Introduction  
 
The first part of this chapter deals with the four stages of legal development 
in Afghanistan where the law-making institutions drafted formal laws. The 
intervening factors mentioned in the legal transplants chapter have affected 
legal developments in Afghanistan. There is yet another type of disruption 
which I call legal interregnum. Legal interregnums take place when the 
executive branch of the government excessively overpowers the parliament, 
the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice and disrupts their smooth 
operations – in formulating and enforcing the law through the use of 
presidential decrees.  
 
Moreover, the presidential hiring and firing of government officials who are 
not part of the president’s inner circle are factors of legal interregnums. In the 
context of Afghanistan, legal interregnums have severely impacted the 
philosophy of trias politica823 or the separation of power during the socialist 
governments (1978-1992) and during Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai’s two terms in 
government (2014-ongoing).   
                                                          
822 Schacht in: Matthew Lippmann, “Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure,” 29. 
823 Trias Politica is a philosophical term developed by the French enlightenment 
philosopher, Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, in his book “De l’esprit des lois” in 1748. 
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The second part of this chapter describes the legal institutions of the 
government and professional institutions which are independent of the 
government. This part will also observe the positive achievements and the 
weaknesses of these institutions.  
 
I argue that in the legal interregnum caused during the first National Unity 
Government (2014-2019), followed by a second presidential term since May 
2020, Afghanistan’s institutions of the government have been severely 
impacted by a web of personal political networks through the individual 
decisions of President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and his presidential palace 
team. This interregnum not only weakens the institutions of the government 
and revokes positive gains achieved since 2001, it also sets a bad precedent 
when the executive branch overpowers other institutions, which violates the 
concept of separation of powers set out in the Constitution 2004.         
 
11.1 The Genesis of Legal Developments in the Realm of the 
State  
 
From 1880 up to the present day, governments of Afghanistan have 
established different institutions which, over the centuries, allowed the state 
to formulate, transplant and develop modern laws such as the civil and 
criminal codes, family laws and constitutions. In this context, as history 
shows, progress has often been slow, incremental and at times disrupted due 
to regime changes, civil wars and international conflicts.  
 
Afghanistan’s legal developments were created in three stages: (1) instigation 
of indigenous legal reforms, (2) continual legal developments and (3) the 
process of expanding the writ of state power through law. The expansion of 
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the writ of the state through law demanded that old legislations be updated, 
replaced and reformed. The phases of Afghanistan’s legal development are as 
follows: 
 
Phase One: The Pre-Nizāmnāma Period 
 
The term Nizāmnāma means the written regulations. Pre-Nizamnama is a 
period in which laws were not written down. In Afghanistan, the early spate 
of legal developments leading to the creation of formal government 
institutions took place under Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826-1863), who 
declared that serious crimes should be referred to him for deliberation.824 
Prior to this time, the ulemā enjoyed unchecked authority over provisions of 
Shari’a education and the application of Islamic criminal law in religious 
courts.825 Afghanistan’s early institutional and legal developments can be 
categorised as pre-Nizāmnāma developments, which refers to statutory 
enactments before 1919 and those following this date.826  
 
This period in Afghanistan may be referred to as phase one of legal 
developments. During this phase, statutory regulations were formulated. In 
phase one, on the whole regulations were designed to form an integral part of 
Shari’a and no clear distinction was attempted between Shari’a and statutory 
enactments. From the 1880s, Abdur Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan 
issued administrative regulations called Asās al-quddāt, a guide for judges on 
court proceedings, and Sirāj al-ahkām, a monumental work in four volumes, 
and on the whole, these regulations followed the Ottoman Mujallah model 
                                                          
824 Jupp, “Legal transplants,” 79. 
825 Jupp, “Legal transplants,” 79. 
826 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 35. 
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and consolidated Hanafi laws from Arabic sources into the Persian (Farsi) 
language.827 Phase one of legal developments was notable in the area of 
codification of the Islamic laws in Afghanistan.  
 
Phase Two: The Nizāmnāma Period 
 
Phase two of legal developments is the Nizāmnāma legislation period, which 
took place during the reign of King Amanullah Khan between 1919 and 1929, 
during which time the first constitution of Afghanistan entitled Nizāmnāma-
e asāsi was promulgated in 1923.828 The government enactments were largely 
derived from classical Hanafi law and were aimed at making the laws easily 
accessible for practice in the courts.829 Mohammad Hashim Kamali argues 
that Nizāmnāma rules were in a subordinate position to those of Shari’a 
law.830 Kamali calls legal developments during Amanullah Khan’s 
government, the “Nizāmnāma period.” In her book, Senzil Nawid lists 
seventy-seven Nizāmnāma laws promulgated during Amanullah Khan.831 
Torunn Wimpelmann notes that during Amanullah Khan’s rule, one-hundred 
and forty Nizāmnāmas were promulgated.832 The codified criminal law, 
named Tamasok al-Qozāt, was also drafted.833  
 
Reading through the three legal guide books, Asās al-Quzāt, Sirāj-al-ahkām 
and Tamassok al-Quzāt, one notes that great importance was given to judicial 
modernisation – a fact that shows Afghanistan advanced judicial 
                                                          
827 Kamali, 35. 
828 Kamali, 35. 
829 Kamali, 35. 
830 Kamali, 36.    
831 Nawid, Religious Response to Social Change, 218-220. 
832 Wimpelmann, The Pitfalls of Protection, 31.  
833 Nawid, Religious Response to Social Change, 79. 
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developments in line with those of the Mamluk Sultans, Ottoman Turkey and 
the legal regimes in the British India.834 Judicial modernisation in 
Afghanistan in the twentieth century sought to reduce the power of religious 
leaders in the judiciary and free the courts from executive domination and 
grant them independence.835  
 
During Nizāmnāma period, the judiciary changed from a two-tier to a three-
tier court system whilst before the Nizāmnāma period, a two-tiered structure 
of Shari’a courts – namely primary courts and appeal courts – existed in the 
country, but there were no regular tribunals for a second review.836 Phase two 
of legal developments marks the organisation of Islamic codified law and also 
the commencement of transplanting Western legal ideas and norms into 
Afghanistan’s statutes.   
 
Phase Three: The Usūlnāma Period 
 
The third phase of legal developments is the phase of statutory law 
developments, called the Usūlnāma period. Usūlnāma, meaning “code of 
principles” began with the promulgation of Constitution 1931, the second 
constitution of Afghanistan; Usūlnāmas tried to downplay the role of 
statutory laws in comparison to that of Shari’a.837 During legal development 
phases one to three, Afghanistan’s leaders from 1880s to the 1930s attempted 
to institutionalise Islamic laws and incorporate them into the quasi-secular 
administrative laws; a move that different Islamic states have followed in 
                                                          
834 These issues are discussed in the Legal Transplants chapter. 
835 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 14.  
836 Kamali, 208.  
837 Kamali, 36.  
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order to create Western-inspired codified laws and constitutions – though 
with varying degrees of success.  
 
The promulgated laws show that in these three stages, Afghanistan’s rulers 
advocated a progressive vision for their country and assisted in the formation 
of laws which denounced polygamy, banned baad (exchange) marriages, 
child marriages and payment of bride-price, and set restrictions on the 
ownership of Shari’a adjudication. These laws also opposed the abuse of the 
fatwā (Islamic legal opinion) institution. The Constitution of 1923 and several 
Nizāmnāma regulations intended to modernise classical Shari’a provisions 
into modern codes of law. These efforts had already been attempted in Egypt, 
Iran and Turkey before they were attempted in Afghanistan.  
 
The Usūlnāma period was a regressive era in which, through constitutional 
amendments, Nadir Shah brought back tribes and religious leaders into the 
most delicate and important justice institutions, partly reversing and partly 
halting fifty years of legal progress achieved in phases one and two.      
 
Phase Four: The Qānūn Period I 
 
Qānūn in Farsi and Arabic means law. In the middle of the twentieth century, 
this term was used for distinguishing between secular laws that encompassed 
administrative or public law, and Shari’a law. The term qānūn appeared in 
the Ottoman laws and the Iranian and Egyptian constitution development 
processes.838 This distinction, to the present day, serves the above-described 
purpose in Afghanistan. The Qānūn period is the fourth phase of legal 
                                                          
838 Khalil, “Early Modern Islamic and Near Eastern Law,” 32-54. 
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developments for statutory laws, which began with the promulgation of the 
1964 constitution, entitled Qānūn-e asāsi.839  
 
Constitution 1964 recognised the freedom of association, the right to work, 
education and religious freedom for both sexes and for all the ethnic and 
religious minority groups of Afghanistan. Zahir Shah’s government (r. 1933-
1973) lived up to most provisions of this constitution. Due to traditional ways 
of life, in the forty years of Zahir Shah’s monarchical rule, fewer women 
sought formal employment or an education. But those women who wanted to 
study or work had a chance to do so. In the Qānūn phase that span from 1964 
to 1973, the government of Afghanistan drafted one constitution, family laws, 
criminal codes and other legislations.  
 
11.2 The Legal Interregnum Stages   
 
Legal interregnum here is used for the disruption of law-making institutions 
by the executive branch, where presidential decrees take over the law-making 
processes. Legal interregnums may also show indicators such as: law exists 
and institutions claim to follow them, but the operation of law only produces 
politicised, neo-patrimonial interests and botched justice.  
 
In Afghanistan, at the end of the Qānūn phase, there were two legal 
interregnum stages in Afghanistan. The first president whose decrees over-
powered the legislature and the judiciary was Daoud Khan (r. 1973-1978).  
Daoud Khan’s government (r. 1973-1978) disbanded all political parties that 
were formed in the latter parts of the twentieth century and set up a one-party 
                                                          
839 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 36. 
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rule. Daud Khan’s new constitution allowed only the Ghorzang-e-Millie 
(National Movement) party to operate.840  
 
The second stage of legal interregnum took place under the leadership of Noor 
Mohammad Taraki (r. 1978-1979) and his successor, Hafizullah Amin (r. 
1979): both of these socialist presidents issued decrees in the early years of 
usurping power through a bloody coup in 1978. Presidential decrees issued in 
these periods have been discussed in detail in the chapters on legal transplants 
and constitutions.841 From 1980, the early years of socialist rule until 2001, 
there was no period of complete legal inactivity, but the number of laws 
promulgated during the said period were not substantial.  
 
Phase Five: Post-2001 Qānūn Period II  
 
Afghanistan’s post-2001 legal developments must be assessed in an entirely 
different light. The Western rule of law projects brought large sums in 
donations to Afghanistan for which the cooperation of the Afghanistan 
government was needed. Legal developments prior to Qānūn period II were 
Afghan-led. Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the governments 
of Afghanistan were able to formulate, draft, and expand a large corpus of 
codified laws.842  
                                                          
840 ASCFO, “A First Step on a Long Journey,” 2. 
841 A number of Presidential decrees discussed in the UNAMA’s Afghanistan’s Fight Against 
Corruption Report of June 2020 at pages 20-22, 24, 31,33, 37, 44-45, 62, 64, 67, 69 and 71 
are: Asset Declaration Law 05 September 2017; National Procurement Authority (NPA), 
November 2018; Access to Information Law 03 March 2018; Penal Code; Whistle Blower 
Protection Law; Anti-Corruption Law 5 December 2018; Anti-Corruption Amended Law 5 
March 2019; Supreme Audit Office Law (SAO Law), 05 March 2020; Municipalities Law 
05 September 2018; Decree for the Separation of MEC from HOOAC 2016; Formation of 
Ombudsman Office 12 May 2018. 
842 Some of the major laws promulgated until the 1990s are as follows: Afghan Penal Code 
1925, Asās-al Qudāt, Basic Law of the State of Afghanistan, Civil Law 1977, Civil Procedure 
Code 1965, Civil Servants Law 1970, Commercial Code of 1955, Commercial Procedure 
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In theory and in practice, Afghanistan’s political leaders are expected by the 
international donor community to respect the rule of law and live up to 
Afghanistan’s international legal obligations. Over the past nineteen years, 
there have been seventeen major international conferences on Afghanistan.843 
International conferences create provisos that require the drafting of new road 
maps, strategies and reporting mechanisms – most of which require the 
issuing of new laws as well. This process benefits Afghanistan’s legal 
institutions as they are expected to follow aid conditionality that brings 
expectations on the recipient nation, Afghanistan.    
 
There has been an exponential growth of laws in Afghanistan since 2001. The 
Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP), an assistance programme managed 
                                                          
Code 1963, Constitution of 1923, Constitution of 1931, Constitution of 1964, Constitution of 
1977, Constitution of 1980, Constitution of 1987, Constitution of 1990, Consultative Council 
Act 1957, Customs Law of Afghanistan, Education Law, Guiding Rules on Criminal Affairs 
1971, Income Tax Law, Insurance Law, Law for Sale of Property from State Warehouse of 
Afghanistan, Law for Support of Commerce in Afghanistan, Law for the State Treasuries of 
Afghanistan, Law of Administration of the Courts of Justice, Law of Attendance and Leaves 
of Civil Servants, Law of Citizenship in Afghanistan, Law of Civil Aviation, Law of Civil 
Procedure 1957, Law of Commerce 1955, Law of Commercial Procedure 1963, Law of Court 
Administration 1956, Law of Crimes by Civil Servants and Public Security Offences 1962, 
Law of Criminal Proceedings 1965, Law of Customs, Law of Customs Exception of Baggage 
and Property of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Agents in Afghanistan, Law of Income 
Tax, Law of Investment, Law of Judicial Authority and Organisations, Law of Marriage, 
Weddings and Circumcision, Law of Military Courts, Law of Mourning, Law of Personal 
Directorate in Afghanistan, Law of Prisons and Jails in Afghanistan, Law of Prosecutions, 
Law of Residence Visas of Foreign Subjects, Law of Resignation of Military and Civil 
Servants of Afghanistan, Law of Secretariat Office in Afghanistan, Law of the Archives 
Directorate in Afghanistan, Law on Organisation and Jurisdiction of Courts 1980, Livestock 
Tax Law, Marriage Law 1934, Marriage Law 1960, Marriage Law of 1971, Municipalities 
Law, Nizāmnāma Jezāye Askari, Nizamnama of Basic Organisations 1923, Nizāmnāma of 
Marriage 1921, Nizāmnāma of Marriage 1924, Opium Law, Parliamentary Elections Law, 
Penal Law 1977, Police Law, Postal Law, Press Law, Regulations for Examining of 
Witnesses 1957, Regulations for the Judicial Training Course 1972, Siraj al-Ahkâm, 
Tamassok al-Qudāt Amaniye, The Civil Code of 1977, The Criminal Code of 1976.  
843 The International Conferences held for aid for Afghanistan between 2001-2019 were: 
Bonn 05 December 2001, Tokyo 21 January 2002, Berlin 01 April 2004, London 31 Jan-
1Feb 2006, Rome 2 July 2007, Paris 12 June 2008, Moscow 30 March 2009, The Hague 31 
March 2009, London 28 January 2010, Kabul 19 July 2010, Bonn 05 December 2011, 
Chicago 20 May 2012, Tokyo 7 July 2012, Brussels 05 October 2016, Geneva 27-28 
November 2018 and Geneva 23-24 November 2020.  
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by the United States Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has listed collections of Afghanistan 
laws in different categories. As of January 2018, the collection included 
administrative laws844, civil laws845 and criminal laws.846 As of 2019, the 
Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) no longer exists and the USAID has 
offered JSSP’s contract to Tetra Tech.  
 
Since 2014, a large number of laws have been issued by presidential decrees. 
The Law on Declaration and Registration of Assets of State Officials and 
Employees was issued by the legislative decree of October 2017.847 The Anti-
Harassment Law 2017 went into effect in January 2018; this law criminalises 
all forms of harassment of women and children, covering physical, verbal, 
psychological and sexual harassment.848 The amended Penal Code 2017, in 
916 articles approved by presidential legislative decree on 04 March 2017 
                                                          
844 Administrative laws of Afghanistan are: Advocates Law, Civil Service Law, Election 
Law, Labour Law, Law on Gathering, Strikes and Demonstrations, Law on Government 
Employees, Law on Managing Land Affairs, Law on Mass Media, Law on Organisation and 
Jurisdiction of Courts, Law on Structure and Authority of the Attorney General’s Office, 
Legal Aid Regulations.  
845 Civil Laws of Afghanistan: Banking Law, Civil Code of 1976, Civil Procedure Code, 
Commercial Code, Commercial Procedure Code, Customs Law, International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Convention Against Corruption, 
International Convention, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention 
on Elimination of All forms of Violence Against Women, International Convention on 
Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, International Convention of the Rights of 
Children, Labour Law, Law on Citizenship, Law on Correctional Centres, Law on Mass 
Media, Law on Passport, Law on Private Investment, Law on Procedure for Obtaining Rights, 
Legal Aid Regulations, Road Traffic Law, Shi’ite Personal Status Law, Environmental Law, 
Income Tax Law, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
846 Criminal Law of Afghanistan: Afghanistan’s Anti-Terrorism Law, Counter Abduction and 
Human Trafficking Law, Criminal Procedure Code 1965 (amendments), Civil Procedure 
Code 1965, Interim Criminal Procedure Code 2004, Criminal Code 2014, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Law on Campaign Against Financing Terrorism, Law 
on Elimination of Violence Against Women, Law on Firearms Equipment and Explosive 
Materials, Law on Juvenile Correction Centre, Law on Prison and Detention Centres, 
Military Criminal Procedure Code, Military Penal Code. 
847 USSD, “Afghanistan 2018 Human Rights Report,” 28. 
848 USSD, 31. 
 
   
 
Page 323 of 531 
 
entered into force on 14 February 2018, combines ten former separate 
criminal laws and also brings together the penal provisions of thirty-three 
laws of other scopes.849 It criminalises international crimes listed in the ICC 
Statute, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and 
aggression, and sets forth criminal liability for civilian superiors or military 
commanders who fail to prevent or punish subordinates who commit these 
crimes and prevents an alleged perpetrator from invoking the defence of 
superior order for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, aggression 
against the state and torture.850  The new penal code also criminalises bacha 
bāzi (sexual abuse of children) as a separate crime and builds on the 2017 
Law on Combat Crimes of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling in Migrants, 
which includes provisions on criminalising behaviours associated with the 
sexual exploitation of children.851   
 
Alongside the donor countries and international organisations, the United 
Nations issues resolutions that require the empowerment of legal bodies in 
Afghanistan. The United Nations Security Council issues various resolutions 
and press statements upon which Afghanistan’s government has to take 
certain actions.852 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 
                                                          
849 ICRC, “Afghanistan Penal Code, 2017.” 1.   
850 ICRC, “Afghanistan Penal Code, 2017.” 1. 
851 USSD, “Afghanistan 2018 Human Rights Report,” 28-29, 33. 
852 Some of the notable documents the United Nations has issued for Afghanistan from 2008-
2017: International Narcotics Control Board 2007 Report (5 March 2008), Draft Press 
Statement (25 August 2008), Security Council Mission document S/2008/782 (12 December 
2008), UN Working Group Conclusions (11 May 2016), S/AC.51/2016/1, ISAF report 
S/2011/364 (14 June 2011), ISAF report S/2013/558 (17 September 2013), ISAF report 
S/2014/678 (17 September 2014), Universal Periodic Review A/HRC/26/4 (04 April 2014), 
Office of High Commissioner queries on death penalty A/HRC/27/23 (30 June 2014), High 
Commissioner for Human Rights A/HRC/28/48 (8 January 2015), Quarterly debate on 
Afghanistan S/PV.7722 (21 June 2016), Quarterly debate on Afghanistan S/PV.7771 (14 
September 2016), Quarterly debate on Afghanistan S/PV. 7844 (19 December 2016), 
 
   
 
Page 324 of 531 
 
S/RES/2255 of 2015 refers to twenty-three previous resolutions issued for 
Afghanistan from 1999 through to 2015.853 Afghanistan deposited its 
instruments of ratification of the Rome Statute on 10th February 2003.854 The 
                                                          
Transmitted conclusion of Bonn Conference from Transition to Transformation Decade 
2011, S/2011/762 (6 December 2001),  Summary of Security Council’s 2242 Informal Expert 
Group on Women, Peace and Security, S/2016/673 (29 July 2016), Report of Tripartite 
Review Commission on the UN in Afghanistan, S/2015/713 (15 September 2016), Seventh 
Report of the Monitoring Team assisting Committee on the situation in Afghanistan, 
S/2016/842 (04 October 2016), Removal of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from ISIL and Al-Qaeda 
sanctions list, SC/12705, (03 February 2017), Press release on delisting one individual from 
Afghanistan, SC12721, (16 February 2017), Secretary General Report UNAMA, S/2016/532 
(10 June 2016),  Secretary General Report UNAMA, S/2016/768 (07 September 2016), 
Secretary General Report UNAMA, S/2016/1049 (13 December 2016), The presidential 
statement on Afghan elections, S/PRST/2014/11, (26 June 2014), Presidential statement on 
counter-narcotics, S/PRST/2014/12, (25 June 2014), Presidential statement ahead of Brussels 
Conference, S/PRST/2016/14 (14 September 2016), Security Council Resolution 
S/RES/2210 for renewing the mandate of UNAMA (16 March 2015), Security Council 
Resolution S/RES/2255 on regarding the 1988 Afghanistan sanction regime (21 December 
2015), Security Council Resolution S/RES/2274 regarding the resolution and renewing 
UNAMA mandate (15 March 2016), Security Council Resolution S/RES/2460 (15 March 
2019), Security Council Resolution S/RES/2489 (17 September 2019), regarding the 
mandate of UNAMA, Security Council Resolution S/RES/2513 (10 March 2020), Security 
Council Resolution S/RES/2543 (15 September 2020), Security Council Press Statement 
SC/14237 (25 June 2020), Security Council Situation in Afghanistan S/2020/891 (03 
September 2020), Security Council Pres Statement SC/14338 (27 October 2020). (Sources: 
Security Council Report – Chronology of Events and UN Documents for Afghanistan). 
853 The listed resolutions: 18 MAR 2017 Security Council Resolution 2344 (2017), 15 MAR 
2016 Security Council Resolution 2274 (2016), 16 MAR 2015  Security Council Resolution 
2210 (2015), 17 MAR 2014  Security Council Resolution 2145 (2014), 19 MAR 2013 
Security Council Resolution 2096 (2013), 14 DEC 2012,  Security Council Resolution 2082 
(2012) and 2083 (2012), 22 MAR 2012  Security Council Resolution 2041 (2012), 12 OCT 
2011  Security Council Resolution 2011 (2011), 22 MAR 2011  Security Council 
Resolution 1974 (2011), 13 OCT 2010  Security Council Resolution 1943 (2010), 22 MAR 
2010  Security Council Resolution 1917 (2010), 08 OCT 2009, Security Council Resolution 
1890 (2009), 23 MAR 2009  Security Council Resolution 1868 (2009), 22 SEP 
2008  Security Council Resolution 1833 (2008), 11 JUN 2008, Security Council Resolution 
1817 (2008), 20 MAR 2008  Security Council Resolution 1806 (2008), 19 SEP 
2007  Security Council Resolution 1776 (2007), 23 MAR 2007, Security Council 
Resolution 1746 (2007), 12 SEP 2006  Security Council Resolution 1707 (2006), 13 SEP 
2005  Security Council Resolution 1623 (2005), 24 MAR 2005, Security Council 
Resolution 1589 (2005), 17 SEP 2004  Security Council Resolution 1563 (2004), 26 MAR 
2004  Security Council Resolution 1536 (2004), 13 OCT 2003, Security Council Resolution 
1510 (2003), 28 MAR 2003  Security Council Resolution 1471 (2003), 24 DEC 
2002  Security Council Resolution 1453 (2002), 27 NOV 2002, Security Council 
Resolution 1444 (2002), 26 JUN 2002  Security Council Resolution 1419 (2002), 23 MAY 
2002  Security Council Resolution 1413 (2002), 28 MAR 2002 Security Council Resolution 
1401 (2002), 28 JAN 2002  Security Council Resolution 1390 (2002), 15 JAN 
2002  Security Council Resolution 1388 (2002), 20 DEC 2001, Security Council Resolution 
1386 (2001). 
854 The Office of the Prosecutor International Criminal Court, “Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities,” 6. 
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international community expects that the Afghan government follow their 
recommendations.855  
 
Legal Interregnum Stage II 
 
The third legal interregnum in Afghanistan commenced in 2014 and continues 
to the present day. President Ashraf Ghani has issued countless presidential 
decrees, taken from trivial issues to issues of utmost importance for 
Afghanistan. Presidential decrees and presidential orders by Ashraf Ghani are 
issued mainly for the removal and appointment of government officials, 
distribution of cash to high level officials, promotions and commendations. 
Presidential decrees were discussed in the chapter on legal transplants in more 
detail.  
 
In the fourth phase of legal developments, which encompasses Qānūn period 
II and legal interregnum period three, Afghanistan has received a substantial 
amount of aid from the international community in order to develop its legal 
affairs and empower the rule of law. Afghanistan has shown unprecedented 
progression in areas such as drafting laws, improving the physical 
infrastructure of courts, public reports, and improving the education of 
members of judiciary. Moreover, there is a visible presence of women in the 
judiciary and in other government organs. There are also improvements in 
institution building, local governance, finance, information and 
                                                          
855 The major policies and plans drafted for Afghanistan are Bonn Agreement 2001, 
Afghanistan Compact 2006, London Conference 2010, Bonn 2 Conference 2011, Paris 
Conference 2008, Kabul Conference, London Conference 2010, TMAF, RECCA, WTO 
Membership, EITI Membership, ANDS, ICPC Interim, Money Laundering Laws, Anti-
Narcotics Law, Security Council Resolutions, UNCAC, NATO Resolute Support, BSA – 
USA-Afghanistan, International Criminal Court and the CEDAW.  
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communication technology, women’s participation in the government, 
inclusion of marginalised ethnic and religious minority groups in low level 
government posts. 
 
11.3 The Legal Institutions of Afghanistan  
 
The Judiciary  
 
The justice institutions of Afghanistan can be broadly defined to include 
different ministries and agencies including the Ministry of Justice, the 
Supreme Court, the Attorney General’s Office, the Anti-Corruption Justice 
Centre (ACJC), the parliament and the Afghan police. Afghanistan’s 
judiciary is committed to Islamic principles and bases all its actions including 
the implementation of the donor-led priorities on Islam. The judicial sector 
strategy for 2008 to 2013, in the section titled ‘Guiding Islamic Values’ states 
as follows:  
 
Justice in Afghanistan is dispensed according to the laws of Allah and 
the traditions of the Prophet (S.A.W.) as enshrined in the provisions 
of the Constitution. Justice must be provided in the most remote parts 
of the country and must be dispensed by justice sector institutions. 
This strategy’s core values are derived from higher goals of Islam, and 
the purposes for which Allah bestowed upon all men, women and 
children the sacred and undeniable rights and responsibilities in the 
Shari’a of equality before the law and access to justice for all. 
Achieving justice is therefore the main objective of the justice sector 
institutions. As the ninth century Islamic scholar Ibn Qutayba, wrote: 
There can be no government without an army, no army without 
money, no money without prosperity, and no prosperity without 
justice and good administration.856  
                                                          
856 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “NATIONAL JUSTICE SECTOR STRATEGY- 
2008-2013,” 13-14.  
 
   
 




The Ministry of Justice  
 
In Afghanistan, the Ministry of Justice was established for the first time 
during the rule of Shah Mahmood (r. 1801-1803).857 The Ministry of Justice 
has been part of the executive branch of different governments. Its main 
duties are as follows: 
1. Preparing drafts of laws and the president’s decrees 
 
2. Expressing opinions regarding the conformity of legal and 
international contracts, conventions and external foreign agreements 
with the laws of Afghanistan 
 
3. Requesting and studying the views of ministers and administrations 
regarding the drafts of laws and regulations which are designed by 
them, and completion of these laws and regulations with the help of 
specialists in the relevant ministries and administrations 
 
4. Providing legal advice to ministers and government offices 
 
5. Defending the rights of government properties and if necessary, 
submitting petitions against government debtors.858   
 
 
The document titled “Five Year Strategy 2014-2018”, prepared by the 
government of Afghanistan, identifies duties of the Ministry of Justice as 
follows:  
 
To provide best quality legal and judicial services to the people of 
Afghanistan by ratification, preparation of legal papers, printing, 
defence of movable and immovable government assets, provisions of 
free legal services to suspects and convicts, solving legal cases (before 
going to courts), providing legal awareness for all people, registration 
of social organisations and political parties and providing oversight of 
their activities, assisting the children in correctional facilities who are 
serving their sentence, coordination with the government organs in 
regards to the legal obligations, and oversight of the implementation 
                                                          
857 Ministry of Justice, “History of Judiciary in Afghanistan,” 33.  
858 Ministry of Justice of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “History of the Ministry of 
Justice,” 1-10. Last accessed 10 May 2019.  
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of international human rights conventions within the government 
organs and also translation of government’s legal documents.859  
 
The services the Ministry of Justice provides are free legal aid, Huqūq (legal 
affairs), human rights, government cases, juvenile rehabilitation, registration 
of political parties and social organisations, government real estates, petition 
writers’ affairs, Taqnin (drafting laws) and legislation, procedure of 
addressing petitions and handling complaints made by individuals.860  
 
The directorates which form the Ministry of Justice are General Directorate 
of Legislative Drafting; General Directorate of Huqūq; General Directorate 
of State Lawsuits; General Directorate of Legal Aid; General Directorate of 
Policy and Planning; General Directorate of Internal Audits; General 
Directorate of Publication and Public Relations; General Directorate of 
Registration of Political Parties and Social Organisations; General 
Directorate of Administration and Finance; General Directorate of Human 
Resources; General Directorate of Foreign Relations; General Directorate of 
Human Rights Support; Gender Directorate and the Department of 
Procurement. The strategies and policies that the Ministry of Justice follows 
as of August 2020 are the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2017; 
Combating Administrative Corruption Strategy 2008-2012; National Priority 
Program Five – JFA 2019-2023, and Public Legal Aid Unit Communication 
Strategy 2018-2022, as well as the policies of the Ministry of Justice.861   
 
                                                          
859 Ministry of Justice, “Law and Justice Strategy 2014-2018,” 5. last accessed 10 October 
2020.  
860 Ministry of Justice, 5. Last accessed 10 October 2020. 
861 The official web portal of the Ministry of Justice, “Strategies and Policies,” last accessed 
10 May 2019.  
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The official web portal of the Ministry of Justice includes a database of all 
the laws of Afghanistan, from the past to the present day. These laws date 
back to over a hundred years ago. The online database is available in the Dari 
(Farsi) and Pashto languages and can be accessed globally. Publications are 
in PDF format and are available for free downloading. This technical 
assistance is provided by USAID and other donors. This online database 
makes Afghanistan’s laws and regulations accessible to anyone in any part of 
the world, which is of great help to Afghan citizens, to Afghanistan’s 
government and to anyone interested in Afghanistan’s laws. The Ministry of 
Justice issues Jarida-e rasmi (official gazette), legal periodicals called Āgāhi 
hoqūqi (legal awareness) and a magazine called Adālat (justice) and a 
newsletter.   
 
The Supreme Court   
 
According to Constitution 2004, the judiciary comprises the Supreme Court, 
courts of appeal and the primary courts, whose organisation and authority 
shall be regulated by law.862 The Supreme Court is the highest judicial organ, 
heading the judicial power of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.863 The 
departments that form the Supreme Court are the Secretariat of the High 
Council; General Directorate of Scrutiny and Studies; Directorate of Judicial 
Audit; Judicial Education Directorate; Directorate of Correspondence; 
General Directorate of Human Resources; Directorate of Publications; 
General Directorate of Finance and Administrative Affairs; Directorate of 
                                                          
862 CONSTITUTION 2004, art. CXVI. 
863 CONSTITUTION 2004, art. CXVI. 
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Planning and Policy; Directorate of Capacity Building and Performance 
Appraisal and the Islamic Verdict & Vice and Virtue Department.864  
 
As of 16 August 2020, the laws the Supreme Court uses for its operations are 
Constitution 2004, Organisation and Jurisdiction Law, Criminal Procedure 
Code, Civil Procedure Code, Commercial Procedure Code, bills, regulations 
and procedures and other laws.865 The Supreme Court consists of the Supreme 
Court chambers, appeal courts, primary courts and special courts.866 The 
Supreme Court ensures the compatibility of all laws with Article 3 of 
Constitution 2004, which states, “In Afghanistan, all laws must be in 
conformity with the tenets of Islam.” The Supreme Court’s main role in 
carrying out this task is defined within the ambit of Article 3 of Constitution 
2004.867 The Supreme Court has been given powers, similar to constitutional 
courts in other countries, to issue binding legal opinions on the 
constitutionality of various legal issues.  
 
The Supreme Court should comprise nine High Council members appointed 
by the president who must also receive parliamentarian endorsement in the 
Upper House (House of the Elders), in observance of the provisions of clause 
three of Article 50 as well as Article 118 of Constitution 2004.868 As of 
August 2020, four High Council members are in their posts: Abdul Malik 
                                                          
864 Supreme Court of Afghanistan official web portal “Court Divisions,” last accessed 16 
August 2020. 
865 Supreme Court, last accessed 16 August 2020. 
866 Supreme Court, last accessed 23 July 2020.  
867 Article 3 of Constitution 2004 provides that ‘No law shall contravene the tenets and 
provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan’.  
868 CONSTITUTION 2004, art. CXVII. Article 50 relates to the creation of a healthy 
administration, aiding legal reforms and citizens’ participation in the government and 
increasing their capacity to access justice without discrimination, and Article 118 relates to 
the qualifications set out for the Supreme Court in 6 sub-sections.  
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Kamawi, Barat Ali Mateen, Abdulqader Adalatkhah and Mohammad Zaman 
Sangari.869 This indicates that at the time of writing, the Supreme Court does 
not have the right number of High Council members, and is not operating its 
full capacity according to Constitution 2004.  
 
The publications of the Supreme Court are Mizān (The Scale), Qazā 
(Judgment), Bulletin (English only), judicial circulars, judicial and 
administrative seminars and conferences, reports and the definite decisions of 
courts. In October 2020, the Supreme Court of Afghanistan added a new 
format of anonymised court decisions which provides more information on 
the court procedures, laws and decisions of the judges. Although this is an 
improvement, it falls short of international standards for a court promulgation.     
 
The ICOIC  
 
The government of Afghanistan has set up a commission for assessing the 
constitutionality of various legal issues. This organ is known as the 
Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the 
Constitution (ICOIC). The ICOIC issues non-binding and advisory opinions. 
The overlap of roles between the Supreme Court and the ICOIC has created 
constitutional conflicts. Ghizal Haress argues that clashes of authority and 
jurisdiction between the ICOIC and the Supreme Court creates flawed judicial 
review processes.870 The ICOIC’s work is regulated by the principles and 
internal rules of the Independent Commission for Overseeing the 
Implementation of the Constitution comprising six sections and twenty-five 
                                                          
869 Supreme Court of Afghanistan official portal “Court Divisions,” last accessed 23 July 
2020.   
870 Haress, “A Flawed Process,” 1-58.  
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articles.871 The ICOIC publishes numerous reports and a constitution 
magazine.  
 
The Attorney General’s Office   
 
The Attorney General’s Office, also known as the Prosecutor’s Office, is the 
prosecutorial section of the judiciary. The 1964 constitution gave power to 
the Attorney General’s Office to investigate and prosecute cases.872 Since its 
establishment as an institution of the government, reporting to the executive 
branch, the Attorney General’s Office has undergone structural changes. 
Martin Lau, lecturer at SOAS University of London, explains that the 
Constitution of 1977 in Article 106 located the Attorney General’s Office 
within the Ministry of Justice, and in the Interim Constitution of 1980, it 
became answerable to the Revolutionary Council; in 1996 the Taliban 
abolished the Attorney General’s Office, but it was reinstated by President 
Hamid Karzai in 2002.873  
 
The Attorney General’s Office operates based on Article 134 of the 
constitution and Article 4 of the law on the Attorney General’s Office 
mandate and structure.874 According to Article 34 of Constitution 2004, the 
Attorney General has the authority to investigate, prosecute crimes and lodge 
cases against the accused in courts.875  
 
                                                          
871 The ICOIC sections contain general provisions, electing the president, the vice-president 
and secretary, the authority and duties of the Commission, a description of ICOIC 
departments, and finally the duties of the chief secretariat.  
872 Wimpelmann, The Pitfalls of Protection, 34.  
873 Lau, “Afghanistan’s Legal System,” 17. 
874 The official portal of the Attorney General’s Office, “Message from Attorney General 
Mohammad Farid Hamidi,” 1.  
875 The official portal of the Attorney General’s Office, “The historical root of Prosecutors 
in Afghanistan,” last accessed 22 February 2019. 
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The Attorney General’s Office is formed by six deputies. These are the 
Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Crimes Investigation; Deputy Attorney 
General’s Office for Prosecution Cases; Deputy Attorney General’s Office 
for Anti-Violence against Women and Juvenile Delinquency; Deputy 
Attorney General’s Office for Financial and Administrative Affairs; Deputy 
Attorney General’s Office for Military Affairs and the Deputy Attorney 
General’s Office for Anti-Corruption Affairs. The Anti-Corruption Judicial 
Centre (ACJC) also operates under the Attorney General’s Office. The 
Attorney General’s Office publishes the Sāranwāl (Prosecutor), Sāranwāl 
(Prosecutor’s Magazine), articles, as well as general and special reports.   
 
The laws that the Attorney General’s Office and prosecutors use for their 
operations are Constitution 2004, the Attorney General’s Office formation 
and competencies, the penal code, criminal procedure law, law on the 
elimination of violence against women, law against drugs and alcoholic 
drinks and their control, and the police law. The procedures it uses are 
procedure for assessing prosecutors’ operations; prosecution office’s cadre 
and rank procedures; procedures for referring prosecutors to training centres 
at Kabul University; procedures for referring prosecutors to training centres 
at private universities; recruitment prosecutors and Internal Complaint 
Procedure Number 180.876  
 
The Attorney General’s Office currently works on ‘Five Year Strategic Plan 
2018-2021.’877 The Attorney General’s Office has offices in 297 out of 387 
                                                          
876 Official portal of the Attorney General’s Office, “Laws,” last accessed 13 August 2020. 
877 Attorney General’s Office, “Laws,” last accessed 13 August 2020.  
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districts and only 263 offices are operating in the district of their 
jurisdiction.878 In March 2020, the Attorney General’s Office informed 
UNAMA that 3,533 prosecutors and administrative staff are in service, with 
1,512 serving in Kabul and 2,011 in the provinces.879 More than a third of the 
Attorney General’s Office’s administrative staff are female and one-twelfth 
of the prosecutors are female.880 In 2019, the Attorney General’s Office’s 
control and monitoring department prosecuted twenty-two staff, including 
seventeen prosecutors, for corruption offences.881 In a previous report 
released in 2019, UNAMA reported that as of 2018, there were 2,082 
attorneys working for the Attorney General’s Office, of which 622 were 
working in Kabul Province on average giving each attorney sixty-five cases 
to work on per year.882  
 
On 22 April 2019, the Attorney General’s Office reported it had resolved 
41,658 cases in the year 2018.883 From these, 21,266 were civil cases, 14,139 
were military cases, 2,855 were cases of crimes against internal and external 
security, 3,398 were drugs cases and 238 were cases of kidnapping. The 
Attorney General’s Office reports that over the past ten years it carried out 
75,957 prosecutions.884 The Attorney General’s Office further reports that 
between 2015 and 2016, it investigated 32,667 criminal cases and referred 
them to the courts.885 Based on Article 134 of the constitution, these cases 
                                                          
878 UNAMA, “Crucial for Peace and Prosperity,” 41.  
879 UNAMA, 41. 
880 UNAMA, 41-42.  
881 UNAMA, 42.  
882 UNAMA, “Groundwork for Peace and Prosperity,” 32. 
883 Attorney General’s Office, “41,658 cases in 2018,” last accessed 6 September 2020.  
884 Attorney General’s Office, “Performance and Achievements of the Attorney General’s 
Office during 2010-2015,” last accessed 6 September 2020. 
885 Attorney General’s Office last accessed 6 September 2020. 
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involved civil and military crimes as well as crimes against internal and 
external security.886 In 2014 and 2015, the Attorney General’s Office 
investigated 22,528 criminal cases; in 2013-2014, it investigated 14,122 
criminal cases; in 2012-2013, it investigated 15,510 criminal cases and in 
2011-2012, a total of 29,966 cases were investigated.887  
 
There is no correlation between the Attorney General’s Office’s statistics and 
those of other judiciary-linked organisations such as the Ministry of Justice 
and the Supreme Court. A substantial number of cases resolved by the 
Attorney General’s Office are cases which do not go to the courts. Providing 
wholesale numbers such as the above without detailed, open, clear and 
verifiable information under the name ‘resolved cases’ undermines the 
credibility of the Attorney General’s Office. In June 2020, UNAMA raised 
doubts on Afghanistan government’s information in several areas, 
highlighting inconsistencies, anomalies and information that in reference to 
another source were deemed doubtful.888 Therefore, statistics from the 
Attorney General’s Office cannot be independently confirmed and verified.     
The Anti-Corruption Justice Centre (ACJC) 
 
In 2016, the government of Afghanistan established the Anti-Corruption 
Justice Centre (ACJC). The centre includes specialist police, prosecution 
units and courts that are [believed to be] independent from political and other 
pressures in detecting, investigating and prosecuting corruption.889 Chad 
                                                          
886 Attorney General’s Office, last accessed 6 September 2020.  
887 Attorney General’s Office, last accessed 6 September 2020. 
888 UNAMA, “Crucial for Peace and Prosperity,” 1-77. 
889 UNAMA, “Anti-Corruption Justice Centre established,” last accessed 13 September 
2020.  
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Brooks and Craig Trebilcock view the establishment of the ACJC as a step in 
the right direction for attracting more support from the international 
community through which the government of Afghanistan could gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of Afghan citizens.890 However, Brooks and Trebilcock 
are sceptical of the ACJC’s efficiency and posit that the government of 
Afghanistan established the centre as window dressing before the NATO 
donor conferences scheduled for June 2016 in Warsaw and October 2016 in 
Brussels.891  
 
Afghanistan’s international obligations regarding the prevention and 
prosecution of corruption cases are derived primarily from the 2003 United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which Afghanistan 
signed on 20 February 2004 and ratified on 25 August 2008.892 UNAMA 
argues that the ACJC is a secure work location where specialised divisions of 
judges and prosecutors, alongside investigative teams of the Major Crime 
Task Force (MCTF), address corruption offences of the highest value or 
involving public officials of senior rank.893  
In June 2018, the United States Watchdog, SIGAR, tasked for Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction, published a report that identified the limitations and 
constraints the ACJC faced. According to SIGAR, the challenges that limit 
the Afghanistan’s government’s ability to combat corruption are (1) key anti-
corruption institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Judicial Centre (ACJC) 
and the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) lack the capacity, resources or 
                                                          
890 Brooks and Trebilcock, “Fighting for Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” 113. 
891 Brooks and Trebilcock, 113. 
892 UNAMA, “Groundwork for Peace and Prosperity,” 10. 
893 UNAMA, 29.  
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security they need to perform their functions; (2) despite efforts by the Afghan 
government to clarify the law, Afghan officials have differing opinions about 
recurring conflicts between these organisations; (3) Afghanistan’s law 
enforcement and judiciary often avoid investigating, prosecuting and 
punishing powerful individuals; (4) unqualified and potentially corrupt actors 
continue to operate in key anti-corruption institutions; (5) there are problems 
even in challenging corrupt officials, even if whistle-blowers expose them 
and finally (6) the United States, as well as international sources and Afghan 
officials express scepticism about the Afghan parliament’s willingness to 
support anti-corruption reforms.894  
 
The United States Department of State reports that according to UNAMA, 
from the Anti-Corruption Justice Centre’s inception in 2016 to mid-May, the 
ACJC tried 223 defendants in fifty-seven cases before its trial chamber and 
173 defendants in fifty-two cases before its appellant chamber.895 Of the 
brought cases against 117 accused, thirty-six were decided after appeal to the 
Supreme Court, 127 warrants and summonses were issued, of which only 
thirteen warrants and thirty-nine summonses could be executed to date, with 
only a single defendant tried as a result.896 As of March 2019, the outstanding  
arrest warrants and summonses were 255, and by March 2020, the Ministry 
of Interior converted summonses into warrants and reported that 171 were 
executed and eighty-four remained outstanding, including those against 
thirty-four fugitives outside Afghanistan.897   
 
                                                          
894 SIGAR, “Significant Problems Must be Addressed,” 1-3. 
895 US Department of State, “Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights Report,” 28.  
896 US Department of State, 28.  
897 UNAMA, “Crucial for Peace and Prosperity,” 12. 
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The Attorney General’s Office publishes limited information on ACJC 
adjudications on ACJC Case Tracker. The data includes the position of the 
convicted officials, the offences as well as the fines and jail terms imposed 
on the convicted persons.898 For serious corruption cases, like those 
investigated by the ACJC, there must be adequate case information available 
in the public domain. Currently, brief information of up to two or three pages 
per case are included on the Attorney General’s Office, which is very short 
and offers insignificant information. An ACJC case promulgations must be 
dozens of pages. Appendix 14 shows a very terse promulgation produced by 
the ACJC. 
 
The Parliament   
 
There are different views as to when the Parliament was formed in 
Afghanistan. Some scholars view Amanullah Khan’s consultative assembly 
as the parliament. However, the first parliament may have been established 
during King Zahir Shah’s rule. The 1964 constitution made the cabinet 
accountable to an elected parliament.899 Torunn Wimpelmann reports that in 
two parliamentary elections held in 1965 and 1969 voter participation was 
low and the intelligentsia could not compete with the traditional power 
holders who formed the majority.900 Most written records point to the fact that 
                                                          
898 As of February 2019, the official portal of the Attorney General’s Office has begun 
recording the offences and legal provisions under which the ACJC tried offenders of serious 
corruption case and these were under Article 421 (false declaration of assets), Article 419 
(illicit enrichment), Article 403 (abuse of function by a public official), Article 399 (abuse of 
influence), Article 396 (illegal ownership of money by a public official), Article 395 (gaining 
benefits from government revenue by a public official), Article 394, (gaining unlawful 
benefits), Article 391(embezzlement by a public official), Article 379 (perpetrators that are 
members of elected bodies), Article 375 (judicial perpetrators), Article 372 (bribe-giving), 
Article 371 (bribe-taking), Article 268-274 (embezzlement), Article 254 and 260 (bribe-
giving), Article 254, 258, 259, 261 (receiving/requesting bribes).  
899 Wimpelmann, The Pitfalls of Protection, 34. 
900 Wimpelmann, 34.  
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the Parliament was formed in the 1960s. Afghanistan had a functional 
parliament until 1992, when the last socialist government of Afghanistan fell 
to the Mujāhedin groups. The Taliban used the legal opinion of their forty-
member ulemā and did not operate a parliament from 1996 until 2001.  
 
In the post-2001 order, Afghanistan’s bicameral National Assembly 
(parliament) comprises of the Lower House (House of the People) with 250 
seats and the Upper House (House of the Elders) with 102 seats. The House 
of the People, elected in 2018, comprises 181 men (72.4 percent) and sixty-
nine women (27.6 percent).901 Afghanistan’s both houses of parliament issue 
publications that are downloadable from their official webpages. Both houses 
type the parliamentary debates and name their report, Hansard Report, a term 
that is copied from Westminster Parliament in England.      
 
The last parliamentary elections were held on 20 and 21 October 2018 after a 
four-year delay by the National Unity Government. Approximately four 
million out of 8.8 million registered voters cast ballots, and although there 
was high voter turnout, the election was marred by irregularities, including 
fraudulent voter registration, voter intimidation, vote rigging – such as 
interference by the Independent Election Commission staff and police, and in 
some cases, polling stations forced to close due to local leaders.902  
 
The Police Force   
 
                                                          
901 UNAMA, “Crucial for Peace and Prosperity” 61.  
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The Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan states 
that in Afghanistan, police structure was established under the Police Training 
Centre for the first time in 1315 (1936).903 German instructors used to provide 
training in this centre which was established in Mahtāb Qala near Pol-e- 
Sokhta area of Kabul.904 Prior to this date, primary historical sources written 
by the British writers refer to traditional police called kotwal. The first 
reference to kotwal is made in literature about Abdur Rahman Khan                (r. 
1880-1901), and his rule in which British political agents had widespread 
presence and influence.  
 
The Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are in charge of securing cities and 
government buildings. The Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police 
2013-2023 lists the main duties and achievements of the Afghan police as 
follows. 
Within ten years the Afghan National Police (ANP) will become a 
unified, capable, and trustworthy civilian police service. Its primary 
responsibility will be to enforce the rule of law; maintain public order 
and security; detect and fight crimes; control borders; protect the 
rights, assets and freedoms of both Afghans and foreigners in 
Afghanistan according to national laws; and operate without ethnic, 
gender, language or religious discrimination. By pursuing the 
principles and objectives of the peace and reintegration program, 
which is based on the decisions of the 2-4 June 2010 Consultative 
Jirga, and creating a lawful society, the ANP will pave the way for 
sustainable peace and socio- economic development of Afghanistan. 
It will be a unified and flexible force allowing personnel in the 
different police pillars of the ANP to transfer from one to the other 
when necessary, and winning public confidence by the use of 
community policing approaches to deliver policing services to the 
people of Afghanistan.905   
 
                                                          
903 The official web portal of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, “Background & History,” last 
accessed 09 March 2019.  
904 The official web portal of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, last accessed 09 March 2019. 
905 The official web portal of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, “Vision and Mission,” last 
accessed 23 July 2020. 
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In tribal areas of Afghanistan, there is a local militia police called arbakai. 
The arbakai militias are recruited from within Pashtūn tribes and are given 
the duty of safeguarding rural villages. Afghanistan has had border police and 
special police forces. In November 2017, the border police merged with the 
Afghan National Army.  
 
Legal documents that have regulated police operations over the past nineteen 
years are The Police Law 2009; The National Police Strategy 2011-2016; the 
National Police Plan 2013-2015 and the Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan 
National Police 2013-2023. There is a police code of conduct which police 
officers are expected to read, understand and follow. There is an official 
swearing-in ceremony where new cadets have to swear on the Qur’an that 
they will serve their homeland faithfully. In 2016, UNESCO reported that in 
Afghanistan, seventy percent of police officers were illiterate.906 In 2017, The 
Asia Foundation reported that apart from police forces, citizens of 
Afghanistan report a crime to Shūrā, jirga, tribal leaders, district governors, 
mullahs, provincial authorities, courts, family members, public prosecutors 
and arbakai (local militia). This indicates that the police are not the first or 
only point of contact for the citizens of Afghanistan. Media sources in 
Afghanistan also report that police officers are on the frontline of war against 
the Taliban – a role that belongs to the army.  
 
                                                          
906 TOLO News, “60,000 Afghan Police Illiterate,” last accessed 12 May 2018. 
   
 




Figure 11: “A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2017” The Asia 
Foundation.  
 
11.4 Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA) 
 
The Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA) was regulated by 
provisions of Constitution 2004. The International Bar Association considers 
that the establishing of AIBA has been carried out according to democratic 
rules, and many Afghan lawyers are now members of the Bar.907 AIBA was 
established under a grant from the Swedish Foreign Ministry, and the UK 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office pays for a placement of a legal specialist 
in Kabul.908  
 
AIBA is an independent organisation that regulates the work of the advocates. 
The Advocates Law passed by Parliament in November 2007 provides for an 
independent, non-governmental Bar Association to lead and regulate all the 
activities of the advocates.909 AIBA was officially established in September 
2008, following an assembly of 450 defence lawyers coming from all parts of 
                                                          
907 AIBA, “Afghan Independent Bar Association.” 1. 
908 AIBA, 1.  
909 AIBA, 1.  
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Afghanistan. During a four-day conference, the leadership of AIBA was 
elected and bylaws were debated and adopted.910 The Advocates Law consists 
of forty-two articles and is based on Article 31 of Constitution 2004 in order 
to regulate the rights and duties as well as other responsibilities of the 
advocates.911  
 
AIBA is a self-governing professional association of lawyers that represents 
the interests of lawyers; promotes their continuing legal education and 
training; regulates entry into the legal profession; upholds professional 
standards and ethics; protects the interests of the public and advocates for the 
rule of law and the independence of lawyers.912 The AIBA committees are 
the Family Rights Committee; Resolving Defence Lawyers’ Problems 
Committee; Consultancy Committee; Legal Aiders Committee; Commercial 
Arbitration Committee; Women’s Committee; International Relations 
Committee; Radio Committee; Training Committee; Fighting Corruption 
Committee; Public Awareness Committee and the Elections Committee.913 
AIBA issues wekālat (legal defence) monthly, and  newsletters.914  
 
The number of AIBA members since its establishment in 2008 through to 
2012 rose to 1,250, which include legal aid and private lawyers.915 The 
number of AIBA registered members as of 2019 were 4,206: 980 women and 
3,226 men.916 In 2019, the AIBA held workshops for 1,971 lawyers, from 
                                                          
910 AIBA, 1.  
911 Article 1 of the Advocates Law of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 
912 AIBA, 1.  
913 AIBA webpage, “About AIBA,” last accessed 23 July 2020. 
914 AIBA webpage, “Publications,” last accessed 23 July 2020. 
915 Han, “Legal Aid in Afghanistan,” 6. 
916 AIBA webpage, “AIBA Annual Report 2019,” last accessed 23 July 2020. 
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which 724 were female.917 The above data indicates that in twelve years of its 
operation, the AIBA has increased its role and attracted more professional 
cadres and lawyers. Criminal defence lawyers reported the judiciary increased 
respect and tolerance for the role of defence lawyers in criminal trials, but 
defendants’ attorneys continued to experience abuse and threats from 
prosecutors and other law enforcement officials.918 The AIBA may be 
regarded as a successful professional body, independent of the government.  
 
11.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided a historical account of legal developments from the 
1880s to the present day. It has highlighted the stages of legal development, 
reversals of gains and the definition of legal interregnum and how legal 
interregnums happened. The chapter has further described the institutions of 
justice in Afghanistan. Where feasible, the chapter has given a longer 
historical perspective of legal institutions. The chapter highlighted the role of 
the political leadership and how throughout different periods, of Afghan-led 
and foreign-led stages, legal developments progressed, faced setbacks by 
interregnums or certain gains reversed.   
 
The chapter has also described the history and foundations of legal 
institutions and the laws that regulate their operations. This extended to a non-
governmental organisation such as AIBA. To follow the findings of this 
chapter and despite the problems highlighted, the next chapter investigates 
                                                          
917 AIBA, “AIBA Annual Report 2019,”  
918 US Department of State, “Afghanistan 2018 Human Rights Report,” 11.   
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the judicial quality in Afghanistan, which is an important element of modern 
governments and the expansion of the rule of law.     
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CHAPTER 12: JUDICIAL QUALITY IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
12 Introduction  
 
This chapter describes legal education, requirements for the tenure of 
judgeship and highlights the sizable growth of judgeship in the post-2001 
period in Afghanistan. It also identifies a number of problems that affects the 
judges, court judgments and the independence of the judiciary.  
 
The chapter focuses on the excessive politicisation, irregularities, flawed 
recruitment processes, and the casuistry application of the law by the judges 
that short-changes the quality of justice in Afghanistan and violate Afghan 
law and international standards.     
    
12.1 Legal Education   
 
In Afghanistan, until recent years, legal sources used for adjudications were 
eighteen books, in use in courts in twenty of the provinces of the country. 
Bokhdi News reports that in 2013, Islamic scholars and judges from other 
Islamic countries reported in their research papers that these legal sources 
were unknown to them, and that Afghanistan lagged behind other Islamic 
judiciaries by at least a hundred years.919  
  
As a direct result of the international community’s humanitarian assistance in 
Afghanistan since 2001, there are now government-run universities in most 
provinces. There are hundreds of private universities, higher education 
institutions and vocational learning centres. In 2011, according to statistics 
                                                          
919 Naderi, “100 years behind other Islamic countries,” last accessed 4 April 2016.   
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from the Ministry of Higher Education of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, 8,902 students enrolled to study law at university.920  
 
There are a number of problems in regard to legal education in Afghanistan. 
Writing in 2013, Rohullah Azizi and Charles Erickson argued that the 
objectives of legal education in Afghanistan were not well-defined.921 The 
dominant style of old school of legalists in Afghanistan has acquired low 
levels of literacy in madrasas, and the use of rote learning of religious texts 
in their original Arabic. There is also an ongoing generational difference in 
perceptions of competency in the legal sphere concerning education and 
expertise, where elderly professionals find younger legalists less capable of 
using their legal expertise.  
 
Some officials in the Supreme Court of Afghanistan have argued that students 
who join the legal profession do not have the requisite expertise and legal 
knowledge to start a successful career, and many organisations working with 
the judiciary have also raised similar concerns.922 The differences in the legal 
curriculum, number and types of skills between that of madrassa rote learning 
and scholastic methods acquired by younger students is a problem the 
governments of Afghanistan have failed to address thorough the years.      
 
There is a substantial growth in the new style, scholastic legal expertise in 
Afghanistan, where law is studied in modern universities. A survey carried 
out by the Rule of Law Stabilisation, conducted in May 2013, shows that there 
                                                          
920 Azizi and Erickson, Legal Education in Afghanistan, 4. 
921 Azizi and Erickson, 10. 
922 Azizi and Erickson, 16. 
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were seventeen universities or higher education institutes and approximately 
13,462 students received training in law.923 There were 380 teachers of law at 
the law and Shari’a schools.924 The increase in the number of law students 
creates hopeful prospects for future legal developments.925 In October 2020, 
a report by 8 A.M. News showed that over 10,000 students enrolled for the 
judicial stage course.926 This indicates the biggest growth of legal education 
in the history of Afghanistan.   
 
12.2 The Recruitment of the Judges  
 
The requirements that a judge has to fulfil in order to occupy his or her 
position differs from one Islamic country to another. According to the 
Administration of Islamic Law Act in Malaysia, the appointment of Shari’a 
court judges does not expressly require a particular educational qualification 
for the judges, but in practice, the appointment of Shari’a judges is only open 
to those who have obtained at least a Bachelor of Arts degree.927 This is 
because judges are appointed from the ranks of the civil service, and the basic 
educational qualification required for the civil service is a degree, which 
                                                          
923 Azizi and Erickson, 16.  
924 Azizi and Erickson, 16.  
925 The United States government as well as the German and Italian governments have 
assisted Afghanistan’s legal institutions. The University of Stanford has produced legal 
books in Dari (Farsi), Pashto and English. The Institute of Max Planck, the IDLO, the UNDP 
as well as other international non-governmental organisations have produced hundreds of 
legal textbooks and practitioners’ guides for the Afghan police forces, judges and prosecutors 
as well as defence lawyers and other professionals. International organisations assisting 
Afghanistan since 2001 have preserved, archived, digitised and printed all types of legal and 
non-legal books on the laws of Afghanistan. The American University of Afghanistan, the 
University of Nebraska, Washington University and New York University as well as other 
Western universities have digitised thousands of books written about Afghanistan. The 
Arthur Paul Afghanistan Collection, part of the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, has digitised 
a number of historical literatures on Afghanistan.  
926 Hussaini, “Do not stifle the applicants’ voices,” last accessed 30 October 2020.  
927 Zin, “Islamic judges in Malaysia,” 119.  
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applies to Shari’a judges as well.928 In Malaysia, a Shari’a judge is also 
required to complete a postgraduate or professional diploma.929 In Indonesia, 
the Religious Judicature Act 1989 sets out requirements for the appointment 
to the position of judgeship in the Islamic courts where the appointee must be 
a Muslim, at least twenty-five years of age, religiously observant, competent, 
honest, just, well-versed in Islamic law and loyal to the official state ideology 
of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.930 The appointee must hold a degree 
in either Islamic law or in civil law.931  
 
In Afghanistan, the law of the jurisdiction of courts, the Code of Conduct for 
judges and Constitution 2004 set out requirements for the appointment of 
judges, determine their training and age, as well as other requirements. 
According to the Law of Organisation and Authority of the Courts of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005, a judge must meet the following 
requirements:  
 
Upon appointment as a judge, (1) the candidate must hold the 
citizenship of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for at least 10 years 
(2) not have been convicted of any crimes or intentional 
misdemeanour by absolute and final decision of an authorised court 
(3) holds a bachelor’s degree from faculties of law or Shari’a or 
above, (4) holds a Diploma of Religious Studies from an officially 
recognised centre or equivalent (5) Not have any epidemic illness or 
disability which impedes a judge’s performance of his duties (6) must 
have completed the age of 23 years upon appointment (7) Must have 
successfully passed a practical Stage judicial training course.932  
 
 
                                                          
928 Zin, 119. 
929 Zin, 119. 
930 Eus and Abdulrahman, “Islamic judges in Indonesia,” 46. 
931 Eus and Abdulrahman, 46. 
932 Touch Point, “A Primer for Practitioners: Legal Education and Training in 
Afghanistan,” 1-2. 
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The law of Civil Procedure 1957 in Article 2 defined the qāzi as “the ruler of 
Shari’a who is appointed by the sovereign or his regent, who settles disputes 
in accordance with the provisions of Shari’a”.933 According to this law, a qāzi 
must be knowledgeable about customs and be able to distinguish the people 
and their position and status in society. Despite the fact that there were two 
law colleges at Kabul University, this law required no further qualifications 
for the employment of a qāzi.934  
 
The Law of Juridical Authority and Organisation of Courts 1967 set out 
certain conditions for admission into the judicial position, which included the 
possession of a bachelor’s degree obtained from the Faculty of Law or the 
Faculty of Shari’a, or a certificate from the official madrasas not below 
baccalaureate level.935 Baccalaureate level in Afghanistan is the completion 
of year twelve of school. The inconsistent and quite irregular educational 
requirements for judges have damaged the quality of judgeship in the entirety 
of Afghanistan. This may in part explain why the citizens of Afghanistan 
distrust the formal judicial institutions. A judge with a few years of 
memorising religious texts and a judge with a doctoral legal qualification do 
the same job in Afghanistan.       
 
12.3 The Expansion of Judgeship  
 
In Afghanistan, the development of legal training and establishing a cadre of 
judges has proved a tumultuous path for different governments. According to 
                                                          
933 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 229.  
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John Jupp, from 1923 until 2004, there were eleven regime changes in 
Afghanistan, eight of which took place from 1973 to 2001.936  
 
According to Mohammad Hashim Kamali, by the late 1960s, a legal 
community upwards of 1,200 persons had emerged, which included 715 
government-appointed judges, 170 prosecutors and 100 lawyers who were 
either graduates of Kabul University or religious madrasas, and in the 1960s, 
the judiciary recruited judges who had obtained a higher education.937 The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that in 2001 to 2002, the 
number of Afghanistan’s judges were 1,920, allocating 7.04 judges for every 
one hundred thousand people in 2001 – and 6.86 judges for every one hundred 
thousand people in 2002.938 The number of lay magistrates was reported to 
be 1,032 of which 29 were female judges.939  
 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Afghanistan reported the number of judges to 
be 2,296 which included a total of 1,849 sitting judges.940 According to the 
Supreme Court of Afghanistan, in 2006, about one-third of the then 1,415 
sitting judges met the higher education qualification requirement.941 By 2019, 
300 female judges serve in Afghanistan’s judicatory.942  
 
  
                                                          
936 Jupp, “Legal transplants,” 78. 
937 Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, 207. 
938 UNODC, “Eighth United Nations Survey,” 137-150. 
939 UNODC, 137-150. 
940 Touch Point, “A Primer for Practitioners: Legal Education and Training in 
Afghanistan,” 2. 
941 Touch Point, 2.  
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12.4 Judgements    
 
In this research, a number of documents issued by the judiciary such as the 
crime statistics, court decisions, case promulgations and the activities of the 
courts have been translated from Dari (Farsi) into English and are shown in 
the appendices. These documents indicate that some level of reporting is 
available which aids the researchers.  
 
An important factor that short-changes justice in the judgments is the personal 
and intuitive influence of judges over what the law is and what the judge 
makes the law to be. This is not legal realism as to what may be possible 
legally in a certain situation. The courts in Afghanistan do not create judge-
led laws, but laws in courts are judge-owned, which means the judges are 
highly likely to use their personal views and read their subjective 
understanding into written laws or into the Qur’an and hadiths instructions. 
John Jupp argues that Afghan judges use personal knowledge and intuition 
rather than the law.943 This problem is more pronounced in the madrasa-
educated judges, most of whom buy their way into judiciary through 
nepotism, bribery and political connections.   
 
In a comprehensive report called, ‘Observing the conditions of courts 
operations and the Judicial System in Afghanistan’ written in 2012, the 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission identified key 
problems in the judiciary to have been lack of access to competent courts; 
lack of trust in the judiciary; judges and judicial staff not turning up for their 
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duties, and at times the judges closing the court doors for days on end.944 The 
report adds:  
 
The judges turned up late and left early and there was no control or 
oversight over their duties. In many areas, judges were not 
independent and in the areas where government had no control, judges 
were under the influence of warlords and insurgents. There were 
deliberate delays and a lack of consideration for the equality of the 
sexes in the courts of law. The judges also ignored cases of violence 
against women. Due to the lack of legal education and expertise, in 
certain areas, judges read out the prosecution’s or investigator’s 
statements as a verdict.945  
 
 
From October 2016 to June 2017, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) and 
Society Empowerment Organisation (SEO) conducted a community court 
observation programme and monitored 929 trials in the Herat, Kandahar, 
Kapisa, Nangarhar and Balkh provinces. The overwhelming majority of the 
trials observed in the five provinces were criminal trials, where routine 
adherence to basic procedural requirements such as properly constituted 
judicial panels and properly attired judges were noted.946  
 
The programme also found there were significant divergences concerning 
adherence to substantive legal requirements that promote transparency and 
protect the rights of the accused; across five provinces, it was more common 
to conduct proceedings in the judges’ chambers instead of in an open 
courtroom as required by law; in the majority of the cases the verdict was not 
routinely announced in public in the presence of the accused and, across the 
five provinces, prosecutorial police revealed a gender bias, as crimes 
                                                          
944 AIHRC, “Observing the conditions of courts,” 8-10.  
945 AIHRC, 8-12. 
946 IWA, “Lessons from Community-Based Monitoring,” 1.  
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involving direct female victims were rarely prosecuted.947 According to 
TOLO News, the legal, judicial and educational institutions of Afghanistan 
are identified as the most corrupt institutions.948     
 
There is yet another institutional problem that relates to the state of 
Afghanistan and how it pursues justice and manages the judiciary. Marin Lau, 
lecturer at SOAS University of London, argues that Afghanistan’s official 
laws – such as the formal legal system established under the provisions of a 
constitution – do not represent de facto norms that govern the lives of the 
majority of the population.949 He finds the government to be unable to 
implement laws in a uniform and countrywide manner, and this is a reflection 
of under-development as well as political constraints.950 This is an ongoing 
problem in Afghanistan which requires the serious attention of the state and 
the judiciary.  
 
Antonio De Lauri focuses on judicial constraints where judges use mediation 
rather than applying abstract laws. De Lauri claims that in civil and criminal 
courts, Afghan judges use mediation. He substantiates his points through 
quoting an actual case. The case was reported in a field research that relates 
to a kidnapping case in which mediation was used under the judgeship of 
Abdul in the Second District Court of Kabul. De Lauri states:      
 
The story begins one afternoon when Homaira, an eighteen-year-old 
girl was approached by a car as she was beginning to make her way 
home from the bazaar, where she had done some shopping. The driver 
of the car, a twenty-year-old man named Hossain, offered to give her 
                                                          
947 IWA, 1. 
948 Amiri, “Educational, Judicial Institutions ‘Most Corrupt’.”  
949 Lau, “Afghanistan’s Legal System,” 7.  
950 Lau, 7   
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a ride home. Since she knew the man, who was from her own 
neighbourhood, she accepted the ride and sat down in the back seat of 
the car. According to the girl, Hossain immediately became 
aggressive and threatened to kill her if she resisted him. After 
threatening her, Hossain drove out of town. Troubled by the fact that 
Homaira had not returned home, the father called the police, not to 
report that she was missing but that she had run away from home. As 
Homaira’s mother explained, within the house her father was 
evidently worried about the girl, but in public he had to appear angry 
with his daughter for the insult she was bringing upon their family. In 
the meantime, Hossain was taking Homaira to the Pakistani border 
where he planned to sell her for profit. However, Hossain, not having 
any experience or the right contacts in Pakistan, almost immediately 
gave up on the criminal venture after some initial difficulties. Three 
days after her disappearance, Homaira returned home. She 
immediately recounted what had happened and gave Hossain’s name. 
Despite this, a day later, she was put into jail and no measures were 
taken by the police against Hossain. The report of the prosecutor who 
sentenced the girl stated that she had run away from home with a man. 
While she was in detention, a meeting between her father, Hossain, 
his father, and other male members of the two families was organised. 
During the meeting Hossain was asked if he was willing to marry 
Homaira, to which he replied ‘Yes’. Homaira was in detention when 
they gave her this news, but she refused the offer. After a few weeks, 
Hossain was also interrogated by the prosecutor, who did not charge 
him with kidnapping, but did obligate him to appear in court. During 
the first session, everyone involved was heard.  Homaira remained in 
detention while Hossain returned home. In the second session, Judge 
Abdul dropped the charge against Homaira after having read all the 
papers and testimonies regarding her case. However, no measures 
were taken by the judge against Hossain. 951 
 
The following is the judge’s explanation for his decision.  
 
Judge: Homaira was detained for many months. From the testimonies 
and the documents, it seems that her version of the facts was what 
actually happened. This is also demonstrated by the fact that she 
refused the marriage proposal of the boy. For her father and for the 
community, it did not matter what happened afterwards. The girl was 
wrong in accepting a ride from the boy. She should not have got in the 
car of a boy who was not her husband or one of her brothers. For 
Homaira’s father this was a disgrace. These stories can end up even 
worse. Homaira had remained in prison for a long time. If she had 
been released she could have run away again or been beaten up at 
home before the matter was settled.952   
                                                          
951 De Lauri, Legal Reconstruction in Afghanistan, 13.  
 
 
952 De Lauri, 13.  
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In the case of Homaira, the criminal responsibility of Hossain is invalidated 
by the fact that societal norms in Afghanistan dictate that a woman must not 
take a lift from a man who is not a husband or sibling. Homaira’s case is not 
an exception, but it is an example that identifies the way judges decide in 
cases where the victim is a woman or girl. Women are more likely to be 
ordered by the judges to observe Shari’a rules of tamkin, which encompasses 
a woman’s matrimonial obligations to her husband, the violation of which is 
called noshūz.953 The tamkin and noshūz concepts take precedent in 
Afghanistan’s judiciary and these religious norms contradict provisions in 
Constitution 2004, EVAW law and the human rights norms. Therefore, most 
of the transplanted human rights norms remain on paper, and in practice, 
judges disregard them.      
 
12.5 Conclusion   
 
This chapter has shown that since the years of the government’s expansion of 
judiciary in the 1960s, the tenure of judicial posts has been problematic; it has 
been affected by institutional failures, corruption and incompetency and this 
in turn has impacted the quality of judgments.  
 
The chapter has identified that many legal provisions and human rights norms 
are disregarded by the judges in Afghanistan. In this thesis, I discussed the 
problem of disregarding human rights in the state education system, the 
bifurcation of legal education into Shari’a and law tracks, the ownership of 
                                                          
953 In Islamic Family Jurisprudence ‘noshūz’ is when a woman is obliged to respect the 
rules of Shari’a in regard to following her husband’s demands.  
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the judiciary by the executive branch and inconsistent constitutional 
provisions, alongside problems of institutional disorganisation, corruption 
and economic interests as a result of donations; explain major the factors of 
circumventing human rights norms. The chapter has also given particular 
attention to the problem of inadequate anonymous court data.  
 
In less developed countries such as Afghanistan, religious interpretations, 
tradition and cultural practices limits women’s social and political rights and 
exposes them to unfavourable conditions, despite elaborate formal provisions 
in the constitution and other laws. Therefore the way women are dealt with in 
society, government and before the law requires particular attention. The final 
chapter therefore investigates women’s status in society and government and 
how they are dealt by the law.  
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CHAPTER 13: THE STATUS OF WOMEN OF 










13 Introduction  
 
The governments of Afghanistan since 1880 to the present, have tried to 
create, expand and modernise government institutions and the state legal 
system. These reforms and expansions demanded that international 
conventions, transplanted legal norms and legal codes help the modernisation 
processes. Major issues relating to women, which governments over the last 
one hundred and forty years attempted to resolve, improve, expand or change 
are bride-prices, baad marriages, polygamy, divorce rights, barriers to 
women’s education and their access to justice through reforming the tribal 
norms of Pashtūnwāli, Islamic law and administrative law. Governments 
intended and to a certain degree acted upon improving women’s rights and 
their living conditions. This chapter uses the process-tracing method and 
offers a historical perspective for the above-written issues. Barriers in 
government and society that slow the improvement of women’s rights will be 
discussed through the intersectionality framework.  
 
This chapter argues that a number of intervening factors and a strong appeal 
to the various agents of traditionalism have negatively affected and continue 
to affect women’s rights in Afghanistan. This chapter also offers an account 
of the national and international mechanisms and institutions seeking to 
I am a woman, I am a woman 
The day I came to this world 
I faced the judgment of my execution 
I didn’t see the doors of my court 
I didn’t see the faces of my judges 
 
Nizar Qabbani 
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empower the women of Afghanistan. It discusses obstacles in society, in the 
education system and how modern legislations prove less fruitful when strong 
legal foundations or meaningful political will to improve women’s conditions 
are absent. From socio-economic to cultural factors, (e.g. corruption, 
traditionalism) there has been little political capital in advancing women’s 
rights within Afghanistan.   
 
13.1 Women’s Status in the Past  
 
In the past, the women of Afghanistan could play active roles in society. 
Nushin Arbabzadah, an Afghan academic and a former Guardian columnist, 
examines historical records in regard to the freedoms the women of 
Afghanistan enjoyed during the Timurid dynasty (1370-1506) in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries. In Timurid times, women held high status, and it was 
this status that in turn allowed them to commission the building of religious 
schools, Sufi khanghahs, mausoleums and shrines.954 This special status was 
based as much on the position of women in Shari’a law as on the position of 
women in the Turko-Mongol sedentary societies.955 Evidence from Timurid 
literature and paintings suggests that women from rich families received an 
education, and in Timurid miniature paintings, girls are often depicted 
studying in rooms beneath those occupied by boys, suggesting that both 
genders received their education in the same building, presumably in a 
madrasa.956   
13.2 Recognition of Women by the State   
 
                                                          
954 Arbabzadah, “Women and Religious Patronage,” 58.  
955 Arbabzadah, 58.  
956 Arbabzadah, 65.  
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In Afghanistan, based on the operations of governments since 1747, women 
are not fully recognised by the governments. In a Taskira document, which is 
the formal identity document issued to citizens of Afghanistan, the mother’s 
information is not included. The women of Afghanistan are only able to 
obtain a Taskira document based on their connection to their father, and again 
their mother’s information is not included. The first state legislation for 
Taskira documents was enacted during the reign of Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-
1929), known as the Taskira Law.957  
 
To the present day, Taskira documents are issued upon citizens’ requests. 
These national identity documents are not issued automatically. This means 
women in rural areas and some women in urban and cosmopolitan cities may 
not receive a Taskira identity document should their agnatic family members 
decide they must not leave home, study, travel or work. Since 1919, the 
governments of Afghanistan have not set up a central organisation to issue, 
record and archive identity documents to Afghanistan’s men and women. 
Different governments of Afghanistan recorded and archived Taskira data in 
paper books and kept them in different departments.   
 
In this chapter, the use of the term misogyny relates to general dislike, 
contempt or ingrained prejudice against women. This term may have different 
connotations in different societies, however, its use here is for the most 
obvious forms of prejudice against the women of Afghanistan. There are 
widespread misogynistic perceptions against women in Afghanistan. Women 
                                                          
957 Nawid, “Aman-Allah and the Afghan ‘Ulama,” 219.  
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are generally regarded as unintelligent, the honour of their men and at times 
as a commodity bought through the payment of bride-price. In the Pashto 
language, the word husband is translated as khāwand (owner). In order for 
men not to mention their wife’s name, they use terms such as mādar-e 
awlādhā, (the mother of the children) or nicknames such as Bibi Gul, 
(Grandma, the Flower). There are derogatory and demeaning words used for 
women such as siāsar (woman with black hair) or zaeefa (the weak person). 
A recent example where men expect their women to hide their names was 
reported by the BBC. Rabia from western Afghanistan returned home 
suffering from pain and fever and gave her prescription to her husband to buy 
the medicine for her. But when the husband saw her name on the prescription, 
he beat her for revealing it “to a strange man” even though it was to a 
doctor.958  
 
Afghan dentist, Ghazal Sharifi Mayel, a mother of two with a successful 
career in Kabul applied for her children’s passports, but her application was 
rejected because she was not recognised as the legal guardian of her own 
children.959 Mayel stated, “As a mother, I felt humiliated because my 
husband’s cousin has more [legal] authority over my kids that I have.960 I 
carried these children in my womb for nine months, and I have delivered them 
after a complicated Caesarean operation.”961 In Afghanistan’s staunchly 
patriarchal society, women are often publicly identified by the names of their 
male relatives – who are seen as their owners.962  
                                                          
958 Nowrouzi, “Where Is My Name,” last accessed 25 July 2020.  
959 Radio Free Europe, “I Felt Humiliated,” last accessed 15 July 2020.  
960 Radio Free Europe, last accessed 15 July 2020. 
961 Radio Free Europe, last accessed 15 July 2020. 
962 Radio Free Europe, last accessed 15 July 2020.   
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In 2017, Laleh Osmany started the online campaign Where Is My Name? 
when she realised she was fed up with women being denied what she thought 
was a “basic right”.963 This campaign resulted in President Ashraf Ghani 
instructing the Afghanistan Central Civil Registration Authority (ACCRA) to 
look into the possibility of amending the country’s Population Registration 
Act to allow women to have their names on their ID cards and children’s birth 
certificates.964 This president’s order does not appear to be an outright victory 
for the women of Afghanistan, as there are mixed feelings and heated debates 
surrounding adding mothers’ names to the Taskira documents. Following 
Ashraf Ghani’s order for the inclusion of mothers’ names; on the 23 of 
September 2020, Javid Rasuli, head of National Statistics Office, announced 
that including mothers’ names on ID cards was optional and that mothers’ 
names would be recorded on the e-Taskira database, and would not be printed 
on the Taskira documents.965  
 
Mohammad Ekram Andishmand views the lack of distributing e-Tazkira ID 
cards after the completion of all the legal and technical processes as the 
government’s failure in one of its biggest national programs.966 The roll out 
of electronic national identity cards (machine readable cards), also known as 
e-Tazkera has begun, heating up a contentious political debate that had been 
                                                          
963 Nowrouzi, “Where Is My Name,” last accessed 25 July 2020. 
964 Nowrouzi, last accessed 25 July 2020. 
965 8 A.M. News, “Inclusion of mothers’ name is optional,” last accessed 23 September 
2020.  
966 Andishmand, “Failure of the National Unity Government,” last accessed 23 September 
2020.   
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simmering since 2013.967 Afghanistan currently has six versions of paper 
Tazkiras in circulation.968   
 
In Afghanistan, there are literatures in circulation which promote an anti-
women sub-culture. BBC Farsi reported the circulation of a thirty-two-paged 
book, Twelve Damned Women, attributed to Mawlana Mohammad Ershad 
Qasimi from Riaz-ul-Olum Gurini of India, translated by Mawlawi Nasrullah 
Takhari; and another book, Six Sinful Women, whose author is unknown. In 
the contents list shared by BBC Farsi News, it reads:  
 
Damn to the women who leave home without their husbands’ 
permission; leaving the husband unhappy leads to damning; women 
putting make-up on and leaving home are damned; dammed are 
women who visit the shrines; who are women damned by?; angels 
damn the women who disobey their husband’s demands; damn to men 
and women who do not marry; damn to women who wear slippers; 
damn to women who wear clothes with bells; damn to women who 
cry for the dead; damn to women who argue and make excuses for 
their husband; damn to women who tear the clothes of a person who 
screams.969  
 
In regard to these literatures, Mohammad Moheq, Afghanistan’s ambassador 
to Egypt, states that these are traditional religious thoughts that accord with 
misogynistic mentality.970 The government of Afghanistan has not arrested or 
reprimanded those who printed, imported or continue to sell these books, and 
did not collect these hate literatures from the markets.   
                                                          
967 Adili and Bjelica, “The E-Tazkera Rift: Yet another political crisis looming?” 1. 
968 Adili and Bjelica, 5.  
969 Rahimi, “When they talk about twelve dammed women,” last accessed 09 December 
2018.  
970 Rahimi, last accessed 09 December 2018.  
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Figure 12: BBC Farsi News: When they talk about twelve dammed women, 
who do they talk about? 
 
13.3 Marriage Registration   
 
The Marriage Laws and civil codes from the 1920s to the present day require 
that each marriage is formally registered. In Afghanistan, to the present date 
there is no nationwide notary organisation or public body assigned for the 
registration of marriages. The registration of marriages continues to be 
voluntary and as a result child and forced marriages are more likely to be 
unregistered.971 The lack of registration of marriages imposes difficulties on 
women with regard to their right to seek divorce in addition to their right to 
dowry (mahr), maintenance and child custody.972  
 
Based on government practices, the citizens of Afghanistan are able to apply 
for the registration of a marriage in courts of law, mainly in primary courts 
under the Supreme Court of Afghanistan. This is different to a marriage 
registration office. It is voluntary and not enforced through legislation. Those 
                                                          
971 Afghanistan State party report, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AFG/1-2 (2011), para. 355; in 
MUSAWAH, “Thematic Report on Article 16,” 4.  
972 MUSAWAH, “Thematic Report on Article 16,” 4. 
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citizens of Afghanistan who migrate to other countries or work for the 
government may apply for court-approved marriage registration in a 
document known as a Wasīqa, whilst millions do not have a marriage 
certificate. This is the second area in which the government of Afghanistan 
does not fully recognise women and their rights. If a woman marries on 
condition that her husband must not marry a second wife, should the husband 
break his promise and marry another wife, then the first wife cannot defend 
her case in the courts of law in the absence of a formal marriage certificate.  
 
Siwan Anderson postulates that bride-price and dowry have been linked to 
domestic violence against women, and inflation in these payments has 
prompted legislation against them in several jurisdictions.973 Marriage 
payments are often a substitute for investment in female human capital, so 
from a welfare and policy perspective, they should be prohibited.974 Bride-
price and marriage payments, have been extensively researched by Alef Shah 
Zadran and Mohammad Hashim Kamali in the context of tribal practices and 
in formal law. Bride-prices and the existence of institutional discrimination 
against women, in Taskira issuance and marriage registrations, leads to a 
number of institutional injustices. These injustices against the women of 
Afghanistan intersect in several areas; it is rooted in societal negative 
perceptions and anti-women hatred, the government’s inaction and a weak 
legal system that often sides with men.    
 
13.4 Religious Obstacles Affecting Women’s Rights   
 
                                                          
973 Anderson, “Human capital effects of marriage payments,” 1.  
974 Anderson, 1. 
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In Afghanistan, the relationships between men and women in family and 
society are drawn by conservative Islamic interpretations of qawāma. 
Qawāma, a Qur’anic concept in Afghanistan’s traditional society is 
interpreted in a way that superimposes legislative and normative laws in 
regard to gender issues. In different Islamic societies, qawāma is interpreted 
very differently. In communities where custom and informal practices are 
dominant, qawāma is literally translated as the superiority of men over 
women. This interpretation forms the focus of Shari’a law in regard to gender 
relations.975 The text of qawāma in Sura An-Nisā, Verse 34 is as follows:  
 
Men are ‘qawāmūn’ (protector/maintainers) in relation to women. 
According to what God has favoured some over others and according 
to what they spend from their wealth. Righteous women are qāniāt 
(obedient) guarding and unseen according to what God has guarded. 
Those (women) whose noshūz (rebellion) you fear, admonish them, 
and abandon them in bed, and adribūhunna (strike them). If they obey 
you, do not pursue a strategy against them, indeed God is Exalted, 
Great.976       
 
In Afghanistan, there are very few ulemā who would interpret qawāma in a 
liberal fashion. The state education system does not promote norms that 
support women’s rights. Fayeq Amiri’s research described in the chapter on 
legal transplants showed that women’s and girls’ status is tarnished in the 
primary school education system; girls are depicted in the curriculum books 
in misogynistic and passive ways. Afghanistan’s education system has not 
succeeded in the promotion of human rights – particularly the rights of 
women and girls. In another research by Shahir Sirat from the Afghan 
                                                          
975  Mir-Hosseini, “Rethinking the Construction of Male Authority,” last accessed 16 
September 2020.   
976 Mir-Hosseini, last accessed 16 September 2020. 
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Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS), titled Education and Politics: The 
Roots of Religious Radicalism in Afghanistan’s School Curricula, using 
contents analysis, Sirat investigated one hundred and forty-four schoolbooks. 
This research identifies and analyses more than fifty cases and examples that 
reinforce the spread of religious radicalism through teachings and lessons 
within Afghanistan’s school curricula, which directly trains students as 
extremists, radicals and fundamentalists.977  
 
Sirat quotes Gitasagal and Nira Yuval Davis who believe that fundamentalism 
has three main characteristics: a plan to control women’s bodies; a kind of 
political action that rejects pluralism and a movement that uses the integration 
of religion as a means to follow their own objectives.978 Sirat observes that 
the educational curricula in Afghanistan are designed and composed 
inexpertly, especially from a philosophical, political and society point of 
view, and the work of Afghanistan’s education curricula has been widely 
influenced and weakened by religion and politics.979 Radical narratives 
excessively undermine the status of women in Afghanistan.  
 
13.5 A Century of Family Law  
 
Since Afghanistan’s statehood in 1880, available official records on the socio-
legal status of Afghan women stem from limited primary sources. During the 
reign of Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), the position of women in 
Afghanistan was inferior to that of men and varied according to age and 
                                                          
977 Sirat, “Education and Politics,” 146. 
978 Sirat, 39. 
979 Sirat, 146.  
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societal norms, and according to differences between ethnic groups to which 
the women belonged.980 Women were expected to remain at home and get 
involved in domestic work and child-rearing.981 The division of males and 
females into separate realms is more pronounced in Afghanistan than in other 
parts of the world.982 Abdur Rahman Khan claimed that the religion of Islam 
entitled men to control their wives and to kill them if they were unfaithful.983  
 
In subsequent monarchical governments, the condition of women did not 
improve much until, in the 1920s, King Amanullah Khan decreed that women 
must appear in public, wear Western attire, receive an education and 
participate in government. The first school in Afghanistan opened in 1901 
under Abdur Rahman Khan.984 The first girls’ school opened under 
Amanullah Khan’s government in Kabul in 1919.985 In 1928, there were eight 
hundred girls in schools.986 However, the girls’ school closed under Nadir 
Shah who ruled Afghanistan from 1929 to 1933.987 In the post-2001 period, 
millions of girls have received primary education and thousands have 
received higher education, some outside Afghanistan.  
 
The first ever legislation that dealt with family law was the 1921 Family Law. 
There were subsequent family law promulgations, namely the 1949 Family 
Law, the 1960 Family Law and the 1971 Family Law. Looking at the contents 
                                                          
980 Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, 171. 
981 Kakar, 171. 
982 Kakar, 172. 
983 Kakar, 172. 
984 Prior to the establishment of government schools, in Afghanistan there were many 
religious (seminary) schools known as the madrasas. In 1901, Abdur Rahman Khan 
established the first school for scientific and secular education.  
985 Rahimi, “Status of Women: Afghanistan,” 8. 
986 Ruttig, “Afghanistan’s Early Reformists,” 3. 
987 Green, Afghanistan’s Islam, 17.  
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of these laws, they all sought to improve gender rights, women’s access to 
judicial adjudication in matters such as dowry claims, child custody, divorce 
and receiving maintenance fees. For legal reform and modernisation 
purposes, these legislations in certain parts had to depart from customary and 
local interpretations of Shari’a. There are not many court records for 
women’s cases. A sample family court decision from the 1980s is shown in 
Appendix 11. The current government of Afghanistan is reluctant to share 
adequate numbers of court promulgations regarding women.   
 
The Civil Law of 1977, the Penal Code (last amended in 2017, in force since 
2018), the Shi’ite Personal Status Law 2009 and Constitution 2004 form the 
family laws of Afghanistan. In 2016, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
(MoWA) – together with relevant ministries and organisations – undertook 
efforts to review and draft a family law in order to replace the Civil Code 
1977.988 The Family and Civil Code 1977 are primarily based on a fairly 
orthodox interpretation of the Hanafi school.989 According to women’s rights 
groups who provide inputs into the draft of the family law, there is little 
information pertaining to the timeline and process of finalising and enactment 
of the new/revised family law.990 The amendments and new provisions have 
been watered down and do not address all the most urgent areas of 
discrimination under the Muslim family laws in Afghanistan and the draft 
currently remains under review with the Ministry of Justice.991  
 
                                                          
988 MUSAWAH, “Thematic Report on Article 16,” 4. 
989 Sharan and Wimpelmann, “Women’s Rights and Political Representation,” 5. 
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Over the past nineteen years, the ulemā and conservative lawmakers in the 
parliament have repeatedly claimed that the laws of Afghanistan promulgated 
and drafted by the past governments are not Islamic. In July 2013 in a rally, 
students at Kabul University denounced the law on Elimination of Violence 
Against Women, and called it un-Islamic and a Western import.992 The 
parliament of Afghanistan, dominated by conservative lawmakers, did not 
approve the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) Law, and this 
legislation exists due only to a 2009 presidential decree.993 The diarchy 
system of modernising and conservative groups in Afghanistan governments 
is a centuries old problem that severely affects women’s rights in legislations. 
The conservatives in the government block or keep modern legislations 
unenforced. Judges’ discretions described in the previous chapter is a major 
impediment.     
 
Despite the problems and disagreements over legislations that support the 
women of Afghanistan, the international community and the state of 
Afghanistan have achieved some successes in empowering those women who 
show a willingness to be empowered, and whose family members support 
their female relatives despite risking their lives.994 The following two graph 
charts offer data collated by the government of Afghanistan on the number of 
                                                          
992 Human Rights Watch, “Ending Child Marriage and Domestic Violence,” 3.                
993 The BBC, “Debate on Women’s Rights Law,” last accessed 28 May 2017. 
994 Achievements for women may be summarised in three categories: short-term project-
based, medium-term educational and professional support and long-term assistance 
guaranteeing a select number of well-networked women in government positions. Short-term 
projects depended on funding and the presence of foreign donor organisations like NGOs, 
and medium-term and long-term activities are ongoing, which have led to the incorporation 
of some of the elements of EVAW’s presidential decree in the updated Penal Code. Debates 
(though still ongoing)  are on increasing the marriage age and legislating a small proportion 
of EVAW cases due to advocacy organisations and some that received media attention. 
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women and men who participate in decision making, and the number of boys 
and girls in schools and universities.  
 
 






Figure 14: Statistical yearbook 2017 and 2018, NSIA.  
 
13.6 The Ministry of Women’s Affairs     
 
In the post-2001 period, numerous government and independent institutions 
were formed for the support of women of Afghanistan. The first of these is 
the revival of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA). This Ministry is 
hailed as an important institution for supporting the women of Afghanistan. 
The procedural regulations for MoWA are as follows:  
 
The first procedural regulation of MoWA as a central institution was 
passed by decision No. 3 of 05.04.2004 of Ministers’ Council, and 
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approved by Decree No. 26 of 24.05.2004 of President of Transitional 
Islamic State of Afghanistan in 4 chapters and 24 articles. Article three 
of this regulation states that: MoWA has the responsibility over 
implementation of political and social policy of the government in 
order to secure and expand legal rights of women and ensure the rule 
of law in their lives within its activity area.995 
 
 
According to MoWA, the foundations of what has now resulted in forming 
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs were first set in 1943.996 Ershad-e-Naswān 
(Women’s Preaching) and Mirman (Woman) are two magazines published by 
MoWA. There are a number of local and international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) which provide help and support for the betterment of 
the lives and the welfare of Afghan women. Over the past nineteen years, the 
British Council’s projects, Tawāndmani (empowerment) multi-partite 
                                                          
995 The official web portal of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, “MoWA History,” last accessed 09 March 2019. 
996 The official web portal of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, “MoWA History,” (Last accessed 09 March 2019). In 1943, during Zahir 
Shah’s reign, a twenty-member union of women established an institution called the 
Women’s Grand Organisation in the centre of Kabul, in order to organise, train and educate 
women. In 1945, King Amanullah allocated a land plot in the Shahr-e-Naw area of Kabul 
(the present location of MoWA) for this organisation, on which a kindergarten, a school, a 
cinema and offices were built. In 1963, this organisation was incorporated into the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs and was called the Women’s Association, which continued its 
activities until 1978. In 1978 the name of the Women’s Association was changed to the 
Women’s Central Club. In 1986 this club was transformed to the Women’s Central 
Association, which continued its activities under this name until 1991. After the event of 27 
April 1978, the Women’s General Council was formed as a social-political organization. The 
Women’s Central Association, which had 360 members, became a second division of this 
council. The Women’s General Council had social and political activities among women. 
This council established its branches both in the capital and in the provinces. In 1991, when 
the Mujahedin came to power in Kabul, the Women’s Grand Organisation was restored and 
first led by Mahbooba Hoquqmal and then by Qudria Yazdanparast. In 1994, parallel to the 
Women’s General Organisation, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs restored the 
Women’s Association in its organisational structure, which continued its activities until 
October 1996. In October 1996, the Taliban entered Kabul and women and girls were 
forbidden to go to school or work. The Taliban incorporated the Women’s Grand 
Organisation with the Women’s Association and hired men instead of women. The Taliban 
regime collapsed in 2001. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs was established according to the 
agreements of the Bonn Conference and became part of the executive of the Interim 
Administration.  
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projects and Promote were funded and supported by the United States, the 
United Kingdom and a number of European states.   
 
13.7 International Instruments for the Support of Women  
 
The United Nations has issued several resolutions pertaining to women’s 
roles in the contexts of peace, gender equality, in society and in government 
settings. UNAMA’s work on women, peace and security is enshrined in UN 
Security Council Resolution 2210 (2015) which reinforces the Mission’s 
imperative to promote gender equality, including increasing women’s role in 
public life and Afghan society.997  
 
The promotion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda is guided by a series 
of commitments to women’s rights including the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action; the Millennium Declaration and the UN Security 
Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security: 1325 (2000), 1820 
(2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2016 (2013), 2122 (2013) 
and 2224 (2015).998 National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan 
(NAPWA), was an initial step by the government of Afghanistan to 
implement its gender commitments in the Afghanistan Compact, I-ANDS and 
other national and international policy instruments on women.999 The Afghan 
government, Finland and UNWOMEN have worked to develop a national 
action plan on Women, Peace and Security.1000  
 
                                                          
997 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2210 (2015).  
998 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2210 (2015).  
999 NAWPA, “President’s Message,” 5.  
1000 Sharan and Wimpelmann, “Women’s Rights and Political Representation” 5. 
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The National Action Plan on UN Security Council resolution 1325 (NAP 
1325) covers the period 2015-2022.1001 Its strategic priorities are grouped 
under the four main pillars of Participation, Protection, Prevention, and Relief 
and Recovery – divided into thirty-nine indicators and twenty-five strategic 
objectives.1002 According to the Annual Report 2018 on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict by the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA), the security situation in 2018 has worsened and there 
are difficulties such as the lack of cooperation between ministries and the 
absence of budgeting and funding for the implementation of NAP 1325, 
compounded with the aggravated insecurity situation, which have hampered 
implementation and programming in provinces as well as Kabul.1003  
 
Women’s rights formed a major part of the Geneva Conference 2020 held in 
Geneva on 23-24 November 2020. UNAMA wrote that violence against 
women and girls has negative consequences not only for survivors but also 
for their families, communities, and society.1004 Deborah Lyons stated that 
violence against women is an impediment to the eradication of poverty, 
sustainable development and efforts towards peace.1005    
 
13.8 The CEDAW Convention   
 
The Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) is an international convention that requires national states 
                                                          
1001Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Afghanistan, “Universal Period 
Review of Afghanistan,” 1.  
1002 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Afghanistan, 1.   
1003 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Afghanistan, 2. 
1004 UNAMA, “Women and Girls Amidst Global Pandemic,” 25 November 2020. Last 
accessed 27 November 2020.   
1005 UNAMA, 25 November 2020. Last accessed 27 November 2020.  
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to create institutional and legislative changes in order to meet the norms and 
provisions enshrined in this convention. The government of Afghanistan 
signed the CEDAW Convention in March 2003.1006 The ratification of the 
CEDAW convention in 2003 made it part of Afghanistan’s legal framework, 
which is an important obligation under international law.1007 There are 
obstacles in the realisation of this convention. The Constitution 2004 at 
Article 3 stipulates that “in Afghanistan no law can be contrary to the beliefs 
and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam”.1008 This article affects the 
implementation of the CEDAW in many ways. Amin Tarzi argues that Article 
3 of Constitution 2004 allows official and non-official ulemā to ascertain 
what is contrary to Islam and what is not:   
 
In the approved version of the [Afghan] constitution, Article 3 was 
amended to read, ‘In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs 
and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.’… This very significant 
clause basically gives the official and nonofficial religious leaders in 
Afghanistan sway over every action that they might deem contrary to 
their beliefs, which by extension and within the Afghan cultural 
context, could be regarded as ‘beliefs’ of Islam.1009 
In 2012, Afghanistan’s Ulemā Council issued a fatwā (edict) proclaiming that 
“men are fundamental and women are secondary”. The edict further said that 
women were to avoid mixing with men in public during social activities that 
included obtaining an education, going to marketplaces and working in 
offices, as well as in other areas of life where men and women mixed.1010 The 
women of Afghanistan face restrictions on their free movement, employment 
and education. These restrictions clearly violate the provisions of CEDAW 
                                                          
1006 United Nations, “Third Periodic Report submitted by Afghanistan,” 5. 
1007 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “ (NAPWA) 2007-2017,” 21. 
1008 CONSTITUTION 2004, art. III.  
1009 Travis, “Freedom or Theocracy?” 1.  
1010 Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan, “Family Law in Afghanistan,” last 
accessed 02 April 2016.   
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and other international obligations supportive of women that Afghanistan’s 
government has agreed to fulfil.   
 
The Home Office of the United Kingdom describes the problems of CEDAW 
implementation in Afghanistan as follows:  
 
In its 2013 Afghanistan report, the CEDAW committee expressed its 
concern at the existence of multiple legal systems with regard to 
marriage and family relations in the State party and their 
discriminatory impact on women. It is concerned that, despite 
amendments of the Shi’a Personal Status Law, discriminatory 
provisions remain, such as the requirement of the husband’s 
authorisation for his wife to leave the house. It is also concerned about 
discriminatory provisions under civil law and customary practices, 
such as the husband’s legal rights to authority over his wife and 
children. It is also concerned over the unequal and limited rights for 
women to divorce and obtain guardianship of children under the Civil 
Law. It is concerned that women are deprived of their inheritance 
rights owing to their subordinate role in society and domination by 
their male relatives. It is concerned at the low registration of marriages 
and divorces, which prevents women from claiming their legal rights. 
The committee is concerned at the persistence of child and forced 
marriages and that the minimum age of marriage for girls is set at 16. 
It is also concerned that polygamy is permitted under certain 
circumstances.1011  
 
The Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women prepared in 
2015 identifies shortcomings by the government in eliminating violence 
against the women of Afghanistan. Rashida Manjoo, the UN Special 
Rapporteur, has concluded in her report as follows:  
 
The Government has undertaken a number of legal and institutional 
initiatives to meet its human rights obligations and to address the 
situation of women and girls in the country, despite the continued 
political, economic, social and developmental challenges. Political 
commitments to protect and promote human rights continue to be 
highlighted through the Bonn process, the Kabul Conference, the 
Tokyo Conference and, most recently, the 2014 London Conference. 
However, these commitments have not translated into concrete 
                                                          
1011 Home Office UK, “Afghanistan: Women fearing gender-based violence,” 14.  
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improvements in the lives of the majority of women, who remain 
marginalized, discriminated against and at high risk of being subjected 
to violence. In light of the above, the Special Rapporteur would like 
to reiterate and expand on key recommendations made by her 
predecessors in 1999 and 2005, many of which remain relevant 
today.1012  
 
The implementation of CEDAW in Afghanistan clashes with tribal and 
religious rules. A number of women living in the rural areas of the country 
suffer greatly when girls are given in baad marriages. Baad marriages, are 
exchange marriages, where a girl is married as compensation for a crime 
committed by a male member of their family. In baad marriage, there is no 
bride-price (toyāna) based on Afghan custom or a dowry based on Islam. The 
practice of baad marriage violates provisions of Constitution 2004 which 
outlaw discrimination and declare that men and women are equal in rights 
and duties.1013 In baad marriages, all Islamic laws which otherwise grant 
rights to the bride are also suspended. Baad marriages violate Afghanistan’s 
statutory laws and the international legal instruments that Afghanistan has 
ratified.   
 
In this section, using process tracing, changes in women’s conditions between 
the government’s first report on CEDAW submitted in 20111014 and 
subsequent periodic reports, the last one having been submitted in 2018, will 
be discussed. The contents of the United Nations report, CEDAW/C/AFG/3 
dated the 24 of January 2019, the findings by the Human Rights Watch and 
the Social Institutions & Gender Index (SIGI) 2019 report on Afghanistan 
                                                          
1012 UNGA, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence,” 18. 
1013 CONSTITUTION 2004, art. XXII. 
1014 Torunn, Pitfalls of Protection, 60.  
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will be used. The United Nations CEDAW/C/AFG/3 report highlights the 
following points: 
 
This report identifies that the state of Afghanistan has created 
commissions for the inclusion of women in the High Peace Council, 
it has established the EVAW High Commission and Provincial 
Commissions in 34 provinces, and significant improvements are made 
in the new Penal Code as it attempts to account for modern day human 
rights standards and international obligation including the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Convention against 
Torture and Convention against Transnational Crimes. The new Penal 
Code has been modernised by reducing punishments of the death 
penalty for fewer criminal cases, refining the definition of rape based 
on more consent requirements, reducing penalty for consensual adult 
zinā (relationship outside marriage) and removing justifications on 
homicide as honour killing, and addressing sexual harassment, rape 
and abortion.1015       
 
In the context of the CEDAW Committee’s recommendation No. 49, 
expecting the state party to submit written information to the Committee 
within two years on the action taken to implement Recommendation No. 11 
on “Support and Protection of Women’s Legal Achievements” and 
Recommendation No. 23 on “Violence Against Women and Punitive 
Actions” a written report was submitted by the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan. The CEDAW Committee states that the government 
of Afghanistan has tried to fulfil its national and international obligations 
towards human rights commitments – particularly on women’s rights.1016 The 
CEDAW Committee’s assessment of actions by the state party is not 
consistent with the problems identified by objective sources. More actions 
need to be taken for meaningful support of women’s rights in Afghanistan.  
 
                                                          
1015 United Nations, “Third Periodic report,” 7, 9, 11.   
1016 United Nations, 5.  
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The Human Rights Watch’s (HRW), submission to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women for the third period report – 
75th Session, issued in December 2019 – raised a number of problems as 
follows:  
Articles 7 and 8: expecting that the State of Afghanistan should be a 
strong defender of women’s rights to be full participants in the peace 
process and ensure that any peace deal fully protects women’s rights 
under international human rights law and the Afghan constitution; 
Article 10: seeking girl’s access to education, whereas, in areas under 
Taliban, girls study for a few primary school classes and in areas 
where the government and insurgents are fighting for control, girls 
seeking education face heightened security threats including sexual 
harassment, kidnapping, and acid attacks, as well as attacks and 
threats against girl’s education. Article 12: raising questions in regard 
to virginity examinations, the invasive, scientifically invalid and 
conducted without meaningful – sometimes any – consent. Article 15: 
highlighting Afghanistan’s failure to enforce the law on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women. Article 16: raising concerns 
for child marriage, criticising the government’s poor track record of 
implementing laws and policies designed to protect the rights of 
women and girls. Articles 15 and 16: accusations of moral crimes that 
lead to the imprisonment of girls and women who run away from 
forced marriages or domestic violence, and endure up to 15 years jail 
term when accused of zinā crime, and at times the victim and her rapist 
both serve sentences under charges of zinā.1017      
The Social Institutions & Gender Index 2019 Afghanistan report assigns 
values for areas such as discrimination in the family; restricted physical 
integrity; restricted access to productive and financial resources and restricted 
civil liberties. The higher values indicate higher inequality and percentages 
range from 0 to 100, whilst legal variables are categorised as 0%, 25%, 50%, 
75% or 100%. The overall SIGI score for Afghanistan in 2019 is 53%. Low 
percentages show better performances.  
                                                          
1017 Human Rights Watch, “Submission to the Committee on the Elimination,” 1-11.  
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Figure 15: Social Institutions & Gender Index, SIGI. Afghanistan 2019.    
 
In practice, over the past few years, women’s rights have undergone a 
downward trend and have severely deteriorated, despite the updating of the 
penal code and the drafting of new legislations. Mehdi Hakimi, an Afghan 
scholar, observes that ten years since EVAW law was issued, violence against 
women and girls is rampant, is perpetuated by both private and state actors 
and breaches of  the due diligence obligations of the state to prevent, 
investigate and punish violence against women constitute human rights 
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violation.1018 Despite the CEDAW Committee’s positive feedback on 
Recommendations 11 and 49, empirical evidence by the Human Rights 
Watch, Social Institutions & Gender Index and independent scholars indicate 
that the government’s performance to support and protect the women of 
Afghanistan has been inadequate, inconsistent, ineffective and too little to 
merit praise.   
 
13.9 Challenges for the Implementation of the CEDAW  
 
Women rights and the violation of women’s rights is a serious universal 
problem. Afghanistan is not the only country with abysmal performance in 
supporting women. In 2014, Heather Monasky wrote that after forty years of 
activism and law reform to eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls 
(VAWG), its lingering global prevalence indicates that the world community 
is short-changing women and girls.1019 Referring to Human Rights Watch’s 
2014 article “Afghanistan: Rights Setbacks Fan Future Fears”, Monasky 
summaries that in recent years, VAWG has worsened in many places across 
the globe, aggravated by conflict, economic inequality, nationalism and 
insecurity.1020 Despite problems and setbacks, Monasky believes that the 
invention of laws and other standards to fight against VAWG has advanced 
women’s rights.1021 Effective implementation of EVAW laws and the 
CEDAW convention and other laws supportive of women in Afghanistan 
requires much more time – possibly a few more decades to come to fruition.  
 
13.10 Women’s Legal Cases   
 
                                                          
1018 Hakimi, “Elusive Justice,” 71.  
1019 Monasky, “What’s Law Got to Do with It?” 328.  
1020 Monasky, 328. 
1021 Monasky, 330.  
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The government of Afghanistan publishes adjudicated cases with anonymity 
and offers brief data, in a number of publications. A small number of criminal 
cases are recorded on the third page of Mizān publication issued by the 
Supreme Court of Afghanistan. Please refer to appendix 13. These cases are 
marked, “From some of the received court decisions.” These court data relate 
to both Afghan men and women. Court decision samples with more details 
are produced by the Supreme Court every few years. The first set was 
published in 2010, the second in 2019. The English translations of two 
promulgated cases are shown in Appendices 12 and 13. An undated Qazā 
(judgment) publication issued by the Supreme Court – has listed anonymous 
data for two hundred and forty-five rape cases involving women and children, 
three hundred and forty defendants, six hundred and sixty-one cases of 
violence against women, and eight hundred and fourteen defendants, all 
reported for 2014.1022  
 
There is another series of anonymised court data listing women’s cases in the 
quarterly reports published by the Supreme Court. These reports are available 
from 2011 to the present date. The table on the next page shows the English 
translation of quarterly court data for 2017, 2018 and 2019 translated and 
collected by the author. A couple of researchers in Afghanistan were asked to 
request court data on women’s cases for this thesis, but were not given any 
information by the Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court or the Attorney 
General’s Office. The next source of data on cases regarding women, again 
                                                          
1022 Supreme Court of Afghanistan, “Qaza,” 115-147.  
 
   
 
Page 383 of 531 
 
brief and anonymous, are the media reports. These are general information 
about violence against women or about women’s cases.  
 




The Supreme Court’s quarterly reports do not clarify whether the above court 
data relates to cases adjudicated in the courts of law. With multiple and 
overlapping judiciary-related organisations doing similar activities in 
Afghanistan, it is possible that some of the above cases have not been resolved 
by the courts; they may have been resolved by the Prosecution Service, 
Family Resolution Unit (police), Huqūq (Ministry of Justice), by village 
elders (jirga-shūrā) or by the victims’ family members. Despite these 
decisions being recorded as court activities, the judges may have confirmed 
decisions made outside the court. This means, some of many of these 
decisions do not follow judicial standards.  
 
   
 
Page 384 of 531 
 
The Ministry of Women’s Affairs registered 3,744 cases of violence against 
women in 2017 and 3,806 in 2018; of those reported in 2018, 24.4 percent 
were beatings, 7.4 percent leaving home due to violence, 14.6 percent 
separation and 9.0 percent were for not receiving alimony.1023 The 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reported 4,329 cases of 
violence against women in 2018 and 4,693 cases in 2019.1024 From the total 
of 4,693 cases in 2019, 1,435 were physical violence; 194 were sexual 
violence; 1,783 were mental and verbal violence; 844 were cases of economic 
violence and 437 were cases of other forms of violence.1025 AIHRC reported 
1,241 cases of violence against women which forms 35.7 percent of cases 
from January to October 2020; the reported violence included physical 
violence, beating, dismembering, injury and forced labour.1026   
 
On the 06 March 2019, the Voice of America Dari/Farsi Service reported that 
7,200 acts of violence against women had been adjudicated.1027 Amanullah 
Iman, spokesperson of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, stated that these 
cases related to 720 cases of beating, 320 of murder, 145 of sexual 
harassment, 113 of suicide, 87 of battery of women and 41 cases of injuring 
women.1028 This break-down shows 1,426 of the claimed adjudicated cases. 
It is unclear what the rest of the cases were. On the 06 of March 2019, BBC 
                                                          
1023 NSIA, “Yearbook – Women And Men In Afghanistan,” 14.  
1024 AIHRC, “Annual Report of Violence Against Women,” 5. 
1025 AIHRC, 5. 
1026 AIHRC, “Ten Months Report for Violence Against Women,” 25 November 2020, 1. 
1027 Rustāee, “7,200 cases of violence against women,” last accessed 06 March 2019.  
1028 Rustāee, last accessed 06 March 2019.  
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Farsi news reported that the government of Afghanistan had only managed to 
decide nineteen percent of cases of violence against women.1029  
 
UNAMA reports that women’s access to justice remains limited and that 
women continue to face inequality before the law.1030 The frequent failure of 
state officials to exercise due diligence in investigating, prosecuting and 
punishing perpetrators, and providing reparations to survivors has contributed 
to the existing high rate of impunity and strengthened the normalisation of 
violence against women in Afghan society.1031 UNAMA found that the police 
often failed to forward honour killing cases to prosecutors.1032 A failure that 
undermines efforts to promote the rights of women, erodes the rule of law; 
contributes to an expectation of impunity; discourages the reporting of these 
cases and increases citizens’ perceptions of a corrupt and unreliable justice 
system in Afghanistan.1033  
 
Action Aid, a British charity, reports that a strong preference among police 
and prosecutors for resolving cases of violence against women outside the 
judicial process and through mediation and/ or referring cases to local jirgas 
for arbitration is a key factor in the weak enforcement of EVAW Law – jirgas 
commonly interpret Shari’a and tribal customs in ways that are unfavourable 
or harmful to women and girls.1034   
 
                                                          
1029 BBC Farsi, “Supreme Court of Afghanistan: Rape,” last accessed 06 March 2019.  
1030 UNAMA, “Injustice and Impunity,” 6. 
1031 UNAMA, 6. 
1032 UNAMA, 6. 
1033 UNAMA, 6. 
1034 Action Aid, “Hanging in the balance,” 6.  
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The government of Afghanistan is formed by conservative and traditional 
men, and as experience in over a decade has shown, the parliament does not 
pass laws that are supportive of women. In the early years of the Karzai 
government (2001-2006) the Supreme Court was the bastion of 
conservatism.1035 This institution is manned by conservatives to the present 
day. In sum, women’s rights are entangled in a web of parochial attitudes and 
radical anti-women perceptions, and vile literatures are in circulation in 
Afghanistan. Women’s affairs are strongly based on a group of ruling elites’ 
discretion who on paper agree to the idea of protecting women’s rights, but 
in practice exercise strong tribal customs, which subject women to inhumane 
treatment, servitude and  at times trade them as chattel.  
 
There are contradictory reports about the number of girls in education in 
Afghanistan. In April 2017, a Ministry of Education official told Human 
Rights Watch that there were 9.3 million children in school, 39 percent of 
whom were girls; Human Rights Watch regards these figures inflated by the 
government’s practice of counting a child as attending school until she or he 
has not attended for up to three years.1036 These reports indicate that the state 
of Afghanistan does not report women’s access to education accurately. 
 
13.11 Conclusion   
 
This chapter has clarified that Afghanistan faces many challenges for 
legislating and enforcing laws that are supportive of women’s and girls’ 
rights. The chapter has shown that actions by Afghanistan’s governments in 
                                                          
1035 Wimpelmann, The Pitfalls of Protection, 45. 
1036 HRW, “I Won’t Be A Doctor,” 7.  
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legislating women’s cases have been very limited and reliable court data is 
scarce. The chapter has further shown how injustices affecting women 
intersect between societal perceptions and block the implementation of the 
national laws and international instruments aimed at supporting women and 
girls. This once again reinforces the disparity between technical and practical 
endorsement of progressive legal transplanting impacting the women of 
Afghanistan.  
 
The chapter concludes that efforts of the Afghan government due to 
international pressure and donor assistance conditionality has created some 
positive legislations for women’s rights, but in lower courts where judges 
have full discretion to interpret the law in whichever ways Shari’a trainings 
deems fit, formal laws often remain unenforced because they are often 
perceived as incompatible with the large section of Afghan society, along the 
inability of their execution by the state legislators. The chapter further  
concludes that donor assistance conditionality has been insufficient in 
upholding mechanisms of implementation and thus it serves to undermine its 
very utility. Theoretically, donor assistance conditionality can induce a 
positive legal culture, however, the terms and processes by which donor 
assistance operates on, fails to be conditional upon practical implementations 
of such legislation, the government can effectively continue to pay legal lip 
service where the laws are articulated in namesake only. Further perpetuating 
the legal culture of public disregard.  
 
This chapter has also shown that slow progress in women’s rights is linked to 
the societal negative perceptions of women, misogyny and the forms of 
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radicalisation promoted in the government educational system atop the 
insecurity, lawlessness and weak governance that disadvantage women in 
personal and public life.  
 
Finally, the chapter has shown that in nearly a century and half, issues such 
as bride-price, baad marriages, polygamy, divorce rights and women’s access 
to education and justice for most of the women of Afghanistan are at point 
zero, and that positive achievements of past governments in women’s rights 
have abysmally reversed, owing to lack of meaningful political will to protect 
women and their rights. The next chapter is the conclusions of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 14: CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, the central theme, legal culture of Afghanistan was discussed 
in light of legal pluralism and legal transplants with a focus on the beliefs and 
values of Afghanistan’s citizens, some of which overlap between the different 
old and new religions of Afghanistan. The contributions of all the faiths and 
belief systems of Afghanistan combined with the information qualitative data 
collected in from forty questionnaire respondents, sixteen interviews and 
technical questionnaires, offers a holistic picture of law, legal development 
and the institutionalisation of justice in Afghanistan from 1747 to 2021. 
Through all the chapters of this thesis, both qualitative and quantitative data 
have been corroborated by existing scholarship as documented.    
  
In chapters 1-3, I set out the research parameters and research questions, 
established the hypothesis and detailed the methodology and a number of 
research methods. These chapters also provided information about the 
questionnaire respondents, interviews and the ethical research issues as well 
as the limitations to the research and research dilemma.  
 
Chapter 4 provided a brief account of Islamic legal institution, a brief history 
of Shari’a and elaborated on a number of Islamic legal concepts. This chapter 
formed the bedrock of understanding Islamic law with a descriptive rather 
than an analytical nature. The chapter concluded that to date Shari’a remains 
broad, uncodified, informal and is prone to a number of varied interpretations 
by the people who claim to be rightly guided: the ulemā. 
Chapter 5 offered an account of how the different religions of Afghanistan 
shape her legal conditions. The chapter used theories of oral culture and 
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offered insights into Afghanistan’s different religions, cults and spiritual 
orders. The chapter further focused on the influences of old religions and their 
impact on Afghanistan’s less literate society. The chapter showed different 
ways the citizens of Afghanistan understand and relate to the religious and 
cultural knowledge of justice.      
 
Chapter 6 discussed the procedural and substantive justice based on the 
Pashtūnwāli tribal code with a number of examples from the 1970s and 2020. 
In this chapter, whilst being aware of the different connotations of the term 
tribe, I argued that in the context of studying Afghanistan, tribe is relevant 
and essential. The overarching conclusion of this chapter was that tribalism 
has formed a diarchy system of codified and customary practices which is a 
huge hurdle against modernisation and the empowerment of universal 
(modern) laws.  
 
Chapter 7 commenced with the theoretical descriptions of legal pluralism, 
focusing on Afghanistan’s customary justice practices (informal justice) by 
members of the different ethnic groups of the country. The chapter filled in a 
huge research gap on the customary law practices of the Turkic population of 
Afghanistan. The author had the benefit of receiving qualitative data from two 
Afghan academics and intellectuals. The chapter concluded that legal 
pluralism in Afghanistan has a number of drawbacks and that the state law is 
a pluralist system that often creates confusions for the litigants. The chapter 
showed that customary law becomes more problematic, when the institutions 
of informal justice vary from one ethnic group to another and are divided into 
further variations within each ethnic group of the country.        
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Chapter 8 focused on legal transplants in Afghanistan. It provided a detailed 
history of legal transplants from the 1880s to 2020. In this chapter, the author 
argued that for the most parts, legal transplants in Afghanistan have followed 
a form of mimetic isomorphism, and borrowings were often used for political 
scoring in situations where the state and society did not grasp the essence of 
the transplanted laws well enough, and a number of ill-fortunes such as the 
polygamous wars among the royals, tribal turf wars, political under-
development, foreign invasions and civil wars led to the reversal of the 
positive gains of the transplanted laws between each government and from 
the 1880s to the 2020.  
 
The chapter investigated legal transplants in two stages: transplanted laws that 
were instigated by the politicians of Afghanistan and those that were imported 
by foreigners, through aid money. The chapter assessed these as different 
borrowings with different effects. The author further argued that legal 
transplants for a variety of reasons did not resonate at local and communal 
level and were received with indifference to the point they were in large part 
disregarded. The chapter used the case-study method and proved the thesis’ 
working hypothesis, concluding that the reversals and the intervening factors 
has been unable to create a culture of legality in Afghanistan. However, in 
light of the research conducted, it should be noted that rather than an outright 
inability to form a culture of legality per se, Afghanistan has had periods of 
gains and reversals as demonstrated in the empirical chapters throughout its 
respective reigns. As the thesis has served to demonstrate that there are a 
multitude of practically recognised informal legal cultures, these competing 
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visions of legality are in of themselves a microcosm of the ongoing power 
struggles within Afghanistan.  
 
Chapter 9 extensively assessed the constitutions of Afghanistan from 1923 to 
2004 and constitutionalism until 2020. My research argued against a number 
of other scholars’ views who have regarded Afghanistan’s constitutions as 
failed documents. I put my points across by focusing on the lasting effects of 
constitutions, whereas in essence, nearly all the constitutions of Afghanistan 
followed the provisions of Amanullah Khan’s constitution of 1923. I 
concluded that each government of Afghanistan incorporated important 
provisions, upheld major provisions of previous constitutions, and despite 
Afghanistan’s turbulent history of statehood and nationhood, Afghanistan has 
fared better in its constitutional commitments than shaping a culture of 
legality through legal transplantations that would not reverse from one 
government to the next. Each constitution of Afghanistan was assessed for its 
merits and demerits. I have based my arguments on the incrementalist nature 
of Afghanistan’s constitutions, and for future direction, in order to 
accommodate inclusivity; I have suggested the adoption of transformative 
constitutionalism.      
 
Chapter 10 used PEA and PAP in order to investigate fifteen sociological 
classifications of corruption in Afghanistan. This chapter identified how 
international aid distribution has led to the formation of a culture of corruption 
and impunity, and how the political system of Afghanistan does little to tackle 
corruption. The chapter drew a full picture of corruption in Afghanistan and 
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showed the ways corruption affects the citizens of Afghanistan, depriving 
them of the services they are entitled to free of charge.  
 
The chapter concluded that the government of Afghanistan deals with 
corruption selectively and re-routes corruption instead of uprooting it, which 
in itself is a form of predatory political corruption. My arguments were 
supported by a number of actual examples of corruption and a few major 
corruption cases were cited. The chapter further concluded that Afghanistan’s 
government, civil servants and politicians light-heartedly perceive the 
concept of corruption and are privy to the rhizomic fabric of corruption 
themselves. Finally, the chapter identified the existence of corruption in all 
facets of life and in all the major institutions of the government, including the 
president’s office and the institutions of justice.    
 
Chapter 11 gave an elaborate history of stages of legal development in 
Afghanistan. In this chapter, I argued that when the executive branch of the 
government excessively overpowers the Parliament, the Supreme Court and 
the Ministry of Justice, or uses the Attorney General’s Office as part of the 
executive, it disrupts their operations and stops them from enforcing the law 
non-arbitrarily. I called this type of intervention and disruption legal 
interregnum and the mechanism used was presidential decrees and executive 
orders. The second part of this chapter listed the institutions of justice, the 
laws they use and shed light on their weaknesses and strengths. 
 
Chapter 12 further investigated the judiciary with a focus on judicial quality. 
It described legal education, requirements for the tenure of judgeship and the 
sizable growth of judgeship in the post-2001 period. The chapter found a 
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number of problems such as irregularities and problems with ensuring 
qualified individuals are recruited as judges. The chapter also discussed the 
importance of open and verifiable public court data. The chapter found that 
publicising a minimal level of anonymous court data and crime statistics are 
inadequate.  
 
Chapter 13 used the process-tracing method to investigate the legislative 
changes over the past century in regards to women’s rights. The chapter has 
shown that justice for the women of Afghanistan is nearly non-existent. The 
chapter showed that achievements for women rights is minimal and legal 
protections and safeguards for women is ignored by members of the judiciary.  
 
The chapter has shown that injustices affecting women intersect between 
societal negative perceptions which often block the implementation of the 
national laws and international legal instruments aimed at supporting women 
and girls. The chapter further identified that slow progress in women’s rights 
is linked to the societal negative perceptions of women, misogyny and 
different forms of radicalisation promoted in the government’s education 
system atop insecurity, lawlessness and weak governance that disadvantage 
women in personal and public life.  
 
The chapter concluded that in nearly a century and half, issues such as bride-
price, baad marriages, polygamy, divorce rights and women’s access to 
education and justice for most of the women of Afghanistan are at point zero, 
and that positive achievements of the past governments in regard to women’s 
rights have abysmally reversed.  
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In summary, the cultural influences of all  the religions of Afghanistan have 
led to her being a country of many diverse beliefs, norms and customs. The 
tribal code of Pashtūnwāli forms the main justice forum for the rural 
Pashtūns. The ill-managed legal pluralism in Afghanistan is due to the failure 
of the state judicial system and the entrenched corruption. Legal transplants 
have shown reversals of gains, but Afghanistan like any other country in the 
world, would need workable legal transplants in order to correct its injustices. 
The constitutions of Afghanistan have upheld some legal protections that has 
proven good enough, despite some of them being weak and less useful. 
Corruption is the biggest impediment to justice in Afghanistan and future 
governments must tackle corruption in order to create a culture of legality and 
support independent and effective government institutions.  
 
The legal development stages show that Afghanistan has achieved successes 
over the years but needs to empower the institutions of justice. The judicial 
institutions require improvements and de-politicisation. There is a need for 
good legal education. The women of Afghanistan must be protected by state 
law and all vestiges of discrimination, misogyny and societal abuses must end 
through reformed modern education that regards men and women as equals.  
 
This thesis in thirteen chapters has drawn a picture of Afghanistan’s legal 
culture from 1747 to 2020. The problem areas identified in this thesis are like 
ink blots that create stains on this picture which are not indelible and must be 
cleared by the capable future generations of Afghanistan, and possibly by the 
help of legitimate future leaders of Afghanistan who come to power through 
free and fair elections.   
   
 




   
 




ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution  
AIBA Afghanistan Independent Bar Association  
AFO Afghanistan Forensic Organisation  
AGE Anti-government Element  
AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission  
ANA    Afghan National Army  
ANP Afghan National Police  
AREU   Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit  
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women  
CBDR Community-Based Dispute Resolution  
CIA Central Intelligence Agency  
CPN Criminal Patronage Networks  
CRB Criminal Record Bureau  
CSO Civil Society Organisation  
DFID   Department for International Development  
EU European Union  
EVAW Elimination of Violence Against Women 
FRU Family Resolution Unit 
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICG International Crisis Group  
ICOIC Independent Commission for Overseeing the 
Implementation of the Constitution  
IDLO   International Development Law Organisation   
ILF International Law Foundation  
INGO   International non-governmental organisation  
IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan  
JSSP Afghanistan Justice Support Program  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO   Non-governmental organisation  
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development  
TMAF Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework  
TUTAP Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan  
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
UN United Nations  
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan  
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme  
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs  
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
USAID  United States Agency of International Development  
WLUML Women Living Under Muslim Laws  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Ad hoc Latin: made or happening only for a particular 
purpose or need 
Adālat    A magazine by the Ministry of Justice of 
Afghanistan  
Agāhi hoqūqi    A magazine by the Ministry of Justice of 
Afghanistan 
Ahrīman Persian: the evil or destructive spirit in the dualistic 
doctrine of Zoroastrianism 
Ahūrā Mazdā Ahriman's benevolent opponent in the Zoroastrian 
religion; worshipped as the saving and superior spirit  
Amel  A place of religious congregation for the Kāfirs of 
Nuristan  
Āqsaqāl/Aksakal  White bearded; lineage elder or leader 
Arāzi An organ of Afghan government for registering land 
titles  
Arbāb Persian: chief of a clan or head of a village  
Arbakai Pashto: tribal militias for policing tribes in 
Afghanistan  
Asha Vahishta Zoroastrianism: excellent order or truth. The lawful 
order of the cosmos according to which all things 
happen    
Ashkun  One of the thirty-three languages spoken in 
Afghanistan 
Ashokā An Indian emperor of the Maurya Dynasty who 
ruled the vast majority of the Indian subcontinent 
from 268 to 232 B.C.E. 
Āshti milli  Persian: national reconciliation  
Atrāf  Rural areas 
Avestā The primary collection of religious texts of 
Zoroastrianism  
Azhdhar  Persian: dragon 
Baad marriages Marriage for compensation of a crime  
Bacha Bazi  Sexual abuse of children 
Bahā’i Persian: an Islam-inspired but heterodox 
monotheistic religion that emphasises the spiritual 
unity of mankind  
Bakhshesh  Gift  
Bakhshi Kirghiz ritual specialist, shaman    
Be Kirghiz camp leader or elder  
Beit Din Hebrew: the name of a rabbinical court in Judaism  
Bibi Gul  Dari: Lit., grandma, a pen name to conceal women’s 
real name  
Bilik Orders attributed to Genghis Khan  
Bodhi tree  Buddhism: tree of awakening   
Burqa An outer garment that covers a woman’s entire body   
Chaipooli Tea money  
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Chitrāl The largest district in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
province of Pakistan  
Dabir  Persian: manager 
Daitya A clan or race in Hinduism  
Darbār-e-kār  Dari: working audience 
Dardic A sub-group of Indo-Aryan languages spoken in 
eastern Afghanistan  
Darvish/Dervish A member of the Sufi order  
Dawak A footman, a junior person   
De facto Latin: in fact, whether by right or not.   
Derāvidian/Dravidian A family of languages spoken in India and Sri Lanka 
Dhimma/Dhimmi A non-Muslim living in an Islamic state with legal 
protection   
Doshmani shakhsi In Afghanistan: personal enmity leading to blood 
feuds  
Duaxān  Persian: prayer reader 
Dūtār A two-stringed lute  
Ershād-e-Naswān  A publication by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
of Afghanistan  
Ex post facto  Latin: after the fact  
Fālbin  Seer 
Fallaq Foot whipping or bastinado  
Farār az manzel  Persian: fleeing violence or forced marriages  
Farmāns  Royal proclamations 
Geser Mongol: epic of King Geser  
Ghilzai One of the four Pashtun Super Tribe  
Gholam Bacha  Janissary 
Gorzang-e-Millie  A political party in Afghanistan meaning National 
Movement  
Great Gīsh The most popular god in Nuristani people’s 
mythology. He received the highest amount of 
attention among the Siāhpūsh Nuristani of Bashgul 
Valley 
Gurdwārā  Place of worship for Sikhs  
Hazāra Name of an ethnic group in Afghanistan  
Heder In Afghanistan: a Jewish religious class  
Hevra A community and religious traditional set-up by the 
Jewish citizens of Afghanistan  
Hindu Name of an ethnic and religious minority group in 
Afghanistan  
Hoqūq/Hūqūq  Persian: legal affairs, a department in the ministry of 
justice 
Indra A Vedic deity in Hinduism, a guardian deity in 
Buddhism, and the king of first heaven called 
Saudharmakapla in Jaïnism    
Jalga/Jirga See Jirga 
Jārchi  An announcer 
Jarib/Jerib A traditional unit of land measuring equal to 2,000 
square metres  
Jarida-e-rasmi Dari: official publication  
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Jin-o-peri “Jinni and Fairies”, the name given to large body of 
myths and legends among the Persianate and other 
communities  
Kāfir In this thesis, it refers to a group of non-Muslims of 
Afghanistan. Kāfir also means unbeliever and is a 
term widely used in different contexts.      
Kalāsha Name for an ethnic group of Kāfirs of Afghanistan    
Kamdesh A district of the Nuristan province in eastern 
Afghanistan  
Kangāsh Assembly of the notables   
Kashr Pashto: a young person  
Kati One of the thirty-three languages spoken in 
Afghanistan 
Kazākh Name of an ethnic group in Afghanistan   
Khān A community notable, a rich person with authority  
  
Khāne-aman Persian: safe home for women  
Khāneghāh/Khāneqāh A place for the Sufi spiritual retreat, a building 
specifically designed for the Sufi gatherings   
Kharāj  Land tax 
Khāwand  Pashto: husband, owner 
Khwājah Persian: a title equal to sir or mister  
Khwājah ain  A wealthy person, a treasurer 
Kirghiz/ Qirghiz Name of an ethnic group in Afghanistan    
Kitābchai’a Hukumati Government record book 
Kolantar  In Afghanistan: an elected member of the patriarch 
in leading Jewish families who represents the 
interests of their community  
Kosher In Jewish dietary law: appropriate food, according to 
biblical and rabbinical sources (kashrut)  
Kurultai  A political and military council of ancient Mongol 
and Turkic people  
Layeha Taliban’s military and political manifesto   
Lingua franca Bridge language, common language  
Loya Jirga Afghanistan: assembly of elders to decide in 
important state matters  
Luus  Dragon in the cult of Zhun 
Mahayana A term relating to certain groups and populations in 
Buddhist philosophies and practices  
Magnus opus  Latin: a great work  
Malang An unworldly person  
Malik Afghanistan: a village chief  
Malum in se Latin: quality of a wrongful and evil act  
Mamlūk Arabic: property. It refers to Muslim slave soldiers 
and Muslim rulers of slave origin  
Manas Kirghiz epic about 16-century hero named Manas  
Mantar  Sage’s writing 
Mārgir  Snake charmer 
Ma’rifat  Sufism: personal experience 
Masharāno Jirga Pashto: Upper House of Parliament  
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Mashr Pashto: an elder, a person of high status  
Megalithvolk  German: megalithic people  
Mehtar The name given to a ruler in Chitrāl  
Miānjigari  Persian: mediation  
Mikva Judaism: ritual public bath  
Mir/Mirs A title given to the Hazāra people of Afghanistan  
Mirman  Pashto: woman. Name of a publication in 
Afghanistan  
Mizān  Persian: the scale. Name of a legal publication in 
Afghanistan   
Münd A clan priest of the Kāfir people of Afghanistan  
Munshi  Persian: secretary 
Murthi/Murti A Hindu cult, also a statute or idol of a deity or 
person in Indian culture  
Musawah The name of a global movement for equality and 
justice in the Muslim family  
Nikāh khat Afghanistan: a marriage certificate  
Nikur In Judaism, the procedure of removing the sciatic 
nerve as well as certain forbidden blood vessels and 
fats from the hindquarters of a slaughtered animal  
Nizāmnāma Laws for the state similar to ‘constitutional laws’ 
Nizāmnāma-e asāsi Afghanistan’s first constitution  
Nizamnama-i-Jazā-i Code of Penal Law  
Omumi 
Oroq/Orūq Kirghiz rules of patrilineal descent  
Osūlnāma The procedural laws of Afghanistan   
Öz Beg The reigning khan of the Golden Horde; also the 
name of an ethnic group of Afghanistan (Uzbek) 
Pāmīri Name of an ethnic group in Afghanistan  
Panchāt Bāshi In Afghanistan, an honorary role for a Hindu 
commercial arbitrator   
Parachuted students A term used in Herat province for students who 
entered education through orders from government 
officials  
Pashtūn Name of an ethnic group in Afghanistan  
Passover  Judaism: a major Jewish holiday in the spring on the 
15th day of the Hebrew month of Nisan  
Parūni One of the thirty-three languages spoken in 
Afghanistan 
Per se Latin: by itself, in itself 
Peri In Persian and Armenian mythology, the Peri are 
exquisite, winged fairy-like spirits ranking between 
angels and evil spirits  
Pir Spiritual leader, master, saviour   
Prajna Buddhism: direct insight into the truth taught by the 
Buddha - a faculty required to attain enlightenment  
Qalandar A name for a Sufi saint  
Qānūn Statutory Law  
Qānūn department  A department of the Ministry of Justice of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2002-2021). This 
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department deals with ‘out of court’ civil and family 
matters  
Qawm/Qowm A group of people, a solidarity group    
Qazā  A legal magazine in Afghanistan  
Qobuz  Horse fiddle 
Rammāl/Ramalbāz A person who plays tricks with a dice  
Rashi  A Judeo-Persian language spoken by the Jewish 
citizens of Afghanistan  
Reshwat  Dari: bribes 
Sabbath In Judaism, the day of rest and seventh day of the 
week  
Samadhi A state of meditative consciousness in Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Jaïnism and Sikhism and Yogic schools  
Sardaftar  Persian: headman 
Sefidpūsh, Siāhpūsh Kāfiri groups of eastern Afghanistan named after the 
colour of their attire, “white clothes” and “black 
clothes”  
Sephardic Jews A group of Jews who inhabited in Afghanistan until 
1978  
Shāh-bālā A rank in the āqsaqāl system  
Shirini Afghanistan: a term used for petty bribery  
Shomer Shabbat Judaism: a person who observes all the laws and 
commandments of Jewish Shabbat   
Siāsar  Afghanistan: a derogatory name to address women  
Siddhārtha Gautama  Sanskrit: In Buddhism it means “He Who Achieves 
His Goal”  
Sikh Name of an ethnic and religious minority in 
Afghanistan  
Sila The term used for Buddhist ethics and morality  
Silsilas  Sufism: chains, lineage  
Sirdār Afghanistan: title for the male royal family members 
of Dūrrani origin. It is also used to refer to a Sikh 
originating from Afghanistan   
Stāge French: a professional training course that in 
Afghanistan is part of the study curriculum for 
aspiring judges  
Sulˈh  Persian: reconciliation  
Sultan Persian: king and also a title given individually to a 
member of the Hazāra ethnic group of Afghanistan  
Tajik The name of an ethnic group in Afghanistan 
Tāla’bin  A fortune teller 
Tanggri/Tengri  One of the names for the primary chief deity of the 
early Turkic and Mongolian people   
Taqnin  The department of drafting laws 
Taskira National identity card in Afghanistan  
Taswir  Arabic: painting 
Tawānmandi Farsi: empowerment. A multipartite project funded 
by the UK government and Nordic states   
Tawārchi  A person who gives news on marriages, deaths and 
funerals 
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Ta’wiz Amulet  
Toyāna  Bride price 
Turkman/Torkman Name of an ethnic group in Afghanistan   
Usūlnama A body of state laws in Afghanistan  
Utzen Name of a Kāfir tribe of eastern Afghanistan  
Uzbek Name of an ethnic group in Afghanistan 
Veda A large body of knowledge originating in the ancient 
Indian sub-continent  
Vedic Related to Vedic Hinduism  
Vis-à-vis  French: in relation to, in comparison with  
Waigal  One of the thirty-three languages spoken in 
Afghanistan 
Walwar Pashto: bride price  
Wamai  One of the thirty-three languages spoken in 
Afghanistan 
Wekālat  A publication by the Afghanistan Independent Bar 
Association  
Wolesi Jirga Pashto: the Lower House of Parliament in 
Afghanistan   
Yasa  "Order" or "Decree": written code of law created by 
Genghis Khan  
Zaeefa  Dari: the weak person, a derogatory term used to 
address women  
Zeitgeist German: the defining spirit or mood of a particular 
period of history as shown by the ideas and beliefs 
of the time  
Zoormandān  Dari: the powerful ones 
Zoorwāk  Pashto: the powerful ones 
 
RELIGIOUS TERMS  
 
Ahkām Religious commands followed by Muslims 
Ahl al-dhimma A non-Muslim living in an Islamic state   
Al-Zakāt A voluntary charity paid to the poor 
Amir The traditional title for a leader  
Amir-ul-Momenin The leaders of the pious community of Muslims  
Aqqayyid  Theology, religious beliefs  
Aqd-al-nikāh The marriage ritual  
Awqāf An charitable endowment  
Bay’at Pronouncement of allegiance or swearing oaths of 
allegiance to a Muslim leader   
Caliph Leader of early Muslim communities  
Caliphate See: khilafat 
Dhimmi A non-Muslim subject living in an Islamic country  
Diyyāt/Diyya Blood money and compensation payment  
Eslāh, Islāh Arabic: correction  
Fatāwā, fatwā  Religious opinions 
Fiqh Jurisprudence created by the Islamic religious 
authority  
Fuqahā  The jurists 
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Hadd A fixed punishment in Islamic law 
Hadiths The reports of the speeches attributed to the Prophet 
Mohammad 
Halal  Religiously permissible  
Hanafi An school of Islamic law founded by Imam Abū 
Hanifa (699-767 C.E.) 
Haq al-ibād The duty owed to mankind. In Islamic criminal law: 
the harm that members of Muslim community inflict 
on each other.  
Hijāb The physical coverage of a woman’s body  
Huquq Allah A duty owed to God according to the right that God 
holds over human beings.  
Ijma  Consensus on legal issues    
Ijtihād Arabic: the process of making a legal decision by 
independent interpretation of the Islamic legal 
sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah  
Ikhwān, Ikhwānis Member of an Egyptian Islamist and reformist 
movement known as the Muslim Brotherhood 
Imam The person who conducts prayers in the mosque   
Imāmi A follower of the doctrine of the Twelve Imāms 
according to the Shi’a branch of Islam  
Ismaili A branch of Shi’a Islam where believers accept and 
follow seven Imāms, also known as “Seveners”   
Jaˊfari The school of jurisprudence as well as the name of 
main branch of Imāmi Shi’a Islam 
Jezya A form of taxation levied on non-Muslim subjects of 
an Islamic government   
Khan molla khan  Supreme ecclesiastical judge 
Khan-e Olūm  Ranks for heads of ecclesiastical education 
Modarres Bāshi    
Khatib Arabic: a Muslim who delivers sermons in the 
mosque.   
Khilāfat A form of governance in charge of managing the 
Islamic community, which orders Muslims to follow 
the life-style of the first generation of Muslims of 
the Arab Peninsula (also spelt “Caliphate”)  
Khutˈba Arabic: sermon  
Lavāt Sexual intercourse between men  
Madhab A religious sect of Islam  
Madrassa  Place of learning, Islamic seminary teachings   
Mahr Marriage portion (dowry).  
Masjed al-Aqsā A mosque located in the Old City of Jerusalem   
Maslaha An Islamic legal principle that translates as “public 
interest” 
Mazālim Arabic: injustices, grievances. In Mazālim courts, an 
official oversaw justice for ordinary people  
Mir-wā’ez  Head preacher 
Mohtasib  Supervisor of morality 
Molla bāshi  Supreme ecclesiastical judge 
Moudāwana The family code in Moroccan law  
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Mu’āmelāt Rulings governing commercial transactions  
Mufti  Providers of legal opinions 
Mullah, cleric, ulemā Terms referred to someone with formal or informal 
knowledge of Islam  
Murti A statue in Hindu faith  
Nasihah Sincere advice  
Nikāh/Zawāj Islamic marriage according to Shari’a laws  
Noshūz A wife disobeying her husband  
Orf/Urf  Custom 
Qādi/Qāzi An Islamic judge  
Qāniāt Obedient wives  
Qawāma Bread winner, a person who provides for the family  
Qisās Retaliation according to Shari’a injunctions   
Qiyās  Arabic: deductions, analogy   
Ra’y Opinion  
Sādāt Plural of Sayyid, an ethnic group in Afghanistan 
believed to be descendants of the Prophet 
Mohammad  
Sadr-i- Shahr  Head of the clerical groups in charge of religious 
endowments 
Sahaba The Companions of Prophet Mohammad  
Sayyids See: Sādāt 
Shari’a Literally: “the path to water”, the most general term 
to refer to laws derived from the divine sources of 
Islam  
Shiite A sect of Muslims  
Shūrā Islamic concept of consultation 
Shūra-e qanun asāsi A Constitutional Shūrā  
Sirāj-al-Akhbār Afghanistan’s second newspaper published in the 
1900s.  
Siyāsa Discretionary decisions or punishments 
Sunna/Sunnat The tradition of Prophet Mohammad  
Ta’zir Deterrence, the power of discretionary punishment  
Tafsir Interpretation or exegesis of the holy writ in Islam 
Tahˈkim  Arbitration  
Taliban Insurgents formed by Mullahs and religious students  
Tamˈkin A woman’s obedience to her husband’s needs or 
demands according to Shari’a   
Taqiyya  Emulation 
Taqwā Piety according to rules of Islam   
Ushr Tithe, a religious tax where one-tenth of the crops 
are given to the religious authorities    
Wāli The legal guardian 
Wali-ul-damm The family members of a dead person who hold 
legal right over  diyyāt (financial compensations) 
Wasīqa A court issued document  
Wilāyat/Wilāya Authority, dominion, guardianship and supervision  
Zeidi A sect of Shi’a Islam 
Zakāt A type of Islamic charity  
Ziārat  Shrine, the grave a stint  
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Zinā Extra-marital relations   
 




Aqidāt al-Tantāwi  





Kanz ul-Sādeq  
Kanz  
Mashkot  
Mūgabāt al-Ahkam wa-waqi al ayyām 
Noor ul-Izāh  
Nur al-Anwār  
Osul-i-Shahi  
Ottoman Mujallah  
Qoduri  
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THE INSTITUTIONS OF PASHTŪNWĀLI 
 
Badal  Retaliation or taking revenge in kind  
Badd Feud or unfulfilled revenge. Badd is also a type of 
marriage exchange where a girl from the culprit’s 
family marries into the victim’s family as 
compensation for the crime committed  
Badragha Accompanying a guest to reach safety  
Baramta An amount of money or asset deposited as a bond 
payment before litigation is finalised by elders in a 
jirga, also; usurping the opposing party’s belongings 
in litigations   
Ghayrat  Chivalry  
Imāndāri Righteousness  
Istighāmat  Trust in God 
Jirga A council attended by the men of a village or tribe 
Kabargen Social isolation of those who violate their Wāk 
(agreement given to resolve disputes)  
Khone A type of sugar cone  
Loya Jirga A traditional set-up of a Grand Assembly where 
members of the government and the tribal elders 
make decisions for the whole of Afghanistan 
Machilgha See “Baramta”  
Maraka An assembly of tribal people who meet to solve a 
problem  
Marakachian The people who form the jirga and litigation process 
in Pashtūnwāli  
Melmastiā  Hospitality  
Nāmūs  Protection of women and guarding their chastity  
Nang  Honour  
Nangyālay A person who preserves honour  
Nanwatai Sanctuary 
Ozrāna An apology, a form of paying a penalty or fine    
Pashtūnwāli The way to be a Pashtūn  
Peghore  Satire  
Prikra A decision reached by a jirga 
Purdah Women’s segregation from men  
Sabāt  Loyalty  
Sharm  A type of shame payment  
Towda  The Pashto translation for ordeal   
Tsāli  Tribal practices  
Tūrah  Bravery  
Wāk The agreement of disputants in giving authority to 
the jirga to resolve a conflict on their behalf   
Walwar Bride-price: an amount of money paid to the bride’s 
parents before marriage can take place  
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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Introduction 
My name is Jawad Hassan Zadeh and I am an Afghan/British citizen based in 
England. I am writing a PhD thesis on Afghanistan at the Birkbeck University of 
London. The title of my thesis is “Afghanistan: legal history and legal culture 
from 1750 to the twenty-first century.” 
I am asking for your help in answering this questionnaire and your answers will form 
a substantial part of my analysis and conclusions. Your information will be used 
anonymously.  
Confidentiality declaration:  
I declare that your name or personal and professional identity will not be revealed in 
my thesis if you choose to remain anonymous. I intend to refer to the interviewees 
as follows: 
Interviewee A: An Afghan lawyer based in Holland, Interviewee B: An Afghan 
prosecutor based in Kabul or Interviewee C: A former Afghan lawyer based in 
France.  
When citing your answers anonymously, it will read as: According to interviewee A, 
the law in Afghanistan is getting better.   
Email: xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.com     Phone: 0044 xxxxxxxxxx 
Postal address: P.O. Box 476, Gravesend, Kent, DA12 9LS, UK  
Interviewee information  
Please state your name:    Education level:  Age: 
 Job:   
 Would you like to be named in my thesis?  Yes        No 
Please feel free to write more information if you like:  
...................................................................................................................................... 
Please feel free to use a separate sheet of paper for longer answers. 
Please type or write by hand if you prefer.  
If you decide to answer this questionnaire partly, I will still gladly use your views.  
I am aware that this questionnaire is long and I am very grateful to you for your 
valuable time. If you require more clarity from me, I shall be glad to assist.  
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Thank you very much in advance. 
Constitutions 
1. What do you think about the purpose of the numerous constitutions of 
Afghanistan? 
.............................................................................................................................. 
2. Are the constitutions of Afghanistan useful for separating the judiciary, 
legislature and executive powers? Please comment on as many constitutions as 
you like, i.e., the constitutions under King Amanullah, Zahir Shah, Daud Khan, 
the PDPA and Constitution 2004.  
Note: The judiciary is formed by the courts, attorney general’s office and ministry 
of justice; the legislature is the parliament and the executive is the president’s 
office and offices working under the president. 
......................................................................................................................................  
3. In your opinion, what needs to be done so that the constitutions serve their 
purpose of separating the three powers?  
......................................................................................................................................  
4. Is Loya Jirga, where a small number of elders decide for 34 million Afghans, 
the correct way to represent all the people of Afghanistan? 
......................................................................................................................................  
5. In your opinion, are there any problems with Loya Jirga? 
......................................................................................................................................  
6. If you were asked to propose ways to improve Loya Jirga, what would you 
say? 
......................................................................................................................................  
7. Do you think that the state of Afghanistan uses Loya Jirga for political 
advantage? 
If yes, how? 
......................................................................................................................................  
8. In your opinion, over the past 272 years, which government of Afghanistan 
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Legal transplants  
9. Do you believe the laws Afghanistan borrowed from Egypt, Turkey and 
Western countries from 1747 to 2001 have been useful?                                                                                                     
Note: Afghanistan’s laws from 1747 to 2001 have lots of borrowing from the 
above countries. 
......................................................................................................................................  
10. Do you believe that laws brought to Afghanistan by Western powers from 
2001 to the present day are useful?  
Note: Alongside the Interim Criminal Code for Courts, Counter-Narcotics Laws 
and the Constitution, Western powers have aided Afghanistan’s legal system 
immensely.  
...................................................................................................................................... 
11. As far as you know, how is formal justice delivered in Afghanistan?  
......................................................................................................................................  
12. Do you believe that the Afghan legal system is getting better? If yes, in what 
way?  
...................................................................................................................................... 
13. Does the state of Afghanistan attempt to bring justice to all citizens without 
prejudice? 
......................................................................................................................................  
14. Can one regard Afghanistan’s law and legal system as fair for the children, 
women, non-Muslims and Muslims of Afghanistan?  
......................................................................................................................................  
15. Are there any areas in the Afghan legal system that treat the defendants 
unfairly? 
Note: These may include women, moral issues, conversion to another faith, crimes 
that the government see as hostility against state officials?  
......................................................................................................................................  
16. In your opinion, how can Afghan officials improve the delivery of formal 
justice? 
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Legal pluralism  
17. How does legal pluralism function alongside the rule of law? 
Note: By legal pluralism, I mean different types of jirgas, shūrās and the formal 
courts. In essence, rule of law means everyone must be accountable to the law.  
......................................................................................................................................  
18. Do you believe that jirga is a good forum to deliver justice? 
......................................................................................................................................  
19. Do you think that jirga must be officially recognised for the delivery of 
justice? 
......................................................................................................................................  
20. In your opinion, is there anything wrong with jirga? If so, what? 
......................................................................................................................................  
21. Do you think that shūrā is a good mechanism to deliver justice? 
......................................................................................................................................  
22. Do you believe that Afghanistan must allow individuals in jirga and shūrā to 
adjudicate in different types of cases? For example, personal disputes, 
criminal, commercial and family cases. 
......................................................................................................................................  
23. Do you believe that jirga and shūrā would be better if independent observers 
were present? 
......................................................................................................................................  
24. Do you believe that recording the jirga and shūrā decisions is a good way to 
monitor their operations? 
......................................................................................................................................  
25. Do you believe that Afghan citizens go to jirga because it is a better way to 
receive justice? 
......................................................................................................................................  
26. Do you believe that Afghan citizens go to a shūrā because of the same 
reasons? 
......................................................................................................................................  
   
 
Page 485 of 531 
 
27. In your opinion, what can the state of Afghanistan do so that citizens go to the 
official courts? For example:  To create transparency, increase the education 
of judges, increase wages, speed up decisions 
......................................................................................................................................  
28. In your opinion, what are the good and bad points of using jirga and shūrā for 
justice? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
The different religions of Afghanistan  
29. Do you believe that different researchers on Afghanistan must include the     
Buddhists, Christians, Kāfiristan’s people, Jewish, Hindus and Sikhs in their 
studies? 
......................................................................................................................................  
30. Have you ever heard that the Jewish people of Afghanistan conduct their 
customary (informal) justice matters in a similar way to how Muslim use shūrā 
and jirga? 
......................................................................................................................................  
31. Do you believe that non-Muslims must be judged under their own religious 
laws? 
......................................................................................................................................  
32. In the past, the Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan (during Abdur Rahman’s and 
Zahir Shah’s rule) held Panchat Bashi commercial arbitrations. Do you believe 
this was a good thing for Afghanistan?  
......................................................................................................................................  
33. Do you believe that the Panchat Bashi mechanism must be revived? 
......................................................................................................................................  
34. Are you aware of the non-Muslims’ legal culture, life and how they conduct 
their affairs when in need of justice? 
......................................................................................................................................  
35. Do you believe that Afghan and international researchers have ignored the non-
Muslims of Afghanistan? 
If yes, in what way? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
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Customary law  
36. Do you think that leaving a large population in Afghanistan to use informal 
justice mechanisms is correct? 
......................................................................................................................................  
37. Do you believe this is because the government is weak? Are there more 
reasons?  
......................................................................................................................................  
38. Do you believe that the government of Afghanistan must empower or disband 
informal justice institutions? These are shūrā and jirga. Please give your 
reasons for both.   
......................................................................................................................................  
39. What are the procedural and substantive justice mechanisms for the Pashtūns? 
Please consider jirga operations to answer this question.   
......................................................................................................................................  
40. Do you believe that the Pashtūns of Afghanistan conduct their legal affairs 
differently from other citizens?  
......................................................................................................................................  
41. Do you believe that baad and revenge killing must be stopped? 
......................................................................................................................................  
42. Do you believe that Pashtūnwāli must be recognised and used for delivering 
justice to all the citizens of Afghanistan? 
......................................................................................................................................  
43. What is your view on Pashtūnwāli? Please list the positive and negative points 
...................................................................................................................................... 
44. Is Hashar/Ashar used by all poor communities in Afghanistan?  
Note: Hashar/Ashar is a self-help community mechanism where poor people in 
Afghanistan help their friends, relatives and neighbours free of charge.   
......................................................................................................................................  
45. Do you believe that Hashar can be a good self-support mechanism for Afghans 
to reduce poverty? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
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Delivery of customary laws  
46. Do you believe that decisions on family issues in a shūrā can be correct and 
fair? 
......................................................................................................................................  




48. Do you believe that Shari’a is included in all the laws and in formal judicial 
decisions in Afghanistan? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
49. In your opinion, how can Shari’a play a better role in delivering justice for 
Afghanistan? For example, writing guidelines for all Shari’a rules or 
interpreting Shari’a for Afghanistan’s current conditions? 
......................................................................................................................................  
50. Do you believe that the ulemā of Afghanistan have a big role in Afghanistan’s 
delivery of justice? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
51. Do you believe that Afghanistan’s ulemā need modern education to present 
Shari’a in a better light? 
......................................................................................................................................  
52. In your opinion, how can Islamic education for the ulemā improve in 
accommodating justice based on Islamic rules that respect the international 
obligations of Afghanistan? 
Note: Synoptically writing, international obligations are fighting corruption, 
treating all citizens under the same clear, open, recorded law. Laws must be fair to 
all. Fair trials and non-discrimination are the main focus of international 
obligations of any country, including Afghanistan.   
...................................................................................................................................... 
Women  
53. Are the women of Afghanistan treated fairly in family circles, where family 
cases are not taken to courts? 
......................................................................................................................................  
54. Is jirga a good place to solve familial issues? 
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......................................................................................................................................  
55. Is shūrā a good place to resolve familial issues? 
......................................................................................................................................  
56. Do you believe that familial issues must be adjudicated in the state courts? 
......................................................................................................................................  
57. In your opinion, how are the women of Afghanistan treated in society? 
......................................................................................................................................  
58. In your opinion, how are the women of Afghanistan treated by the 
government? 
......................................................................................................................................  
59. In your opinion, how are the women of Afghanistan treated under informal 
laws? 
......................................................................................................................................  
60. In your opinion, how are the women of Afghanistan treated under formal laws? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
Corruption 
61. Do you believe that corruption is a big problem in Afghanistan’s justice 
organisations? 
......................................................................................................................................  
62. In your opinion, does corruption deter Afghans from using state courts? 
......................................................................................................................................  
63. Do you believe that judges are recruited in transparent ways? 
......................................................................................................................................  
64. What are the main problems that Afghan judges are facing? 
Please use a tick where appropriate  
Security  
Low wages  
Low education  
Lack of clear laws  
Bad management by the government  
State’s unwillingness to deliver justice   
Inadequate legal education   
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66. Have you read Afghan school books, either in Dari or Pashto, that were printed 
between 2002 and 2019? 
......................................................................................................................................  
67. Have you heard any positive or negative views about these books from others? 
......................................................................................................................................  
68. Do you believe that Afghanistan’s education system prepares Afghans for 
developing their country? 
......................................................................................................................................  
69. In your opinion, does the Afghan education from year 1-12 teach Afghan 
citizens tolerance? 
......................................................................................................................................  
70. Do you believe that a few lessons to cover human rights and women’s rights in 
all curriculum books are adequate to bring Afghanistan in league with the rest 
of the world? 
......................................................................................................................................  
71. Do you believe that Afghanistan’s education system needs reform and 
improvements? If yes, what do you propose?  
......................................................................................................................................  
72. As well as your own answers to question 71, please answer the following 
question. 
Please put a tick as appropriate  
Subject  
 
Inadequate  Fairly covered   Fully covered  
World history    
History of the non-
Muslims of 
Afghanistan  
   
Debates and 
reasoning  
   
Knowledge of 
different religions  
   
Scientific lessons    
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Lessons for human 
rights 
   
Citizenship    
Equal 
opportunities 
   
Respecting the law    
Peace     
The development 
of Afghanistan  
   
 
73. Do you believe that a student completing the baccalaureate (year 12) attains 
adequate education to move on to Higher Education? Please explain your 
answer.  
......................................................................................................................................  
74. In your opinion, what are the problems with Afghanistan’s primary, secondary 
and higher education?  
...................................................................................................................................... 
International community 
In this part, my questions relate to humanitarian aid only. Please do not comment 
on military or war issues.  
75. Do you believe that the international community is helping Afghanistan to 
deliver justice fairly? 
Please explain your answer.  
......................................................................................................................................  
76. Do you believe that Afghanistan’s government is able to improve the delivery 
of justice without intellectual or financial help from the international 
community? 
......................................................................................................................................  
77. Is the international community interfering with Afghanistan’s plans to deliver 
justice fairly?  
......................................................................................................................................  
78. Are you positive about the international community’s role in helping 
Afghanistan’s legal system? 
......................................................................................................................................  
79. If you believe that certain activities should have been different, could you 
please list them? 
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......................................................................................................................................  
80. In your own words, if you were to advise the international community on 
helping Afghanistan’s legal system, what would you propose?  
......................................................................................................................................  
Final question  
Thanks for your patience. Despite this questionnaire being long, have you enjoyed 
answering my questions? 
......................................................................................................................................  
Please feel free to write anything else that you think may be important for me to 
note in my thesis.  
......................................................................................................................................  
Thank you very much for your help and support. 
Jawad Hassan Zadeh 
21 November 2019 
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APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JEWISH FAITH 
 
Introduction 
My name is Jawad Hassan Zadeh and I am an Afghan/British citizen based in 
England. I am writing a PhD thesis on Afghanistan at the Birkbeck University of 
London. The title of my thesis is “Afghanistan: legal history and legal culture 
from 1750 to the twenty-first century.” 
I am asking for your help in answering this questionnaire and your answers will form 
a substantial part of my analysis and conclusions. Your information will be used 
anonymously.  
Confidentiality declaration:  
I declare that your name or personal and professional identity will not be revealed in 
my thesis if you choose to remain anonymous. I intend to refer to the interviewees 
as follows: 
Interviewee A: An Afghan lawyer based in Holland, Interviewee B: An Afghan 
prosecutor based in Kabul or Interviewee C: A former Afghan lawyer based in 
France.  
When citing your answers anonymously, it will read as: According to interviewee A, 
the law in Afghanistan is getting better.   
Email: xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.com     Phone: 0044 xxxxxxxxxx 
Postal address: P.O. Box 476, Gravesend, Kent, DA12 9LS, UK  
Interviewee information  
Please state your name:     Education level:  
Age:  
 Job status:    
 Would you like to be named in my thesis?       Yes            No     
Please feel free to write more information if you like:  
...................................................................................................................................... 
Please feel free to use a separate sheet of paper for longer answers. 
Please type or write by hand if you prefer.  
If you decide to answer this questionnaire partly, I will still gladly use your views.  
I am aware that this questionnaire is long and I am very grateful to you for your 
valuable time. If you require more clarity from me, I shall be glad to assist.  
Thank you very much in advance. 
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The different religions of Afghanistan  
1. The non-Muslims of Afghanistan are under-researched. Do you believe that 
different researchers from Afghanistan and from other countries must include 
the history of the Jewish people of Afghanistan? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
2. In what way do you suppose that such research must be conducted and 
disseminated? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
3. Do you believe that the educational system of Afghanistan must include the 
history of the Jewish people of Afghanistan in its curriculum?   
...................................................................................................................................... 
4. In your opinion, based on your experience and knowledge, when the Jewish 
subjects of Afghanistan lived in Afghanistan, were they marginalised in society 
or in government? Or did they live happy lives in the midst of their Muslim 
countrymen/women?   
...................................................................................................................................... 
5. Please write the positive and negative experiences that you have lived through 
in Afghanistan.  
...................................................................................................................................... 
6. Different historical accounts point to the fact that the Jewish subjects of 
Afghanistan contributed to the economy of Afghanistan through the import and 
export of goods. Is this an indication that they had realistic chances to prosper 
in their homeland, Afghanistan?  
...................................................................................................................................... 
7. King Habibullah Khan and Amanullah Khan embarked on the modernisation 
of Afghanistan and spearheaded legal reforms through transplanting laws from 
other countries. What contributions did the Jewish people of Afghanistan make 
in this process? 
 
...................................................................................................................................... 
8. From 1747 when Afghanistan was formed, until the 1960s, Jewish people 
performed important jobs in the government institutions of Afghanistan. How 
did they influence plans to develop Afghanistan?  
 
...................................................................................................................................... 
9. In a PhD thesis recently written by Faiz Ahmed in the United States, the writer 
highlights the role of the Ottoman and Indian Muslims in Amanullah Khan’s 
government and his legal reforms. Do you believe that the Jewish people of 
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Afghanistan, India and Turkey also had a role in these reforms which may have 
been under-researched and downplayed? If yes, please elaborate.   
 
...................................................................................................................................... 
10. Have you ever heard that the Jewish people of Afghanistan conducted their 
customary (informal) justice matters based on their religious precepts? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
11. How did Jewish people solve their disputes and issues if they did not want to 
avail themselves of the government court system? For instance, by elders’ help, 
in a synagogue or in other ways? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
12. Do you believe that the non-Muslims of Afghanistan must be judged under 
their own religious laws? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
13. Are you aware of Jewish legal culture, life and how they conducted their 
affairs when in need of justice? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
14. When in need of religious guidance that could not be obtained in Afghanistan, 
where did the Jewish people refer to? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
Please feel free to write your personal account of being a Jewish subject of 
Afghanistan, and also how you have followed Afghanistan’s affairs from your 
country of domicile/naturalisation. Please write as much as you like.   
...................................................................................................................................... 
Thank you very much for your help and support. 
Jawad Hassan Zadeh 
14 December 2019 
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APPENDIX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HINDU AND SIKH FAITHS 
 
Introduction 
My name is Jawad Hassan Zadeh and I am an Afghan/British citizen based in 
England. I am writing a PhD thesis on Afghanistan at the Birkbeck University of 
London. The title of my thesis is “Afghanistan: legal history and legal culture 
from 1750 to the twenty-first century.” 
I am asking for your help in answering this questionnaire and your answers will form 
a substantial part of my analysis and conclusions. Your information will be used 
anonymously.  
Confidentiality declaration:  
I declare that your name or personal and professional identity will not be revealed in 
my thesis if you choose to remain anonymous. I intend to refer to the interviewees 
as follows: 
Interviewee A: An Afghan lawyer based in Holland, Interviewee B: An Afghan 
prosecutor based in Kabul or Interviewee C: A former Afghan lawyer based in 
France.  
When citing your answers anonymously, it will read as: According to interviewee A, 
the law in Afghanistan is getting better.   
Email: xxxxxxx@xxxxxx.com     Phone: 0044 xxxxxxxxxx 
Postal address: P.O. Box 476, Gravesend, Kent, DA12 9LS, UK  
Interviewee information  
Please state your name:      Education level:               
Age:  
 Job status:   
 Would you like to be named in my thesis?           
Please feel free to write more information if you like:  
...................................................................................................................................... 
Please feel free to use a separate sheet of paper for longer answers. 
Please type or write by hand if you prefer.  
If you decide to answer this questionnaire partly, I will still gladly use your views.  
I am aware that this questionnaire is long and I am very grateful to you for your 
valuable time. If you require more clarity from me, I shall be glad to assist.  
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Thank you very much in advance. 
The different religions of Afghanistan  
1. The non-Muslims of Afghanistan are under-researched. Do you believe that 
different researchers from Afghanistan and from other countries must include 
the history of the Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
2. In what way do you suppose that such research must be conducted and 
disseminated? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
3. Do you believe that the education system of Afghanistan must include the 
history of the Hindu/Sikh people of Afghanistan in its curriculum?   
...................................................................................................................................... 
4. In your opinion, based on your experience and knowledge, when the Hindu and 
Sikh subjects of Afghanistan lived in Afghanistan, were they marginalised in 
society or in government? Or did they live happy lives in the midst of their 
Muslim countrymen/women?   
...................................................................................................................................... 
5. Please write the positive and negative experiences that you have lived through 
in Afghanistan.  
...................................................................................................................................... 
6. Different historical accounts point to the fact that the Sikh/Hindu subjects of 
Afghanistan contributed to the economy of Afghanistan through the import and 
export of goods. Is this an indication that they had realistic chances to prosper 
in their homeland, Afghanistan?  
...................................................................................................................................... 
7. King Habibullah Khan and Amanullah Khan embarked on the modernisation 
of Afghanistan and spearheaded legal reforms through transplanting laws from 
other countries. What contributions did the Hindu and Sikh people of 
Afghanistan make in this process? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
8. From 1747 when Afghanistan was formed, until the 1960s, Sikhs and Hindus 
performed important jobs in the government institutions of Afghanistan. How 
did they influence plans to develop Afghanistan?  
...................................................................................................................................... 
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9. Have you ever heard that the Sikh and Hindu people of Afghanistan conducted 
their customary (informal) justice matters based on their religious precepts? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
10. How did Hindus/Sikhs solve their disputes and issues if they did not want to 
avail themselves of the government court system? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
11. Do you believe that the non-Muslims of Afghanistan must be judged under 
their own religious laws? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
12. Are you aware of the Sikhs’ and Hindus’ legal culture, life and how they 
conducted their affairs when in need of justice? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
13. When in need of religious guidance that could not be obtained in Afghanistan, 
where did Hindus and Sikhs refer to? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
14. Are you happy to take part in this research? 
...................................................................................................................................... 
15. Please feel free to write your personal account of being a Sikh/Hindu subject of 
Afghanistan, and also how you have followed Afghanistan’s affairs from your 
country of domicile/naturalisation. Please write as much as you like.   
...................................................................................................................................... 
Thank you very much for your help and support. 
Jawad Hassan Zadeh 
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APPENDIX 4: TECHNICAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Women  
1. How can one obtain court statistics for Violence against Women 
(VaW) cases? 
2. How can one find the case details (nasse mahkama) for Violence 
against Women (VaW) cases? 
3. Which provinces of Afghanistan issue statistics on Violence against 
Women (VaW) cases? 
Education  
4. What is the education curriculum for the madrasas from which 
judges are recruited? Please list subjects of study. 
5. What are the names of the books studied in madrasas? Please list the 
names chronologically if possible.   
6. How do the madrasa graduate judges learn about qanun? 
7. Which courses do madrasa-trained judges study before sitting as a 
judge? 
8. What happens to judges who do not study stage qazaee? 
9. Do judges use the codified laws or do they use casuistry skills and 
their own intuition when making decisions in criminal cases?  
Transfer of cases 
10. How does the judiciary ensure that bribery does not take place when 
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Open Courts 
11. Can any member of public not related to the case sit in a criminal 
court and witness a trial?  
12. Do certain criminal court branches disallow lay witnesses to sit and 
watch the trial?  
Defence  
13. Does the defence lawyer have adequate time to prepare for the trial? 
14. What are the main problems for the defence lawyer in a criminal 
court? 
15. Do judges respect defence lawyers and give them a chance to make a 
presentation in the hearing, or is their role ignored?  
Public law 
16. How can a person bring a case against the state? 
17. If a person complains about police brutality, can that person defend 
his case? 
18. How can a litigant seek to revoke a wrongly confiscated property by 
the government?  
19. How are citizens able to seek a judicial review of an unfair 
government decision? 
20. In cases where the prosecutor and judge ill-treat a defendant, how 
can this defendant seek justice against them? 
21. Can a defence lawyer lodge a complaint against a judge or 
prosecutor?  
22. How does the government assure that people who speak different 
languages and dialects are spoken to in their mother language?  
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23. Are there trials where the judge and prosecutor speak one language 
and the defendant another language?  
24. How does the state assure that poor defendants in criminal matters 
have access to legal aid funds?  
International Fair Trial Standards and Afghanistan domestic standards  
25. How do judges assure that their decisions are based on Constitution 
2004 and the other international obligations of Afghanistan? 
26. How much have motahedul-maal directives affected trial 
procedures?  
27. How do judges apply presidential decrees with Shari’a and the other 
laws of Afghanistan?  
28. I am very grateful for your help and support.  
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APPENDIX 5: ĀQSĀQAL INFORMAL JUSTICE QUESTIONS 
 
1. How do the Turkic people of Afghanistan (Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirghiz 
and others) deal with their legal issues? Here I am particularly 
interested in the role of the elders. 
............................................................................................................................... 
2. What is Āqsāqal’s role in the delivery of informal justice?  If there 
are differences with elders of other ethnic groups, please write these 
differences.  
............................................................................................................................... 
3. How are cases dealt with from beginning to end?  
............................................................................................................................... 
4. In your opinion, what is the reason for the scarcity of information 
about Āqsaqāl in English, Farsi and Pashto? Jirga and shūrā are 
mentioned in thousands of researches, but Turkic people’s informal 
justice is not mentioned. 
............................................................................................................................... 
5. Since 1747, how has the role of Āqsaqāl grown or lost significance? 
For instance, is it due to urbanisation that Turkic informal justice is 
not researched – or are there other reasons?   
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APPENDIX 6: QUESTIONS FOR THE AIHRC 
 
1. Has an agreement been made with the Ministry of Education? What 
undertakings has been given?  
.......................................................................................................................... 
2. How successful has AIHRC been in incorporating human rights norms 
in the school curriculum?  
.......................................................................................................................... 
3. What problems have been noted on the side of the government in 
promoting human rights lessons? 
.......................................................................................................................... 
4. Have peace agreements with opposition groups affected the 
government’s undertaking in the promotion of human rights?  
.......................................................................................................................... 
5. How much has Article 3 of Constitution 2004 affected the government’s 
undertakings?  
.......................................................................................................................... 
6. Is AIHRC’s assessment of the progress of its programmes positive? 
.......................................................................................................................... 
7. Has the government been committed to its undertakings in all parts of 
Afghanistan, or have these not been implemented in the Pashto 
speakers’ curriculum? Furthermore, did some groups stop human rights 
lessons?  
.......................................................................................................................... 
8. Which programmes did AIHRC want to implement that it has not been 
able to?   
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APPENDIX 7: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ARRIVAL OF 
ARAB FIGHTHERS IN AFGHANISTAN  
 
(INTERVIEWEE: FORMER PDPA MEMBER AND GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIAL) 
1. What policies have the governments of Afghanistan pursued to 
protect Jewish subjects? 
 
2. How successful were governments in protecting them? 
 
3. Did close relations with the Nazis lead to anti-Semitism in 
Afghanistan? 
 
4. The PDPA supported Palestine. Did such support cause anti-
Semitism in Afghanistan? 
 
5. To your knowledge, when did members of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Palestinian Hizb-ut-Tairi infiltrate 
Afghanistan’s political scene? 
 
6. Were their influences connected to promoting a particular form of 
Islam or did they support the politics of a particular super-power? 
 
7. Did the new form of Islamic exegetes’ arrival in Afghanistan affect 
the Hindus and Sikhs?  
 
8. How did the PDPA promote equality between men and women and 
how did it protect the religious values of non-Muslim subjects?  
 
9. What was the reason for the growth in status of Hindus and Sikhs in 
the PDPA?  
 
10. Please add any other information relevant to the above questions.  
 
 
I am very grateful for your help and support.  
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APPENDIX 8: THE INTERVIEWEES’ DETAILS 
 
No Interview date 
and number 
Interviewee Subject of 
interview 
Objective of interview  
1 # 1 – 02.12.2019 Interviewee A The life of the Jews 
of Afghanistan  
History, religion and 
legal culture of the Jews  
2 #2 - 08.12.2019 Jack Abraham  The life of the Jews 
of Afghanistan 
Security, trade and 
education  
3 # 3 – 16.12.2019  Interviewee A Support given to 
Islamic groups by 
the governments of 
Afghanistan in the 
1970s 
Foreign religious 
groups’ entry into 
Afghanistan  
4 #4 -  30.12.2019  Jack 
Abraham  
Verification of 
information in  
books regarding 
Jewish Afghans  
Accuracy of historical 
accounts/ objectivity 
and writers’ biases 






attitudes to law and 
order  
6 #6 – 29.01.2020  AIHRC  
Interviewee C 
Human rights 
education in the 
school curriculum  
Strategies, practices and 
problems encountered   
7 #7 – 13.02.2020 Interviewee B Informal chat  Daoud Khan and PDPA 
governments  







9 # 9- 04.03.2020  Behzad 
Hakkak  
Legal questions  Procedural matters and 
legal reforms  
10 #10 – 24.03.2020 Ichawar Dass The life of Hindus 
and Sikhs in 
Afghanistan  
History, origins and 
trade  
11 #11 – 25.03.2020  Behzad 
Hakkak  
Informal chat  Legal enforcements  
12 #12 – 25.03.2020 Ziauddin 
Bozorgmehr  
Taxation  Problems of tax 
collection under 
different governments  
13 #13 – 29.03.2020  Najmuddin 
Kaviani   
The life and culture 
of people in 
Nuristan   
Kafiristan people and 
their conversion to Islam  
14 #14 – 30.03.2020  Najmuddin 
Kaviani   
History of language 
conflict  
Identity problems since 
1900 
15 #15- 05.04.2020 
and 06.04.2020  
Ichawar Dass Hindus’ and Sikhs’ 
contributions to the 
laws of 
Afghanistan  
Law and societal 
interactions in informal 
justice matters  
16 # 16 – 02.06.2020 
 
 
Aziz Rafiee  
 
Āqsaqāl informal 
justice mechanism  
 
Turkic groups’ informal 
justice system   
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APPENDIX 9: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE’S RESPONDENTS’ 
DETAILS 
 
No. Name Education level Job 
1 Mr A.  B.A., Political Science Former diplomat, currently 
self-employed 
2 Abdul Saboor Ragbar M.A., Persian Language  Student  
 
3 Mr B. B.A. Former Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, currently retired  
4 Ahmad Zia Siamak M.A., Russian language  Former deputy spokesperson 
of Hamid Karzai, diplomat, 
journalist, novelist  
5 Arzo Naubahar B.A., International 
Relations and Global 
Politics  
Integration Officer  




M.A., Ecole Supérieur 
d’Agriculture de Purpan 
Former Journalist and 
diplomat based in Tehran  
8 Asadullah Shafaee M.A., Nationalism & 
Ethno-Religious Conflicts  
Journalist, translator and 
researcher   
9 Behzad Hakkak B.A. Law, M.A., 
International Law 
AIHRC Afghanistan  
10 Besmellah Hedayat B.A. Law and Political 
Science  
Employee of the Parliament 
Administration  
11 Ehsan Qaane LLM International Law President of Afghanistan 
Analysts Network 
12 Elham Pasarlay  
 
LLB Law, LLM., Law  Trainee Lawyer  
13 Emal Viyaar B.A. Law, M.A. 
International Law 
Lawyer  
14 Mrs E. LLB Law, Legal Practice 
Course (LPC) 
Solicitor  
15 Mr F. 
 
Primary education  Unemployed  
16 Harpal Singh High School, Child 
Psychology  
Self-employed  
17 Jawad Jawid Master of Business 
Administration 
Professional Translator  
18 Kaneshka Morady B.A. Pedagogy  Self-employed  
 
19 Karim Rahim B.A. Law  Interpreter and writer  
 
20 Koroush Dehghan B.A. and M.A. 
International Politics  
M.A. Student, Birkbeck 
University of London   
21 M. Ayub Yaqubi 
 
B.A., M.A. University lecturer of law in 
Kabul  
22 Mr G. B.A. Law Retired  
 
23 Mina Gawdi BSc.  Earth & Planetary 
Sciences  
Interpreter  
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24 Mir Abas MEng. Engineering  Former diplomat,  
business owner   
25 Mr H.  M.A. Comparative Laws International Development 
Consultant  
26 Nadia Hashimi   Intermediate level literacy  
 
Unemployed  
27 Dr. Naqibullah Rasuli  Medical Doctor, M.A. 
International Development 
Management   
Former diplomat, university 
student  
28 Najibullah Rahimi  B.A., M.A.  
 
Policy Advisor and linguist  
29 Najmuddin Kaviani B.A., M.A. 
 
Former MP, researcher, 
writer  
30 Nazifa Haqpal  B.A., M.A., PhD Student 
SOAS, University of 
London 
Former diplomat at 
Afghanistan embassy in 
London, student    
31 Professor Mohammad 
Nazif Shahrani 
PhD. Anthropology  Professor at Indiana 
University, Bloomington;  
and writer   
32 Mr K. 
 
B.A. Military Officer  
33 Obaidullah Rahimi  B.A. Law and Political 
Science  
Civil servant  
34 Dr. (Mrs) L. Medical Doctor  
 
Médicines Sans Frontièrs, 
Afghanistan   
35 Dr. Sediq Hemat Medical Doctor (Military)  Former head of 
Afghanistan’s prisons  
36 Shams Sadat B.A. Journalism  
 
Owner of translation firm   
37 Zahir Mohseni B.A. Persian Literature  Former school principal,  
Radio Ketaab   
38 Professor Zaman 
Stanizai 
PhD. Philosophy  Professor at Pacific Graduate 
Institute, California  
39 Zia Afif B.A. Social Care 
 
Senior Personal Advisor  
40 Zia Bozorgmehr B.A. Law & Political 
Science  
Defence Lawyer  
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CASE PROMULGATIONS 













Number of entry: (       ) 
   
  
Date of entry: /      /  13  
   
   
Details of the judges  
Name  M. A. J.  W. M. Q. 
Surname    R. N. S.  N. K. Kh. 











Details of the parties and type of case  
Prosecutor’s 
details  
W. B. Type of 
incident  
Absence 
from duty   
Defendant’s 
details   
Q. D. son 





Police Dept.  
Defendant’s job Sergeant  Date of 
incident  
12/08/2017  
Lawyer’s details   None Reason for 
adjudication   
AWOL 
Victim’s details   None  Relation 
between 
defendant 
and victim  
None  
The case brief  The prosecutor claims the defendant was absent from duty from 
12/08/2017 until 06/04/2018. There are no exonerating documents 





-1 The defendant admits to his guilt -2 There are no leave papers or 
medical certificates. -3 The detachment’s commander has 
confirmed the defendant’s absence. The prosecutor relies on 
Section (2) Article (10) annex 1 of the Penal Code.  
Defence brief / 
or the lawyer’s 
defence  
I have been absent from duty because of family problems. I accept 
that I was absent and promise not to repeat it in the future. I ask the 
judicial panel to aid me in this matter.  
Judicial Panel’s 
Decision  
E. D. son of E. A. son of G. B. Sergeant at Koh-e-Zoor District 
Police Headquarters of Herat Province has ignored the military 
rules and decided to leave his post due to (family problems) on 
12/08/2017 and went to his home, returning after (1 year, 1 month 
and 28 days). The AWOL returned to his duty on 06/04/2018 and 
his detachment introduced him to the prosecution office. His case 
was referred to the Penal Department of Military Officers of Herat 
Civic Primary Court for legal actions.  
The judicial panel investigated the case and found that the 
defendant violated the military rules and for his AWOL exceeding 
one year, he has not produced convincing evidence. Therefore, 
based on -1 the defendant’s confession for his AWOL -2 Written 
complaint from his detachment for his absence (annex 2) of the 
dossier from 12/08/2017 until 10.10.2018 exceeding 1 year absence 
from duty.   
The Judiciary 
Supreme Court 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
Presidency of Herat Appeal Court 
Presidency of Herat Primary Court 
Head of Military Branch 
Final Court Decision Format 
Primary Court Penal Cases 
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Date 04/07/2020 place of signature of authoritative director (                    )  
Source: Supreme Court of Afghanistan, weblink: 
https://supremecourt.gov.af/sites/default/files/2020-09-10.pdf                                              
Last accessed 16 October 2020. [own translation.]  
 
  
The judicial panel confirmed the criminal action based on Section 
(2) Article (10) of annex 1 of the Penal Code. The defendant has 
not had a criminal background and has returned to his duties 
voluntarily, and the detachment needs his services; according to 
Sections (1-17 and 12) sub-section (2) of Article (213) of the Penal 
Code lenient penal measures may apply, but as the defendant has 
held public duties, based on Section (4) Article (218) of the Penal 
Code, serious penal measures apply.     
The 
promulgation  
Herewith, we the judicial panel for offences of the military 
personnel of Herat Civic Primary Court, in an open court session 
held on 06.01.2020 in the presence of the parties reached a majority 
verdict that; You  M. L. son of W. A. son of Y. M. Sergeant of 
Public Security of Kabul Province for having gone AWOL; based 
on Section (2) Article (10) annex 1 of the Penal Code, with 
consideration to Section (3) Article (211) and sub-section (4) 
Article (215) of the Penal Code must pay a cash fine of (20,000) 
Twenty Thousand Afghanis. The right to appeal is reserved for both 
parties.      
Reasons for the 
finality of the 
verdict  
The parties agreed with the verdict of the Primary Court, the 
Appellate Prosecution branch of Herat Zone also confirmed the 
verdict.   
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APPENDIX 11: CASE 2 – FAMILY AJUDICATION 
 
The case of Shirin v. Hura 
In the case of Shirin v. Hura (Decision No. 205/7.10.1971, Cassation Court 
for Civil and Criminal Affairs, Kabul), Shirin claimed that in 1964 when Hura 
was a child, she was contracted in nikāh (Islamic marriage) to him by her 
father Jamaluddin. On the 18.06.1966, that is two years later when Hura had 
attained majority, she also confirmed the marriage verbally. At this stage 
Shirin asked Hura to complete a nikāh khat (marriage certificate) but Hura 
refused to cooperate, and this, as Shirin claimed, was “due to provocation by 
Jamaluddin, and Hura’s brother Abdul Jabbar, as a result of which Hura now 
refuses to abide by her marital obligations to me”. The Primary Court of 
Jozjan province asked Shirin for a nikāh khat which he failed to produce. 
Consequently, without going into further detail, the court decided (Decision 
No. 4/27.2.1971) that on the basis of Article 5 of the 1960 Marriage Law, the 
claim could not be heard. On Shirin’s appeal, this decision was confirmed by 
the Provincial Court of Jozjan and later by the Cassation Court in Kabul. The 
Cassation Court noted in its decision that Shirin does not possess a valid nikāh 
khat required by Article 5 to prove his claim to nikāh against Hura, the result 
of which was that the lower court considered his claim non-hearable in a court 
of law. The Cassation Court, because of judicial stipulations, confirms the 
decision of the lower courts. Thus, Hura’s father and brother had no part to 
play through the proceedings as their confirmation or denial of the claim 
would be of no avail under the terms of Article 5. Yet, given the patriarchal 
and authoritarian pattern of family in Afghanistan, the guardian’s/relative’s 
influence can hardly be denied as an underlying basis of much litigation over 
child marriage. Where the alleged wife refuses to abide by her marital 
obligations, she is likely to be influenced by her guardian and close relatives. 
Shirin’s reference to provocation by Hura’s father and brother is a typical and 
yet unexpressed feature of disputes over child marriage. Such allegations, 
although unheeded by the courts, nevertheless constituted a basis of public 
concern and criticism, which was expressed in parliament and eventually led 
to the removal of the controversial Article 5 from the statute book. As borne 
out of the parliamentary debate of the Marriage Bill (later Law of 1971) 
Article 5 was criticised on the ground that it resulted in the loss of many 
lawfully married wives by their husbands merely because of the latter’s 
failure to complete a nikāh khat. A further criticism levelled against Article 5 
was that it encouraged avaricious guardians to pursue their self-seeking 
interests with impunity. They denied the nikāh of their wards with the 
assurance that in the absence of a nikāh khat, the husband had little chance of 
winning in court litigation.        
 
Source: Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, pages 114-115. 
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APPENDIX 12: CASE 3 - ABDUCTION OF A MARRIED WOMAN 
 
Courts Jurisprudence  Orders  
 
Jurisprudence Determination No. 659, dated: 20/03/1387 (09/06/2008), 
of the General Penal Dewan (Chamber) of the Supreme Court of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
 
Identification of the Attorney / Prosecutor: Alhaj Najibullah Zarenkhail, 
General Penal Prosecutor of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO)    
Identification of the accused persons (Defenders): Mohammad Hakem, son 
of --------, and Mohammad Sharif, son of ----------, resident of -------------, 
province: ---------------  
 
Type of incident: Abduction of a married woman. 
The files and papers of the aforementioned case, with reference No. 1138, 
dated: 10/02/1386 (30/04/2007), of the General Penal Prosecutor of the 
Attorney General’s Office, due to the objection of the appointed Attorney, 
has been referred to the General Penal Dewan (Chamber) for further 
consideration, and this has been registered in the receipt book with reference 
No. 923, dated 15/02/1386 (05/05/2007). 
 
Occurrence of the case (incident):  
After scrutinising the files and papers of the aforementioned case, it has been 
confirmed that Mrs Rahela married Mr Hafta Gull, son of -----, a resident of 
Kapisa Province, three years ago and the offspring of their marriage included 
a son. Mrs Rahela visited her father, Mohammad Qasim’s house, which is 
situated in the Mussahi area, to stay there for a few nights. Hakem, the 
accused person and Rahela’s cousin (her father’s sister’s son), and who is 
Mohammad Qasim’s nephew, also visited his maternal uncle, Mohmmad 
Qasim’s house. Perhaps in the past there may have been a love affair between 
the above-mentioned persons (Rahela and Hakem). On the aforementioned 
date, Hafta Gull wanted to take his wife Rahela to his home in Tagab. 
Previously, Rahela may have reached an agreement with her cousin, Hakem, 
concerning their marriage. Hakem told Hafta Gul that he wished to 
accompany them to the city. All three of them thus began their journey 
towards Kabul in a Siracha vehicle (an estate car). When they arrived in the 
city, Hafta Gull went to the pharmacy to buy some tablets (medicine), and 
during this time Hakem and Rahela manged to escape from the area. Using 
the estate car, they reached the house of Mohammad Sharif, son of -----------
--, situated in Qarabagh, in order to marry at an opportune time. Hakem left 
Rahela in Mohammad Sharif’s house and told Sharif to be careful and to 
ensure that ‘my cousin, Rahela, does not commit suicide, and I will return by 
evening prayers.’   
 
Hakem returned to Mussahi. Meanwhile, Hafta Gull thought that his wife had 
returned to his father-in-law’s house, and therefore Hafta Gull went to his 
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father-in-law’s house where he then realised that neither his wife nor Hakem 
were there. He (Hafta Gull) submitted a petition to the District Office, and 
subsequently, Hafta Gull’s father-in-law, Mohammad Qasim, and his 
nephew, Hakem, were arrested and were interrogated. During the 
interrogation, Hakem admitted his crime and stated that he had abducted 
Rahela and that she had been taken to Mohammad Sharif’s house in 
Qarabagh. Finally, with the help of the Police Command of Qarabagh, Rahela 
and Mohammad Sharif were arrested at Mohammad Sharif’s house at 3.30am 
and both were transferred to Mussahi. The accused persons admitted the 
crimes which they had been accused of. Rahela was underage and therefore 
her case was referred to the Children’s Attorney Department and the files and 
papers of the others, after completion of the interrogation, were forwarded to 
the Mussahi Primary Court for judgement.  
 
The aforementioned court arrived at a decision and following the decision, 
No. 9, dated 20/03/1385 (10/06/2006), in accordance with Article 130 of the 
constitution, the accused person was sentenced to six months of 
imprisonment, with one month of imprisonment and the remaining period, 
according to Article 161 of the constitution, which was an educational 
imprisonment. However, due to there being no justifiable reason and no 
evidence against Mohammad Sharif, according to Article 4 of the 
constitution, Mohammad Sharif was recognised as not guilty.    
 
The Penal Dewan (Chamber) of the Kabul Appeals Court arrived at decision, 
No. 635, dated: 02/09/1385 (23/11/2006), accepted and agreed with the 
decision of the Preliminary Court as it was.  
 
The appointed Attorney/Prosecutor of the Attorney General’s Office 
submitted an objection appeal to this Dewan (Chamber) and stated that the 
appeals court did not take into consideration the errors in law that were made 
by the Preliminary Court of Mussahi, and these errors were repeated and the 
same errors were made by the appeals court. Furthermore, it was stated that, 
concerning the accused Hakem, according to Article No. 424 of the penal 
code, and concerning the accused Mohammad Sharif, according to Article 
No. 339 of the penal code, both must be punished, and consequently 
demanded that this Dewan (Chamber) overturn its decision. 
 
Analysis and evaluation 
The files and papers of the case were scrutinised, and it was confirmed that 
Mrs Rahela married Hafta Gull when she was 11 years old. Rahela 
complained about Hafta Gull and his family due to their misconduct and their 
bad attitude towards her, and this situation culminated in her escaping and 
there was therefore no issue of abduction. During the interrogation and 
interview, Rahela clearly explained the situation around her escape and that 
the issues of abduction and the love affair mentioned in this case were not 
true and were baseless, and this had been fully detailed in the attorney’s 
statement. Furthermore, as per the declaration of Rahela’s father, the notion 
of a love affair between Rahela and Hakem had not been observed. Finally, 
the issue concluded in the divorce of Rahela, and also in the divorce of the 
   
 
Page 512 of 531 
 
sister of Hafta Gull. The verdict was thus issued and the decision of the Kabul 
Appeals Court was accepted.   
 
Verdict: 
We, the Judiciary Panel of the General Penal Dewan (Chamber) of the 
Supreme Court, during a meeting which was held on 
19/03/1387(08/06/2008), have unanimously arrived at the verdict in 
accordance with the guidance of Article 26 of the Structure Law, and the 
power of the courts and with analysis and evaluation of the judicial advisers, 
have agreed with the decision of the Kabul Penal Appeal’s court, No:635, 
dated: 02/09/1385 (23/11/2006). Therefore, the office of the secretariat 
should remove the case from registry and submit it to the relevant department.  
 
Source: Supreme Court of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [own translation].  
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APPENDIX 13: CASE 4 – UNDERAGE MARRIAGE 
 
Report of Final Court’s Decision   
 
The victim must not be harmed for his/her complaint as seeking this 
right is an accepted legal principle 
 
Jurisprudence Determination No. 2292, dated: 28/07/1395 (19/10/2016), 
of the General Penal Dewan (Chamber) of the Supreme Court  
 
Details of the case:  
Type of case: Underage marriage. 
Place of incident: Kandahar Province. 
Date of incident: 12/12/1394 (02/03/2016). 
Identification of the accused person: A man known as (FD). 
Occupation of the accused person: Self-employed.  
Plaintiff: A girl named (ZH), aged 13 years old.  
Relationship between the accused and the plaintiff (claimant): Father and 
daughter.  
Motivation of the case: The plaintiff’s report.  
 
Summary of the case, as stated by the investigator:  
Having studied the decisions of the courts, it is known that on 12/12/1394 
(02/03/2016), the officials of the Aurfi Police check post based in Dand 
District of Kandahar Province found a girl known as (ZH) whose feet and 
hands were chained. The police interviewed the girl.  
The plaintiff, (ZH), stated during an interview, “My mother is deceased and I 
have siblings (brothers and sisters). After the death of my mother, my farther 
organised my arranged marriage when I was seven years old to a man known 
as (MB), who in turn offered his sister as a substitute and (MB) gave his sister 
to my father for marriage. Without the performance of local traditions, I was 
then handed over to (MB) and my father married the sister of (MB). I spent 
two years at my husband’s house whilst he also had two other wives. After a 
few months, I visited my father’s house; however, being in my father’s house 
was dreary for me and I also did not want to continue living at my husband’s 
house. On numerous occasions, I escaped from my husband’s house and went 
to either my father’s house or to a relative’s house. However, my relatives 
used to hand me over to my father who would then hand me back over to my 
husband.  
 
On this occasion, I escaped to my father’s house and my father chained me 
up; I managed to break free from the chains and came to the police.”  
 
During the interrogation, the accused, (FD), who is the father of plaintiff, 
confessed to having carried out this action and stated that as he had no money 
to offer for his marriage, he had to give his underage daughter to (MB). He 
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stated, “On several occasions, my daughter escaped from my house and her 
husband’s house and so I chained her up.”  
 
Circumstance of the Case in the Courts 
1- Circumstance of the case in the preliminary court 
1-1: The prosecutor’s summary pertaining to the allegation  
Taking into consideration the contents of the case, the accused, (FD), gave 
his young daughter, who was aged seven at the time, to a man who already 
had two wives, for the purpose of marriage, and in return he married the sister 
of that man (MB). Thus, the accused had committed a crime according to the 
Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women which includes the 
arranged marriage of an underage girl.  
 
1-2: Reasons behind the allegation: 
- The admission of the accused during the interrogation, whereby he accepted 
that he had committed the crime and stated that his wife had died and in trying 
to secure his second marriage, he had offered his underage daughter for 
marriage.  
 
- Direct allegation of the plaintiff, in the presence of the local police, against 
her father.  
Taking into consideration the aforementioned reasons, the allegation against 
the accused person pertaining to Violence against Women has thus been 
substantiated. Therefore, I ask that the board of the Preliminary Court of Dand 
District sentence the accused person according to Article 28 of the Law on 
the Elimination of Violence against Women. This could help him improve as 
an individual and will further serve as a lesson for others.  
 
After the allegations of the prosecutor, the lawyer of the accused provided a 
counter defence statement, which was as follows: 
 
1-3: Summary defence of the accused  
Having read the statement of allegation submitted by the prosecutor, the 
accused person was asked how he wished to defend himself against the 
allegations that the prosecutor stated against him: whether it be written, 
verbally or through a lawyer. The accused stated that he wished to provide 
his defence personally and verbally to the judiciary board of the court, and 
stated as follows:  
 
“My daughter is bad tempered (she was suffering from nerves) and I sent her 
to the house of (MB) to teach her how to pray and to learn how to observe 
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Ramadan. After a few days, she left (MB’s) house and escaped to another 
place. In order to prevent her from escaping again, I put chains on her feet. I 
am a poor and destitute person and I did this because of my deprivation and 
because I had no other alternative. My wife was blind and I was forced to give 
my daughter (ZH) for marriage as a substitute in order that I may marry 
another. I feel ashamed about my actions. In conclusion, I ask that an order 
of not guilty be issued in my case.” 
 
1-4:  Conclusion and reasoning of the court: 
Taking into consideration the file and declaration of the accused person, it has 
been concluded that the accused person arranged for his underage daughter to 
enter into a marriage with a person who already had two wives. The accused 
stated that he did this because of his state of deprivation and because he had 
no money to re-marry. Therefore, on the basis of the above-mentioned details, 
the accused person is responsible and committed the crime according to the 
Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women as he organised the 
marriage of his underage daughter and, consequently, he must be punished.  
 
Reasons given by the court: 
1- The accused had confessed his crime and stated that he had no money and 
therefore arranged for the marriage of his underage daughter to the person 
(MB) in order to marry his sister. 
 
2- The plaintiff had stated, “My father arranged my marriage when I was 
underage to a man known as (MB) who in turn offered his sister as a substitute 
and (MB) gave his sister to my father for marriage. I escaped because of this 
dilemma.”  
 
3- The Public Health Directorate of Kandahar Province, in reply to the letter 
dated 24/12/1394 (14/03/2016), confirmed that (ZH) is 14 to 15 years old and 
her marriage to her husband took place three years ago.  
 
Thus, taking into consideration the above reasons, the crime of the accused 
person is obvious, and the following decision has been taken:  
1-5: Decision of the preliminary court: 
We, the Judiciary Panel of the Preliminary Court of Dand District of 
Kandahar Province, during a meeting which was openly held on 09/02/1395 
(28/04/2016), in the presence of both parties involved in the case, have 
unanimously arrived at the decision, in accordance with the guidance of 
Article 28 of the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women, that 
you (FD) committed a crime against (ZH) and have been sentenced to two 
years of imprisonment, commencing on 12/12/1394 (02/03/2016), and that 
the husband of the plaintiff is also to be legally prosecuted.  
 
2- Procedure at the appeals court: 
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After the issue of the Qarār (order) by the preliminary court, the prosecutor 
was not satisfied with the court order and requested that the case be referred 
to the appeals court.   
 
2-1: Summary of the objection and the reasons for appeal:  
The accused confessed his crime in having carried out this action and stated 
that he had to give his underage daughter to (MB). The daughter of the 
accused escaped from (MB’s) house and made a complaint against her father. 
The allegation against the accused person pertaining to Violence against 
Women has thus been substantiated. Therefore, the court order for 
punishment is not adequate. As such, the preliminary court order must be 
reconsidered, and I am not satisfied with the court’s decision.   
 
 
2-2 Summary of objection and response of accused  
The accused was brought from prison to a judiciary meeting and the accused 
stated that he would like to provide his reasons regarding his objection to the 
preliminary court order before the judiciary board in a verbal manner, as 
follows: 
 
“My previous wife had died; I had a few children at home and I was forced 
to marry for the well-being of my children. I therefore offered my underage 
daughter for marriage in substitution for a marriage for myself as I was unable 
to pay for a second marriage; I did this because I was desperate, and this was 
an inevitability.  
 
I now ask the judiciary board for mercy because I have no one to look after 
my family and I am a destitute and poor person.” 
 
2- 3: Conclusion and argument of the appeal court: 
Taking into consideration the contents of the case, the accused (FD) had a few 
children and his wife had died and he gave his underage daughter to a man 
for the purposes of marriage, and in return he married the sister of that man 
(MB). He took his daughter (ZH) to MB’s house although she was not eligible 
for marriage. (ZH) escaped from her husband’s house and escaped to her 
close relatives’ house and made a claim against her father in which she stated 
that she was eight years old and was given for marriage to (MB). The accused 
confessed to the crime, but stated that he had been forced to do so as his 
previous wife had died, he had a few children at home and there was no one 
to look after his children and thus he was forced to re-marry for the wellbeing 
of his children. He maintained that he therefore offered his underage daughter 
for marriage in substitution for his own marriage because he was unable to 
pay for his second marriage and he did this because he had no other 
alternative. He asked the judiciary board for mercy because he had no one to 
look after his family and he was a destitute and poor person.  
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The objection of the accused person is valid, and the decision of the 
preliminary court may be amended. We, the Judiciary Panel, have therefore 
made the following decision with regard to the accused person:  
 
Verdict  
We, the Judiciary Panel of the Appeal Dewan (Chamber) of Kandahar 
Province, during a judiciary meeting which was held in the presence of both 
involved parties on 08/03/1395(28/05/2016), and taking into consideration 
the reasons and reports, have unanimously arrived at the verdict in accordance 
with the guidance of Article 54 of the Law on the Organisation and Power of 
Courts and in accordance with the provision of Article 267  of the 
Performance of the Penal Code, and Decision No. 4, dated 09/02/1395 
(28/04/2016),   of the Preliminary Court of Dand District, you (FD), in the 
case of Violence against Women according to Article 28 of the Law on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women and in accordance with the provision 
of Article 144 of the penal code, are subject from the date of imprisonment 
on 12/12/1394 (02/03/2016) to one year of imprisonment and MB is to further 
be legally prosecuted.  
 
 
3- Process of the case in the General Penal Dewan (Chamber) of the 
Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.  
The prosecutor accepted the verdict of the appeal court, but the accused 
made a request for its conclusion. 
3-1 Summary of the objection to the conclusion  
The accused did not prepare details regarding his reason, but in the order 
issued by the appeal court he inserted his thumb impression to indicate that 
he was not satisfied.   
 
3-2 Analysis of the judicial advisors  
The interrogation papers and decision of the Judiciary Panel of the Appeal 
Dewan (Chamber) of Kandahar Province considered the aforementioned 
court decision during a judiciary meeting and arrived at Decision No. 44 on 
08/03/1395 (28/05/2016). According to Article 28 of the Law on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women, and in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 144 of the penal code, (FD) was sentenced to one year 
of imprisonment.  The prosecutor accepted the verdict of the Appeal Court, 
but the accused made a request for its conclusion and the file was referred to 
this Dewan; there was no objection in the course of the interrogation and on 
the basis of the documents and the crime of the accused is confirmed in the 
lower court. According to Article 144 of the penal code, the accused person 
is sentenced to one year of imprisonment. Although there is no mercy in the 
Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and the prosecutor 
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accepted the court’s decision, the accused rejected the decision. Therefore, 
according to the request of the accused, the decision was reviewed in 
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Organisation 
and Power of the Courts.  
 
3-3 Verdict 
The Judiciary Panel of the General Penal Dewan (Chamber) of the Supreme 
Court, during a meeting which was held on 18/07/1395 (09/10/2016), based 
on the analysis and evaluation of the judicial advisers in light of the provisions 
of Paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Law on the Organisation and Power of the 
Courts, accepted Decision No. 44, dated 08/03/1395  (28/05/2016), of the 
Penal Court of the Kandahar Province Appeal Court  in which (FD) was 
sentenced to one year of imprisonment according to Article 28 of the Law on 
the Elimination of Violence against Women and on the basis of the provisions 




The victim must not to be harmed for his/her complaint as seeking this right 
is an accepted legal principle. This principle has been accepted in Article 261 
of the Penal Performance Law. (If the appeal was made by the accused person, 
the court may reduce the punishment or may withdraw the accused person’s 
case, but it may not increase the punishment which has already been issued.)  
 
All the procedures of the judicial prosecution of the accused or guilty persons 
are related to the public order as, in general, the penal code is a matter of 
general rights. In fact, in the conclusion of a matter, the implementation of 
the correct law must be applied without taking into consideration the contents 
of the objection of the person who objected, and the decision must be 
considered in accordance with the law and the person who required its 
conclusion; there is a procedure to be dealt with, although this is in a civil 
case. In the penal code, in order to ensure fair justice, if the accused person is 
accused by the state or justice authorities, according to the requirements and 
in the interests of society, such a person should not be sentenced without 
justification. Where a judge makes a mistake, this may require amnesty and a 
reduction of the punishment will be accepted. As Prophet Muhammad stated, 
“As much as you can, avoid the punishment of Muslims. If you can, find a 
way to subsidise the issue against a Muslim.” In the event that an Imam 




Related Legislative Articles  
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Article 9 of the Law on the Organisation and Power of Courts:  
(1) The cases in general will be resolved in the courts in respect of their 
nature, quality and contents in two stages: primary and appeal. However, if 
the law allows, it may be considered in three stages or one stage. 
 
 (2) With regard to paragraph (1), the Supreme Court recommend that this 
article is only for the assurance of the correct implementation of the law and 
will consider the orders of the lower courts, according to its persistence, 
violation, abolition cancellation and change.  
 
Article 54 of the Law on the Organisation and Power of Courts  
 
The appeal court reconsiders the decision and order of the lower courts 
specified in this law and other related laws.  
 
The appeal court shall reconsider, in all circumstances, the decisions of the 
lower court and must rectify, cancel, change and approve or withdraw the 
decision in accordance with the law.  
 
Article 144 of the Penal Law: 
 
Where extenuating circumstances are present in a misdemeanour, the 
punishment shall be reduced as follows: 
 
(1) If the anticipated punishment has a minimum limit, the court in 
determining the punishment cannot be restricted by it.  
 
(2) If there is more than one anticipated punishment, the court can consider 
only one of them.  
 
(3) If no minimum punishment is fixed in the law, the court can order a cash 
punishment.  
 
Article 28 of the Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
 
If a person marries a woman who has not attained the legal age of marriage 
without considering Article 71 of the civil code, the offender, in consideration 
of the circumstances, shall be sentenced to a minimum imprisonment of not 
less than 2 years, and based on the request of the victim, the marriage shall 
be revoked in accordance with the provisions of the law.  
 
Article 267 of the Performance of the Penal Code 
 
 In the conclusion of its matter, the appeal court will take one of the following 
decisions: 
 
(1) Issue an order to verify the decision of the preliminary court; 
(2) Reject the decision of the preliminary court and issue a new order; 
(3) Amend the decision of the preliminary court;  
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(4) Rectify the decision of the preliminary court in the event that there are 
errors in the writing or incorrect figures recorded which does not have a 
material effect on the order;  
(5) Dismiss the decision of the preliminary court and refer the case to a higher 
authorised court, and issue an order regarding the rejection of the previous 
order;  
(6) Issue an order for further investigation, where there are errors in the 
documents or an investigation which affected the order.  
 
Source: Supreme Court of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. [own translation.]  
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APPENDIX 14: PROMULGATION OF SERIOUS CRIME BY THE 
ACJC 
 
Continuation: page of the verdict 
Verdict: 
We, the Judiciary Panel of the Directorate of the Preliminary Court 
responsible for the investigation of serious state corruption related crimes, 
have unanimously arrived at the following decisions, in the presence of both 
parties of the case, during a meeting which was publicly held on 02/12/1395 
(20/02/2017): 
You, Mohammad Arslan, son of Mohammad Qasim, in the matter of 
obtaining a $300 (three hundred US dollars) bribe, in accordance with Section 
1 of Article 255 of the penal law, you have hereby been sentenced to two 
years’ imprisonment and a cash fine equivalent to the amount of the relevant 
bribe.  In the case of mediation in the act of bribery for the sum of $48,000 
(forty-eight thousand US dollars), in according to Section 2 of Article 255 of 
the penal law, you have been sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and a 
fine equivalent to the amount of the relevant bribe. In the case of mediation 
in the act of bribery for the sum of $36,000 (thirty-six thousand US dollars), 
in accordance with the abovementioned article of the stated law, you have 
been sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment and a fine 
equivalent to the amount of the relevant bribe. In the matter of obtaining a 
bribe for the sum of $36,000 (thirty-six thousand US dollars), according to 
Section 1 of Article 255 of the penal law, you have been sentenced to two 
years and six months’ imprisonment and a fine equivalent to the amount of 
the relevant bribe.  Further, according to Article 158 of the penal law, you 
have been sentenced to a total of ten years’ imprisonment and a fine for the 
sum of $120,300 (one hundred twenty thousand, three hundred US dollars).  
You, Ali Mohammad, son of Abdul Ghani, and Naqibullah, son of Najibullah, 
have both been found to be involved in receiving bribes for the sum of 
$36,000 (thirty-six thousand US dollars), in according to Section 1 of Article 
255 of the penal law, and taking into consideration Article 39 of the same law, 
each of you have been sentenced to two and a half years’ imprisonment and 
a cash fine equivalent to the relevant bribe aforementioned , including the 
sum of $120,000 (one hundred and twenty thousand  US dollars) applicable 
to both you and Arslan and, according to Section 2 of Article 48 of the penal 
law, a guarantee will be applied.   
You, Naqibullah, in the matter of obtaining a bribe amounting to $400 (four 
hundred US dollars), have been sentenced, according to Section 1 of the 
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Article 255 of the penal law, to two years’ imprisonment and a cash fine 
equivalent to the amount of the relevant bribe.  
You, Ali Mohammad, son of Abdul Ghani, in the matter of obtaining a $300 
(three hundred US dollars) bribe, have been sentenced, according to Section 
1 of Article 255 of the penal law, to two years’ imprisonment and a cash fine 
equivalent to the amount of the relevant bribe.  
In total, you have been sentenced to four and a half years’ imprisonment and 
the abovementioned cash fine. According to Article 158 of the penal law, you, 
Naqibullah and Mohammad Ali, have been sentenced.  
You, Q.A. son of Alfatullah, in the matter of requesting a bribe in the sum of 
$48,000 (forty-eight thousand US dollars), have been sentenced, according to 
article 254 and Section 1 of Article 255 of the penal law, to three years’ 
imprisonment and a cash fine equivalent to the amount of the relevant bribe.  
You, Mohammad Ullah, son of Mohammad Mir, in the matter of requesting 
a bribe in the sum of $36,000 (thirty-six thousand US dollars), have been 
sentenced, according to article 254 and Section 1 of Article 255 of the penal 
law, to two and a half years’ imprisonment and a cash fine equivalent to the 
amount of the relevant bribe.  
You, Mohammad Arslan, Naqibullah and Ali Mohammad, in the matter of 
misusing powers of your employment in order to obtain the sum of $40,000 
(forty thousand US dollars) as a bribe are not guilty due to the absence of any 
legitimate reason, pursuant to Article No. 25 of the constitution, Article 5 of 
the penal executive law and Article 4 of the penal law, who is not guilty.  
You, Mohammad Bashir, son of Abdul Qoddus, according to article 381 of 
the penal law have been fined to pay the sum of 24,000 AFS in cash, and a 
1994 model Corolla vehicle as recorded in the file of the prosecution in 
accordance with Article 119 of the penal law. The sum of $1,000 (one 
thousand UK dollars) received from Arslan, Naqibullah and Ali Mohammad, 
must be returned according to Article 262 of the penal law.  
Furthermore, Ahmadzai Group must be carefully and lawfully subject to 
financial costs for re-investigation. In the event that other persons are 
identified during the course of this investigation, a case will be registered 
against them.  
 
Source: The Attorney General’s Office of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
(ACJC Tracker). [own translation.]  
COURT DATA 
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APPENDIX 15: CORRUPTION CASES REPORTED IN BULLETIN, 
BY THE SUPREME COURT OF AFGHANISTAN  
 
       SOURCE: BULETTIN NO. 118, SUPREME COURT OF 
AFGHANISTAN, PAGE 37. 
 
 
Source: Bulletin No. 118, Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 
08 October 2020, page 41. https://supremecourt.gov.af/sites/default/files/2020-
10/118/pdf   
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APPENDIX 16: SAMPLE FOR MIZĀN COURT DATA 2020 
 
Translation of Mizān number 483, dated 20 May 2020 


































03.05.2020 1 person 6 years’, 
1 person 4 years’ 
imprisonment, 

























22.03.2020 2 persons 18 
months’, 










22.03.2020 1 person 4 years’, 




















22.03.2020 1 person 6 years’, 
1 person 4 years’ 
imprisonment, 





Usurpation  2 
persons 






Usurpation  3 
persons 
25.04.2020 Each person 10 
years’ imprisonment 
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persons 














02.05.2020 1 person 12 years’, 




































Kunduz Province  
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weapon to the 
enemy  



















1 person 05.04.2020 7 years’ 
imprisonment 
   
 


















































































































1 person 04.05.2020 18 months’ 
imprisonment 
   
 
















Death due to 
accident  











Murder  2 
persons 
28.04.2020 1 person 25 years’ 
imprisonment, 




































fake banknote  
2 
persons 


















06.05.2020 1 person 3 years’ 
imprisonment, 1 
person 20,000 AFS 















06.05.2020 1 person 10 years’, 
2 persons 2 years’ 
imprisonment 
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Source: Mizān Fortnightly Publication, Supreme Court of Afghanistan                        







laceration   
2 
persons 
14.04.2020 1 person 18 months’ 
imprisonment, 













Murder  6 
persons 
10.05.2020 1 person 30 years’ 
imprisonment, 





Membership  2 
persons 







Murder due to 
kidnapping  






















Kidnapping  3 
persons  










05.05.2020 Each person 21 
years’ imprisonment  
Appeal rights are reserved by law 
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APPENDIX 17: TRANSCRIPTION OF THE CONVERSATION 
BETWEEN AN AFGHAN DIPLOMAT BASED IN GERMANY 
SOLICITING FOR BRIBES   
 
Speaker 1: Salam. Are you well? 
Speaker 2: Fine, thanks. Are you okay? 
Speaker 1: Thanks. How are you? 
Speaker 2: I am fine, thanks. I am Mohammad.  
Speaker 3: Basir, Mohammad is one of our friends. Please look after him. 
He is like my brother. 
Speaker 2: Hello. 
Speaker 1: He has told you *** he knows the problem. If you had one it 
would be better, but you do not have a Taskira. 
Speaker 2: I do not have a Taskira because I grew up in Iran. I have no 
family members left in Afghanistan. I am from Kunduz; I have no family in 
Kunduz. I do not have a Taskira. That is why I spoke to Mr Jawad. He told 
me, “7,000 Rupis.”  
Speaker 1: Yes, he under-quoted. If it was not due to him, this would cost 
no less than 10,000. Because you do not have a Taskira, I will do something 
for you ***. I will do something.  
Speaker 2: Now there is no Taskira, will you make me a Taskira? Or maybe 
you will make me a number 2? Is it a fake one?  
Speaker 1: ****? 
Speaker 2: There is a number 2 Taskira: the fake one. 
Speaker 1: I will make it myself to enable me to do this work. 
Speaker 2: Okay, 7,000 or 8,000 – or you are saying 10,000? 
Speaker 1: It is the 10,000 that I quoted.  
Speaker 3: 10,000? Before contacting you, I spoke to Mohammad; he is my 
friend. You speak to Basir yourself; agree on whatever you two would like 
to agree between you. You know better. 
Speaker 2: That is correct. There is no problem. Whatever amount is 
needed, I will borrow. But my work has to be finished in one day because 
my mother is unwell. She is in Iran. I have to visit her immediately. Where 
do you want the money to be handed to you? When do you want it? Shall I 
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come alone or with my children? We are five people: I, my wife and three 
children.  
Speaker 1: We will talk about that later; we cannot talk over the phone. Talk 
with ***; he is your contact person. I will arrange what you should do.  
Speaker 2: Berlin contact persons? 
Speaker 1: Speak to ***; he will tell you where to come and what not.  
Speaker 2: It is okay. Do you need photos for the Taskiras and the 
passports? 
Speaker 1: He will tell you all of this information. 
Speaker 3: You talk about the price and reach a fee. Mohammad, do not 
worry about this issue.  
Speaker 2: What is the final price then? 
Speaker 1: The same price that was quoted. It is not negotiable: there are 
many problems, there are several people, not 1 or 2, you know there are 
many *** in Berlin. 
Speaker 2: I know. I have recently arrived. I still have not found a proper 
job and my mother is unwell in Iran, which is why I want this work to be 
completed quickly.  
Speaker 1: Over the passage of time this will be more difficult. 
 Speaker 3: You conclude the prices and come to a mutual agreement. 
Mohammad, do not about those issues. Just agree on the price.  
Speaker 2: That is fine. 10,000 Euros, I will pay that. What else can I do? 
My mother is unwell. I agree to pay 10,000 Euros. 
Speaker 1: That is agreed. 
Speaker 3: That is okay, Mohammad; I will call you and inform you later. I 
say, “Goodbye” now. 
Speaker 2: Goodbye. 
Speaker 3: Goodbye. 
Speaker 3: Hello, Basir. This guy has driven me mad.  
Speaker 1: Do you know him? 
Speaker 3: Yes, he is from Kunduz. I do not know where he lives, but he is 
from Kunduz. 
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Speaker 1: Have you told him my name? No names are to be mentioned.   
NOTES: The word ‘Rupis’, an old currency name from Afghanistan, is used 
habitually to mean ‘money’. Depending on the location, Rupis may be used 
to mean Euros, Dollars or Pounds Sterling.  
 
Source: Social Media. 
[own translation and transcription of video.]  
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR READING MY THESIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
